Indonesia's Islamic Revolution

Kevin W. Fogg

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Indonesia's Islamic Revolution

The history of the Indonesian Revolution has been dominated by depictions of grassroots fighters and elite politicians who thought of it as a nationalistic or class-based war. In this major new study, Kevin W. Fogg rethinks the Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949) as an Islamic struggle, in which pious Muslims, who made up almost half the population, fought and organized in religious ways. Muslims fighting on the ground were convinced by their leaders' proclamations that they were fighting for a holy cause. In the political sphere, however, national leaders failed to write Islam into Indonesia's founding documents – but did create revolutionary precedents that continue to impact the country to this day. This study of a war of decolonization in the world's most populous Muslim country points to the ways in which Islam has functioned as a revolutionary ideology in the modern era.

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In Indonesia, no matter how good the research has been, I would not have made it through without the kindness, generosity, and hospitality of friends who see me as more than a researcher. Lisa Sri Dwiyana and Ali Akbar and their family have been all too good to me in Padang. Most of all, though, the Siburian family in Jakarta (and extended family spread throughout the country) have taken me in as one of their own, for which I am so grateful. The late Lydia and Victor Siburian took me in when I knew almost nothing of the country and made a home for me in Cinere. Wanda and Nelda Siburian and their families have been more wonderful to me than I deserve.

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Despite the generous help of the many people listed, many faults remain in this book. I recognize these as shortcomings on my part – please do not ascribe them to anyone else. The best way to address them here is in the Indonesian way: *mohon maaf sebesar-besarnya*.

A Note on Indonesian Names

Indonesian naming conventions are varied across the archipelago and rather difficult to navigate for those who are not accustomed to them. The names in this book are especially difficult because of spelling reforms that have been implemented in the Indonesian language, one of which took place during the period under study and not all of which were adopted into Indonesian personal names.

As a rule, all the place names presented in this book will be given according to the administrative usage in Indonesia as of 2019.

For personal and institutional names, the book will strive for the twin goals of consistency and compliance with the individual or institution's preference. Thus, H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto and Mohamad Roem will follow older spelling conventions, but Sukarno (who was notably ambivalent about the vowels used in his name) will follow modern spelling. For those whose preferred spelling changed with the reforms of the 1940s, such as M. Arsjad Th. Loebis/Lubis, the updated version will be used in the text, although the Bibliography will list authors as they appear on the publication.

Although most Indonesians do not have surnames, the footnotes and bibliography default to listing individuals by the final of their names, as is common usage in international publications on Indonesian topics. The only exceptions are those where the name cannot be sensibly reordered, such as Abu Hanifah. In the text, where individuals were more commonly known by a part of their name other than the final part (e.g., "Sjafruddin" for Sjafruddin Prawiranegara), that will be used.



Map 1 A political map of Indonesia, showing the 2019 provincial boundaries and key cities discussed in this text. Note that the Indonesian portion of the island of Papua (the current provinces of Papua and West Papua) was generally not involved in the revolution, and this territory did not become independent with the rest of Indonesia in 1949. The author expresses his appreciation to Mads O'Brien for producing this map.

Introduction

Sanwar was a young girl of sixteen when she married Anwar Jalil, a teacher of exegesis at a local Islamic school in the nearby town of Padang Panjang. She remembered it as the first day of Ramadan – the Muslim fasting month – in the year 1364 on the Islamic calendar; that was August 9, 1945 on the Western calendar. After the small village wedding, her husband kept commuting by foot to the school. A few weeks after they were married, on Ramadan 17 (August 25) "he came home from Padang Panjang and said maybe we were free. We had no radio. No one trusted the newspapers. We trusted what the leader of the school said."[1] The world's largest Muslim country had thrown off the burden of non-Muslim rule. This news of independence came to Sanwar on the authority of an Islamic scholar, at the holiest time of the year for Muslims.

This picture looks very different from the thoroughly secular nationalist affair celebrated every year in Indonesia on August 17, commemorating a proclamation by the country's first president and vice-president. When Indonesia proclaimed independence in 1945, most of the country's inhabitants learned about it during the holiest part of the Islamic calendar. Muslims gathered in Islamic schools to hear about what independence meant, and they followed their Islamic leaders into battle. Those same leaders issued instructions about the revolution as a holy war and told their followers how to treat the bodies of fallen soldiers as martyrs. In light of all this, seeing the historical moment from the perspective of the new president and vice-president in Jakarta is not enough. To fully understand the history of Indonesia's war of independence, one has to look at the religious context that colored the experience for millions of Muslims across Indonesia. In fact, it is not even enough to contrast the experience of pious Muslims at the grassroots levels with secular politicians at the center; one must also look at the struggle of

[1] Author's interview with Hj. Sanwar, Pandai Sikat village, Kab. Tanah Datar, West Sumatra, February 12, 2010.

Islamic politicians at the highest rungs of government, who made their own efforts to add an Islamic flavor to this fight for decolonization.

The struggle to liberate Indonesia from 1945 to 1949 is called the Indonesian Revolution. The territory of the former Netherlands East Indies had been occupied by the Japanese during World War II. Shortly after Japan's surrender, Indonesia proclaimed its independence. This proclamation was rejected by the Dutch (and, to some extent, their allies), who then tried through military force to reestablish their control over the archipelago. Indonesians struggled both militarily against the colonial troops and politically to set up a new state. The Dutch achieved a tenuous hold over most territory again before the United Nations forced them to the negotiating table, where they finally agreed to recognize Indonesia's independence.

As the place of Islam in the Indonesian state has been debated ever more fiercely in the last few decades, the time is ripe to re-examine the role of Islam in the birth of the nation. This book uses archival records, published sources, and a broad range of oral history material to look at Islam in the Indonesian Revolution, first at the grassroots level (in Indonesia's war of independence), then at the elite level (in Indonesia's political revolution). Doing so helps us to better understand the revolution, to document the impact that the revolution had on Muslim life in the country, and to examine the historical roots of the position of Islam in Indonesia today. Thinking more broadly about revolutions, this case demonstrates how the type of Islamic revolutionary ideology that fuels a revolutionary war on the ground differs from the Islamic revolutionary ideology put forward by elites.

Indonesia's Islamic Revolution

Indonesia's revolution was an Islamic revolution in two senses. First, looking at the war of independence, the pious Muslims who fought against the Dutch understood this as an Islamic struggle toward Islamic ends and organized themselves in Islamic ways. Thus, the change of state that took place through military struggle had an Islamic flavor for a sizable slice of participants (between one-quarter and one-half of Indonesians, judging by data about pious Muslims in the 1950s).

Second, looking at the political revolution with the establishment of a new state, there were fundamental transformations in the way that Islam affected politics and in the way that politics impacted Islamic life. These transformations caused a revolution in the practice and understanding of Islam in Indonesia, consolidating the structures to implement a state-defined orthodoxy, privileging laypeople as temporal leaders for the

Muslim community, and breaking the political unity of pious Muslims. The most prominent pious Muslim leaders in the political revolution also subscribed to a very different understanding of Islam than pious Muslim participants on the grassroots level; these leaders emphasized rationality and modernity.

"Pious Muslims" is a category of analysis drawn from Indonesian society. The Indonesian term *santri*, denoting those who are particularly devoted to prayers and other practices of Islam or who have studied in Islamic schools, has been in use (alongside other terms for this group) since at least the 1840s.[2] The *santri*, called "pious Muslims" here, have been understood as a religious bloc in Indonesian society throughout the twentieth century, intersecting with other identities such as ethnicity, class, and geographic location.[3] At the level of government, there has constantly been a group of Islamic interests active in Indonesian politics ever since independence, called by different names such as *golongan Islam*. As individuals and as collectives, these Islamic groups are understudied in the revolution, both at the level of fighters and at the level of elites.

In unpacking the dual meanings of an "Islamic revolution" for Indonesia, this book does not consider all things to be Islamic. In the colonial era, some Dutch bureaucrats believed that Indonesians saw Islam as "everything the native can identify as his own territory,"[4] and scholars of anthropology and religion since independence have sometimes taken very broad definitions of what should be classified as "Islam."[5] Such a catholic view is not particularly helpful in identifying the real religious changes of the revolutionary era, so this book takes a more limited approach based on local understandings of what constituted the Islamic religion. These understandings might be unexpected for those more familiar with modern, textual Islam in other parts of the Muslim world, and indeed there was contention even within the Indonesian Muslim community at the time about what was properly Islamic. At the grassroots level, Muslims wore amulets and recited spells as part of Islamic

[2] M. C. Ricklefs, *Polarizing Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions (c. 1830–1930)* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007), 49.

[3] For more on this bloc and its position in Indonesian society and scholarship, see Chapter 1.

[4] Anthony Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution, 1945–1950* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), 4, quoting Dutch Governor-General Idenberg to de Waal Malefijt, October 7, in S. L. van der Wal, *Het Onderwijsbeleid in Nederlands-Indie 1900–1942* (Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1963), 215.

[5] See, e.g., Mark R. Woodward, *Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989). This field of scholarship is analyzed further in Chapter 1.

practice in a way that was condemned by Western educated political elites; those same elites strove for a type of religious socialism in government as an outgrowth of their faith, but their treatises on religious socialism would have been entirely inaccessible to Muslim peasants in the fight. The standard that brings these two together is for practices to have a distinctly Islamic narrative among the participants, such that Muslims conceived of doing them as part of their religion.[6]

The story of this book is not meant to rewrite the entire Indonesian revolution nor to claim that Islam was the only or the most legitimate prism through which to view the war.[7] The revolution was sprawling and diverse, with different participants understanding it in very different ways based on their location, ethnicity, class, gender, religion, and other factors. Indeed, some of the individuals interviewed for this book did *not* see a special role for Islam in the revolution, and their accounts should be considered alongside the narratives of interviewees who did engage in the struggle through an Islamic prism. Rather than claim that all Indonesians thought of the revolution as an Islamic movement or experienced it in Islamic ways, the argument here is that a distinct but significant sector of Indonesian society participated in the revolution Islamically, and the revolution also deeply impacted the practice of Islam in Indonesia because of the political transformations it brought. Better recognition and analysis of this religious aspect of Indonesia's independence struggle should impact not only the broader vision of the revolution but also thinking on the place of Islam in Indonesia since the 1940s.

Revolution, Ideology, and Islam

Beyond its importance for the country, the Indonesian Revolution presents a major case for the comparative history of revolution, especially revolution in a Muslim context. Its size, its precedent-setting recourse to the United Nations for resolution, and its success in establishing a new state all make it important to consider.[8] This book, though, focuses on

[6] For a much more incisive, wholistic review of how to define what should count as "Islamic," see Shahab Ahmed, *What Is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).

[7] Compare Michael Francis Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma below the Winds* (New York: Routledge, 2003), which did not negate or deny secular strands of Indonesian nationalism in the early twentieth century, but exposed the equally vibrant, critically important heritage of Islamic nationalism at that time.

[8] Despite this, it oddly does not earn an index entry in John Foran, *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), unlike fifty-five other "Third World" countries that had revolutions or attempted them.

how the Indonesian Revolution can contribute to studies of ideology in revolution.

The "fourth generation" of scholarship on revolutions that emerged in the late twentieth century recognized the place of ideology, correcting the exclusive interest on structures in earlier work.[9] Recent scholarship has pointed to "revolutionary ideas as action *and* discourse,"[10] in other words, scholars should look for ideology not just in what people said about their revolutions but also in how they conducted their revolutions. This is a useful approach for Muslim contexts – bearing in mind that Islam places heavy emphasis on orthopraxy as well as orthodoxy.[11]

Islam is an obvious, though not always natural, basis for revolutionary ideology. Jack Goldstone laid out the key requirements of a revolutionary ideology thus: "(a) inspire a broad range of followers by resonating with existing cultural guideposts, (b) provide a sense of inevitability and destiny about its followers' success, and (c) persuade people that the existing authorities are unjust and weak."[12] Of these, the third is the trickiest for Islamic ideologies to accomplish; Nikki Keddie has noted how revolt is difficult to justify theologically in Islam.[13] Still, many different iterations of Islamic revolutionary ideology have been formulated to fuel movements around the Muslim world.

If this book's argument for the study of Indonesia is that a large subset of society understood the revolution as Islamic, then its argument for the comparative study of revolutions is that Islam as a revolutionary ideology is divergent – even contradictory – between the grassroots and the elite. In the Indonesian revolution, religion was key for many participants, but different religious visions were mobilized at different levels. Scholars of ideology in revolution have already noted the potential for an ideological gap between leaders and "the masses."[14] As James C. Scott said in the context of nationalism (but equally applicable to revolution), "the meaning of independence at the base of many nationalistic movements

[9] Jack A. Goldstone, "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 141, 154–156.

[10] Sune Haugbolle and Andreas Bandak, "The Ends of Revolution: Rethinking Ideology and Time in the Arab Uprisings," *Middle East Critique* 26, 3 (2017): 197. Emphasis in the original.

[11] Wilfred C. Smith, *Islam and Modern History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 20.

[12] Goldstone, "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," 156.

[13] Nikki R. Keddie, "The Revolt of Islam, 1700 to 1993: Comparative Considerations and Relations to Imperialism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 36, 3 (July 1994): 466.

[14] Jack R. Censer, *Debating Modern Revolution: The Evolution of Revolutionary Ideas* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 176.

diverged markedly from its meaning to the intelligentsia who nominally led them."[15] This book demonstrates that even when the ideology appeared rooted in the same cultural framework – in this case, Islam – it could still "diverge markedly" in action and in discourse.

This case shows the difference clearly because the revolution had two rather distinct realms: popular mobilization in the war of independence and elite jockeying in the political revolution. At the grassroots level, Indonesia's pious Muslims believed that fighting for independence was a holy war, that any victims in this fight would be Islamic martyrs, and that Islamic forms of magic would protect them and help ensure victory. Many of these beliefs were anathema to the country's political elites, who issued warnings against the proclamation of holy war and derided magic as superstitious and un-Islamic. Still, these popular visions of Islam flourished among everyday people and community-based Islamic scholars.

That revolutionary ideology – which was locally rooted, often radical, and open to the supernatural – stood in contrast to the Islamic ideas espoused at the elite level. The Islamic politicians struggling to put an Islamic stamp on independence agreed with the grassroots that freedom from the Dutch was a religious necessity. However, pious Muslims at the elite level wanted to prove that Islam was a rational religion that could form the basis of a leading state in the modern world. They created mechanisms by which orthodoxy could be defined and promoted by the state; they sought to write Islamic law into the constitution as a key feature of "Islamic-ness" – in line with Shahab Ahmed's observation that Islamic law is "a discourse *par excellence* of an educated, specialized scholarly elite"[16]; and they emphasized textual approaches to Islam, inspired by both Middle Eastern and European approaches to the religion. Islam was still central, and these politicians still had an Islamic vision in their experience of the revolution, but this vision was distinct from the one seen among nonelite Indonesian Muslims.

The divergence of discourse and actions between Indonesia's grassroots movements and pious Muslim elites in the revolution also fits into a wider historical pattern. Indeed, Indonesia in the 1940s is hardly the first modern revolution when participants on the ground had strong religious beliefs about the fight that were not shared by political leaders nor reflected in the outcome. For the Philippines, Reynaldo C. Ileto has demonstrated how grassroots ideas of the passion of the Christ colored

[15] James C. Scott, "Protest and Profanation: Agrarian Revolt and the Little Tradition, Part II," *Theory and Society* 4, 2 (1977): 241.
[16] Ahmed, *What Is Islam?*, 93.

participation in popular uprisings and the Filipino revolution.[17] In a Muslim context, Islamic actors (including *ulama* as well as pious Muslim laypeople) played a key role the Iranian Constitutional Revolution between 1906 and 1911, but the resulting state did not reflect their religious vision.[18] Even before the Constitutional Revolution, *ulama* had played key roles in the major Iranian social uprising of 1890–1892, the Tobacco Movement, where Islam was also the idiom in which they expressed resistance.[19]

For Muslims, religious action and discourse fueling revolt were not only limited to successful cases (revolutions) but also to many other uprisings and conflicts.[20] Thus, Islamic forms of resistance, protest, and rebellion formed a cultural framework to underlay the specific Islamic ideology that would rise in a particular revolutionary context.[21] This cultural framework gave birth to locally rooted, but still very Islamic, ideologies – especially as Muslims rose up against European colonialism. These ideologies often built on a long-standing tradition of millenarianism in Islam,[22] which was still visible in some parts of the Indonesian revolution, such as among the fighters of the Darul Islam movement. When resistance against European empires framed itself in terms of an Islamic struggle (ideology as discourse), this ideology mobilized the masses to participate in the fight in Islamic ways (ideology as action). This could be seen for example in Abd al-Qadir's movement in Algeria in the 1830s;[23] resistance to Russian imperialism in the Caucasus

[17] Reynaldo Clemeña Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840–1910* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979).

[18] Vanessa Martin, *Iran between Islamic Nationalism and Secularism: The Constitutional Revolution of 1906* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2013).

[19] Mansoor Moaddel, "Shi'a Political Discourse and Class Mobilization in the Tobacco Movement of 1890–92," in John Foran, ed., *A Century of Revolution: Social Movements in Iran* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 1–20; Ranin Kazemi, "'Neither Indians, Nor Egyptians': Social Protest and Islamic Populism in the Making of the Tobacco Movement in Iran, 1850–1891," PhD diss., Yale University, 2012, chapter 4.

[20] There is a strong Orientalist trope of a merciless, exclusivist, irrational practice of "holy war" being central to Islam in practice. As with so many Orientalist tropes, concrete facts about the way Muslims have historically conducted wars have been drowned in fears and exaggerations that say much more about the non-Muslims crafting these images than about Muslims. Rather than give the stereotype more attention by picking it apart in fine detail, this book presents a case study of Muslims at war from which readers can draw their own conclusions. It may, though, be useful to consider David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

[21] On the place of cultural framework undergirding ideology in revolution, see Goldstone, "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," 154–155.

[22] Keddie, "The Revolt of Islam, 1700 to 1993," 466.

[23] Benjamin Claude Brower, "The Amîr ʿAbd Al-Qâdir and the 'Good War' in Algeria, 1832–1847," *Studia Islamica* 106, 2 (2011): 169–195.

in the mid-nineteenth century[24]; or the uprising in Terengganu, Malaysia, in 1928.[25] This mode of Islamic mobilization had also been used in earlier conflicts in Indonesia,[26] such as the Java War,[27] the Revolt of 1888,[28] and the Aceh War.[29]

It was not only the grassroots ideology in Indonesia that echoed broader Islamic trends, the Islamic revolutionary ideology of the elites also mirrored developments elsewhere. Whereas Islamic revolutionary ideas had previously leaned heavily on millenarianism, in the twentieth century, elites around the Muslim world replaced such justifications with new forms of politics in a modern mode.[30] Modern forms, such as the emergence of Western-educated elites, also defined Indonesia's political revolution. The extreme case of modern innovation in Islamic politics, which eschewed not only millenarian uprising and armed revolution but also traditional territorial or ethnic nationalism, occurred at the same time as Indonesia's revolution: the creation of the state of Pakistan.[31]

In other ways, however, Indonesia provides an exceptional example. Indeed, other cases of modern revolution in Islamic countries either do not have Islamic ideology at both levels (elite and grassroots), or the ideological difference between the two levels is harder to demonstrate due to the circumstances. In many other cases of Muslim anticolonial revolutions, the Islamic ideology was not found at the elite level. In most of the Arab world, although Islamic modernism may have been a midwife to Arab nationalism, scholars herald nonsectarian local nationalisms

[24] Michael A. Reynolds, "Muslim Mobilization in Imperial Russia's Caucasus," in David Motadel, ed., *Islam and the European Empires* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 187–212.

[25] Amrita Malhi, "Making Spaces, Making Subjects: Land, Enclosure and Islam in Colonial Malaya," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 38, 4 (2011): 743.

[26] See an overview of texts that fuelled this narrative in Mualimbunsu Syam Muhammad, *Motivasi Perang Sabil di Nusantara: Kajian Kitab Ramalan Joyoboyo, Dalailul-Khairat, dan Hikayat Perang Sabil* (Jakarta: Media Madania, 2013).

[27] Peter Carey, *Destiny: The Life of Prince Diponegoro of Yogyakarta, 1785–1855* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2014), 249–251.

[28] Sartono Kartodirjdo, *The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course, and Sequel*, Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, no. 50 ('S-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

[29] Joshua Gedacht, "Holy War, Progress, and 'Modern Mohammedans' in Colonial Southeast Asia," *Muslim World* 105, 4 (2015): 446–471; Ibrahim Alfian, *Perang di Jalan Allah: Perang Aceh 1873–1912* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1987).

[30] R. Michael Feener, "New Networks and New Knowledge: Migrations, Communications and the Refiguration of the Muslim Community in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," in *New Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 6, Robert W. Hefner, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 68.

[31] Faisal Devji, *Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea* (London: Hurst, 2013), argues convincingly about how peculiar this case was in modern history.

among the elite (not Islamic ideology) for ushering in independence,[32] for example in Algeria.[33] More recently, in the so-called Arab Spring of 2011, Islamic ideology was not articulated at the grassroots. Scholars of politics have recently theorized that "many of the revolutionaries active in the Arab Spring were motivated, at least in part, by a psychological attachment to religion," drawing the connecting line between personal piety and participation in the initial protests,[34] but Islam did not appear in their discourse or actions in the revolution. In Egypt, Islamic movements were early and important players in the overthrow of the *ancien régime*, but they did not frame their protest in explicitly Islamic ways – indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood told members *not* to chant Islamic slogans in Tahrir Square.[35] Similarly, in Tunisia, Islamic groups were not very involved in the initial uprisings that overthrew the Ben Ali government.[36] Religion was also late to become a factor in the Syrian uprising that devolved into a multifactional civil war.[37] Unlike Indonesia, none of these cases of anticolonial revolution or contemporary revolt had Islamic revolutionary ideology emerging from both the grassroots and the elites.

Iran is distinct from Indonesia in other ways. Iran in 1979 is the case that has defined the category of "Islamic Revolution" in the modern era,[38] but studies of Iran have failed to differentiate the levels at which Islamic ideology functioned. Scholars have noted that diverse sectors of society fueled the revolution with a range of ideologies – many of them not religious.[39] (It is worth noting that Indonesia's revolution had a

[32] Rashid Khalidi, "Introduction," in Rashid Khalidi et al., eds., *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 7–10; Adeed Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), chapters 2 and 4.

[33] Omar Carlier, *Entre Nation et Jihad: Histoire Sociale des Radicalismes Algériens* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1995).

[34] Michael Hoffman and Amaney Jamal, "Religion in the Arab Spring: Between Two Competing Narratives," *Journal of Politics* 76, 3 (July 2014): 605.

[35] Neil Ketchley, personal communication, August 7, 2017. For a fuller study of the Egyptian case, see Neil Ketchley, *Egypt in a Time of Revolution: Contentious Politics and the Arab Spring* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[36] Anne Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia: The History of Ennahda* (London: Hurst, 2017), 130–131.

[37] Philippe Droz-Vincent, "State of Barbary (Take Two): From the Arab Spring to the Return of Violence in Syria," *The Middle East Journal* 68, 1 (2014): 33–58.

[38] John L. Esposito, *The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact* (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990).

[39] Fakhreddin Azimi, *The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle against Authoritarian Rule* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 213–214; Charles Kurzman, *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

similar diversity of ideological components, although, unlike Iran, in Indonesia's case Islam did not come out on top.) When looking at the Islamic ideology in the Iranian revolution of 1979, though, studies have focused on the vision that Ayatollah Khomeini articulated for Islamic government: *vilayat-e faqih*, or guardianship of the Islamic jurist.[40] This vision – centering on clerics, theologically intricate – must have differed from the ideology of Islamic participants at the grassroots level. However, because the revolution in Iran was not so prolonged as the Indonesian one was, or because the all-encompassing state discourse of the Islamic Republic has overshadowed and overwritten grassroots Islamic discourses, the divergence of Islamic ideology in the Iranian case has not received thorough attention.

The Indonesian Revolution, then, provides a case study in revolutionary ideology where Islam was used both at the grassroots and elite levels, but in divergent ways. Documenting how Islam functions as an ideology at each level and the contradictions between the two levels opens the possibility for better understanding of Islam as a political ideology in various contexts. The fact that the leaders and the masses deployed Islam differently does not make either version of revolutionary ideology less Islamic – on the contrary, Shahab Ahmed has noted that throughout history "Muslims made themselves Muslims, thought of themselves as Muslims, and lived as Muslims in quite contrary ways."[41] It should not be surprising that pious Indonesian Muslims saw the revolution in different ways as an Islamic struggle, and yet this point has not been argued before and also goes against the main currents of Indonesian historiography and popular memory of the revolution today.

Revising the Historiography of Indonesia's Revolution

Mohammad Natsir, a leading Islamic politician in Indonesia for the first decades after independence, and a key figure in this book, attended an exhibit in Jakarta in 1972 about the Indonesian Revolution. He and his Muslim activist colleagues walking through the exhibit were aghast that the Islamic side of the revolution was nowhere to be found in the displays. One of them even ran back to his house quickly to pick up a

[40] Ruhollah Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*, Hamid Algar, trans. (Berkeley, CA: Mizan, 1981).
[41] Ahmed, *What Is Islam?*, 102.

book about Aceh (the northern tip of Sumatra) during the revolution so there would be *something* in the display about Muslim contributions.[42]

This anecdote is characteristic of the Indonesian historiography of the revolution. Those aspects that fueled the later regimes' legitimacy narratives – mostly the personal cult of Sukarno or the army's prestige as guardians of independence – received thorough attention, while other actors were forgotten.[43] In this way, much like the Filipino revolution fifty years earlier, "scholarship on the revolution has actually domesticated a subject matter which, in itself, ought to be strange and full of surprises, a product of a different time and sociocultural milieu."[44] The tilt toward proregime, domesticated stories of the revolution can even be seen in the personal memoirs that got published about the revolution in later years, which were most often by military figures,[45] or figures close to the regime.[46] Overall, Indonesian accounts since the 1960s have emphasized the vision of nonsectarian Indonesian independence with its current borders and constitutional structure.

In that same time span, though, scholars – especially non-Indonesians – have pointed more and more to the diverse experiences of the revolution that depended on the position and positionality of participants. One early wave focused on local experiences of the revolution and how the narratives might or might not connect with national experiences.[47] Another deep vein has been to document the leftist or labor struggles in the revolution and their alternative visions for

[42] Mohammad Natsir, foreword to M. Zein Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1980), 13.

[43] Mestika Zed et al., *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah*, vol. 6 "Perang dan Revolusi" (Jakarta: Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 2012); See also the New Order–era histories of the revolution by province, e.g., Pasifikus Ahok, Slamet Ismail, and Wijoso Tjitrodarjono, *Sejarah Revolusi Kemerdekaan (1945–1949) Daerah Kalimantan Barat* (Pontianak: Kanwil Depdikbud Provinsi Kalimantan Barat, 1993).

[44] Reynaldo C. Ileto, "History and Criticism: The Invention of Heroes," in *Filipinos and Their Revolution: Event, Discourse and Historiography* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1998), 214.

[45] Suhario Padmodiwiryo, *Revolution in the City of Heroes: A Memoir of the Battle That Sparked Indonesia's National Revolution*, trans. Frank Palmos (Singapore: Ridge Books, 2016); A. H. Nasution, *Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, 11 vols. (Bandung: DISJARAH-AD, 1978–1991).

[46] Roeslan Abdulgani, *Api Revolusi di Surabaja* (Surabaya: Ksatria, 1961); Ali Sastroamidjojo, *Milestones on My Journey*, C. L. M. Penders, ed. (St. Lucia: Queensland University Press, 1979); John Coast, *Recruit to Revolution: Adventure and Politics during the Indonesian Struggle for Independence*, Laura Noszlopy, ed. (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2015).

[47] John R. W. Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945–1946: A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution* (Ithaca, NY: Modern Indonesia Project of Cornell University, 1964); Audrey Kahin, "Struggle for Independence: West Sumatra in the Indonesian National Revolution, 1945–1950," PhD diss., Cornell University, 1979;

Indonesia's future.[48] Dutch historiography has focused on the experiences of Dutch participants and the debate over the Netherlands' strategy in the war.[49] Mary Margaret Steedly has made a particularly impressive recent contribution by chronicling a triply marginal demographic: Christian women far from the political center. Although less connected to any given ideology of the struggle, her work again shows the fundamental disruption of society and the transformative changes that came out of the Indonesian revolution.[50]

While there are some excellent works on specific local Islamic movements, like Chiara Formichi's fine-grained analysis of the Darul Islam movement in West Java and its leader Kartosuwirjo,[51] the community of pious Muslims as a whole has not received attention as a nationwide category of analysis. With a wider, national lens, it becomes possible to see how many Islamic elements of the revolution were not limited to one local area but were rather common experiences in several different regions. The first part of this book, looking at Islam in the war, changes current understandings of Muslims in the revolution by connecting broadly across the whole archipelago and by examining previously marginalized aspects, like Islamic magic, to get a fuller sense of how pious Muslims at the grassroots were fighting for independence.

Audrey R. Kahin, ed., *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution: Unity from Diversity* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1985); Robert Cribb, *Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945–1949* (Jakarta: Equinox, 2009 [1991]); William H. Frederick, *Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989); Audrey Kahin, *Rebellion to Integration: West Sumatra and the Indonesian Polity, 1926–1998* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999); Robbie Peters, *Surabaya, 1945–2010: Neighbourhood, State and Economy in Indonesia's City of Struggle* (Copenhagen: Asian Studies Association of Australia in Association with NIAS Press, 2013).

[48] Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944–46* (Singapore: Equinox Press 2009 [1972]); Jafar Suryomenggolo, *Organising under the Revolution: Unions and the State in Java, 1945–1948* Kyoto CSEAS Series on Asian Studies 9 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2013).

[49] J. J. P. de Jong, *De Terugtocht: Nederland en de Dekolonisatie van Indonesië* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2015); H. W. van den Doel, *Afscheid van Indië: De Val van het Nederlands Imperium in Azië* (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2000); and most controversially, Rémy Limpach, *De Brandende Kampongs van Generaal Spoor* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2016). See also the reflection on Dutch violence in Bart Luttikhuis and A. Dirk Moses, eds., *Colonial Counterinsurgency and Mass Violence: The Dutch Empire in Indonesia* (New York: Routledge, 2014) and the ongoing research project at KITLV, "Nederlands militair optreden in Indonesië, 1945–1950," www.kitlv.nl/nl/research-projects-dutch-military-operations-in-indonesia/ (accessed July 19, 2017). Many thanks to Simon Boeke for helping me to navigate this literature.

[50] Mary Margaret Steedly, *Rifle Reports: A Story of Indonesian Independence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).

[51] Chiara Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation: Kartosuwirjo and Political Islam in 20th Century Indonesia* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012).

Not all studies of the revolution are concerned with grassroots experiences of the war, though. The high-level politics of Indonesia's revolution have also been covered extensively by scholars both inside and outside Indonesia.[52] The political aspect of the revolution was crucial to the actual achievement of independence. George McT. Kahin's foundational study leaned more toward political and diplomatic developments over military ones,[53] in keeping with Robert Cribb's analysis that the revolution was really "a long, fractious ceasefire punctuated by brief bouts of heavy fighting."[54] Previous studies have looked at the intense diplomacy at work around the world to achieve Indonesia's independence through the intervention of the United Nations,[55] the struggles in Indonesia's nascent parliament,[56] or the stories of the regional states set up by the Dutch.[57] There have even been previous treatments of Islamic politics during the Indonesian Revolution,[58] but they have missed several of the key ruptures as well as some of the mechanisms that brought change for Islamic politics in Indonesia.

Focusing specifically on the Islamic politics of the revolution leads to different conclusions from previous studies. In some ways, this connects to the previous work of Micahel Laffan, who documented the rise of Islamic ideas of nation among Indonesians from the late nineteenth century while under Dutch colonialism,[59] or contributes to M. C.

[52] One key overview that sought to balance the politics of the time with the experience of fighting on the ground was Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*.

[53] George McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952).

[54] Robert Cribb, "Legacies of the 'Revolution,'" in David Bourchier and John Legge, eds., *Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s* (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), 75.

[55] The classic studies of diplomacy focusing on the United Nations (characterized by Alastair M. Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations* [London: Stevens & Sons, 1960]) or very partisan and personal views (e.g., Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*; Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945–1965* [The Hague: Mouton, 1973]) can now be supplemented with more global views. See especially Samuel E. Crowl, "Indonesia's Diplomatic Revolution: Lining Up for Non-Alignment, 1945–1955," in Christopher E. Goscha and Christian F. Ostermann, eds., *Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945–1962* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press and the Woodrow Wilson Center, 2009), 238–257.

[56] Deliar Noer and Akbarsyah, *KNIP: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, Parlemen Indonesia 1945–1950* (Jakarta: Yayasan Risalah, 2005).

[57] The best documented is the State of East Indonesia, the most successful puppet state set up by the Dutch; see Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Dari Negara Indonesia Timur ke Republik Indonesia Serikat* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1985).

[58] E.g., B. J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971); Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945–1965* (Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1987).

[59] Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia*.

Ricklefs's magisterial, longue durée narrative of the trend toward a new, textual orthodoxy among Javanese Muslims,[60] but a focus on the Indonesian revolution allows challenges to their arguments, too. The revolution gave rise to a new kind of leader for Islamic politics, not just Mohammad Natsir (who has been so well documented by the work of Audrey Kahin)[61] but a wider group of Western-educated "Islamic socialists" who took the movement in new directions. This book looks at Islamic politics during the revolution specifically to highlight the rapid and significant changes that took place in these four-and-a-half years that realigned previous politics in the archipelago and the later trajectory of Islamic politics, as seen in work by Rémy Madinier and others.[62] These changes set revolutionary precedents that continue to impact Indonesian politics today.

Finally, by setting the divergent experiences of the grassroots and the political elites side by side, this study of the revolution shows one of the great weaknesses of Islamic politics in the mid-twentieth century. Islamic politicians had an understanding of religion in the revolution that stood in contradiction with the Islamic ideology of the pious Muslim grassroots. Linking these two sides, the nationwide fight for independence from a non-Muslim foreign power and the struggle in the halls of power to imprint Islam in the new state, points to a misalignment in the pious Muslim community that undermined the struggle for a more Islamic Indonesia after the revolution.[63]

Sources and Challenges

To make the case that pious Muslims in Indonesia understood the revolution as an Islamic struggle, this book brings to bear different types of evidence. The events and the environment of the times are challenging to document because of the wartime circumstances, and it is particularly

[60] For the twentieth century, this is argued in M. C. Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java, c. 1930 to the Present* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012).

[61] Audrey R. Kahin, *Islam, Nationalism and Democracy: A Political Biography of Mohammad Natsir* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012).

[62] Rémy Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Masyumi Party between Democracy and Integralism*, trans. Jeremy Desmond (Singapore: NUS Press, 2015).

[63] The later debate over a more Islamic state has been a major theme for scholarship on Islam in Indonesia; see, among others, Andrée Feillard and Rémy Madinier, *The End of Innocence? Indonesian Islam and the Temptations of Radicalism*, Wong Wee, trans. (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011), especially chapter 1; Carool Kersten, *Islam in Indonesia: The Contest for Society, Ideas, and Values* (London: Hurst, 2015), especially chapters 3 and 4; and Jeremy Menchik, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), especially chapters 4 and 5.

difficult to capture the grassroots experience because the majority of Indonesia's population in the 1940s was illiterate, so they did not leave behind written sources. However, triangulating from archival, published, and oral sources, a picture emerges of different Muslim experiences of revolution that diverged from the dominant, secular nationalist narrative.

The archival sources that remain are most complete for society's highest elites. To document political developments, the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia) has the most extensive collections from the revolutionary government. These archives speak to governmental decisions and aspirations, although it is clear that many of the ideas in these documents were proposed but never implemented, and the reports that reached the political center were limited by a lack of information from the regions. To complement this, there are several regional government archives in Indonesia (the collections from Aceh and South Sulawesi are particularly strong) that have limited documentation from the revolutionary period. Some personal papers or private collections from the time have also been incorporated as evidence.

Printed materials were used to complement these archival sources, both materials produced by the government and the many published by private interests. These have been collected in major research libraries in Singapore, Jakarta, North America, and the United Kingdom, and they show how politicians, religious leaders, and public intellectuals saw the revolution. The fact that these materials were printed does not mean that they necessarily captured the zeitgeist of revolutionary Indonesia, but they are often the best window into the ideas that circulated among the Muslim community. Some of this printed material certainly became the basis of sermons or public discussions that reached larger numbers of people than just their print circulation;[64] for other material the circulation and reception remain unclear. The documents that took the form of religious instructions, like juridical rulings that all Muslims must join the fight, were designed to be repeated in large religious gatherings and spread further by word of mouth. There were also plenty of accounts published after the revolution by participants, documenting their experiences – but even those cannot be taken as fully representative of the various kinds of participants.

[64] See Amiq, "Two Fatwas on Jihad against the Dutch Colonization in Indonesia: A Prosopographical Approach to the Study of Fatwa," *Studia Islamika* 5, 3 (1998): 87–89, 94–97 for an example of circulation of texts and ideas between orality, print, and public discussion.

Bearing in mind that most Indonesians at the time were illiterate, this book also looks beyond printed sources to integrate oral history.[65] More than eighty interviews were conducted between 2006 and 2017 with Indonesians who directly experienced the revolution, as well as dozens more interviews with people born later who were children and students of Islamic leaders from that time, across twelve of Indonesia's current provinces.[66] The oldest respondent was born in 1908 (the oldest woman interviewed was born in 1916), and any specific oral history data used in the book comes from those born before 1930, mostly from those who were in the age range of 15–23 at the start of the revolution[67] – the prototypical age of people joining militias, setting up public kitchens, or leaving their Islamic schools to take part in this movement.[68] Even though many of the interviews are not quoted or cited directly in the book (only those interviews that provided a specific piece of data appear in footnotes), all of them have informed its perspectives.

Of course, the oral histories are also affected by their era. Those interviewed for this project spoke in the context of a democratic and open Indonesia, with Islam undergoing a kind of conservative turn in the country,[69] but also in the context of a global war on terror framed largely against Islamic radicalism. In 2006 or 2010, not to say after the emergence of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, openly advocating for an Islamic state in Indonesia was very politically dangerous, and no respondents were pushed to explicitly endorse or evaluate that political ideology because of the personal jeopardy it could have brought to them,

[65] The book additionally makes use of the oral histories held in the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia with political leaders, but these can be considered to have more in common with the other archival materials. They reflect the political elite, rather than everyday participants.

[66] Ethics approval for these interviews was received from Yale University in the course of my doctorate, but I have also received research permits from the Indonesian state: Surat Izin Penelitian No. 5351/SU/KS/2005, Surat Izin Penelitian No. 231/FRP/SM/X/2009, Surat Izin Penelitian No. 0036/EXT/SIP/FRP/SM/VII/2010 (Perpanjangan I), and Surat Izin Penelitian No. 244/SIP/FRP/E5/Dit.KINII/2016.

[67] As noted previously, I have interviewed a much wider range of individuals who witnessed the revolution as children or who related stories from their parents, siblings, or teachers from the revolutionary period. These individuals have not been used as central primary sources for any points in this book, but where their accounts influenced my general thinking they are also listed in the appendix that gives the names, dates of birth, and locations of interview for all oral history informants. The sample is roughly one-fifth women (slightly higher for those born in 1930 and before).

[68] See also Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, xiii and 4–5, whose observation about the important role of youth is equally true for the pious Muslim community.

[69] Martin van Bruinessen, ed., *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the "Conservative Turn"* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2013).

their families, or their communities.[70] Instead, the types of associations joined, the way community efforts for the war were organized, and the leaders taken up by the local community all form clear and specific points of evidence, alongside the available written sources, supporting a distinctly Islamic experience of and ideology for the revolution – in action and discourse.

The interviews did not reflect any sort of consensus Islamic narrative by modern-day Indonesia Muslims, cast back over the Indonesian revolution. As Mary Margaret Steedly has shown, the dominant narrative that has been adopted in society is generally focused on the triumphalism of the Indonesian army in achieving freedom, and the normative narrative for participants is one in which the participant emphasizes the kind of activity that would help to qualify for a veteran's pension.[71] Such a government-interest-inflected narrative was loosely present in some interviews conducted for this book, although by 2006 all were resigned to whatever their veteran status was. Instead, the interviews consistently showed a strong concern with local events; respondents in each area asserted that the struggle in their region had been the fiercest, the most true to the spirit of Indonesian independence, or the most important. They also spoke about the religious side of their experiences without any particular idea of how Islamic groups were functioning in other regions, besides a few famous episodes like the NU *fatwa* of October 1945. From these varied narratives, the book relies on patterns and repetitions – features that appear in multiple areas or that connect oral histories to documentary sources – to construct an image of what the pious Muslim side of the revolution was like.[72]

Many other authors, from tenured professors to budding history students, have previously written about the revolution using ephemera or

[70] Notably, the mood on this had changed somewhat by 2019, when many public figures were flirting with the idea of a more Islamic basis for Indonesia. However, because of the political concerns involved when the bulk of the interviews were conducted between 2006 and 2012, asking for such an explicit evaluation of the idea of an "Islamic state" for Indonesia would have both been unethical and unreliable – informants' responses would have been much more colored by their views on the subject from the intervening decades rather than at the time of the revolution. The focus on finer details sidesteps the issue. It is worth emphasizing here that none of the respondents in their interviews articulated or advocated a vision of Indonesia at odds with the current state, and Indonesian authorities have no reason to question the patriotism of any informants; it was clear in the oral history interviews that all of them love their country.

[71] Steedly, *Rifle Reports*, 9, 56.

[72] In this, the book comes down more on the side of using oral history interviews as "documents" rather than "texts." Cf. Linda Shopes, "'Insights and Oversights': Reflections on the Documentary Tradition and the Theoretical Turn in Oral History," *Oral History Review* 41, 2 (2014): 257–268.

oral history interviews that are not readily available; when warranted and after some scrutiny, their evidence is included alongside other primary source materials in this book. Although the argument here diverges on several key interpretive points from some prior accounts that provide kernels of data, specific historical facts can still be accepted as valid, and many of those facts support the interpretation of this book, that Muslims could experience the revolution as an Islamic struggle and that Islamic politics transformed over the course of the revolution.

Another challenge when writing on Indonesian history is the size and diversity of the archipelago. Studies are rarely able to capture the entire country, although for such a national moment as the revolution a national scale is worth attempting. To make the case that there was a category of experience and an ideology of struggle throughout all Indonesia that was Islamic, the book pulls from sources that discuss many different regions. This is not intended to cherry-pick cases, but rather to show commonalities and connections between local Islamic communities from various islands and ethnicities, fueling an analysis of where and when pious Muslims shared key ideas and experiences, despite their range of ethnicity, class, and location. Because documentary sources on Indonesia overrepresent Java, the book takes extra care to integrate less populated areas outside of Java so as to demonstrate the nationwide scope of the argument.[73] Even though fighters in all these diverse regions were not in direct communication throughout the revolution, they had similar Islamic ideas about the cause, imagined Indonesia as a unitary nation, and had parallel experiences and Islamic revolutionary ideology at the grassroots level. The commonalities found across different communities in different geographic regions are also taken as evidence of certain common (if not shared) experiences among Indonesia's Muslim community fighting for independence.[74]

Outline of the Book

This book examines the Islamic nature of the Indonesian revolution in two parts. To set up the different realms of revolution, the first chapter

[73] The exception to this rule is Papua, which did not have a revolutionary experience along the lines of the rest of Indonesia and did not become a part of independent Indonesia at the conclusion of the revolution. The modern-day Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua are not included in this study.

[74] Here, as with the oral histories mentioned previously, the focus on specific details – for example, looking at individual examples of fatwas issued during the revolution – is used as a guard against the potential that these cases appear similar because of a convergence of collective memory.

lays out the nature of Islam in Indonesia and the developments in Indonesian Muslim society in the first half of the twentieth century. Part I of the book then makes the case for an Islamic revolution at the grassroots, discussing how Muslims participated in Indonesia's war of independence. Part II discusses revolutionary changes in Islamic politics, seeing how pious Muslim elites engaged with the political revolution. Both are divided into short chapters on targeted subjects or specific moments, designed so they can be read as excerpts or pulled into comparative studies with other cases.

Part I: Islam in Indonesia's War of Independence

The first part of the book discusses the ways in which grassroots participants fighting for Indonesian independence understood and conducted their fight as an Islamic one. At this level, the war of independence felt like an Islamic revolution for Muslims on the ground because they believed they were fighting for a religious goal and they participated in the fight in Islamic ways.

This part begins with a look at the explicit instructions from Islamic leaders to participate in the fight because this discourse provides the clearest signs of why Muslims supported the revolution. From common battle cries to the flood of fatwas describing Indonesia's revolution as a holy war, Muslims heard that the struggle was incumbent on people of faith and that those who died would be martyrs. A particularly deep exposition of the Islamic approach to the war effort was written by M. Arsjad Thalib Lubis. These Islamic calls to action demonstrate the rhetoric that justified the fight as an Islamic revolution.

In response to those calls, Muslims organized themselves to participate in the revolution using specifically Islamic channels: Islamic militias and Islamic organizations contributing under the leadership of Islamic clerics. The most famous militias were Sabilillah and Hizbullah, associated with the Islamic political party Masjumi, and they were often better equipped than the official army units in their provinces. The incorporation of mass Islamic organizations as mobilization for participation in the revolution also convinced the many members of these organizations that the struggle was an Islamic one.

Although mass Islamic organizations were the primary guardians of Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia, this does not mean that all Muslim participation in the revolution aligned with modern ideas of textual Islam. In the revolution, many practices that would be rejected today were considered Islamically mainstream and acceptable. This was manifested in the magical forms – understood by their practitioners as

Islamic – that were used in the revolution by pious Muslims, including amulets and trances. The use of Islamic magic promising invisibility, supernatural strength, or imperviousness to bullets not only showed the type of grassroots Islam that was fueling the revolution but it also came with serious consequences for Muslim militias like fearlessness and high casualty rates.

One key aspect of the fighting on the ground during the revolution was the conflict between different sectors of Indonesian society. In Indonesia, this has become known as the social revolution, and it included both randomized acts of terror and systematic efforts to reorganize power in society – especially efforts to place greater power in the hands of Islamic leaders. Muslims rose to power in many areas, but mostly found themselves unable to protect those gains after the revolution ended. The greatest exception to this rule was in Aceh, at the northern end of Sumatra, which was the most thorough and successful social revolution in Indonesia's war of independence. Another important episode in the war, the Madiun Revolt led by Communist forces, can be seen as competing social revolutionary efforts by leftist and Islamic interests.

Finally, the most prominent Islamic movement to emerge within the Indonesian revolution was called "Darul Islam," a group in West Java that later went into rebellion against the Indonesian state. Part I will conclude by showing how similar Darul Islam was to the experience of other Muslims fighting for Indonesian independence: it also had Islamic calls to action, organized itself in Islamic ways, utilized Islamic magic, and engaged in violence targeted at other Indonesians. Rather than be seen as an exceptional movement, Darul Islam should be seen as just the most extreme end of the spectrum of Islamic revolution in Indonesia; the most exceptional aspect of the movement was its leader.

Part II: Islam in Indonesia's Political Revolution

Part II of this book shifts the focus to the struggle of Muslims in the political realm, to look at how changes in politics both inside and outside the Islamic community transformed religion in Indonesia. Although the setting for this part of the story is the political revolution that took place in Indonesia with the establishment of an independent state, Indonesian Islamic parties did not achieve their most revolutionary goal: reorganizing the state along religious lines. Islamic politicians were centrally involved in setting up and running the new government, but the concessions to Islamic interests were limited to specific areas. Instead, looking at the political revolution can show the nature of elite Islamic ideology and uncover the ways in which the structural transformations of this

period contributed to the longer-term revolutionary changes in the understanding and practice of Islam in Indonesia.

The political revolution began with a failed effort to insert Islam into the new country's constitution. A select committee from the greater body writing the constitution agreed on a compromise formulation that would have made "belief in God with an obligation to follow Islamic sharia for its adherents" one of the founding principles of Indonesia. This compromise, known as the Jakarta Charter, fell apart within a day of the proclamation of independence, a near miss that left the constitution without any references to Islam. The failure showed the limits of political Islam in Indonesia at the start of the revolution.

In response to that failure and to changes in political life, Muslims wanted to organize themselves to better assert their interests in politics. This led to the creation of an Islamic party, Masjumi, in November 1945. The leadership of the party tilted toward laypeople who had previously been active in politics and toward younger Muslim activists; older clerics were put on a special advisory board and Islamic organizations were recognized with "extraordinary membership" status. The structures of this party set precedents for Islamic politics that are still seen to this day.

A crucial early victory for Islamic politics was the establishment of a Ministry of Religion, a bureaucratic space in which Muslims could hold positions and shape both government and society. Although there had been some colonial Dutch and Japanese precedents for religious bureaucracy, the new ministry was important both for the prominence and independence it gave religious issues and the opportunities it opened up for Islamic clerics who were not qualified to work in other parts of the government.

In contrast with the traditionally educated Islamic clerics who won a victory with the new Ministry of Religion, within the Masjumi party a group of young, Western-educated leaders was ascendant. They identified themselves as "Islamic socialists." Their ideology pulled on both European political ideas and Islamic morals to craft a vision of a strong democracy functioning within the limits of Islamic law to promote economic and social justice. This group and the peculiar nature of its rise – with support from socialists outside the Masjumi party – must be understood to grasp the direction of Islamic politics in the revolution and afterward.

The unity of Masjumi as a political vehicle could not withstand the chaos of the revolution, however, so two chapters discuss the regional parties that emerged and the split of a rival Islamic party, PSII, from within the body of Masjumi. The regional parties were primarily the result of the poor communication between regions during the revolution

and the lack of widespread knowledge about politics at the center, but one of the parties – Perti from the west coast of Sumatra – survived as a party past its revolutionary roots. The split of PSII, however, was driven only marginally by regional interests, and was largely a result of factional politics within Masjumi. Both cases, though, set important precedents for the split of Islamic political interests, another phenomenon seen in Indonesia to this day.

The final chapter looks at a subject that is ostensibly part of the political revolution, but has many characteristics of the Muslim participation in the war of independence. Diplomacy to secure recognition for Indonesia's independence by other sovereign states was initially conducted in the Middle East by Muslim activists who truly believed this was an Islamic struggle. Their important contributions to Indonesia's first formal foreign relations – all with Arab states – have been largely forgotten, but show that Islamic understandings of the Indonesian revolution were not limited to isolated militia groups in the archipelago.

In the conclusion, the chronicle of many later instances where Muslims spoke about the Indonesian Revolution in Islamic ways points again to why this perspective must be evaluated. To complement this, one can also see the important, ongoing impacts of the revolution on Muslim social and political life in Indonesia. Islam in Indonesia as it exists today is a result of key changes that happened during the revolution.

1 Islam in Indonesia before the Revolution

Indonesia today is the world's fourth most populous country and the country with more Muslims than any other. As of the 2010 census, Muslims made up roughly 87 percent of Indonesia's population,[1] and national leaders estimated a similar percentage of Muslims around the time of independence.[2] Muslims have been present in the archipelago for centuries, and Islamic sultanates were established on Sumatra as early as the thirteenth century of the common era,[3] but the early twentieth century was a time of particularly important and particularly rapid change for the Muslim community. In part, this was because they were all under the colonialism of the Netherlands and then (briefly) Japan, tying together thousands of islands in a way they had not been politically united before. In other ways, the religious changes in Indonesia in the decades before the Indonesian revolution were the result of transnational forces within Islam, leading to theological reform and modernization, new ways of organizing the Muslim community, and new ideas about the future of that community.

This chapter introduces Islam in Indonesia and the upheaval of the early twentieth century to readers who do not have a solid grounding in the transformations that were taking place. This provides context against which to recognize some continuities and major changes that took place during the revolution. The basis for the changes of the early twentieth century were the long-standing institutions of Islamic life in the archipelago: scholars and schools. Change came first in the different approaches

[1] Badan Pusat Statistik, "Penduduk Menurut Wilayah dan Agama yang Dianut," http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=321&wid=0 (accessed July 21, 2017). Yearly surveys in between decennial censuses in Indonesia do not provide detailed statistics on religion.

[2] Abu Hanifah, *Soal Agama dalam Negara Modern*, 2nd ed. (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1950), 21–22.

[3] Alexander David Robert Wain, "Chinese Muslims and the Conversion of the Nusantara to Islam," DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2015, chapter 3, "Samudera-Pasai"; cf. Michael Laffan, *The Makings of Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the Narration of a Sufi Past* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), chapter 1.

to religion that divided the Muslim community. Three subsequent trends brought more lasting impact: the birth of modern organizations, the rise of a new orthodoxy, and the participation of the Muslim community in politics. In the early 1940s, life in the archipelago was sharply disrupted by the Japanese occupation during World War II, but this occupation also set up the position of the Muslim community in the revolution.

Islam in Indonesia at the Turn of the Twentieth Century

Although the Dutch were active traders in the Indies from the late sixteenth century and engaging in explicit territorial colonialism from the early nineteenth century, it was only just after the turn of the twentieth century that they solidified their claims to all the territory of the Netherlands East Indies, which would later become independent Indonesia.[4] For Muslim communities, the political changes were important, but the key institutions of Islamic life showed broad continuity from the nineteenth century into the early twentieth. These institutions were Islamic leaders and Islamic educational institutions.

Islamic leaders were a staple of village life in every Muslim village in the Indonesian archipelago. The terms for local Islamic leaders varied with the various ethnic groups across the archipelago: *teungku* in Aceh, *syekh* in West Sumatra, *kyai* on Java, *tuan guru* on Lombok, *anrong guru* in South Sulawesi, and many others.[5]

Religious leaders served multiple purposes in an East Indies village. They provided education for the community by teaching basic literacy and thus serving as the first step for young men who might study later in an Islamic school. They led Muslims in rituals, such as prayers and communal activities. In many cases they performed divination and mystical healing, or released individuals from spells.[6] Often Islamic leaders also led the community more generally.[7]

[4] M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200*, 4th ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).

[5] James T. Siegel, *The Rope of God* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Lynn L. Thomas and Franz von Benda-Beckmann, eds., *Change and Continuity in Minangkabau: Local, Regional, and Historical Perspectives on West Sumatra* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1985); Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976 [1960]); Fahrurrozi, "Tuan Guru and Social Change in Lombok, Indonesia," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 46, 135 (2018): 117–134; Mustari Bosra, *Tuang Guru, Anrong Guru dan Daeng Guru: Gerakan Islam di Sulawesi Selatan 1914–1942* (Makassar: La Galigo Press, 2008).

[6] Clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2, 2 (1960): 238.

[7] Cf. the comparisons of village Islamic life in Muhamad Radjab, *Semasa Kecil di Kampung, 1913–1928: Autobiografi Seorang Anak Minangkabau* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1974);

On a supra-village, or even archipelago-wide level, sometimes Muslims collaborated with the colonial powers,[8] but more often they spearheaded resistance against the Dutch. Muslims of the archipelago were in direct conflict with the Dutch from as early as 1596, and changes in governance in the early nineteenth century moved the initiative for anticolonial resistance into the hands of Islamic revivalists.[9] As Antony Reid observed, "Every time of upheaval in Indonesia demonstrated again [Islamic teachers'] ability to inspire peasant resistance and heroism."[10] More prominent religious leaders were those who had traveled – especially those who had completed the pilgrimage to Mecca – and received an advanced Islamic education.[11]

Islamic leaders were often based in Islamic educational institutions. These Islamic schools were "geared to learning Arabic and memorization of texts dealing with the various Islamic sciences, especially canonical law, theology, and behavior."[12] Like the terms for Islamic scholars, the names of these schools varied across the archipelago, including *surau* in West Sumatra and *meunasah* in Aceh; the word *madrasah* for Islamic schools became more common only in the twentieth century and usually described Islamic schools organized in a modern style with grades and preset courses. The normative model of an Islamic school in Indonesia, however, is that of a Javanese *pesantren*.[13] Young men could spend years studying at a *pesantren*, or cycling between several *pesantren*, gathering different aspects of Islamic knowledge so as to become qualified to open their own school. Alternatively, they could stay at a *pesantren* only for a short time and then return to their home community. Regardless, time at

oral history with Mohamad Roem, interviewed by A. Rahman Zainuddin, ANRI SL1 1981 #6, tape 1; oral history with Idham Chalid, ANRI SL1 1985 #9, tape 1.

[8] For the foremost example of this, see Nico J. G. Kaptein, *Islam, Colonialism and the Modern Age in the Netherlands East Indies: A Biography of Sayyid Uthman (1822–1914)* (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

[9] Gerrit Knaap, "Islamic Resistance in the Dutch Colonial Empire," in David Motadel, ed., *Islam and the European Empires* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 217, 221.

[10] Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 4.

[11] For more on the rising number of pilgrims and their influence on nineteenth-century religious life on Java, see Sartono Kartodirjdo, *The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course, and Sequel* Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, no. 50 ('S-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), especially chapter 5.

[12] Howard M. Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State: The Persatuan Islam (PERSIS), 1923 to 1957* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 23.

[13] This is normative not only in Indonesian scholarship, where studies sponsored by the Ministry of Religion tend to focus on *pesantren*, but also in Western scholarship, which is often Java based (see, e.g., Karel A. Steenbrink, *Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah: Pendidikan Islam dalam Kurun Moderen* [Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986] and Florian Pohl, *Islamic Education and the Public Sphere: Today's Pesantren in Indonesia* [Munster: Waxmann, 2009]).

a *pesantren* served as a rite of passage for most Muslim young men on Java. On Sumatra, there existed a similar tradition of young men taking up residence in a religious school as a bridge between childhood and adulthood.[14] On Kalimantan, in the same way, Islamic educational institutions served as a key socializing experience for young men.[15] Across the archipelago, these institutions were not necessarily long-standing traditions, having been shaped in the nineteenth century, but they were an established form of education by the turn of the twentieth century.[16] In all cases, traditional Islamic schools were cultural centers grounding the community of pious Muslims in a given region.

Divisions within the Muslim Community

Over the first half of the twentieth century, the normative idea of what was "Islamic" in Indonesia narrowed, but it still contained a wide variety of beliefs and orientations – and significant contestation between the holders of different positions. Understanding the dividing lines between Muslims at the time is important for understanding the different positions toward the prospect of an Islamic Indonesia.

Pious versus Nominal Muslims

In the 1950s the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz documented religious life in the East Javanese town of Pare.[17] The work he produced from that time, *The Religion of Java*, became foundational for the discussion of Islam in Indonesia. Geertz categorized the residents of his town into three subvariants. These three religious communities were not distinct in language or location; rather, they lived cheek-by-jowl across Java in neighboring villages and sometimes mixed together in the same

[14] On the West Sumatran *surau*, see Azyumardi Azra, *Surau: Pendidikan Islam Tradisional dalam Transisi dan Modernisasi* (Ciputat: Logos, 2003). On the tradition of *meunasah* in Aceh, see Siegel, *The Rope of God*, particularly chapter 7.

[15] Suriansyah Ideham et al., *Sejarah Banjar* (Banjarmasin: Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Daerah, Propinsi Kalimantan Selatan, 2003), chapter 4.

[16] Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents*, 14; Kevin W. Fogg, "State and Islamic Education Growing into Each Other in Indonesia," in Pia Jolliffe and Thomas Bruce, eds., *Southeast Asian Schools in Modern History: Education, Manipulation, and Contest* (London: Routledge, 2019), 188–203.

[17] Geertz and others on the project used the pseudonym "Modjokuto" for this town in their works.

village, mingling in social contexts and competing in the lowest level of government.[18]

Geertz used the Javanese social category of *santri* for pious Muslims who practice a stricter form of Islam. "The *santri* religious tradition, consisting not only of a careful and regular execution of the basic rituals of Islam – the prayers, the Fast, the Pilgrimage – but also of a whole complex of social, charitable, and political Islamic organizations," stands in contrast to that of *abangan* in Geertz's typology.[19] *Abangan* were nominal Muslims who identified with Islam but did not practice the normative obligations. Instead, they were deeply entrenched in rituals drawn not from the orthodox Islamic corpus, but rather from traditional beliefs about spirits and their impact on human affairs.[20] The third category, *priyayi*, or aristocratic individuals with beliefs inspired by Hinduism, has fallen out of use in discussions of religion; it has been identified as a social class instead of a religious orientation.[21]

Scholars since Geertz have been split in their evaluation of the major categories of *santri* and *abangan* for pious and nonpious Muslims. Certainly, Indonesian Muslims have come to use the term *santri* outside of Java; *santri* has now become a national term for the kind of pious Muslims Geertz described. However, Indonesians are generally less familiar with *abangan* as a religious descriptor, especially outside of academic circles.[22] All the same, most scholarship on Indonesia has

[18] Robert R. Jay, *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1963), another anthropologist in Geertz's group in Pare provides an excellent example of *santri* and *abangan* villages living in close quarters and in conflict.

[19] Geertz, *Religion of Java*, 6.

[20] Geertz, *Religion of Java*, 11.

[21] See Donald K. Emmerson, *Indonesia's Elite: Political Culture and Cultural Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 103–104.

[22] The continuing relevance of the term *santri* is evidenced by the large number of Indonesian books that deploy the term *santri* in their titles, such as Asrori S. Karni, *Etos Studi Kaum Santri: Wajah Baru Pendidikan Islam* (Bandung: Mizan 2009); Syafiq Hasyim, ed., *Pluralisme, Sekularisme, dan Liberalisme di Indonesia: Persepsi Kaum Santri di Jawa Barat* (Jakarta: ICIP, 2007), and Promono U. Thanthowi, *Kebangkitan Politik Kaum Santri: Islam dan Demokratisasi di Indonesia, 1990–2000* (Jakarta: PSAP, 2005). *Abangan*, even when it appears in Indonesian scholarship, is usually paired with *santri* and evaluated for its efficacy as a cultural category, as in Yanuar Pribadi, "An *Abangan*-Like Group in a *Santri* Island: The Religious Identity of the *Blater*," in Bernhard Platzdasch and Johan Saravanamuttu, eds., *Religious Diversity in Muslim-Majority States in Southeast Asia: Areas of Toleration and Conflict* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2014), 214–233. M. C. Ricklefs notes the recent provenance of the word *abangan*, as opposed to the very old term *santri*, in his "The Birth of the Abangan," *Bijdragen van de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 162, 1 (2006): 36. Mohamad Roem also attests to the prevalence of *santri* as a common identity, but he expresses his personal ambivalence toward the terms (especially *abangan* and *priyayi*), in oral history with Mohamad Roem, interviewed by A. Rahman Zainuddin, ANRI SL1 1981 #6, tape 1.

accepted the observation that a readily identified sector of society practiced Islam in a more devout and conscientious way.[23] Even if not recognizing distinct sectors of society, Timothy Daniels helpfully suggests that these are recognized modes of religious practice, in which individuals participate across a spectrum ranging from highly animist to strictly orthodox.[24]

A few have rejected Geertz's categories. Azyumardi Azra has criticized Geertz for making it appear as though *abangans* and *priyayi* were not Muslims and thus undermining the position of Islam in Indonesian society.[25] Mark Woodward has asserted the Islamic roots of *abangan* and *priyayi* practices, calling them *Islam Jawa* (Javanese Islam, as opposed to some internationally recognizable Islam), and rejecting the idea that these practices are sharply limited to strict sociological categories.[26]

Historians are now converging around the idea that the sharp divide between pious and nonpious Muslims was characteristic of the specific moment of Geertz's fieldwork. Ricklefs noted that the ideas of a division along the lines of *santri* and *abangan* were fairly new in the twentieth century,[27] and reached their peak in the 1950s.[28] In the 1990s, many Indonesian authors conceded that the divisions may once have applied, but argued that "the *santri-abangan* dichotomic approach [was] no longer relevant to an understanding of the religious life of Javanese Muslims."[29]

This book accepts the existence of a sector in Indonesian society that is oriented to Islam as the source of inspiration for its worldview and lifestyle. More simply, there was indeed a difference between pious Muslims and nominal Muslims in Indonesia in the 1940s, and pious

[23] See, e.g., R. William Liddle, *Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration: An Indonesian Case Study* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970); Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2007 [1962]); Saiful Muzani, "The Devaluation of Aliran Politics: Views from the Third Congress of the PPP," *Studia Islamika* 1, 3 (1994): 177–221.

[24] Timothy Daniels, *Islamic Spectrum in Java* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), especially chapter 2.

[25] Azyumardi Azra, *Islam in the Indonesian World: An Account of Institutional Formation* (Bandung: Mizan, 2006), 3.

[26] Woodward, *Islam in Java*. Woodward also asserts that the nonorthodox practices of *abangans* are still drawn from the practices of Sufism, thus giving them Islamic roots; see Mark R. Woodward, "The Slametan: Textual Knowledge and Ritual Performance in Central Javanese Islam," *History of Religions* 28, 1 (1988): 54–89. Some of his arguments go rather beyond the consensus of the field.

[27] Ricklefs, *Polarizing Javanese Society*, 86.

[28] Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents*, chapter 4.

[29] Bambang Pranowo, "Islam and Party Politics in Rural Jawa," *Studia Islamika* 1, 2 (1994): 18. This sentiment was common among articles in the journal *Studia Islamika* at the time.

Muslims drew different conclusions about events because of their orientation toward normative Islam. All the same, the definition of pious Muslims used here for the mid-twentieth century differs slightly from the usage of *santri* today. In this book, pious Muslims are those who believed that their actions were inspired by Islam, rather than simply those who strictly avoided traditional or pre-Islamic rituals. Thus, an Indonesian man who participated in mystical activities and believed in amulets would be no less a pious Muslim than an Indonesian woman who staunchly avoided any practice (like mysticism or amulets) not explicitly found in the Qur'an, so long as they both believed their practices to be Islamic. Borrowing Ahmad Syafi'i Maarif's definition, pious Muslims are "those who take Islam as *the* way of life," whether or not their knowledge of Islam follows prevailing ideas of orthodoxy.[30]

Estimating a precise number or percentage of pious Muslims within the general population is difficult. Ricklefs has used figures on almsgiving to estimate that between 10 and 40 percent of the people in the provinces of Central and East Java were pious in the 1950s.[31] Those numbers should be seen as low when extrapolated to a nationwide estimate; Central and East Java were far from the most pious provinces. Another rough indication can be found in the results of the 1955 elections, when approximately 44 percent of the Indonesian populace voted for an Islamic party, signaling their acceptance of the principle that Islam should govern the life of the state.[32] Whether the figure is closer to one quarter or one half of the Indonesian population, the bloc of pious Muslims was a significant sector of the country during the revolution.

Traditionalist versus Reformist Muslims

In addition to the split between pious and nominal Muslims, there is another major cleavage in the Muslim community of Indonesia: the theological division between traditionalist and reformist Muslims.

This split focuses on how Muslims approach texts and authority in their religion. In Indonesia, the majority of Muslims followed the Shafi'i

[30] Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Islam as the Basis of State: A Study of the Islamic Political Ideals as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia," PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1983, 5. Emphasis in the original. For a more wholistic discussion, see Ahmed.

[31] Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents*, 84. Although they were very populous, Central and East Java cannot be taken as representative of all of Indonesia; certainly election returns for Islamic parties were higher outside of these provinces.

[32] Using figures from Alfian, *Hasil Pemilihan Umum 1955 untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat* (Jakarta: Leknas, 1971), 9.

school of jurisprudence, one of the four Sunni approaches to theology and Islamic law dating back to the early centuries of Islam.[33] While founded ultimately on scripture (the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet), a significant canon of texts had grown over the centuries to settle issues of ritual, theology, and Islamic law. In Indonesia, Muslims who adhere to the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence (or to any single school of jurisprudence) are called "traditionalist Muslims."[34] They are, in many ways, the local heirs to a huge and long-standing network of scholars across the Islamic world and across time, with implications for how traditionalists in the early twentieth century saw their position between local community and scholars around the globe.[35]

A new theological trend emerged within Islam around the turn of the twentieth century, as a generation of Islamic scholars in the Middle East came to grips with the impotence of Islamic countries facing European imperialism.[36] A new brand of theology called for a revival of Islamic societies based on a return directly to the Islamic scriptures, deriving fresh interpretations directly from the scripture without regard to the intervening precedents set by the schools of jurisprudence. This Islamic reformism came into sharp conflict with traditionalist Muslims for rejecting the authority of Shafi'i jurisprudence and calling for cultural changes among Indonesian Muslims. Followers of this theological line are called "reformist Muslims."[37]

Reformist Islam in Indonesia received its greatest boost with the founding of an organizational body, Muhammadiyah. The founder of Muhammadiyah adopted certain Western practices in addition to his theological innovations, such as adding secular subjects, grade levels, and desks to the traditional offerings of a *pesantren*.[38] As the organization

[33] For more on the Shafi'i *madhhab*, see E. Chaumont, "al-Shāfiiyya," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

[34] This term has become ubiquitous in scholarship on Indonesia in both English and Indonesian (where it is rendered *tradisionalis*, a direct transliteration). Alternatively, when the group first became identified in Indonesia through conflict with reformists, they were called *kaum tua*, or the "old group."

[35] R. Michael Feener, *Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), chapter 2.

[36] Muhamad Ali, *Islam and Colonialism: Becoming Modern in Indonesia and Malaysia* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016).

[37] In scholarship on Indonesia, both the terms "modernist" and "reformist" have been used with regards to this group, with modernist being more common in Indonesia (as *modernis*, although *kaum muda* or "young group" was the original moniker when they emerged as a force in the 1910s). The term "reformists" is used here because it does not suggest that this group was somehow more modernized, but rather that they were reforming theology.

[38] Howard M. Federspiel, "The Muhammadijah: The Study of an Orthodox Islamic Movement in Indonesia," *Indonesia* 10 (1970): 57.

expanded, it built a large network of social services, including not only schools but also hospitals, libraries, women's circles, and youth scouting groups.[39]

In response to Muhammadiyah's spread and the concomitant spread of Islamic reformism, a group of traditionalist scholars in East Java came together in 1926 to defend and uphold the Shafi'i school in theology. They formed an organization called Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), or "Revival of the Religious Scholars," which spread mostly on Java.[40] Over the following two decades, NU became the largest Islamic organization in the archipelago, and was also seen to speak for all traditionalist Muslims on the national stage, even though other traditionalist groups emerged in several regions.

Although other theological questions have risen in the century since Muhammadiyah's founding (such as the relative role of reason),[41] the basic division among pious Muslims in Indonesia remains a traditionalist-reformist divide. Over the years, the difference became as much social and cultural as theological, with each group defending certain modes of practice and networks of scholars. The two sides have clashed at times, most notably in the 1920s (leading to the creation of traditionalist organizations) and in the 1950s, but they agree on the importance of Islam more than they disagree on the minutiae of ritual, and together they constitute a solid religious bloc of Indonesian society, even when they are in political or theological competition.

Trends in the Early Twentieth Century

Three major trends in the first half of the twentieth century set up the struggle of pious Muslims in independent Indonesia. These trends were (1) toward organizations; (2) toward new conceptions of orthodoxy; and (3) toward politics.

Toward Organizations

Islamic organizations in Indonesia were not limited to the two largest groups, Muhammadiyah and NU, mentioned previously, but these two groups exemplify the trend. In most cases, a particularly charismatic

[39] Ali, *Islam and Colonialism*, chapter 1.

[40] Menchik, *Islam and Democracy*, 48–51; Faisal Ismail, *Islamic Traditionalism in Indonesia: A Study of the Nahdlatul Ulama's Early History and Religious Ideology* (Jakarta: Departemen Agama, Proyek Peningkatan Pengkajian Kerukunan Hidup Umat Beragama, 2003), 32.

[41] See, e.g., Kersten, *Islam in Indonesia*, chapter 3.

religious leader would gather several like-minded colleagues together to found an organization, often based at a particular school or set of schools, to protect and promote their theological vision. This also took place amid a swell of voluntary associations of various kinds in Indonesian society, such as labor unions and student organizations alongside new religious groups.[42]

Traditionalist organizations appeared in several provinces to safeguard their beliefs against increasing reformist encroachment. These organizations included Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti), founded in West Sumatra in 1928 in response to sharp conflict with Muhammadiyah followers over orthodoxy[43]; Jamiyatul Washliyah, which grew out of a debating club in an Islamic school in Medan in 1930[44]; al-Ittihadiyah, a group that emerged in Medan among the ethnically Malay population in 1935[45]; Rabithatul Ulama, a scholars' union in South Sulawesi founded in 1938[46]; Musjawarattuthalibin, a traditionalist union in South Kalimantan in the 1930s[47]; and Perikatan Umat Islam, a group based in Sukabumi, West Java that included many large Sundanese *pesantren*.[48]

On the other side of the divide, reformist-minded organizations whose alumni greatly impacted the revolution included Persatuan Islam (Persis), founded in Bandung in 1923 by the Indonesian theologian of Indian heritage, A. Hassan[49]; Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB), a group that grew out of associations among high school students in the Dutch educational system in 1925[50]; and a new organization called Studenten Islam Studieclub (SIS) that emerged from JIB in 1934, targeting university students.[51]

One hallmark of the new wave of organizations was their increased accessibility to all members of society. This was not only because they

[42] The classic account of the rise of new forms of associationalism and new thinking is Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912–1926* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).

[43] Alaiddin Koto, *Pemikiran Politik PERTI, Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (1945–1970)* (Jakarta: Nimas Multima, 1997); Za'im Rais, "The Minangkabau Traditionalists' Response to the Modernist Movement," Master's thesis, McGill University, 1994.

[44] Al Rasyidin, "Islamic Organizations in North Sumatra: The Politics of Initial Establishment and Later Development," *Al-Jami'ah Journal of Indonesian Islam* 10, 1 (June 2016): 71–74.

[45] Rasyidin, "Islamic Organizations in North Sumatra," 74–75.

[46] Bosra, *Tuang Guru, Anrong Guru dan Daeng Guru*, 164–165.

[47] M. Nur Maksum et al., *Musyawaratuthalibin: Historis, Perjuangan dan Pergulatan Pemikiran* (Banjarmasin: Antasari Press, 2007).

[48] Steenbrink, *Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah*, 75–76.

[49] Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology*.

[50] Robert E. Elson, "Disunity, Distance, Disregard: The Political Failure of Islamism in Late Colonial Indonesia," *Studia Islamika* 16, 1 (2009): 15–16.

[51] Yudi Latif, *Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008), 207.

were open to members from various walks of life and were fundamentally voluntary, with individuals electing to join. It also stemmed from their creation of targeted auxiliary groups for Muslim women, youth, children, and special interest groups. This was true of many other types of organizations emerging at the same time in Indonesian society, such as societies to preserve *adat* (local customs), but Islamic organizations' auxiliaries had great staying power as groups for self-identification.[52]

Islamic organizations changed the face of Islam in the archipelago in two ways. First, they connected Muslims to co-religionists beyond their village in a concrete way. Muslims previously had an idea that there were millions of others like them in the *ummat*, the Islamic community, and if they had traveled to study at an Islamic school outside of their village they would have encountered a tiny cross-section of their co-religionists. But the new Islamic organizations socialized Muslim villagers to the idea of a truly global community by sending them newsletters with news from Muslim communities around the world; by announcing to them how their membership connected them to a community of hundreds of thousands, and even by holding mass rallies to advocate on issues well beyond the scope of any one village.[53] Second, Islamic organizations, through their debates on theology and promotion of particular practices, changed the normative practice of Islam in the archipelago and pulled Muslims closer to modern Middle Eastern constructions of orthodoxy.

Toward New Conceptions of Orthodoxy

The second major trend in Islam in the Dutch East Indies during the first half of the twentieth century was toward new conceptions of orthodoxy. As debates emerged in the Middle East and Southeast Asia about the role of Islam in society and the decline of Muslims compared to the West, Islamic leaders became more concerned with properly practicing their religion so as (in their view) to achieve prosperity and freedom once again.[54]

[52] Cf. Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, chapter 6, on the appeal and lasting power of Masjumi's auxiliaries.

[53] Laffan, *Islam Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia*, 234–235 and passim. The trend of greater Muslim awareness of the global Islamic community was a worldwide phenomenon in the early twentieth century; see Cemil Aydin, *The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), chapters 4 and 5.

[54] For an excellent examination of the foreign influences (Western and Arab) on cultural traditions and Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia during this period, see Jeffrey Hadler, *Muslims and Matriarchs: Cultural Resilience in Indonesia through Jihad and Colonialism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).

One important impetus in inspiring new forms of piety among Muslims in the Indies was the *hajj*, which had greatly increased in the nineteenth century.[55] This trend continued in the early decades of the twentieth century; while from 1905 to 1914, an average of 347 people per million inhabitants of Indonesia went to Mecca on *hajj* each year, this number increased markedly to 565 per million in 1920–29.[56] Participating in the *hajj* exposed more and more Southeast Asian Muslims to new standards of Islamic piety, which they then brought back and practiced in their home communities, where they were more likely to imitate forms of Islam they saw or learned in Arabia. Many young Indonesian men stayed in Mecca longer than just the *hajj*, pursuing studies there to master the Islamic sciences and becoming committed to Arab ideas of orthopraxy that differed from their homelands. One example was Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid, who studied in Mecca starting in 1923; upon his return to his home island of Lombok, he founded schools that taught in the Arabic language and preached strict adherence to five prayers each day and congregational prayers each Friday, at odds with local practices among many Sasak Muslims. The new understanding of Islam spread by Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid, based on his experiences in Arabia, fundamentally changed religious practice on the island.[57] Lombok was just one example of a changing local community, and Mecca was not the only source of this kind of religious change. After the turn of the twentieth century, a substantial contingent of Southeast Asian Muslims studying in Cairo also spread these ideas upon their return to various parts of the East Indies.[58]

Many of the founders of Islamic organizations were indeed leaders who had returned from the Middle East. These men used their newly founded organizations to proselytize and promote strict Islamic practice. Among other methods, changes to Islamic education during this period facilitated increased knowledge of Islamic texts and thus stricter practice. A practice adopted almost simultaneously on Java and Sumatra was to

[55] Eric Tagliacozzo, *The Longest Journey: Southeast Asians and the Pilgrimage to Mecca* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 181; Kartodirdjo, *The Peasants' Revolt of Banten*, 141; Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia*, 39.

[56] Henri Chambert-Loir, ed., *Naik Haji di Masa Silam: Kisah-Kisah Orang Indonesia Naik Haji 1482–1964*, vol. 3, 1954–1964 (Jakarta: KPG, 2013), 1228.

[57] Abdul Hayyi Nu'man, *Maulanasysyaikh TGKH. Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid: Riwayat Hidup dan Perjuangannya* (Pancor, Lombok: Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Wathan, 1419 H/1999 M); Sven Cederroth, *The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah: A Sasak Community on Lombok* (Goteborg, Sweden: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1981), chapter 4.

[58] Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia*, 139; Audrey Kahin, *Rebellion to Integration*, 54.

pay increased attention to teaching comprehension of the Arabic language, with the goal that students would understand and begin to interpret what they were reading (whereas previously they had mostly intoned the text and memorized the explanation given by their teacher).[59]

Competition between traditionalists and reformists was also crucial to spreading new conceptions of Islamic orthodoxy. As organizations on each side of the theological divide tried to draw more Muslims to their view, they fought to assert their correctness and uprightness on all issues of praxis and doctrine, such as the way to pray, the rules for inheritance, and the nature of God's divine unity.[60] As a result, organizations pushed their members to follow Islamic precepts in ways that more closely mimicked Islamic models in the Middle East.[61] Overall, in the early twentieth century promoting certain forms of Islamic piety became just as important for Islamic leaders as proselytizing the religion to non-Muslim communities.[62] This is evident in the stated goals of the organizations according to their founding documents, as well as in their activities in the first half of the twentieth century.[63]

Toward Politics

In the nineteenth century, Dutch colonial bureaucrats worked hard to keep religious leaders out of politics. The Dutch had a class of officially recognized Islamic scholars who "lent themselves to the Dutch colonial policy in repressing manifestations of [extremist, anticolonial] activity," but these men could not create their own interpretations of how Islam should engage the state, for fear of losing state patronage.[64] Thus, political thought or activity was discouraged among scholars, forcing any political activity to position itself in direct opposition to the colonial state. Many religious movements of opposition did arise, but these were quickly suppressed or their leaders exiled by the Dutch. No sustained

[59] Steenbrink, *Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah*, 3, 44, 71.

[60] Hamka has identified these among the many issues addressed among Indonesian Muslims in the early twentieth century; see Kevin W. Fogg, "Hamka's Doctoral Address at Al-Azhar: The Influence of Muhammad Abduh in Indonesia," *Afkaruna: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 11, 2 (2015): 125–156.

[61] Za'im Rais, *Against Islamic Modernism: The Minangkabau Traditionalists Responses to the Modernist Movement* (Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2001), 94.

[62] Menchik, *Islam and Indonesian Democracy*; Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology*, vii.

[63] See, e.g., *Al Djamijatul Washlijah ¼ Abad* (Medan: Pengurus Besar Al Djamijatul Washlijah, 1955), 342, which states the goal of the organization as "Implement the requirements of the Islamic religion so as to progress toward happiness in the world and the hereafter."

[64] Kartodirdjo, *The Peasants' Revolt of Banten*, 146. Cf. Kaptein, and Laffan, *Makings of Indonesian Islam*, pt. 3.

movement could emerge that faced political questions from an Islamic stance.

This was in part due to the policy formulated by the foremost Dutch advisor on Islamic issues: Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje. Instead of seeing Islam as a single phenomenon that was dangerous for the Dutch colonial project, Snouck Hurgronje saw many different components. One element that became a focus of his work in the East Indies was the influence of Sufism on Islam; he believed that this held the Muslims of the archipelago back from modernity (including being integrated into the Dutch empire), and therefore he fought to combat Sufi strains.[65] This was also related to Snouck's differentiation between religious Islam and political Islam. In advocating that the Dutch colonial government support the purely religious elements and forbid all political elements, he won the agreement of many Islamic scholars at the turn of the twentieth century.[66]

The other key pillar of Dutch policy was to favor Indonesian customs and customary law, called *adat*, over Islamic practices.[67] In some regions, the Dutch preference for *adat* over Islam also connected with favoring traditional nobles over Islamic leaders, as in Aceh.[68] In other regions, the Dutch crafted and cultivated *adat* to align with their colonial aims, such as in West Sumatra.[69] This contributed to antagonism between Islamic leaders and the Dutch and between Islamic leaders and traditional nobles.

Dutch policy entering the twentieth century called for Islam to be explicitly apolitical, but other circumstances pushed the Muslim population in the opposite direction. In particular, the economic dominance of the local Chinese population on Java grated on indigenous and Arab traders, who began to form organizations and unions to face Chinese economic competition.[70] After a few false starts in the first decade of the twentieth century, a successful organization was founded in 1912, with explicitly indigenous leadership, called Sarekat Islam (SI). Under the guidance of the Surabaya-based activist H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, SI grew

[65] Laffan, *Makings of Indonesian Islam*, chapter 11 and passim.
[66] Harry J. Benda, "Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia," in *Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia: Collected Journal Articles of Harry J. Benda* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series No. 18, 1972), 87, 92.
[67] Henry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), 68.
[68] Siegel, *The Rope of God*, 70; Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 75.
[69] Hadler, *Muslims and Matriarchs*, chapter 2, esp. 57.
[70] Azyumardi Azra, "The Sarekat Islam and the Indies Chinese: An Account of the Anti-Chinese Riots in Colonial Indonesia," *Studia Islamika* 1, 1 (1994): 25–53.

into a much larger body and spread beyond Java. At the same time, its interests broadened from breaking Chinese monopolies to the general promotion of Muslim welfare and the Islamic religion. During its first decade, SI engaged in programs primarily concerned with social welfare, rather than religious practice or overt politics. With this focus, SI membership expanded rapidly on Java and beyond, to reach a peak in 1919 of a reported two million members.[71] Although it had started as fairly neutral in politics (Snouck Hurgronje, writing from the Netherlands in 1916, even welcomed the emergence of SI as a positive development for Indonesian Muslims,[72] and several of his protégés were close observers of the early period),[73] political issues grew markedly in the organization at the end of its first decade. This included the rise of many Communist and left-leaning leaders in local SI branches.

In 1923, in response to these political trends, Tjokroaminoto led the organization as a whole to take two bold steps: first, rejecting the Communist ideology as "godless" and thus inappropriate for them (and thereby ejecting a large bloc of the SI's left-leaning members), and, second, transforming the organization Sarekat Islam into the political vehicle Partij Sarekat Islam.[74] Part of the drive to give Sarekat Islam a more political character came from Haji Agus Salim, a Minangkabau former bureaucrat in the Dutch colonial government who had received a Western-style education but also "knew a great deal about Islam from its basic sources."[75] The ejection of the Communists in 1923 weakened the Sarekat Islam, and the exit from Sarekat Islam did not destroy Marxism in Indonesia; rather, the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party) had a continuous existence from 1920 to 1966.[76] The change led the Partij Sarekat Islam to focus on promoting more Islamic goals and boycotting the colonial government. Tjokroaminoto went so far in 1926 as to flatly reject an invitation to sit in the colony's representative council (Volksraad).[77] Still, the movement was susceptible to society's trends; in 1929, in response to surging nationalism and the founding of several secular parties, such as Sukarno's Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), the Partij Sarekat Islam changed its name to Partai

[71] Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 200; Ricklefs doubts that so many people participated in the organization.
[72] Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 70.
[73] Laffan, *Makings of Indonesian Islam*, 194.
[74] Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 237–238.
[75] Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973), 298.
[76] On the founding of a Communist party in the Dutch East Indies and its early interaction with Islamic groups, see Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, chapters 6 and 7.
[77] Elson, "Disunity, Distance, Disregard," 5; *PSII dari Tahun ke Tahun (with English Translation)* ([Jakarta?]: Departemen Penerangan dan Propaganda PSII, [1952]), 8.

Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII), thus fusing its strong sense of Islamic identity with the new territorial nationalism of the era.[78]

Unlike SI and its successor parties, many of the mass Islamic organizations formed in the first half of the twentieth century were explicitly apolitical. This was certainly true, at least initially, for the two largest groups, Muhammadiyah and NU.[79] The apolitical stance connected with these organizations' focus on theological and liturgical issues, which were the impetus for their founding. At the same time, given Dutch policy that discouraged and suppressed political Islam while allowing or encouraging a more cultural practice of religion, their apolitical stance safeguarded the continued existence of Islamic organizations. Sometimes it even gave them access to government funds to further their projects, as with many modern-style Islamic schools.[80]

Many Islamic schools, however, were breeding grounds for politics, and particularly politics opposing colonialism. According to one Indonesian observer, the pattern of educational movements evolving into more political forms reflected new trends in Western-style education integrated in Islamic schools, causing new types of self-reflection and competing ideas among the up-and-coming Muslim leaders.[81] The reformist schools of West Sumatra provide perhaps the clearest example of an educational movement turning ever more political. In 1930, what had been an alliance of several dozen reformist schools called Sumatera Thawalib (Sumatran Students) transformed itself into a mass political movement open to the public. The new organization, created by young reformist teachers and heavily influenced by trends in the Middle East and on Java, called itself Persatuan Muslim Indonesia (Union of Indonesian Muslims) or Permi.[82] Permi fused nationalism and religion at a time when other Islamic organizations were promoting religion only. In this way it provided a sharp critique, first of secular nationalism, which Permi leaders and other pious Muslims found objectionable for isolating Muslims in the East Indies, and second of apolitical religious activism, which Permi leaders thought did not fulfill all the requirements of Islam.[83] Although it aspired to spread across the Dutch East Indies, the

[78] Elson, "Disunity, Distance, Disregard," 8.
[79] Gregory John Fealy, "Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A History of Nahdlatul Ulama, 1952–1967," PhD diss., Monash University, 1998, 30.
[80] A famous example is the Adabiyah School of Abdullah Ahmad in Padang, Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement*, 43.
[81] Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam dalam Bingkai Keindonesiaan dan Kemanusiaan: Sebuah Refleksi Sejarah* (Bandung: Mizan, 2009), 89.
[82] Taufik Abdullah, *Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra (1927–1933)* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971), 130–131.
[83] Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement*, 321.

actual footprint of Permi was limited to West Sumatra. Its ideas on Islamic nationalism, however, had an impact on the direction of politics back on Java.

Even as Permi proposed a new possible direction for nationalism, the most politically prominent strand of Indonesian nationalism was avowedly secular, with Sukarno keeping his Partai Nasional Indonesia "closed to religion," and Christian newspapers calling for "setting aside all religions" to achieve the goals of nationalism.[84] Facing this staunch secularism, Islamic activists felt "boycotted, ignored, not accorded their due, their ideas not considered worthy or relevant, not embraced and employed by their fellows."[85] At the same time, pious Muslims generally rejected the leadership of secular nationalists. In 1933, in an article in the Islamic journal *Pembela Islam*, a Muslim activist named Sabirin argued that the secular nationalists, who rejected the religious duties to pray five times a day and avoid women who were not their relatives, etc., "were somehow short of the mark and were not good choices as leaders for Muslims who might otherwise be attracted by some of the nationalists' political statements."[86] At the same time, secular nationalists rejected Islamic nationalism as applicable only to a small sector of society, with one secularist writing in 1931 that "a political association with Islam as its basis will bring division and will find adherents only amongst serious Muslims."[87]

This polarization between secular and Islamic politics grew more and more marked by the final years of Dutch colonialism. The shared anticolonial history and synergy between communism and Islam were forgotten.[88] Even between secular nationalists like Sukarno and pious Muslims, like the young student columnist Mohammad Natsir, there was increasing conflict over the role that Islam should have in a future Indonesian state. In a series of contending editorials published in 1940, Sukarno looked to the Turkish model of a fully secular government while Natsir called for total integration of Islam in the state so as to properly serve the Muslim population.[89]

[84] Quoted in Elson, "Disunity, Distance, Disregard," 6.
[85] Elson, "Disunity, Distance, Disregard," 7. Cf. Kahin, *Islam, Nationalism and Democracy*, 14–16.
[86] Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology*, 35.
[87] Elson, "Disunity, Distance, Disregard," 10, quoting *Pertjatoeran*, March 12, 1931. "Serious" here most likely refers to *santri*, pious Muslims.
[88] Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 342.
[89] Significant excerpts from these debates have been translated in Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement*, 279–295. Several of Natsir's essays from this debate are reprinted in the fifth section of M. Natsir, *Capita Selecta* (Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1954).

After 1930, Islamic groups focused increasingly on implementing Islam more perfectly and saw nationalism as merely a means to reach that end. Permi shifted to this position after it was criticized by Muslim leaders both inside and outside West Sumatra.[90] PSII also turned more exclusively toward Islam around this time,[91] leading to some of the conflicts mentioned previously between PSII leaders (and Muslim leaders in general) and secular nationalists.[92]

Although they were growing more distant from secular nationalism in the 1930s, pious Muslims were also fighting among themselves more. PSII remained the main vehicle for Muslim politics until the Japanese invasion, but it had several offshoots. In 1933, a medical doctor named Sukiman, who had studied in the Netherlands and been thoroughly integrated in the nationalist movement there, took exception to PSII's refusal to cooperate with the Dutch authorities. When PSII kicked Sukiman out of the party, he led several followers to establish their own party, the Partai Islam Indonesia (PII), with a more collaborative stance.[93] Without mass backing, PII fizzled within a year. Sukiman's critique of PSII's noncooperative policy, though, had an impact on other PSII leaders, including Haji Agus Salim, who had been so crucial when Sarekat Islam ejected its Communist-leaning members. With several other regional leaders, Salim founded the Gerakan Penjadar PSII (Front to Awaken the PSII) in 1936.[94] After several years of struggle within the party over its stance toward the Dutch colonial government, PSII kicked out the Gerakan Penjadar and its sympathizers in 1937. These sympathizers, including not only Salim but several other future leaders such as the law student Mohamad Roem, established the Gerakan Penjadar as an independent political organization, but it, too, failed to win a mass following.[95] Still, there was room in Indonesian politics for an alternative to PSII in the field of Islamic nationalism, as was proven by the re-emergence of PII in 1938 with support from many Western-educated intellectuals.[96] The departure of the PII and Gerakan Penjadar left PSII unified against collaboration with the Dutch colonial regime but

[90] Elson, "Disunity, Distance, Disregard," 14.
[91] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 48.
[92] Latif, *Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power*, 201.
[93] Elson, "Disunity, Distance, Disregard," 22. On Sukiman, see Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972), 189.
[94] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 57–58; Noer, *Partai Islam*, 18; oral history with Harsono Tjokroaminoto, interviewed by Wardiningsih Surjohardjo, ANRI SL1 1982 #60, tape 11.
[95] Elson, "Disunity, Distance, Disregard," 24.
[96] Elson, "Disunity, Distance, Disregard," 25.

hollowed by the loss of several notable leaders and divided about its own political potential.

In an attempt to unite the archipelago's Muslims, and in a display of strong initiative by the hitherto apolitical mass organizations, Muhammadiyah and NU organized an "All Islam" conference in 1937. This conference resulted in the founding of an umbrella organization for all Islamic groups in Indonesia, the Madjlisul Islamil A'laa Indonesia (MIAI, or Great Islamic Council of Indonesia).[97]

The MIAI brought together the three major trends of Islam under late Dutch colonialism. Organizations, ranging from small groups like SIS to mass movements like NU and Muhammadiyah, were the chief vehicle for Islamic progress and reform, and the MIAI was the first example of mass organizations taking the lead on issues of Islam and nation. MIAI was also a forum for debates on orthodoxy and proper Islamic practice; it promoted stricter adherence to Islam among Indonesia's Muslims and debated how such adherence could be encouraged or enforced. And, finally, the MIAI was a vehicle for political interests, a body that directly interacted with the state and impacted colonial policy. All this opened the way for greater predominance on the part of Islamic theological leaders in the political realm. MIAI proved that Snouck Hurgronje's policy of separating Islam from politics was not successfully implemented by the Dutch colonial state.

Around this time, similar unifying organizations emerged in the broader world of Indonesian nationalist agitation. In 1939, most Indonesian political parties and nationalist organizations joined the new Gabungan Politik Indonesia (Indonesian Political Federation, GAPI), agitating for an indigenous representative body and increased autonomy for the Dutch East Indies.[98] These issues appeared particularly pressing for Indonesians because of the war spreading in Europe and East Asia, but the Dutch were unwilling to make concessions. Islamic organizations supported GAPI's demands and made additional stipulations about minimum Muslim representation in any parliament and administrative branches for Islamic affairs, but these demands were swept away by the invasion of the Japanese.[99]

[97] Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 89–90. Although this organization was founded by leaders from Muhammadiyah, NU and PSII, NU did not become a formal affiliate until 1939; see Jeremy Menchik, "Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, 3 (2014): 604–605.

[98] Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 230.

[99] Elson, "Disunity, Distance, Disregard," 30.

Japanese Occupation

The Japanese invaded the Dutch East Indies on January 10, 1942 and conquered the whole territory by March 8, 1942, thus smashing the image of impregnability that the Dutch had built up for centuries.[100] This swift victory was perhaps facilitated by Indonesian Muslims' refusal to defend the Dutch East Indies in a vigorous way. NU and Muhammadiyah each ruled that protecting the Dutch colonial state did not count as defending one's homeland for theological purposes, and MIAI prohibited Muslim blood transfusions to wounded soldiers in the Dutch military.[101] After capturing the territory with relative ease, the Japanese divided the East Indies into three parts to be occupied and administered by different military units. Sumatra came under the Japanese 25th Army (at first jointly with Malaya, then independently run from Bukittinggi); Java was under the Japanese 16th Army; and East Indonesia (comprising basically all islands outside of Sumatra and Java) was under the Japanese Navy.[102]

The position of Muslim organizations under the Japanese differed markedly from their position under the Dutch, especially on Java. Although at first the Japanese closed down all native organizations, including Islamic organizations, so as to secure their control over the new territories, they then fostered Islamic organizational activity specifically to win allies among Muslims, hoping to cultivate a force that could be mobilized in the war if necessary.[103] Among their first actions in this regard, in 1942 the Japanese founded an Islamic affairs office, staffed both by local Muslim leaders and by Japanese Muslims, on Jakarta's central square.[104] Then the Japanese rechartered MIAI as a way to channel Muslim support to the occupying regime. All other Indonesian political parties, nationalist and communist, remained banned. In October 1943, the MIAI held its last meeting, and its Japanese creators shut it down as easily as they had reopened it. In its place, the Japanese sponsored a new federation of Islamic mass organizations – initially only NU and Muhammadiyah – to be called Masjoemi.[105]

[100] Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 10.
[101] Elson, "Disunity, Distance, Disregard," 35.
[102] Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 235; Kahin, *Rebellion to Integration*, 95.
[103] C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, "Japanese Islam Policy in Java, 1942–1945," in *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia: Five Essays* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), 134–35; Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 201.
[104] Van Nieuwenhuijze, "Japanese Islam Policy in Java," 117–121.
[105] Van Nieuwenhuijze, "Japanese Islam Policy in Java," 153; Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 151. Masjoemi later incorporated the Persatuan Ummat Islam (PUI) of Sukabumi and Persatuan Ummat Islam Indonesia (PUII) of Majalengka, two smaller mass

The November 1943 creation of the social organization Masjoemi was a turning point for pious Muslims on Java. When the Japanese military government closed down MIAI, it called the group "the shadow of an 'anti-colonial' federation."[106] MIAI's replacement thus had to have a different character, and this character was defined by working exclusively through mass organizations. In this way, the Japanese were able to change their relationship with Java's Muslim populace and change their interlocutors. The Japanese empowered the leaders of Islamic mass organizations, primarily theological leaders, over political leaders from PSII and other parties from the late colonial era.[107] This solidified the theological leaders' dominant position, a position that they had begun to assert after the Al-Islam conference of 1937. The ascendance of more theological leaders was largely a result of Japanese policy (the Japanese handpicked the leaders for both the MIAI and Masjoemi during the occupation), but Japanese policy may have grown out of an astute observation of the strength of mass organizations in Javanese society.[108] By contrast, it may have been an attempt by the Japanese to forestall any potential political opposition.[109]

The most important innovation of Masjoemi as an unofficial organ of the Japanese occupation government was the incorporation of *ulama* into positions of governmental authority on Java. On both a local level, through the Islamic Affairs Offices created by the Japanese, and on the island-wide level, government-sponsored *ulama* had an official venue to influence other *ulama* and to engage directly in governance.[110] The Japanese chose Muhammadiyah leader Mas Mansur to be among four Javanese leaders (along with secular nationalists Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta and education activist Ki Hadjar Dewantara) at the highest level of political leadership under the occupying forces.[111] Thus Muslims on Java were gaining power not only in the religious sphere but also in the governmental structure more generally.

On Sumatra, too, the Japanese found ways to integrate Muslims in the administration of the occupied territory, but in a much more limited way.

organizations. Throughout this book, the mass organization will be spelled with "oe" (i.e., Masjoemi), to differentiate it from the later political party, which will be spelled with "u" (i.e., Masjumi).

[106] Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 151.

[107] Latif, *Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power*, 214.

[108] Oral history with Mohamad Roem, interviewed by A. Rahman Zainuddin, ANRI SL1 1981 #6, tape 8. Roem reports that both he and Agus Salim were happy not to be chosen for leadership positions by the Japanese, but had absolutely no control over this because appointments were entirely Japanese prerogative.

[109] Cf. Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 108–110.

[110] Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 165.

[111] Noer, *Partai Islam*, 23.

In West Sumatra, the seat of occupying 25th Army, the Japanese accommodated Islamic voices by placing key Muslim leaders from Islamic education and mass organizations on the council advising the army leadership.[112] Elsewhere on Sumatra, Muslims were more disappointed with their position under the Japanese. For example, in Aceh the Japanese devolved some power to the *ulama*, who expressed their solidarity with the Japanese by revolting against the Dutch immediately before the Japanese invasion and joining Japanese-sponsored councils.[113] Primarily, though, the Japanese ruled Aceh through its traditional nobles (*ulèëbalang*), the rivals of the *ulama*, leading to frustration against the new occupiers.[114] In the South Sumatran city of Palembang, too, Muslims were frustrated by a general ban on religious associations and strict limitations on Islamic education.[115] On Sumatra, no formal organization brought together all Muslim groups until the very end of the war, when the Japanese inaugurated the Madjelis Islam Tinggi (High Islamic Council, MIT), and then only around the island's capital of Bukittinggi.[116] The major inroads that Muslims on Java made into government under the Japanese were not shared on Sumatra.

In East Indonesia under the Japanese Navy, developments were similar to those on Sumatra. In South Sulawesi, the Japanese shut down all Islamic schools and organizations.[117] In a concession to the Islamic community, the Japanese created an umbrella organization based in Makassar called Jam'iyatul Islamiyah (Islamic Community) that included several prominent Buginese and Makassarese Islamic leaders, but the organization's head was a Japanese Muslim whose religious belief was highly suspect.[118] In South Kalimantan, however, Islamic organizations were shut down but schools were allowed to continue, and the Japanese even founded a new Islamic Middle School in Banjarmasin, albeit with Japanese propaganda heavily integrated into the curriculum.[119] The major traditionalist organization of the region, Musjawarattuthalibin, never recovered from being closed down by the Japanese.[120]

[112] Kahin, *Rebellion to Integration*, 99.
[113] R. Michael Feener, *Shari'a and Social Engineering: The Implementation of Islamic Law in Contemporary Aceh, Indonesia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 31–33.
[114] Anthony Reid, *The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra*, 2nd ed. (Singapore: NUS Press, 2014), 126–127.
[115] Oral history with K. H. M. Zen Syukri, June 7, 2010, Palembang; oral history with M. Thahir Azhari, January 17, 2010, Ciputat.
[116] Reid, *Blood of the People*, 176.
[117] Bosra, *Tuang Guru, Anrong Guru dan Daeng Guru*, 255.
[118] Bosra, *Tuang Guru, Anrong Guru dan Daeng Guru*, 258–259.
[119] Suriansyah Ideham et al., *Sejarah Banjar*, Bab VI.
[120] M. Nur Maksum et al., *Musyawaratuththalibin*, 71.

In Eastern Indonesia, then, one could argue that Islam was neither promoted nor discouraged; it was contained. This was in keeping with Japanese plans to keep Eastern Indonesia in their empire for perpetuity, and thus not to empower any representatives, religious or secular, of the indigenous populations in the eastern archipelago.[121]

Across the three occupation zones, there was early opposition to the Japanese occupation, but this never grew into something effective. When the Japanese initially instructed Muslims to bow toward Tokyo rather than Mecca during their prayers, Muslims thoroughly rejected these orders.[122] As the Japanese learned more about traditional customs and avoided such flagrantly offensive instructions, most resistance faded from the Islamic sector. Instead, opposition to the Japanese on Java at least coalesced around communists and socialists in Jakarta, especially Amir Sjarifuddin and Sutan Sjahrir and their young followers. Amir's circle failed in its attempts to resist; when the activists were arrested in early 1943, the Japanese executed most of Amir's deputies and spared Amir only because of a personal plea from Sukarno.[123] Sutan Sjahrir's circle, however, succeeded only by limiting itself to political discussions and nationalist theorizing, what Anderson called "thinking dangerous thoughts."[124] Both of these resistance groups were left-leaning and did not include any prominent Islamic activists.[125] Although a circle of Muslim youth formed around the Muslim intellectual Mohammad Natsir, it was significantly smaller, less influential, and not so strongly opposed to the Japanese.[126] Within the urban Islamic community on Java, the initiative remained with those who collaborated with the Japanese during the occupation, and outright opposition was minimal.

Rather, the Japanese encouraged or imposed cooperation at all levels. They began building up Indonesian strength to help combat any Allied invasion toward the end of the war. This involved the creation of military units and militias. Though the Japanese originally formed these militias with the intention that they could aid the Japanese military, it became clear by 1945 that these military and paramilitary groups would serve as the defenders of impending Indonesian independence. On Java, the

[121] Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 13.
[122] Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 122–123. Cf. Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution*, 128.
[123] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 38.
[124] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 49.
[125] For more on the underground resistance of Amir and Sjahrir, see Anton Lucas, ed., *Local Opposition and Underground Resistance to the Japanese in Java, 1942–1945* (Melbourne: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986).
[126] Latif, *Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power*, 217.

Japanese first inaugurated an indigenous fighting force in October 1943, a group called Pembela Tanah Air (Fatherland Defenders, known as Peta). This effort involved giving some 40,000 Javanese cadres military training in the Japanese style and providing their soldiers with limited arms.[127] On Sumatra, a similar effort, known by its Japanese name Giyugun (People's Militias), trained between 7,500 and 9,000.[128] More than a year later, in December 1944, the Japanese started a similar initiative on Java for specifically Islamic militias. This force, called the Hizbullah (from the Arabic for "Faction of God"), had the stated purpose "to realize the device of the Indonesian Muslim community, viz. to stand together with Japan, in the path of the Lord, in any situation."[129] Contradictory though their charge was, the training of Muslim military leaders for this auxiliary of Masjoemi proved important for the Muslim community's participation in the later revolution against the Dutch. Although perhaps no more than 500 men graduated from the Hizbullah training program, their effect was greatly multiplied by Muslim men who flocked into Islamic militias, swelling the militia's numbers to 50,000.[130]

On the outer islands, the Japanese did not build up Muslim militias in the same way. No separate Islamic militia group was ever formed on Sumatra by the Japanese, but many of the Japanese-trained military leaders for the Giyugun there were products of the Islamic educational system and active in Islamic organizations.[131] In Eastern Indonesia, Japanese preparations for Indonesian independence only began very briefly before the end of the war, so they sponsored no military groups.[132] By contrast, some Muslim militias formed independently in mid-1945, and these represented the main preparations of East Indonesian Muslims for independence.[133]

Between the consolidation of the Dutch territory in Southeast Asia and the collapse of Japanese occupation in the region, there were major shifts in Islamic life in Indonesia. In August 1945, they quickly became compounded with the rapid changes of the revolution. Muslims were primed to engage in a fight, to defend their religion, and to build a more religious future for their country.

[127] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 20–21; Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 14.
[128] Mestika Zed, "Giyugun – The Indigenous Defense Force in Sumatra," in Peter Post, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 128–132.
[129] Quoted in van Nieuwenhuijze, "Japanese Islam Policy on Java," 159.
[130] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 26; Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 17.
[131] Kahin, *Rebellion to Integration*, 102–103.
[132] Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 13.
[133] Bosra, *Tuang Guru, Anrong Guru dan Daeng Guru*, 261–262.

Part I

Islam in Indonesia's War of Independence

2 Islamic Calls to Action

Saifulkan Angai was sixteen years old when the Dutch came back to South Kalimantan in 1946 as part of their efforts to reclaim their colony. Faced with revolution, he joined the Muhammadiyah Islamic organization and enlisted in the organization's local militia for the struggle against the colonizers and their troops. Crucial to his involvement in the militia were the exhortations from the local religious leader in the rural town of Marabahan, a man named H. Mahyuni. This learned scholar encouraged Muslim men to join in fighting the Dutch, promised them that this was a holy war, that anyone who died on Indonesia's side in the war would be a martyr, and that these martyrs would receive rewards from God in the afterlife. According to Saifulkan Angai, "For the Muslims, they were seen as martyrs that liberated the faith, liberated us, so we could put [Islam] into practice." As he recalled sixty years later, this made the Indonesian side much more enthusiastic and vigorous in their defense of the homeland, and it brought more fighters to join their struggle.[1]

Pronouncements from the local ulama were only one kind of many Islamic calls to action during the Indonesian revolution. These calls to action ranged from one-line chants and slogans to long, intricate essays, and sometimes they were even unspoken, like the implicit instigation caused by Dutch attacks on Islamic targets. The most obvious and most plentiful type of call was the *fatwa*, or Islamic juridical decree that classified an action within Islamic law as mandatory, forbidden, or something in between. Many fatwas were issued across the country and throughout the course of the revolution to call Muslims to the struggle, often requiring them to participate as a religious obligation, and explaining to them why this was a worthy – even holy – cause.

These Islamic calls to action are a natural starting place because they provide a window into Muslim understandings of the revolution. Of

[1] Interview with H. Saifulkan Angai, Marabahan, South Kalimantan, September 26, 2010. My thanks to Irfan Noor, Syaharuddin, Ahmad Syadzali, and H. Mustofa for helping to arrange this interview.

course, there was not a uniform ideology for all Muslims – there also existed variation within theological explanations of the necessity of fighting the Dutch. However, it is clear that many Muslims had an understanding of the fight that focused on theological imperatives, quite distinct from secular nationalism. Muslims claimed the revolution against the Dutch as a religious war, or *jihad fi sabilillah*. The mobilization was, in their view, not just to uphold Indonesian independence but also to defend the Islamic religion; ulama believed that independence was an important bulwark to support and further Islam, and therefore they preached that Muslims were obliged to join in fighting the Dutch. Islamic calls to action colored the way that Muslims saw and understood both their participation in the revolution and the intended outcome of the struggle.

The Reasons for the Revolutionary Struggle

When trying to unpack how Muslims in the Indonesian revolution understood underlying objectives of the struggle, one first must recognize that the main priority for all groups, Islamic and secular, was independence. All sides repeated the mantra, "*Yang penting, merdeka*" (What's important is independence) in both contemporary and subsequent accounts. There can be no doubt that the expulsion of the Dutch was the point on which all revolutionaries, of every variant interpretation, could agree. Even those ulama and Muslim groups who were most committed to the establishment of an Islamic state emphasize in later accounts that, during the four years of the revolution, they put achieving independence from the Dutch first.[2] To what end, though, did Muslims want this independence? This varied within the diversity of Indonesian Muslims, but some broad lines of commonality were clear.

Islamic ideas about the fight did not stop at gaining independence from the Dutch; in fact, independence from the Dutch was just one necessary step on the way to their Islamic aspirations. For the Islamic militias, the popular slogan "*Merdeka atau mati*!" (Freedom or death!) was understood as defending "the Republic, Religion, and the Homeland." Furthermore, it was only half of their battle cry; this was completed with "*Allahu Akbar*!" (God is the greatest!).[3] Indeed, "*Allahu*

[2] This was emphasized in interviews with, among others, T. G. K. H. Drs. M. Thoulun Abd. Rauf, Palembang, June 7, 2010; Buya Mozhar, Padang, June 14, 2010; Ahmad J. D., Mataram, August 28, 2010; and H. Saifulkan Angai, Marabahan, September 26, 2010.

[3] K. H. Saifuddin Zuhri, *Guruku Orang-Orang dari Pesantren* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2001 [1974]), 347, 358.

Akbar" was a common refrain among all streams of revolutionary leaders, including famously unorthodox leaders like Bung Tomo, the Indonesian commander in the Battle of Surabaya.[4] The repetition of the Muslim battle cry over the radio every night by Bung Tomo both appealed to Muslim fighting forces and gave religious gravity to major announcements.[5]

Another common battle cry for Islamic groups encouraging their members to join the physical struggle for independence was "*isy kariman mut syahidan*," an Indonesian form of the Arabic expression for "live nobly, die as martyrs."[6] The connection of theological positions (the greatness of God, the idea of martyrdom) with the independence of the country demonstrates how Muslims understood the fight in more than secular nationalist terms. This suggests that more than just national independence was at stake.

For many Muslims, the independence of Indonesia was closely tied to the independence of their religion. The Yogyakarta newspaper *Kedaulatan Rakyat* reported in late October 1945, about a resolution of the organization Nahdlatul Ulama that clearly connected the national struggle and religious struggle in this way:

> We strongly implore the Government of Indonesia that they define a position and actions that are clear and proportionate to every effort to endanger the independence of the religion and state of Indonesia, especially regarding the Dutch and their agents. We ask that it be ordered to continue the struggle in the way of God, to hold firm the state of the Republic of Indonesia, freedom, and the Islamic religion.[7]

According to the NU, "struggle in the way of God" was inextricably tied to the new Republic, and freedom was tied to Islam. This sentiment was echoed in the newspaper affiliated with the Islamic party Masjumi, the daily *Al-Djihad*, on January 28, 1946, when Wondoamiseno, at the time a leader of the Islamic militia Hizbullah, spoke of the "independence of our country and our people" being "based on Islam."[8]

Freedom and independence, and especially the concept of freedom of religion, carried particular meanings for Indonesian Muslims, which did not always dovetail with the Jeffersonian/Madisonian idea of freedom of religion. As noted by Dutch scholarship at the time, most Muslims in

[4] Tim Penyusun Buku PWNU Jatim, *Peranan Ulama dalam Perjuangan Kemerdekaan* (Surabaya: Pengurus Wilayah Nahdlatul Ulama Jawa Timur, 1995), 60.
[5] Frederick, *Visions and Heat*, 252. [6] Koto, *Pemikiran Politik PERTI*, 183.
[7] Quoted in Tim Penyusun Buku PWNU Jatim, *Peranan Ulama dalam Perjuangan Kemerdekaan*, 63.
[8] Quoted in Deliar Noer, "Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indonesia," MA thesis, Cornell University, 1960, 76.

Indonesia, when faced with these two rather abstract nouns (freedom, religion; in Indonesian as *kemerdekaan agama*) set in relation to each other, would be more likely to interpret them as "freedom for religion" than "freedom of religion," with the necessary implication that this freedom was specifically granted to Islam so that it could finally achieve its goal of "the Muslim community in the full, Islamic sense of the word," i.e., enshrined in the laws and the state.[9] Thus, for these Muslim revolutionaries, the key to Indonesia being free was the practice of Islam, and the key for Islam to be free was an independent Indonesia.

Early Fatwas

From the beginning of the revolution and across the archipelago, Muslims at the grassroots were not just spreading their own slogans about religion and the Indonesian cause, they were also hearing decrees from Islamic scholars about the war. In Islamic terms, these decrees were issued as fatwas. A fatwa is an "opinion on a point of law," usually sought from a qualified expert (or, in many modern settings, a board of experts) by a specific individual to provide Islamic legal guidance on their circumstances.[10] In the Indonesian context, fatwas were issued by both by individual Islamic jurists and by organizations, who would assemble boards of qualified men to weigh in on matters related to Islamic law. The fatwas decided upon for individual cases would be sent to the individuals concerned, but for points of widespread public interest they could be published in newspapers or organizational newsletters, announced or preached from the mosque pulpit on Fridays, or spread simply by repetition and word of mouth. During the revolution, many of the most prominent fatwas were issued by collective boards of scholars, rather than individuals (or at least claimed to speak for a group of scholars).

Those fatwas related to the Indonesian revolution invariably called the struggle a *perang fi sabilillah* or *jihad fi sabilillah* (war in the way of God). As an evaluation of the legal status of the war under Islamic law, this both had the power to motivate (or obligate) Muslims to take up arms and to reinterpret or reframe for Muslim participants the nature of the fight.[11]

[9] C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, "Islam in a Period of Transition in Indonesia," in *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 82.

[10] E. Tyan, "Fatwā," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., Brill Online, 2012.

[11] This connects to Benedict Anderson's ideas about political communication and change of consciousness; see his "Cartoons and Monuments: The Evolution of Political Communication under the New Order," reprinted in Benedict R. O'G. Anderson,

Fatwas are thus a useful window into the thinking of Islamic scholars about the Indonesian revolution.

One of the earliest fatwas, issued by the leader of NU, K. H. Hasjim Asj'ari, in September or October 1945, has now been lost to history, probably because it was issued in *pegon* (Javanese written in Arabic script) and thus was not carried by Romanized print media.[12] A number of other announcements or proclamations rejecting Dutch imperialism and hailing Indonesian independence from an Islamic standpoint were also made at mass meetings in the early months of independence, but few of these were recorded precisely.[13]

The first major fatwa to be published was decreed on October 15, 1945, in Aceh. Issued by the new civilian government of Aceh, the Romanized Indonesian text announced the end of World War II and warned of the danger of Dutch recolonization:

> They will enslave the people of Indonesia to become their servants again, and they will enact efforts to destroy our pure Islamic religion and to suppress and impede the greatness and prosperity of the Indonesian nation.… In accordance with our belief that this struggle is a pure struggle that is called PERANG SABIL [Holy War], therefore believe, O my nation, that this struggle is a continuation of the earlier struggle in Aceh led by the late Tgk. Tji' Di Tiro [the leader of the Acehnese in the Dutch-Aceh War, 1873–1910] and the other heroes of the nation. For that reason, awaken, O my nation, and be united in standing shoulder-to-shoulder and taking steps forward to join in the footsteps of the struggle of our ancestors before us. Follow obediently all of the orders that our leaders give us for the rescuing of our Homeland, Religion, and Nation.

The document is then signed by four leading elderly ulama from different parts of Aceh, and attested to by the civilian administrators of the day.[14] This fatwa is consonant with another provincial proclamation – in this case a government order, rather than a religious one – issued in Aceh on the same day. In that proclamation, Tuanku Mahmud, the head of the regional branch of the new Indonesian government, called for peaceful relations between all religions and prosperity for all. Most notably, it instructed readers, "Do not let [internal Indonesian] differences of

Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006 [1990]), 152–193.

[12] Amiq, "Two Fatwas on Jihad against the Dutch Colonization in Indonesia," 104.

[13] Amiq, "Two Fatwas on Jihad against the Dutch Colonization in Indonesia," 95–96. See also Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, 75, noting that even the meeting that established the Islamic party Masjumi was begun with a fatwa about fighting.

[14] Arsip Provinsi Aceh, Koleksi Karesidenan Aceh 1945–49 dan 1951–52, #217.

religion become a barrier in the struggle for independence. Do not do anything that could offend the feelings of various religions."[15]

That very nationalistic, only mildly Islamic vision of independence contrasted with a more militant fatwa circulated at the same time. The second fatwa was written in Jawi (Indonesian written with Arabic script), the language of the Islamic clerical class. It probably went out to Islamic scholars in Aceh, being read at Friday sermons and taught in Islamic schools, but because of its script it would have been inaccessible to many government bureaucrats and secular-leaning leaders. This Jawi fatwa was issued from the same place, with the same date, but with a more overtly religious message:

> May all of you, brother Muslims, continue on in the pleasure of God, that is the independence of our country Indonesia. Hopefully all of us will give Thanks to God, … and may we be close to one another in the closeness of the Army of Mujahidin [Islamic religious fighters] that enjoys the Blessing of the Religion of God and raise up the Word of God and hold fast to the instructions of Islam. [At this point the proclamation gives excerpts from four Qur'anic verses in the original Arabic: Al-Ma'idah 5:2, Al-Imran 3:64, An-Nisa 4:89, and Al-Baqara 2:120. The proclamation did not translate them for readers.] It is mandatory for us to join in the fighting of the enemies of God and enemies of the Prophet and to follow … Muslims, do not follow those Infidel Colonizers or those who lean towards them who want to re-colonize Indonesia. It is mandatory for us to love and be close to God and His Prophet, and may you sacrifice Life and Wealth to strengthen the Religion of God and the legitimate kingdom.[16]

The second, through its invocation of Qur'anic verses, demonization of the Dutch in Islamic terminology (Arabic-, not Sanskritic-root, particularly using the word *kafir* or infidel), and heavy invocation of the Prophet in addition to God, focuses its audience on a more strict and theological message. Thus, even in the case of Aceh, where the local branch of the Republican government openly recognized some religious aspirations in the early revolution, the intentions and motivations of the Islamic scholarly class were more radically Islamic than the government recognized. For this region, specifically, the Islamic vision of decolonization was written into an existing Islamic narrative of resistance to the Dutch, dating back to the Dutch war to conquer Aceh that began in 1873.[17]

[15] Arsip Provinsi Aceh, Koleksi Karesidenan Aceh 1945–49 dan 1951–52, #67.

[16] A copy of this proclamation, in both its Jawi and Romanized Indonesian forms, is available in Arsip Provinsi Aceh, Koleksi Karesidenan Aceh 1945–49 dan 1951–52, #217. Ellipses in the original.

[17] Edward Aspinall, *Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 25–30.

The Acehnese fatwas, the first major Islamic decrees to be publicized during the revolution, set the tone for future Islamic decrees, by stating an unambiguously Islamic logic for resisting the Dutch, by mandating Muslim participation in the fight, and by conflicting so starkly with the proclamations of the secular government issued at the same time. These elements were soon repeated on Java.

The most famous fatwa to come out in favor of the revolution was issued by the Nahdlatul Ulama of East Java on the eve of the Battle of Surabaya. Gathering together on the night of October 21, 1945, under the leadership of K. H. Wahab Hasbullah, and with the knowledge of the organization's ultimate leader K. H. Hasjim Asj'ari, the leading traditionalist Islamic minds of the region discussed the military and political situation in terms of religious obligation. In the wee hours of the morning on October 22, 1945, they settled on the following decree:

1. The independence of Indonesia that was proclaimed on 17 August 1945, must be defended.
2. The Republic of Indonesia, as the only legitimate government, must be defended and preserved even if this demands the sacrifice of property and lives.
3. The enemies of the Republic of Indonesia, especially the Dutch army that has come piggy-backing on the duties of the Allies (America-England) regarding the issue of Japanese prisoners of war, will certainly use this political and military opportunity to re-colonize Indonesia.
4. The Islamic community, especially followers of Nahdlatul Ulama, is required to raise arms to oppose the Dutch and their accomplices who wish to re-colonize Indonesia.
5. This requirement is a "jihad" that becomes mandatory for every Muslim (*fardlu 'ain*) who is within a radius of 94 Km (that is, the distance within which a Muslim can pray congregational prayers and travelers' prayers). Those who are outside of the defined radius are obligated to help those brothers who are within the aforementioned 94 Km radius.[18]

This fatwa was crucial in building the support of the Islamic militias for the total struggle that was to break out immediately afterward in Surabaya. More notably, this decree was not in line with the secular national

[18] Tim Penyusun Buku PWNU Jatim, *Peranan Ulama dalam Perjuangan Kemerdekaan*, 59. The parenthetical interjections in the original.

direction of the Indonesian state.[19] The resolution proclaiming a *jihad* immediately gave the Indonesian revolution another meaning for those who followed the fatwa; it caused them to think of the national struggle in religious, not secular, terms. This naturally led to conceiving of the *outcome* of the struggle in religious terms. NU was not alone in issuing an organizational fatwa for religious struggle against the Dutch.

A Flood of Fatwas

In fact, for a brief window at the beginning of the revolution, the rhetoric of *jihad* and Islamic struggle seemed ubiquitous in Indonesia. Even the left-leaning paper *Merdeka* in Jakarta employed the rhetoric of *jihad fi sabilillah*. On November 30, 1945, after reporting on various Islamic groups who were participating in the fighting and an Islamic school that was closed because all of its students felt the call of God to the battlefield, the newspaper published an Islamic call to arms. Under the heading "*Berdjoeang Fisabilillah*!" (Go Struggle in the Way of God!), the paper wrote "People of faith struggle in the way of God; people of disbelief struggle in the way of Satan."[20]

The trend of issuing fatwas to label the Indonesian revolution a holy war was so large and conspicuous that it received a response from the national government. Just as major public fatwas began to boom, Vice-President Mohammad Hatta issued a Government Declaration (*Maklumat Pemerintah*) on October 17, 1945, labeled "Prohibition on declaring (Holy) war by any individual." Using the reasoning that Indonesia must coordinate its defense carefully and present itself well before other nations, the vice-president declared it illegal for any individual outside the government to declare war or to make known a holy war (*perang sabil*). The text of the declaration also refers to fierce anger in all quarters of society, suggesting that such statements of holy war were legion and not limited to very pious Muslims.[21] Hatta's prohibition on such fatwas seemed to have no effect at the grassroots level; the month after this Government Declaration saw the most prominent fatwas issued by NU, the new Masjumi party, and others.

[19] Notwithstanding the attempts of low-level NU activists in recent years to argue otherwise; see, e.g., Gugun El-Guyanie, *Resolusi Jihad Paling Syar'i: Biarkan Kebenaran yang Hampir Setengah Abad Dikaburkan Catatan Sejarah Itu Terbongkar!* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pesantren, 2010), especially 99ff.

[20] *Merdeka*, November 30, 1945.

[21] Koesnodiprodjo, *Himpunan Undang[2], Peraturan[2], Penetapan[2] Pemerintah Republik Indonesia 1945* (Jakarta: S. K. Seno, 1951), 60.

The historian Anthony Reid has argued that the pattern of calling for holy war in all quarters "quickly faded" about one month later, from November 1945, because ulama doubted "whether a *jihad* was an appropriate form of struggle for a state which promised no stronger place for Islam than its Japanese and Dutch predecessors."[22] However, this reasoning does not explain what happened on the ground, where fatwas in fact continued, or account for the religious logic of these declarations. Fatwas that had already been issued remained in effect for the duration of the conflict, meaning that a dearth of new declarations of *jihad* did not necessarily mean that the "holy war" character of the conflict had gone away. Furthermore, ulama and leaders of religious organizations and parties continued to issue fatwas urging the people to join the struggle until the end of the revolution, showing their belief that the conflict would lead to a greater place for Islam in an independent Indonesia.

To demonstrate the continual flow of fatwas, one can look at the second half of 1947, a full two years after the revolution started. In July 1947, after the First Dutch Aggression (euphemized by the Netherlands as a "Police Action"), Muslim leaders across Java issued fresh calls for *jihad fi sabilillah*. In August, S. M. Kartosuwirjo, a former Sarekat Islam activist associated with Masjumi and leading Islamic militias in West Java, appealed for Muslims to redouble their efforts in the holy war.[23] On September 18, 1947, the Majelis Syuro' (Consultative Council) of the Masjumi party issued a renewed call for religious struggle against the Dutch; it recategorized the holy war as personally (not just collectively) incumbent on all Muslims, male and female, and it confirmed that any who died in the fighting would be martyrs.[24] Later in September, the new political party Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia made a similar declaration, echoing the rhetoric of Kartosuwirjo.[25] Thus, Islamic organizations and leaders in Indonesia continued to employ the rhetoric of *jihad* – even to impose an obligation of *jihad* – repeatedly through the end of the revolution.

These national statements were complemented and made real by local ulama. Although less likely to be written down, local proclamations of holy war were common throughout Indonesia, and such proclamations were important motivators for Muslim participants, as recounted by former soldiers from Islamic militias across Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan,

[22] Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 56.
[23] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 103.
[24] ANRI RA10, Djogdja Documenten 1945–1949, #243.
[25] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 105.

Sulawesi, and Lombok.[26] While repeating several points of the organizational proclamations examined previously, former participants in the revolution recounted that the emphasis of local ulama was on martyrdom, and their messages were delivered directly to Muslim militias who might be faced with the prospect of death in battle.[27]

Some fatwas went even further in promoting participation in the war. K. H. Hasjim Asj'ari of NU forbade Muslims from going on the pilgrimage to Mecca in a July 1946 fatwa; because the travel was difficult and unsafe under the current conditions, and because the Dutch were using the opportunity of the *hajj* to trick Indonesian Muslims, he decreed this fifth pillar of the Islamic faith was temporarily forbidden.[28] The intention was to keep all available Muslim men in Indonesia to engage in the struggle and to weaken Dutch attempts to appear accommodating of Islam. In North Sumatra, the Jamiyatul Washliyah organization also went above and beyond in supporting the cause of the revolution, even to the point where one decree proclaimed that "Anyone who is a traitor to their homeland, their blood is *halal*."[29] This was a sharper application of the saying of the Prophet Muhammad that apostates who separate from the community are one of the three categories of Muslims whose blood is legally permitted[30]; the Washliyah resolution assumed (or decreed) that those not fighting for Indonesia were also apostates. Among other things, this allowed its Muslim followers to kill their local feudal leaders and other Muslims with clear consciences.

[26] Interviews with H. Munir Zakaria, Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, February 3, 2010; Zainal Abidin, Sigli, Aceh, March 15, 2010; Abdurrahman Teuku Cek, Banda Aceh, Aceh, March 17, 2010; TG. K. H. Drs. M. Thohlon Abd. Rauf, Palembang, South Sumatra, June 17, 2010; H. Jamiluddin Azhar, Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara, July 27, 2010; H. Saifulkan Angai, Marabahan, South Kalimantan, September 26, 2010; and Sayyid Saggaf Al-Jufri, Palu, Central Sulawesi, October 11, 2010.

[27] This was made especially clear to me by H. Saifulkan Angai, but others confirmed his analysis for other regions.

[28] His *fatwa* to this effect was printed in the newspaper *Lasjkar*, July 31, 1946, p. 2. This opinion was later confirmed by the Ministry of Religion; Akh. Minhaji and M. Atho Mudzhar, "Prof. K.H. Fathurrahman Kafrawi: Pengajaran Agama di Sekolah Umum," in Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, eds., *Menteri-Menteri Agama RI: Biografi Sosial-Politik* (Jakarta: Badan Litbang Agama Departemen Agama RI bekerjasama dengan PPIM-IAIN Jakarta, 1998), 49.

[29] Ahmad Hamim Azizy, *Al-Jam'iyatul Washliyah dalam Kancah Politik Indonesia* (Banda Aceh: Yayasan Pena, 2006), 102. *Halal* is the Muslim equivalent of kosher, meaning that the food or activity is permissible for Muslims. Although Azizy does not give a date for this *fatwa*, he states that Jam'iyatul Washliyah issued it during the social revolution, which peaked in North Sumatra in 1947.

[30] Amiq, "Two Fatwas on Jihad against the Dutch Colonization in Indonesia," 94. The saying was recorded in the hadith collection *Sahih Muslim*.

A Manifesto for the Islamic Revolution: M. Arsjad Thalib Lubis's *Toentoenan Perang Sabil*

One of the most complete and most permanent of the many calls for holy war in the Indonesian revolution was a book by the Medan-based Islamic scholar M. Arsjad Thalib Lubis. Lubis was born in 1908, about 40 km north of Medan, and schooled entirely in the region. He became one of the leaders of the North Sumatran Islamic organization Jamiyatul Washliyah in the 1930s and continued to be active in the teaching and administration of this organization through the end of his life.[31]

In early 1946, he penned what would become his most famous work: a ninety-page booklet in Romanized Indonesian entitled *Toentoenan Perang Sabil* or *Guidelines for Holy War*.[32] In this book, dated February 8, 1946 (or, in the Islamic calendar, Rabi'ulawal 7, 1365), Lubis not only laid out general guidelines for a holy war according to Islamic law, he also applied these guidelines to the conflict with the Dutch and gave very specific instructions to help Indonesians engage in the struggle. Because Lubis was a prominent figure in the leading traditionalist Islamic organization across northern and eastern Sumatra, the book and its ideas had the authority and network to spread widely, and followers of the organization still today herald it as one of the scholar's major works.[33] The book's popularity is also shown by the fact that it was reprinted in 1957, after which it gained traction among participants in a regional rebellion, leading to some trouble for Lubis.[34] The book reads half as a spur to action and half as a field manual for the *perang fi sabilillah* or "war in the way of God."

Lubis first addressed the question of holy war theoretically. Thus, the first twenty pages of the book spelled out the history of the Prophet as regards waging war, the requirements for something to be declared a holy war, and the mandates for action when a war receives this appellation (specifically, the requirement to participate and the prohibition from retreat).

In the third chapter, Lubis directly answered the critical question that caused him to write the book. In no uncertain terms, he stated that

[31] M. Hasballah Thaib, *Syeikh H.M. Arsyad Thalib Lubis: Pemikiran dan Karya Monumental* (Medan: Perdana, 2012).

[32] M. Arsjad Th. Loebis, *Toentoenan Perang Sabil* ([Medan]: Aboe Hanifah and Ibnoe Moehammad, 1946).

[33] Interview with Edy Zuhrawardi Pane, Medan, February 21, 2017; he was one of the syeikh's last students in 1970–1971, just before he passed away.

[34] M. Arsjad Th. Lubis, *Penuntun Perang Sabil* (Medan: Madju, 1957); interview with Usman Batubara, Medan, February 27, 2017.

According to my understanding and position, fighting in the war against the Dutch people and their assistants who want to conquer our homeland Indonesia, falls into the category of a war blessed by God, a war that opposes the enemies of God, and a war that will lift up the Word of God (*kalimatoellah*) in Indonesia. Because of this, whosoever joins in the fight with pure intentions, with the intention to lift up the Word of God, with the intention to claim blessings and reward from God, with the intention to destroy the enemies of God, then he is fighting in the way of God, and if he is killed his death is martyrdom in the way of God, and he will go to heaven.[35]

This fatwa by Lubis was argued more fully and more exhaustively than other fatwas issued at the time, but in this way it was also more gripping. Lubis laid out the several requirements where the fight to repel the Dutch qualified as a holy war, and then proclaimed its status – a proclamation made all the more powerful by the preceding chapters on the importance and blessings associated with such a fight.

As if to drive home the correctness of his conclusion, Lubis then listed five other fatwas from around Sumatra and Java declaring the Indonesian struggle against the Dutch to be a holy war, more evidence of the large number of fatwas issued around this time. First he pointed to the resolution of the Masjumi congress on November 7–8, 1945, which stated "The independence of the country and nation of Indonesia is an absolute necessity in order that Islam can live safely and well in our homeland. Each Indonesian is required to defend that independence." Next he reprinted the fatwa of his own organization, Jamiyatul Washliyah, in early December 1945, saying

It is required for each member of the Islamic community of Indonesia to reject the coming of the Dutch and their allies who want to take control of Indonesia. Muslims who die in the battle rejecting the Dutch and their allies, whose deaths are caused by that fight and who intend to uphold the Islamic religion, are martyrs in the way of God.

The All-Muslim Congress of Sumatra on December 6–9, 1945 had issued a fatwa saying, "The struggle to drive out the enemies from our homeland or to destroy them is required on each individual (not collectively on the community)." Syeikh Sulaiman ar-Rasoeli, a venerated scholar from West Sumatra, had announced to his followers, "This is what is called a holy war (*fi sabilillah*) and whoever dies in this war dies as a martyr, because they are defending our country, nation, and religion, namely Islam." Finally, Lubis wrote that the leading scholars in Medan had gathered on October 18, 1945 to answer a question from the

[35] Loebis, *Toentoenan Perang Sabil*, 22.

Indonesian governor of Sumatra, asking what was the legal status of those who died fighting the Dutch and their lackeys. The answer was "They die as martyrs. [Thus] their corpses do not need to be washed and do not need to be prayed over" in the usual way.[36] Citing these rulings from across Sumatra and also from Java shows that the fatwas of the archipelago did circulate beyond just their local regions and that they were shared and spread within the Muslim community. For readers of the book, though, all of these other authorities upheld Lubis's position that this was a holy war, so that it was both easy and necessary to see the war of independence through an Islamic lens.

The remainder of *Toentoenan Perang Sabil* was written as a handbook for those soldiers and their support staff engaged in the war. Lubis included chapters on "Guidelines for Holy War" (with such rules as the prohibition from retreat, and the injunction to swear oaths before taking to the battlefield), "Guidelines for Rituals during War Time" (with several simplifications and allowances for those engaged in holy war), "Islamic Women on the Battlefield" (outlining their potential roles, such as bringing water and tending the wounded), "Explanation of Dying as a Martyr" (who qualifies and how to treat the corpses), "Glorious Work when Facing War" (supporting roles such as funding supplies and acting as a look-out), "Prayers to Say When Facing Battle," and "Islamic Spirit for the Struggle."

Lubis positioned his booklet within the contexts of both Islamic theology *and* Indonesian nationalism. Immediately after his preface, Lubis reprinted the August 17, 1945, Indonesian Proclamation of Independence made by President Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta, two secularist Muslim politicians. At the end of each chapter, he chose an inspiring quote, selecting three from classical or modern Arab authors and three from leading Indonesian activists (Sukarno, H. Agus Salim, and H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto). Most interestingly, in the last chapter he wrote about the war as not merely a reflection on individual Muslims in Indonesia, but as a reflection on how the Indonesian nation as a whole was an Islamic nation, saying "if we retreat or run away we will be insulted as a nation who lost and died becoming the occupants of hell."[37]

Importantly, several times throughout the book Lubis recounted for his reader the outcome of this war (if fought with a pure Islamic spirit intending to uphold the Word of God). When dedicating this work to the Islamic militias active in his region, the introduction stated the intent of these militias as "defending the independence of our homeland so as to

[36] Loebis, *Toentoenan Perang Sabil*, 23–25. [37] Loebis, *Toentoenan Perang Sabil*, 85.

make the Word of God the highest object of veneration."[38] Later, when decreeing his fatwa, Lubis predicted that in an independent Indonesia, the products of the land would be used for the enrichment of the people.[39] In the final chapter, as he presented inspiration to imbue his readers with an "Islamic Fighting Spirit," Lubis foresaw Indonesians "standing firm in their independence upon truth, receiving justice, living prosperously in peace, and with compassion for one another."[40]

M. Arsjad Thalib Lubis was long seen as staunchly conservative, and sometimes as a bit of a hothead in his proclamations; for example, he participated in the Jamiyatul Washliyah fatwa mentioned in the preceding text that decreed the blood of enemies to be *halal*. However, as the other fatwas of 1945 have shown, Lubis was far from the only scholar proclaiming the Indonesian Revolution a holy war. This book was just a particularly lengthy, prominent example of the attitude of Islamic scholars facing this war. Islamic scholars claimed this war as an Islamic struggle and believed in specific theological outcomes if the battle was well fought, both for the individual (blessing on earth or martyrdom) and for the nation (blessing and prosperity). This longer theological manifesto, like the succinct fatwas and even shorter battle slogans, and also alongside other extended guides to Islamic war that circulated during the revolution,[41] spread the Islamic understanding of the revolution to the broader Muslim population and imbued the struggle with strong religious overtones.

Attacks on Islam as Calls for Action

Fatwas provide an insight into the thinking of the religious elites who created them, although the way that they were spread around and the testimony from oral history shows that they were not just limited to these religious elites. To get at the perspective of pious Muslim nonelites is more difficult, but one demonstration of their motivation comes from the key moments that escalated Muslim fighting for independence. Muslim soldiers were extraordinarily motivated by attacks on mosques or Islamic symbols.

[38] Loebis, *Toentoenan Perang Sabil*, 4. [39] Loebis, *Toentoenan Perang Sabil*, 19.
[40] Loebis, *Toentoenan Perang Sabil*, 79.
[41] E.g., Asasoedin Sokah, *Panggilan Sjahid* (Padang Pandjang: Badezst, 1945); *Pedoman Oemmat Islam didalam Pertempoeran* (Jogjakarta: Harian Islam "Al-Djihad," 194[6?]), which was explicitly tied to the Masjumi-backed daily newspaper; Madjlis Sjoera Masjoemi Daerah Priangan, *Sikap Islam terhadap Moesoeh jang Menyerah* (Priangan: Bagian Penerangan Masjoemi, Daerah Priangan, [1949?]).

One of the most famous cases occurred in Luwu, the region of Sulawesi at the northern end of the Gulf of Bone. There, the revolution had been a rather low-level conflict in which the Indonesian side had not, generally, taken great risks, until provoked by attacks on Islam. As one participant from the royal house of the Datu of Luwu told a researcher in 1981,

> The things that pushed us to fight to the death against the colonizers were the establishment of Christian missions that worked to spread the Christian religion in the Luwu region, and if the Islamic community had not opposed it then churches would have popped up all over. Even more so, when the Dutch ripped apart the pages of the Qur'an and beat Tomanjawani, this was a violation that strongly embarrassed us in the Islamic community.[42]

The specific incident previously mentioned bears greater explanation, for it instigated open warfare in the Luwu region. On January 26, 1946, colonial soldiers – a pro-Dutch company of Ambonese Christians – heard that Republican-aligned troops, who had already long retreated from the district capital of Palopo, were gathering in the small village of Bua, 25 km south of the city. One of the local youth, Tomanjawani, heard that the colonial soldiers were coming, and raced to the mosque at Bua to warn the troops there.[43] When the colonial forces arrived, they beat Tomanjawani, who was the only one remaining in the mosque, ripped pages out of the Qur'ans they found there, and desecrated the mosque with graffiti.[44] Even those who were simply found in neighboring houses were jailed.[45]

This incident lit a flame under Muslims in the region, such that they were no longer willing to avoid conflict with the occupying forces. They formulated an immediate military response, which allowed them to briefly retake the city of Palopo.[46] Islamic leaders, like Opu Daeng Risaju (later made a national hero for her role in the struggle; she was also a

[42] Interview of Andi Kaddi Raja with Mahadin Shaleh, September 21, 1981, quoted in Mahadin Shaleh, "Sumbangsih Islam terhadap Perjuangan Kemerdekaan di Luwu," Skripsi S1, Fakultas Adab, IAIN-Alauddin, 1982, 157. A similar sentiment about attacks on Islam spurring more widespread and bolder participation in the revolution was echoed in my interviews with K. H. Sjojah Opu Daeng Malonjo, Bua, Luwu, South Sulawesi, April 27, 2010; Andi Anton Pangeran, Palopo, South Sulawesi, April 27, 2010; and Umar Masri, Ponrang, Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 3, 2010.

[43] Interview with K. H. Sjojah Opu Daeng Malonjo, Bua, Luwu, April 27, 2010. This man was one of those gathered at the mosque who fled before the KNIL soldiers. His participation in the revolution was recognized with an award from the central government in the 1980s.

[44] Shaleh, "Sumbangsih Islam terhadap Perjuangan Kemerdekaan di Luwu," 131.

[45] Interview with K. H. Sjojah Opu Daeng Malonjo, Bua, Luwu, April 27, 2010.

[46] Shaleh, "Sumbangsih Islam terhadap Perjuangan Kemerdekaan di Luwu," 137. Republican forces held Palopo for three days, until colonial reinforcements arrived.

pioneer in the regional branch of the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia), pushed for total war against the Dutch and any other Christians. For this, she was imprisoned and tortured, rendering her deaf for the remainder of her life.[47] From the perspective of gender, Opu Daeng Risaju demonstrates that Muslim women did not limit themselves to supportive or peripheral roles, as envisioned by Lubis's text, for example; women could be active combatants and leaders in the struggle. For the region of Luwu, the incident in Bua and the leadership of Opu Daeng Risaju ended the period of quiescence in Luwu and initiated violent revolution.

Similar anecdotes have appeared across the archipelago regarding the importance of religiously charged incidents in inciting more active participation in the revolution. In South Kalimantan, a colonial soldier stomping on the Qur'an inflamed the Muslims of the Hulu Sungai region to throw themselves more fervently into the independence struggle.[48] Sometimes the local media would even use attacks on mosques to mobilize local fighters, as when the leading headline in the left-leaning Surakarta daily paper *Lasjkar* screamed "Mosques burned by the Dutch!" on September 10, 1946.[49]

Such reactions to the abuse of Islamic symbols give some idea of how Muslims at the grassroots lived out their religious understanding of the conflict, connected to but not restricted to the fatwas of religious scholars. When attacks on Islamic symbols were used as the key instigators for scaling up revolutionary struggle, the sentiments of defending Islam – and thus connecting Islam with the homeland – naturally followed. Once again, religion was woven in as an integral part of the independence fight.

Conclusion

In all the fatwas that flooded Indonesia during the revolution, Islamic scholars made it clear that they saw the fight not in secular nationalist terms. Instead, for them the future independence of Indonesia was tied up with religion: independence was an Islamic goal in itself (thus justifying the proclamation of a holy war), but it was also a means to a greater religious end. Islamic scholars spoke of independence as a necessary step

[47] Mahbubah Kadir Daud, "Opu Daeng Risaju Tokoh PSII dan Perjuangan di Luwu," Skripsi S1, Fakultas Adab, IAIN-Alauddin, 1983, 62.
[48] Muhammad Iqbal, "Menyulut Api di Padang Ilalang: Pidato Politik Soekarno di Amuntai 27 January 1953," Skripsi S1, Universitas Negeri-Yogyakarta, 2009, 58.
[49] "Masjid Dibakar Belanda," *Lasjkar*, September 10, 1946.

toward a more religious society and a state in which Islam could flourish. In these fatwas, the revolution was presented as an Islamic struggle.

Such fatwas served as Islamic calls to action across Indonesia and throughout the revolution. The fact that Lubis, writing in Medan just six months after the proclamation of independence, was able to cite fatwas from as far away as Yogyakarta and Bukittinggi – despite the tremendous difficulties of communication during wartime – shows how they circulated through the Islamic community. Fatwas supporting the revolution came out in many different parts of the archipelago and reached Muslim communities even in remote areas. The fact that even the left-leaning press, in newspapers like *Merdeka* and *Lasjkar*, also printed these Islamic decrees shows that they had weight and appeal in this struggle. And the testimony of Muslim participants like Saifulkan Angai, that they were inspired by exhortations about the revolution as a holy war and believed in the status of the fallen as martyrs, shows that the fatwas framed Muslim understandings of the fight.

Pious Muslim participants in the revolution – beyond the clerical class – not only echoed these Islamic calls to action with their own slogans that invoked Islam. They also took up the Islamic calls to action, both in how they responded to provocations around religiously sensitive sites or symbols and in how they organized themselves for the fight. The way that Muslim communities organized and conducted their struggle during the revolution is the subject of the subsequent chapter.

3 Ulama, Islamic Organizations, and Islamic Militias

In 1948, Lela Rosma was a seventeen-year-old student deep in the interior of West Sumatra when the Dutch invaded her local community for the first time since the Japanese surrender. She fled the town of Payakumbuh, where she had been studying, and traveled back toward her home village with hundreds of others in horse-drawn carts.

Upon reaching her village in Guguak, Lela Rosma reactivated as a member of the local female Islamic militia, *Sabilillah Muslimaat*. This group was the women's branch of the main Islamic militia in the region, *Sabilillah* (a name meaning "in the way of God"), which was, in turn, loosely connected with the national Islamic political party Masjumi. Locally, a branch of the party and its militia had grown up around local ulama (Islamic religious scholars), Islamic schools, and the modernist Muslim organization Muhammadiyah. Although the local women's militia in Guguak had formed prior to the Dutch aggression in December 1948, their activities had been largely restricted to running the local community kitchen. After the Dutch re-entered the area, provoking a conflict in which more than fifty members of the community died, women actively engaged in fighting, too. Rosma's preferred attack involved mixing sand and chili powder and throwing it in the Dutch soldiers' eyes.[1] In other areas of the province, *Sabilillah Muslimaat* was most active in Red Cross activities.[2]

Although the women's Islamic militia in Guguak, West Sumatra, was perhaps especially active, its existence was not exceptional. In fact, *Sabilillah Muslimaat* was one of two major women's militia organizations in the province. The other (called *Lasjkar Muslimat*, or Muslim Women's Troops) was connected with the local traditionalist Islamic organization and also functioned as a division of a much larger men's militia.[3]

[1] Interview with Lela Rosma, Tujuh Koto Talago, West Sumatra, March 21, 2008.
[2] Syamsul Madi, "Partai Politik Islam di Sumatera Barat, 1945–1949," Skripsi S1, Fakultas Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial, Universitas Negeri Padang, 2000, 26.
[3] Koto, *Pemikiran Politik PERTI*, 49 n. 56.

Islamic militias became ubiquitous in Muslim areas of Indonesia to fight off the Dutch. These militias were, more often than not, offshoots of Islamic organizations, which had branches down to the smallest village – anywhere large enough to maintain a mosque for congregational Friday prayers. The organizations were built on the backs of local scholars, the Indonesian ulama, who had been trusted leaders in their communities for decades before the conflict began. The ulama were a long-standing institution in Muslim communities across the archipelago; their role dated back centuries. In many areas, they had also led the resistance to initial colonization by the Dutch. Islamic mass organizations were newer, but had still been established in many communities for more than a generation before the Japanese occupation. Islamic militias were a novel form for most communities, although pulling on older traditions.

All three institutions – ulama, Islamic organizations, and Islamic militias – were critical to the mobilization of Muslims for the revolution. They were also all quite well suited to this task. In addition to urging participation, they could spread a particular, Islamic understanding of the fight. Islamic militia members were likely to serve under religious leaders, and this in turn made them more likely to hear about an Islamic vision for the fight. In the context of these groups, Islam was *the* prism for understanding the revolution.

Ulama as Revolutionary Leaders

Ulama were leaders on the ground organizing and mediating the Islamic experience of the Indonesian revolution. They were called by many names in different parts of the archipelago (*kyai*, *syeikh*, *buya*, and *tuan guru* are some of the more common terms), but regardless of the title this group formed the most prominent and respected leaders in most rural communities, so the fact of their participation is not surprising.[4] Some of the modes of their participation, however, do deserve closer examination.

One early role of Islamic scholars was to convey the news of Indonesia's independence to their followers and interpret this information for them. In the fatwas issued by the NU or in Aceh – always signed by individual prominent ulama so as to carry weight in specific localities – the message included the fact that Indonesian independence had been declared and should be supported by Muslims. This was the first way that some Muslims heard about independence. Importantly, the ulama

[4] Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution*, 11; Bosra, *Tuang Guru, Anrong Guru dan Daeng Guru*, 22.

couched this message in Islamic contexts, often juxtaposed with names of famous Islamic leaders of yore or paired with a call to *jihad*.

In other cases, ulama announced and interpreted independence for their followers in person rather than through a disseminated fatwa, although the form and content of these announcements varied widely. Because ulama so often had youth assembled at their traditional Islamic schools (called *pesantren* or *madrasah*), it was natural that ulama were the ones to inform Islamic youth of the Indonesian independence, and to interpret this independence for them. In Bekasi, on the outskirts of Jakarta, after news of the proclamation came to the local religious scholar, K. H. Noer Alie, the *kyai* ordered his students to assemble at the mosque. There he announced to them that independence had been proclaimed, and he preached about the meaning of independence: "a form of freedom for natives from the colonialism of other nations, especially the Japanese, Dutch, and landlords who were Chinese."[5] In East Lombok, teachers of the famous Nahdlatul Wathan Dinniyah Islamiyah *pesantren*, who had heard word on the radio, were the first to pass on the announcement of independence to their students.[6]

By bringing this news into their local communities, ulama gained a new nationalist identity in their local communities, to complement their existing religious one. They could add an additional component, a revolutionary or military profile, through involvement in the new militias that they were founding in every corner of the country.

Although many folded themselves into Islamic organizations or nationally aligned militias, others wanted to continue to lead independently. In the Muara Enim region of South Sumatra, locals report that H. Moh. Jamili and H. Zainuddin Akudaun led their own fighting force, aligned with both national army and a national Islamic militia group (called *Hizbullah*, see the following text) but subject to neither, drawing on their own charisma.[7] In East Lombok, the location of the Nahdlatul Wathan school mentioned previously, several teachers from this *pesantren*, in particular T. G. H. Faisal, became famous for leading students in guerilla attacks on the Dutch-occupation government.[8] In the Mandar homeland, now West Sulawesi province, K. H. Muhammad Thahir and Imam Lapeo, with the support of the local king's consort Ibu Depu, inspired and oversaw the creation of *Kebaktian Rahasia Islam Muda*

[5] Ali Anwar, *K.H. Noer Alie: Kemandirian Ulama Pejuang* (Bekasi: Yayasan Attaqwa, 2001), 62.
[6] Interview with H. Jamiluddin Azhar, Mataram, July 27, 2010. H. Jamiluddin was a student there in this period.
[7] Interview with T. G. K. H. Drs. M. Thoulun Abd. Rauf, Palembang, June 7, 2010.
[8] Interview with H. Jamiluddin Azhar, July 27, 2010.

(Young Islamic Secret Religious Duty, known as KRIS-Muda), the leading militia of the region.[9] In Central Sulawesi, teachers from the local Alkhairaat branch school in Poso were at the forefront of fighting the Dutch, such that eight of them were shot in the harbor for their militia work, including the head of the school, Abu Samad Hassan.[10] These four examples from different corners of the archipelago point to the common trope of local militias led by Islamic scholars and teachers.

The participation of ulama in the creation or leadership of such local militias was critical in defining the nature of the fighting unit and its mentality going into battle. For Muslims who joined fighting forces because ulama had instructed them to do so, this motivation colored their expectations in these groups. They fought following the prescriptions of Islamic legal thought laid out by the ulama, believed in an ultimate spiritual reward for fighting, and also hoped to establish a country that would allow Islam to grow and flourish.

Ulama also used the discipline of military units to foster piety, interweaving their religious and military roles. In one instance on Takalar, an island off the coast of South Sulawesi, ulama commanded the supposedly nonsectarian *Lipan Bajeng* militia. In this role as leaders, the ulama implemented and regulated the five daily Islamic prayers for their troops and enforced attendance at congregational Friday prayers, which were also used as motivational sessions for the fight. According to several participants, this caused the general piety of the fighters to increase as a result of involvement in the revolution, and even to spread to elsewhere in South Sulawesi through contact with other troops. Some reports even claim that non-Muslims (notably the heroic fighter Walter Mongonsidi) attended Friday prayers with Muslims to build solidarity.[11] The function of community prayers in the *Lipan Bajeng* militia suggests that the ulama leaders believed that this religious obligation would not only improve the faith of their troops, but it would also help them to defeat the Dutch, connecting the divine with their cause and its outcome.

Whether they joined in the military struggle, many ulama across Indonesia provided support and inspiration for troops engaged in fighting. In South and Central Kalimantan, local religious scholars prayed over the local fighters and delivered special inspirational sermons.[12] After the Dutch occupied South Sumatra in 1946, ulama originating from the

[9] Bosra, *Tuang Guru, Anrong Guru, Daeng Guru*, 262.
[10] Interview with K. H. Abd. Salam Thahir, October 12, 2010.
[11] Mustari Bosra, *Laskar Lipan Bajeng: Perjumpaan Agama dan Nasionalisme dalam Perjuangan Bangsa Indonesia* (Makassar: Rayhan Intermedia, 2009), 88–90.
[12] Interview with H. Saifulkan Angai, Marabahan, September 26, 2010.

region, even those as far away as Mecca, felt obliged to try to reinvigorate the revolutionary struggle in their home region. In letters from the newly formed *Front Republikein Sumatera Selatan di Saudi Arabia* (South Sumatran Republican Front in Saudi Arabia), they announced to the international press in 1948 that the military struggle would continue, urged on their brothers to take up arms, and instructed Muslims that "the Religious Law … forbids (*mengharamkan*) to take sides with the Dutch or with those who join with them."[13] This continued a centuries-old tradition of long-distance activism by Indonesian ulama, dating back to Sheikh Yusuf al-Makassari in the seventeenth century and Ahmad Khatib al-Minangkabawi in the nineteenth century,[14] using classical forms for Islamic mobilization in the revolution.

Ulama, pulling on their traditional role as local leaders in Muslim communities, shaped the local understanding of the revolution and the form of local fighting forces. Their contribution to the revolution was so critical that in 1950 the minister of religion proposed a major documentation project and book to commemorate their role, and he called for nominations from all regencies in the archipelago.[15] In many cases, though, ulama did not do this as individuals, but rather through Islamic mass organizations.

The Mobilization of Islamic Organizations

Islamic mass organizations had been rife throughout Indonesia from the 1910s, growing in the 1920s and fracturing – though still retaining their large membership numbers – in the 1930s. The Japanese occupation of the early 1940s provided a different challenge. In many regions, especially outside Java, the Japanese suppressed Islamic organizations. In Palembang, South Sumatra, for example, the Japanese in 1942 closed all Islamic schools save one.[16] In South Kalimantan, the oppression of the organization Musjawaratutthalibin was so hard that, although

[13] Letters of July 5, November 18, and June 30, 1948, respectively, in ANRI RA10, Djodja Documenten 1945–1949, #73.

[14] Azyumardi Azra, *The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern Ulama in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004), chapter 5; Hadler, 8.

[15] Arsip Propinsi Naggroe Aceh Darussalam, Koleksi Lhok'nga, 1934–1952, #88, Letter from Kepala Jabatan Agama Lhok'nga, February 24, 1950, to all Kepala Negeri. Nothing seems to have eventuated from this documentation project.

[16] Interview with M. Tahir Azhary, Ciputat, Banten, January 17, 2010; interview with K. H. Zen Syukri, Palembang, South Sumatra, June 6, 2010; and interview with Prof. H. Mochtar Effendy, Palembang, South Sumatra, June 7, 2010.

members tried to revive the organization in 1945, it never really recovered.[17] On Java, the organizations generally fared better under the protective wing of Masjoemi, the umbrella Islamic organization created by the Japanese in 1942, but their activities were still curtailed.[18] The revolution, then, demonstrated the vibrancy of Islamic mass organizations in Indonesia because these groups revived and universally threw themselves wholeheartedly into the independence struggle after the proclamation in 1945.

The permeation of modern-style Islamic mass organizations throughout society made them ideal channels for mobilization toward the revolutionary effort. In interviews, Muslim participants in the revolution credit Islamic organizations for the bulk of Islamic support and activity in the Indonesian revolution.[19] Islamic organizations were ready-made for this kind of mobilization. They already had broad membership bases, spreading not only to cities across the country but also into small towns and rural communities. These organizations also had means of spreading news to their members, through newsletters and couriers reaching local leaders and then using Friday sermons to tell whole congregations.

Not only their broad reach in society but also some of their specific activities facilitated easy transitions into physical revolution, especially leading to membership in armed militias. Scouting and young men's auxiliary organizations often changed their purpose very quickly from religious studies to military service. For example, Hizbul Wathan (the Muhammadiyah scouting organization) in Tappong, South Sulawesi, had been assembling members at the local Muhammadiyah headquarters for paramilitary drills since the mid-1930s. Similar groups emerged elsewhere in the province under Muhammadiyah auspices in 1942, specifically in Polombangkeng, Bantaeng, and Jeneponto. These groups easily transitioned into Islamic militias to fight off the Dutch, and early trainees then became critical leaders in the physical struggle for independence. Often the Islamic militias they formed stayed intact

[17] Maksum et al., *Musyawaratuththalibin*, 48; oral history with Idham Chalid, interviewed by M. Dien Madjid, ANRI SL1 1985 #9, tape 5.

[18] For a full history of Masjoemi (the organization, not yet a political party), see Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*.

[19] Interview with K. H. Sjojah Opu Daeng Malonjo, Bua, Kab. Luwu, South Sulawesi, April 27, 2010; interview with H. Saifulkan Angai, Marabahan, South Kalimantan, September 26, 2010; interview with Jamaluddin Batubara, Medan, North Sumatra, October 26, 2009; interview with M. Tahir Azhary, Ciputat, Banten, January 17, 2010; interview with Lela Rosma, Guguak, Kab. 50 Koto, West Sumatra, March 21, 2008.

throughout the revolutionary period.[20] On Sumbawa, West Nusa Tenggara, the local Muhammadiyah had not trained a paramilitary organization on its own, but it did push its younger male members into the local branch of the nationalist militia.[21] In that instance, a religious organization fed its members into a nonsectarian Republican militia, though it was more common for Islamic organizations to fuel Islamic militias.

Sabilillah and *Hizbullah*

The most famous manifestations of Islamic participation in the independence struggle were the Islamic militias organized by the national Islamic political party Masjumi: *Hizbullah* and *Sabilillah*. Because the party Masjumi started as little more than an umbrella for the existing Islamic mass organizations of the time, these militias often functioned as a branch of the local Nahdlatul Ulama or Muhammadiyah chapter. *Hizbullah*, taking its name from the Arabic for "faction of God," had formed in 1944 when the Japanese wanted to train Muslims for potential mobilization in their war effort.[22] *Hizbullah* militias were, in theory at least, trained and armed by the Japanese during the occupation, and therefore should have been immediately ready when fighting broke out after the Japanese surrender. *Sabilillah* (meaning "way of God") was conceived as irregulars; all Muslim men (and in some cases women) who were in physical condition to fight could be called into a *Sabilillah* unit when their locality needed it. In practical terms, though, this dual structure did not exist on the ground, where Islamic militias often included a mix of trained and untrained, armed and unarmed men. By default, society referred to any and all of these Masjumi-aligned (although not necessarily Masjumi-sponsored) militias as "Hizbullah."[23]

In December 1945, the Masjumi's program put a heavy emphasis on increasing the number of members in their militia branches, specifically

[20] Shaleh, "Sumbangsih Islam terhadap Perjuangan Kemerdekaan di Luwu," 107; and Bosra, *Tuang Guru, Anrong Guru dan Daeng Guru*, 261.

[21] Interview with Syamsuddin Anwar, Mataram, August 29, 2010. The militia he referenced was the *Badan Keamanan Rakyat* (BKR, People's Security Board), the standard militia associated with nascent Republican government across the archipelago.

[22] Cribb, *Gangsters and Revolutionaries*, 76.

[23] Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution*, 91–92, describes the conditions on the ground around Bandung in great detail. He makes the distinction of *Hizbullah* as the organized city companies and the *Sabilillah* as the irregular rural companies (92), but even this distinction loses much of its meaning when applied outside of Java. Therefore, I will generally follow common practice in referring to all these groups as *Hizbullah*, except in cases in which they specifically called themselves *Sabilillah*.

Hizbullah, and improving their training and weapons.[24] The figures put forward in early 1946 by Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, the Masjumi party's vice-chair, claiming three million members of *Hizbullah* and two million in *Sabilillah* were almost certainly more bluster than fact.[25] Real numbers are more likely to have been in the hundreds of thousands, but because the numbers constantly shifted and Masjumi authority over the militias across the archipelago also tended to be rather dubious, it is impossible to know for sure.

The Masjumi leadership originally conceived of the *Hizbullah* as a military auxiliary to their political party. To this end, they recommissioned the organization in a February 1946 declaration, although on the ground very little changed.[26] Masjumi also appointed leadership at the top of the militia, which should then coordinate with the civilian political leaders. As a political party in the national system, Masjumi also recognized the military leadership of the Indonesian National Army (TNI), and especially the person of its Commanding General Sudirman. They reaffirmed their commitment to this command structure when, in a resolution of July 8, 1946, all the Masjumi and G.P.I.I. (the Masjumi youth auxiliary) branches from across Java and Madura unanimously resolved that "Every member of Masjumi and G.P.I.I. expresses their faith in *Panglima Besar* [Commanding General] Sudirman as the Leader of the Military, and *Hizbullah* and *Sabilillah* stand behind him."[27]

In local contexts, though, Masjumi's control was limited at best, and local Islamic militias often did not recognize either national Islamic leadership or local secular army commanders. The case of Palembang, South Sumatra, provides a good example of *Hizbullah* units functioning on the very edge of Masjumi control. K. H. Ahmad Azhary, an established Islamic politician and scholar in the town, led his students to create a *Hizbullah* militia. They drilled on the outskirts of Palembang several times a week until the outbreak of fighting in the region, at which point they traded training for combat. When, in mid-1946, Azhary was appointed minister of religion in the Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet, the Dutch issued a warrant for his arrest, and he had to go into hiding. At this point, the militias were already practically independent under their own company commanders.[28] The salary for a *Hizbullah* fighter in 1948 was,

[24] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 222.
[25] Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, 78.
[26] Amiq, "Two Fatwas on Jihad against the Dutch Colonization in Indonesia," 109 n. 41; cf. Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, 356.
[27] ANRI RA6, Sekretariat Negara RI, 1945–1949, #1053.
[28] Interview with M. Tahir Azhary, Ciputat, Banten, January 17, 2010. Prof. Tahir Azhary is the son of K. H. Ahmad Azhary. See also Chapter 12.

according to one fighter in Palembang, Rp. 200 (presumably per month).[29] It is unclear whether this came from local or national Masjumi coffers, or from the local government, but it is more likely that it came from local Masjumi or local branches of mass Islamic organizations, given comparable developments elsewhere.[30]

Across Indonesia, but especially on Java and Sumatra, local organizationally minded ulama often compelled all their students of fighting age to become *Hizbullah* members under their leadership.[31] Syeikh Kyai Yahya of Muara Enim, South Sumatra, encouraged the youth under him to join up with a company division of *Hizbullah*.[32] K. H. Noer Alie in Bekasi, West Java, also turned his students into a *Hizbullah* unit.[33] This was reported by scholars and participants as common practice around Bandung,[34] Yogyakarta,[35] and Surakarta.[36] With the endorsement of local ulama, the population also supported Islamic militias throughout the revolution. In some places around West Java, the locals treated Islamic militias so much better than the Indonesian national army troops (the TNI) that the latter complained about favoritism.[37]

The difference was not just in treatment but also in recruitment. In many areas, the piety of the locals led them to join *Hizbullah* militias in much greater numbers than they joined secular militias. This was certainly true around Tegal and Brebes on the border between West and Central Java.[38] In Benkayang, West Kalimantan, *Hizbullah* was the main militia group of the region, founded by a certain Captain Bambang Ismoyo who came from Java, where he had also served in *Hizbullah*.[39] The area of *Hizbullah*'s greatest strength, however, was East Java, where

[29] This was reported by Malisin, a former *Hizbullah* member in Palembang, in his letter to the president in 1956 trying to get a pension. ANRI RA11, Kabinet Presiden 1950–1959, #789.

[30] In West Sumatra (see following text), the religious and party militias were fully supported by their mass organizations.

[31] See also the cases in West Java described in Karl D. Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 8, 194, 272–275.

[32] Maliyanti, "Peranan Syeikh Kyai Yahya dalam Pengembangan Islam di Muara Enim (1881–1951)," Skripsi S1, Fakultas Adab, IAIN-Raden Fatah, Palembang, 2002, 50.

[33] Anwar, *K.H. Noer Alie: Kemandirian Ulama Pejuang*, 82.

[34] Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution*, 92.

[35] Mohammad Iskandar, ed., *Keterlibatan Ulama di DIY pada Masa Perang Kemerdekaan periode 1945–1949* (Jakarta: Proyek Peningkatan Kesadaran Sejarah Nasional, DepDikNas, 2000), 40ff.

[36] Soepanto, *Hizbullah Surakarta* (Surakarta: UMS Karanganyar, 1993), 36.

[37] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 120.

[38] See the report of Djamal Marsudi about the end of the Central Java Darul Islam movement, held in ANRI RB16, Djamal Marsudi, 1947–1979, #53.

[39] Ahok, Ismail, and Tjitrodarjono, *Sejarah Revolusi Kemerdekaan*, 68.

traditionalist ulama through the vehicle of the Nahdlatul Ulama organization swelled the militias' ranks and made them into a major force to be reckoned with when the Allies tried to reoccupy the region.[40]

In the spirit of mobilizing all wings of the Islamic organization in support of the revolution, women also organized themselves as fighting spread across Indonesia. As noted in the story of Lela Rosma, the women's auxiliary of *Sabilillah* (women were not permitted to serve in the trained military units of the *Hizbullah*) was called *Sabilillah Muslimaat*. They modeled themselves on the women reputed to follow the Prophet and his companions when they went to battle, providing drinking water and tending the wounded.[41] The initial focus was on Red Cross and public kitchen activities, with some efforts made to help the families of martyrs and provide clothing for soldiers, as local circumstances permitted.[42]

Despite prescribing them separate roles, Muslim leaders still saw women as important participants in the Islamic struggle for Indonesia's freedom. On April 6, 1946, a newspaper in Surakarta, Central Java, carried an announcement from the local Muslim women leaders, laying out the proper role of women in the struggle: "we, the women who are also counted among this country's citizens, feel it is necessary and mandatory to guard the interest of our State and to be fully responsible for the sovereignty of the REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, therefore even MUSLIM WOMEN are summoned to collectively strengthen the front from the back lines." This involved contributing funds for the *Sabilillah*, preparing community kitchens and medicines for the fighters, taking in the children of those who went off to fight, and "strengthening the propaganda regarding instructions to uphold God's *Tauhid* [Oneness] and *Tawakkal* [Reliance on God] as deeply as possible, and making women aware of their obligation to defend their homeland as Citizens with souls."[43]

Regardless of whether for women or men, whether they were closely tied to the central leadership of the Masjumi party or run entirely by local ulama, Islamic militias had a distinctly Islamic understanding of the revolution. As the local leadership of the *Hizbullah* and *Sabilillah* militias in Surakarta told their followers in a newspaper report in March 1946,

[40] Zuhri, *Guruku Orang-Orang dari Pesantren*, 335–360; Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 267.

[41] *Qo'idah Moeslimaat (Masjoemi bg. Wanita)* (Jogjakarta: Masjoemi Daerah Jogja, Sidzin Moeslimaat, n.d.), 7.

[42] *Qu'idah Moeslimaat*, 8–9.

[43] "Kaoem Moeslimaat Haroes Djoega Bersiap," *Lasjkar*, April 6, 1946. Capitalization in the original. Arabic words have been preserved and translated in brackets.

"every attack or violation of the sovereignty of the Indonesian nation also means a violation of the security of the functioning of the Islamic religion and the security of the Indonesian Islamic Community."[44] In combination with the fatwas already circling throughout society from the early days of the revolution, statements like this were plenty of motivation to fight for the defense of God and country. This cause made Islamic militias particularly fierce in the battlefield.

Islamic Militias in Battle

That these Islamic troops were irregular does not mean that their contributions to the fighting were unimportant. On the contrary, Islamic militias were often the strongest local fighting force, and they were famed for their fierceness – and often blind bravery – in battle. This gave them a reputation often superior to that of official government forces, who "often ran away from combat situations with Dutch soldiers, leaving the fighting to the Islamic militias."[45]

Hizbullah groups fought fiercely, for example, in the Battle of Surabaya in 1945.[46] This port city saw the most famous battle of the Indonesian revolution. It built from small conflicts in October to a crescendo in November, when it became an all-encompassing street battle throughout the city.[47] *Hizbullah* and *Sabilillah* militias, led mostly by NU cadres from the area surrounding Surabaya, were prominent in the battle. The *Hizbullah* central headquarters for Surabaya was one of the first targets bombed on November 10, 1945 (the day now commemorated as Heroes' Day in Indonesia).[48] *Hizbullah* units fighting Allied troops in the city saw losses (listed as "martyrs") as early as October 30. Their men often died undertaking military tasks that other units avoided or rejected. For example, the men Ma'sum and Akhyak from the East Surabaya *Hizbullah* took grenades to attack Allied tanks; they were killed but took the tanks down with them.[49] Islamic militias' willingness to take such brash action, often dismissed as suicide by nonreligious units, was seemingly linked to

[44] "Bersiaplah Sabilillah Hisboellah," *Lasjkar*, March 16, 1946.
[45] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 102. Similar sentiments are expressed in Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution*, passim.
[46] See also the account in Tjantrik Mataram, *Peranan Ramalan Djojobojo dalam Revolusi Kita*, tjetakan ke-4 (Bandung: Masa Baru, 1966), 35–36.
[47] For a standard, secular-nationalist account of the Battle of Surabaya, see Frank Palmos, *Surabaya 1945: Sakral Tanahku* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor, 2016).
[48] Tim Penyusun Buku PWNU Jatim, *Peranan Ulama dalam Perjuangan Kemerdekaan*, 62.
[49] Tim Penyusun Buku PWNU Jatim, *Peranan Ulama dalam Perjuangan Kemerdekaan*, 63.

their belief in the Islamic motivation for the fight, the promise of martyrdom, and also the protection of amulets they carried into battle.

Another famous battle where *Hizbullah* militias were crucial to the outcome was the response to the Madiun Affair of September 1948. When Musso and the leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) declared the Indonesian Soviet Republic in the East Java city of Madiun on September 18, 1948, the response of Masjumi and its militias was sharp.[50] On October 7, 1948, Kasman Singodimedjo issued an order from Masjumi Central Defense Board to all Muslims, instructing them to engage in *jihad fi sabilillah*, and for Masjumi to create local Defense Boards to coordinate their military efforts. Kasman went further, saying that if the local government is in disarray, or in Communist or left-leaning hands, local Masjumi members should seize the institutions of the state.[51] This instruction was strongly criticized by Republican military officials, who accused Muslim leaders of sowing anarchy in the wake of Madiun.[52] Nonetheless, local Islamic militias in various parts of East Java attempted to put Kasman's instructions into action and seize the local administration. One American researcher working in the region in the 1950s reported of a town where an Islamic militia came through in the wake of the Madiun revolt. The Islamic militia instructed the *lurah* (village head) that Indonesia was an Islamic state so he should perform his five daily prayers more carefully, and that all left-leaning youth organizations should be banned.[53] This demonstrates how the Islamic militia experience could be separate from, and in some ways almost anathema to, the mainstream revolution.

Conclusion

The *Hizbullah* differed from secular militias in several ways. First, being recruited by ulama to join, they were also more likely to serve under religious leaders. Often, religious leaders incorporated spiritual training alongside military training, attempting to make Muslim soldiers more devout and orthodox. Furthermore, because *Hizbullah* members saw

[50] For a general overview of Madiun, see Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 136ff, or Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 265–267. See also Chapter 5.
[51] ANRI RA10, Djogdja Documenten 1945–1949, #91.
[52] See the report of Gatot Subroto in ANRI RA10, Djogdja Documenten 1945–1949, #91; he is the one who forwarded the Masjumi instruction to the government. On the Masjumi instruction, the bottom of the one-page order reads "If this is already understood (take notes as necessary) please tear up or burn"; clearly this was not intended for outside consumption.
[53] Jay, *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java*, 74.

ulama as simultaneously religious and military leaders, the authority of these Islamic scholars increased. Second, being an all-Muslim unit led to affirmation of Muslim soldiers' preconceptions about an Islamic society. Rather than being a secular, Westernized experience of nationalism across ethnic and sectarian divides, the *Hizbullah* or *Sabilillah* were intensely visceral vehicles to experience Indonesian nationalism in a way that confirmed ethnic and religious ideas about what the new nation should be. They were also virtually independent of control by central Masjumi, meaning there was minimal standardization to the party's vision. The widespread participation of Muslims in Islamic militias, even if on an ad hoc basis, means that many of them experienced a revolution that never challenged their Islamic notions. The militia experience was built on the backs of local branches of Islamic organizations. These organizations were ready-made for mobilizing Muslim participation in the revolution because of their broad reach across the country and their legitimacy in local communities.

The organizations' legitimacy, in turn, came from local ulama, religious leaders who took on new leadership roles during this time of war. Already carrying the mantle of religious authority, Islamic religious leaders could become military authorities and even revolutionary authorities through their actions in this time of strife. Because of the roles they assumed to support the revolution, many ulama across Indonesia came to believe that they had earned a leading position in the independent country born from this struggle, setting up a conflict in the postwar era when many other groups and individuals also claimed the same revolutionary inheritance.

4 Magic, Amulets, and Trances

Syekh Buya Ungku Saliah, usually called Tuanku Saliah, was a key religious leader near Lubuk Alung, West Sumatra. He was well known in the region for being particularly harsh on moral laxity, for leading a branch of the Shattariyah Sufi brotherhood, and for his ability in making and undoing magic. A particular specialty was using Qur'anic verses to break *pakasiah*, spells that made women fall in love with someone in particular, or *kabaji*, spells to create hatred between husband and wife. During the Indonesian revolution, Tuanku Saliah was already elderly, in his sixties, so he did not participate in the fighting directly. He did, however, play a key role in protecting Lubuk Alung. One market day, when the market was full of vendors, traders, and customers doing their business for the week, Tuanku Saliah had a vision and told everyone to clear out before heavy rain. This was unusual, considering it was not the rainy season, but people cleared the market anyhow in deference to this stern religious leader. No more than two hours later, the Dutch conducted an air assault on Lubuk Alung and leveled the market.[1]

This story of a religious scholar with divinely granted foresight is but one of many stories from the Indonesian revolution that hinge on Islamic magic. In a context where Indonesian Muslims had significantly less access to quality weapons than their enemies, many fighters turned to responses in the realm of faith, in particular, belief in supernatural protections for those who were poorly armed. The most famous and perhaps the most common Islamic magic during the revolution involved amulets, called *jimat* in Indonesian: these usually consisted of written scripture verses, prayers, or mantras believed to give the wearer power.[2]

[1] Beni, "Biografi Tuanku Saliah, 1885–1974," Skripsi S1, Jurusan Sejarah, Fakultas Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial, Universitas Negeri Padang, 2005, 2–4; the Lubuk Alung incident is also recorded in Bahri, *Sejarah Angkatan Laut Pangkalan Besar Pariaman (1945–1950)* (Padang: Dewan Harian Daerah Angkatan 45, Museum Gedung Juang 1945 Sumatera Barat, 1996).

[2] For a greater exploration of amulets in Islam, see T. Fahd, "Tamīma," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

Amulets, like trances, spells, and other forms of Islamic magic, are now seen by many Indonesian Muslims as sitting at or beyond the edge of Islamic orthodoxy, but they connected themselves to the Islamic tradition very clearly by using Arabic inscriptions, usually drawn from Islam's holy texts. During the revolution, these forms of Islamic magic were central to Muslims' fight for Indonesian independence.[3]

Tradition of Islamic Magic

Amulets and other magical traditions have been found throughout the Islamic world, including in sub-Saharan Africa,[4] Turkey,[5] the Arab world,[6] Iran,[7] South Asia,[8] and even diaspora communities like enslaved African Muslims in Brazil.[9] They have a particularly strong tradition in Southeast Asia, though, often connected to times of war or rebellion.

There has been some speculation that religious magic and supernatural powers were part of initially attracting converts to Islam in Southeast Asia.[10] Certainly the famous and quasi-mythical figures of conversion on Java, the Wali Songo, were connected with various magical acts.[11] From before the spread of gunpowder-based weapons, talismans for invulnerability were seen as a crucial preparation for warfare.[12] Talismans were not limited to times of war, though; Muslim rulers across the archipelago employed protective talismanic seals on their correspondence and proclamations through the nineteenth century, in ways that largely mirrored

[3] Magical practices were also found among non-Muslim – and even anti-Muslim – fighters, including the famous arch-enemy of Islamic forces in Aceh, Daud Cumbok. See Reid, *Blood of the People*, 217. The fact that magic was used beyond just pious Muslims is not surprising, but this chapter will focus on understanding and analyzing the practices of pious Muslim practitioners.

[4] Knut S. Vikør, "Sufi Brotherhoods in Africa," in Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels, eds., *The History of Islam in Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 442.

[5] Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3rd ed. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 192.

[6] Emilie Savage-Smith, *Magic and Divination in Early Islam* (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2004).

[7] Mahmoud Omidsalar, "Charms," *Encyclopedia Iranica*, www.iranicaonline.org/articles/charms-lat (accessed August 27, 2014).

[8] Katherine Ewing, "The Sufi as Saint, Curer, and Exorcist in Modern Pakistan," *Contributions to Asian Studies* 18 (1984): 106–114.

[9] Paul E. Lovejoy, "Background to Rebellion: The Origins of Muslim Slaves in Bahia," *Slavery and Abolition* 15, 2 (1994): 168.

[10] Azra, *Islam in the Indonesian World*, 6.

[11] Kees van Dijk, "*Dakwah* and Indigenous Culture: The Dissemination of Islam," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 154, 2 (1998): 224.

[12] Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680*, Volume One: The Lands below the Winds (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 124–127.

Muslims in other regions.[13] Many practitioners of magic were devout Muslims, and magical practice drew on Islamic elements, such as verses from the Qur'an and invocations of God.[14] Although healing, prophecy, childbirth, and even love potions were addressed in Islamic magical practices in the archipelago, practices connected to warfare remained a particularly vibrant nexus.

Throughout the Dutch colonial era, many reports rose of Islamic magic as part of anticolonial rebellions, often of a millennial character. Thus, we see amulets and spells of invincibility in the Java War,[15] the 1888 revolt in Banten,[16] the 1908 antitax rebellion in West Sumatra,[17] the Aceh War,[18] and others. In many cases, magic of invincibility (whether funneled into an amulet or not) was drawn from an Islamic text, such as in the Selompret Melayu affair of 1896 in Semarang, when local Islamic scholars were using a Naqshbandiyya Sufi text to teach invincibility.[19] In the nineteenth century, many Islamic texts were focused on the magical arts.[20] A particular anthology entitled *Kidung Nabi* (Song of the Prophet), for example, was filled with "spells for warding off sickness, black magic, fire, theft, poisons, agricultural pests and other dangers and evils, and for winning the love of others, the protection of angels, and so on."[21] Even though many texts existed, magic did not require literacy or logo-centrism; the traditional martial arts were also seen as an embodiment of magic that entirely transcended words.[22] These fighting techniques, known generally by the name *silat*,

[13] Annabel Teh Gallop, "The Amuletic Cult of Ma'ruf al-Karkhi in the Malay World," in Robert M. Kerr and Thomas Milo, eds., *Writings and Writing: Investigations in Text and Script, in Honour of Dr Januarius Just Witkam, Professor of Codicology and Palaeography of the Islamic World at Leyden University* (Cambridge: Archetype, 2013), 167–196.

[14] Farouk Yahya, *Magic and Divination in Malay Illustrated Manuscripts* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 30–31.

[15] Peter Carey, *The Power of Prophecy: Prince Dipanagara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 1785–1855* (Leiden: KITLV, 2008) and Michael Adas, *Prophets of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest Movements against the European Colonial Order* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), especially chapters 2 and 6.

[16] Kartodirdjo, *Peasants' Revolt*, throughout, e.g., 205.

[17] Ken Young, *Islamic Peasants and the State: The 1908 Anti-Tax Rebellion in West Sumatra* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1994), 1 and passim.

[18] Laffan, *Makings of Indonesian Islam*, 158.

[19] Laffan, *Makings of Indonesian Islam*, 190.

[20] Yahya, *Magic and Divination in Malay Illustrated Manuscripts*; see also examples from across the archipelago in the British Library's online Endangered Archives project, including EAP061/3/104; EAP144/3/49; EAP 144/4/18; EAP 144/4/28; EAP 144/4/33; EAP 276/1/1; EAP 329/1/32; EAP 329/1/85, http://eap.bl.uk (accessed January 4, 2019).

[21] Ricklefs, *Polarizing Javanese Society*, 40.

[22] D. S. Farrer, *Shadows of the Prophet: Martial Arts and Sufi Mysticism* ([Dordrecht]: Springer, 2009), 67.

were usually taught as part of the general curriculum of Islamic boarding schools, including magic of invulnerability as well as the physical combat aspects.[23] At times these arts have been connected with specific Sufi traditions, and they were probably passed on in the same way as Sufi brotherhood membership: from teacher to disciple.

Magical knowledge in the archipelago was connected with the past through generations of practitioners, but it was also connected with the wider Islamic world. Many Indonesians, including Islamic reformers like Syekh Jamil Jambek of Bukittinggi, studied magic while on the *hajj* to Mecca, and brought those traditions back to their hometowns.[24] Although they may have learned from teachers from across the Islamic world (Jamil Jambek, e.g., claimed to have studied with a Moroccan), Snouck Hurgronje also reported that Indonesians and Malays were famed in the Holy Cities of Islam for their knowledge of the magical arts, especially the creation and empowerment of amulets.[25] These items could be made or blessed in the Holy Land and taken back to Indonesia for special efficacy. Among the many items found on *hajjis* returning to Indonesia in the nineteenth century were amulets of many kinds, including mystical formulas in Arabic, Javanese, and Sundanese; repeated calligraphic inscriptions of the names of God and Muhammad; and small models made from bamboo, metal, or paper. There were also writings about auspicious days, spiritual beings that inhabited Java, and magical medicines.[26] Clearly all these things were taken to be Islamic, even quintessentially Islamic, when they were being created in and brought back from the Holy Cities.

In the early twentieth century, though, many urban or reformist Islamic thinkers began to turn away from the magical traditions of Islam, decrying them as heterodox. Agus Salim made such statements in 1919, lambasting the sellers and buyers of amulets as not having sufficient commitment to the faith to accept death without invulnerability spells.[27] Such sentiments foreshadowed the divide on this issue during the Indonesian revolution, when Islamic magic was practiced furiously by the Muslim fighters at the grassroots level, but ignored, condemned, or denigrated as un-Islamic by the Western-educated leaders of political Islam.

[23] Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents*, 113.
[24] Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement*, 36 n. 16.
[25] C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century*, J. H. Monahan, trans. (London: Luzac & Co., 1931), 96. See also Tagliacozzo, *The Longest Journey*, 167.
[26] Tagliacozzo, *The Longest Journey*, 167. [27] Laffan, *Makings of Indonesian Islam*, 210.

Prayers and Incantations

Although Islamic magical beliefs could involve amulets, trances, and more fantastic exhibitions of supernatural intervention, many more commonplace rituals could also connect with Islamic magic, including the most basic ritual: prayer.

Muslims are obliged to perform five ritual prayers per day, but additional types of prayers are available for particular occasions. One of these is the prayer for a specific purpose, called *salat hajat* in Indonesian, which is a collective intercession that can be directed to any purpose that is not immoral. During the revolution, that purpose was victory and independence. On October 13, 1945, Muslims in Yogyakarta flocked to the central mosque of the town to pray. Unusually, this gathering was held at one o'clock in the morning, with the strange hour perhaps reinforcing the otherworldly feel of the event. After the crowd had assembled, a leading local scholar, K. H. Badawi, read out an Islamic declaration stating that all Muslims should fight off the Dutch and then led them in the Arabic invocations of the *salat hajat*.[28] In the following weeks, similar meetings were held in other places in Indonesia, and even beyond. In the Middle East, Indonesia's representatives convinced co-religionists there to hold special prayers for the Indonesian cause.[29] Although supplication is a spiritual practice well within orthodox practices, it could also connect with or feed Islamic magic, especially when it intersected with more mystical practices.

One example of an esoteric practice building on supplication was found in Cirebon, West Java, where Muslims reportedly gathered at the tomb of the local saint Sunan Gunung Jati to pray for the independence struggle.[30] Gathering at a spiritually significant place to seek divine aid is reminiscent of the more mystical Islamic traditions of Cirebon, such as the esoteric *brai* chanting, which also pulls from Islamic formulae.[31] This also invokes the practice of visiting tombs of great Islamic leaders, including notably Sunan Gunung Jati whose tomb hosted these prayers, to seek saintly or divine intervention.[32]

The experience of special prayers for independence spanned from well-educated religious leaders, like the one who led prayers in

[28] Amiq, "Two Fatwas on Jihad against the Dutch Colonization in Indonesia," 96.
[29] Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, 89, 239.
[30] Amiq, "Two Fatwas on Jihad against the Dutch Colonization in Indonesia," 96.
[31] Matthew Isaac Cohen, "Brai in Performance: Religious Ecstasy and Art in Java," in David D. Harnish and Anne K. Rasmussen, eds., *Divine Inspirations: Music and Islam in Indonesia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 132–160.
[32] Abdul Ghoffir Muhaimin, *The Islamic Traditions of Cirebon: Ibadat and Adat Among Javanese Muslims* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2006), 179ff.

Yogyakarta, to uneducated and unempowered individuals, young and old. The majority of attendees at these rituals would have been local Muslims without special training in the Islamic sciences, and the experience of this majority of attendees would have invoked Islamic magical practice in a variety of ways. Of course, assembling in the dead of night or coming to a place of great spiritual significance set the tone. The special prayers, though, being invocations in Arabic – a respected but still very foreign language for most Muslims – would also have been an experience steeped in mystery. Benedict Anderson has noted that Arabic remained an "esoteric vocabulary" for most Muslims, even pious ones – a language more recited and invoked than understood.[33] The prayers thus became slogans, in James T. Siegel's understanding, repeated faithfully without understanding in an effort to attain a sort of "revolutionary invulnerability."[34] In this way, they became appealing even to those who were not normally pious; Saifuddin Zuhri reports that not only *Hizbullah* militias but also government troops and bureaucrats – even up to the provincial governor – "flooded" the house of a ninety-year-old Islamic teacher in Parakan, Central Java, to seek his prayers of blessing, which they believed would bring special blessing in battle.[35]

In some instances, the religious leaders could easily have been aware of the magical understanding of their followers, whether or not they shared them. Certainly, though, some did share these proclivities toward magic. Such was the case for K. H. Noer Alie of Bekasi. In the early days of the revolution, according to a former-student-turned-biographer, the *kyai* used special prayers to build up the strength of his militia to fight against foreign forces with superior weapons.

> K.H. Noer Alie very firmly believed in the strength and greatness of The Creator, instructing his troops to hold tightly to the strength of Allah SWT. K.H. Noer Alie was quite sure that if God willed it, natural (physical) strength as strong and great as anything could be defeated by the strength of faith.
>
> To give motivation for the struggle, K.H. Noer Alie ordered around 200 of his followers to fast for seven days at the Ujungmalang mosque. While they fasted, the participants were taught to recite the *hizbun nasr* prayer until they had memorized it. They also added to this by reading *wirid*, *rartibul haddad*, *salat tasbih*, *salat hajat* and *salat witir* [various kinds of prayers]. If they had finished,

[33] Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The Languages of Indonesian Politics," in *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Equinox, 2009 [1990]), 127.
[34] James T. Siegel, *Fetish, Recognition, Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 213.
[35] Zuhri, *Guruku Orang-Orang dari Pesantren*, 340–341.

they were declared "graduated" and were given a kind of certificate that was symbolized by the giving of small-sized tin plaque with the red-and-white [Indonesian national] flag on the back and with the writing *La ilaha illa-Allah, Muhammad ar-Rasul-Allah* (There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Prophet of God).

Each time certificates were distributed, K.H. Noer Alie instructed his soldiers not to conduct themselves in a boastful and arrogant way, especially at the moment of battle. By the middle of November, 1945, K.H. Noer Alie had a *Lasykar Rakyat* [militia] brigade which was trained in military and religious skills.[36]

These certificates that K. H. Noer Alie gave to his students were not so different from the amulets being provided by other Islamic teachers to fighters across the archipelago. Such amulets were the major focus of Islamic magic during the war.

Amulets and Spells

The most common invulnerability magic focused on the creation of talismans or amulets, called *jimat* in Indonesian, generally believed to render the bearer impervious to bullets and supernaturally strong in battle. Amulets were common not just among Muslims, but also among Christians and even communists in twentieth-century Indonesia.[37] Nor were they limited to wartime; even in times of peace, local *kyai* provided amulets for their students and followers.[38] The Indonesian revolution, however, was a time when many Muslims turned to amulets and spells of invulnerability as their greatest protection.

The uses of the amulets could vary. Sometimes amulets could be used to provide invisibility, so as to escape capture and punishment by an enemy. For example, a bandit leader named Pak Macem in Cibarusa, southeast of Jakarta, armed his followers with amulets just for this purpose, to hide not from the Dutch but from Republican troops who accused them of brigandage and dacoity. Their amulets proved ineffective, and Pak Macem was seen by army regulars, who gunned him down along with his followers.[39]

In other cases, amulets were used to empower weapons, or weapons were even seen as amulets in and of themselves. Muslims on Java have

[36] Anwar, *K.H. Noer Alie: Kemandirian Ulama Pejuang*, 75–76.
[37] Steven Farram, "Revolution, Religion and Magic: The PKI in West Timor, 1924–1966," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 158 (2002): 25–26.
[38] Jay, *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java*, 36.
[39] Cribb, *Gangsters and Revolutionaries*, 53, 90–91.

Figure 1 This example of an amulet in the Indonesian national archives came from fighters in Central Java. Reproduced with the permission of the National Archive of the Republic of Indonesia. From ANRI RB7, Marzuki Arifin, 1945–1984, #366.

long held beliefs about the spiritual power of *kris*, Indonesian daggers.[40] Certainly these traditional weapons would have been carried or brought out during the war to empower the forces struggling for independence, but not every fighter would have access to a rare and powerful *kris*. Islamic spells could equally be applied to the revolutionary weapon *par excellence*: the sharpened bamboo spear. In the latter case, "the spear itself was laved or consecrated, sometimes a small pennon of white cloth with Koranic verses on it was attached to its end."[41] This most mundane weapon, when combined with the right blessing, was believed to inflict more damage on the bearer's enemies and the enemies of the religion.

The most common use of amulets, though, was for personal invulnerability. Although several forms have been reported, the most common type was a headband or a cloth tied onto the body with an Islamic invocation in Arabic. Marzuki Arifin, an official in the Department of Home Affairs who was sent to negotiate a truce with the Central Java Darul Islam rebels in 1950, preserved several examples from those soldiers (such as the one in Figure 1). They are strips of cloth approximately ten inches long and two inches tall. The cloth had been dyed red, with Arabic phrases written in white; the dyeing process seems to have employed the *batik* methods that would have been most familiar to Javanese at the time. The center holds the Arabic invocation *Allahu Akbar* (God is the Greatest), framed by a crescent moon, with other

[40] Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents*, 426–428; Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 35–36.
[41] Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution*, 104.

Arabic invocations on the sides.[42] In other cases in West Java, the headbands were reported to be white, but with similar writing.[43]

The start of the revolution made amulets of all kinds very popular. Especially when fighting began to heat up in the final months of 1945, invulnerability became the primary interest of many men on the front lines. Around Bandung, amulet fever struck in November and December 1945. John R. W. Smail reports widespread belief in these talismans in Bandung, including some making trips as far as Java's south coast to visit a particularly powerful *kyai* and bring a blessed item back to the city. Young troops, particularly young Muslim troops who would also recite mantras when charging into battle, sought out such magical aids in large numbers.[44] The fact that they used Arabic and were granted by Islamic teachers demonstrates how these magical items were understood within the idiom of Islamic magic.

Martial Arts and Trances

The protection provided by amulets could be paired with one more practice connected to Islamic magic: Indonesian martial arts. Local martial art forms, called by the generic name *silat*, are common from Aceh through the Moluccas, and are grounded in Islamic networks, institutions, and beliefs. In some parts of the archipelago, this connection between Islam and defensive arts was more prominent, such as in Palu, Central Sulawesi, where Sayyid Idrus al-Jufri founded a Martial Arts Association to help his outreach and draw more students into his Islamic school.[45] In most places, though, *silat* was merely one of many parts of the standard curriculum, taught to students by the same instructors who taught them about textual Islamic sciences.[46] The Japanese period, when all schools were encouraged to teach exercises (in imitation of Japanese schools) even facilitated instruction in the martial arts.[47]

[42] Two of these of the same style but by different hands are preserved in ANRI RB7, Marzuki Arifin, 1945–1984, #366.
[43] Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution*, 104.
[44] Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution*, 103.
[45] Ahmad Bachmid, *Sang Bintang dari Timur: Sayyid Idrus al-Jufri, Sosok Ulama dan Sastrawan* (Jakarta: Studia Press, 2007), 37.
[46] This seems to be general knowledge among Muslims in Indonesia, and was reflected in interviews with Ucep Sulirrahman, Cibadak, West Java, June 27, 2009; K. H. M. Zen Syukri, Palembang, South Sumatra, June 3, 2010; and H. Mas'oed Abidin, Padang, West Sumatra, June 11, 2010. There is also a fictional depiction of an Islamic teacher and Sufi leader as a *silat* teacher in Mochtar Lubis, *Tiger!*, translated by Florence Lamoureux (Singapore: Select Books, 1991), in the person of Wak Katok.
[47] Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 28.

Alongside the institutional and personal connections between martial arts and Islam in Indonesia, there is also an overlap in beliefs. To a greater or lesser extent, *silat* is infused with Islamic mysticism and magic. As defensive arts are fundamentally oriented toward the question of mortality and death, they were understood in Islamic frames that structure general beliefs about these subjects.[48] Furthermore, *silat* instruction involves the initiation into various mysteries and facilitates "the attainment of magical results such as invincibility, incredible speed, and 'superhuman' strength."[49]

At the time of the revolution, when so many Muslim youth were organized into militias led by their religious teachers, it is only natural that they would also incorporate the martial arts – a skill taught by the same figures of authority who led them into battle. In many cases, beliefs in superhuman powers bestowed by *silat*, amulets, and divine guidance were all deployed by the same fighters in an Islamic militia, led by their local ulama.[50]

In a vivid account of how martial arts were deployed by religious teachers during the revolution, the Masjumi politician Abu Hanifah wrote in his memoirs about being in the Sukabumi area of West Java in the final months of 1945. His account points to the authority of local ulama in martial arts and the blending of defensive arts and Islamic magic.

> One night, I was invited by Kiai Sanusi to his mosque where there was to be a meeting of the leaders of the resistance, especially the Moslem leaders of the region. After we had eaten we were invited to sit in the yard of the mosque in a circle. In the centre was a free space of about ten square meters. Kiai Sanusi explained to me that he had news that in a short time they would be invaded by the Indian soldiers of the Allied forces and we had to know the system of hand to hand fighting of these soldiers, especially the Gurkhas from Nepal. For that reason he would demonstrate to us some of their defence tactics. I listened to him politely but was skeptical. However, I got a surprise. After we had been sitting there for some time two youngsters about sixteen years old were brought in front of him. He made some ritual gestures with both hands and then pulled the young fellows towards him and whispered in their ears. He loudly said some Qur'anic verses, and let them go. He announced in a loud voice that the youngsters were now ready to show the tactics of Gurkha hand to hand fighting. Each one had a curved knife made of wood which resembled the Gurkha dagger. Kiai Sanusi gave a sign and the youngsters went through the motions of fighting. It was very interesting and I was quite tense trying to analyse the movements. I knew some fighting systems myself so I was really eager to know

[48] Farrer, *Shadows of the Prophet: Martial Arts and Sufi Mysticism*, 43.
[49] Farrer, *Shadows of the Prophet: Martial Arts and Sufi Mysticism*, 53.
[50] Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution*, 88.

if all this was not faked. I couldn't see anything amiss, however. After ten minutes or so Kiai Sanusi let them stop and some pupils sprinkled water over their heads.[51]

Several points in this story are telling. First, these activities take place at a mosque, before a meeting of Muslim leaders, led by the most authoritative religious scholar of the Sukabumi area. Clearly this would have been understood by all participants as an Islamic event, engaging in Islamic practices.

Second, the differing approaches of the two leaders in this story map onto the broader picture of differing approaches to Islamic magic. The narrator, Abu Hanifah, was a Western-educated medical doctor who had experience serving with the Dutch. He was so skeptical of the demonstration that he later asked to see two more young men in trance perform the *silat* from his home region before he admitted that some power was at work. Kyai Sanusi, however, was the head of Persatuan Ummat Islam, a local traditionalist organization based in Sukabumi, but also a member of the Majelis Sjuro (Consultative Board) of the Islamic party Masjumi, and had been a member of the body that drafted the Indonesian constitution.[52] The divide between these two men, one exceedingly skeptical of the proceedings while the other led and facilitated Islamic trances and defensive arts, reflect the gap between graduates of Western-style education in the Islamic movement and those who had been trained entirely in Islamic educational networks.

A third important feature of this story is the trance state induced in the fighters. Trances are found in various forms in Indonesia, not only for martial arts but also for dance performances and religious rituals.[53] Even for dance performances, though, trances for men often imitate going into battle.[54] Although major Islamic organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama distanced themselves from trances later in the century, they remained open to them at the time of the revolution.[55]

In some instances, it appeared that Islamic fighters going into battle were fighting in a state of trance. This was reported by news bodies covering the famous Battle of Surabaya in November 1945, when smiling Muslim youths charged at British tanks and armored

[51] Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution*, 186.
[52] Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 31, 100–101; van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 154.
[53] Kathy Foley, "The Dancer and the Danced: Trance Dance and Theatrical Performance in West Java," *Asian Theatre Journal* 2, 1 (1985): especially 31–32 on *dabus*; Daniels, 42ff.
[54] Foley, "The Dancer and the Danced," 41.
[55] Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents*, 103–104.

cars.[56] When Islamic prayers, amulets, martial arts and trances faced high-powered modern weapons, the outcome was devastating for Islamic militias, and this became a point of critique for Western-educated Muslim elites.

Consequences of Islamic Magic: Fearlessness and High Casualties

The Islamic magic used by fighters in the Indonesian revolution did not bring the most-desired consequences: the fighters were not rendered invincible. Belief in and practice of magic did have other very real consequences, though. Trusting in their amulets or protective spells caused Muslim troops to be fearless or even reckless in battle, often making the first charge and attacking far superior forces. This led to stunningly high casualties for Islamic militias, especially in the high-profile battles of the first months of the revolution.

It is no surprise that a soldier who believes himself to be invulnerable to enemy weapons will be fearless in battle. Rural *santri* fighters who believed in Islamic magic were described as "fanatical masses" with "great intensity of purpose," and they were feared by both foreign troops and non-pious Indonesians.[57] As noted in the preceding text, Muslim fighters – generally identified with the *Sabilillah* and *Hizbullah* militias – took the lead in attacking British troops and artillery in the Battle of Surabaya in November 1945. Local news reports called their actions "suicide attacks," charging at tanks with nothing but "spirit that shines brilliantly."[58] Other accounts point to the prevalence of supernatural beliefs, such that the young men might have believed their own deaths impossible, making it less likely that these were intended as suicide attacks. Accounts agree that the tenacity of Islamic militias in Surabaya was fueled by Islamic mantras repeated throughout the city and the instruction of their local ulama,[59] and amulets and Islamic magic are a natural corollary. Even otherwise secular accounts of the revolution agree that the "fanaticism and fury of Surabaya" was intense, led by the Islamic groups.[60]

Similarly, the Gurkha-led attack on the city of Bandung in December 1945 was "only one of several quite well-authenticated cases of [Islamic

[56] Mataram, *Peranan Ramalan Djojobojo dalam Revolusi Kita*, 35–36, providing a lengthy quotation from Surabaya's radio news broadcasts at the time.
[57] Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution*, 105.
[58] Mataram, *Peranan Ramalan Djojobojo dalam Revolusi Kita*, 35.
[59] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 157–58.
[60] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 166.

militias] marching openly up to tanks and machine guns shouting 'Allahu Akbar!' ('Allah is great') and being mown down in great numbers."[61] Smail notes that amulets and Islamic magic were critical to the revolutionary spirit of the city and especially to the willingness of pious warriors to fight with abandon. As with many rebellion movements in this area over the last two centuries, amulets "gave enormous spiritual security and encouragement."[62]

These kinds of attacks – fearless, reckless, and fueled by Islamic magic – were commonplace in the early months of the revolution, but fewer are reported in later years. This is the primary sense in which Anthony Reid's observation about the dissipating "Holy War" nature of the revolution is accurate.[63] Reid concludes that the nature of the revolution did not support such activities, but one must consider two other explanations for the decline of brazen attacks based on beliefs of invulnerability. The first is that Indonesians saw in these initial battles that the amulets were not, in fact, effective at protecting them and thus gave up on attacks that relied on invulnerability. It is highly likely that this played some role. A more macabre, but also very plausible, possibility is that the segment of the population that held these beliefs most fiercely was unable to continue such attacks because they had been largely killed off in the early months of the revolution. Certainly all reports of Islamic militias leading the charge against better-armed enemies describe not only the fear they inspired but also the very high casualties that they experienced – sometimes whole units were killed, down to the last man.

Conclusion

Islamic magic was an established aspect of Islamic knowledge and practice in Southeast Asia,[64] but the Indonesian Revolution was in some ways its last great hurrah. Although amulets, spells, and esoteric practices related to martial arts continue in Indonesia up to the present, they have not been on such widespread display since the early revolution, and certainly have not impacted national events in the same way.[65] This

[61] Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution*, 104.
[62] Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Agrarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Development," in Claire Holt, ed., *Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: Equinox, 2007 [1972]), 79.
[63] Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 56.
[64] Yahya, *Magic and Divination in Malay Illustrated Manuscripts*, 29.
[65] Amulets again appeared in 1965, e.g., when *kyai*s issued them to protect followers from the anti-Communist purges, and Islamic spells were used for Teungku Bantaqiah's rebellion in Aceh as late as the 1980s and 1990s. See Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents*, 108; and Aspinall, *Islam and Nation*, 99.

outpouring of mystical, esoteric, or heterodox Islamic practices was more than just a momentary fascination, though. It provides insight into the mentality of everyday Muslim participants and how they believed the Divine was involved in the struggle.

One must be careful not to ascribe any ultimate authority to Islamic magical practices during the fight as windows into Islam in Indonesia. Maitrii Aung-Thwin has astutely noted the pitfall of mistaking moments of resistance or rebellion to be the definition of "authentic" in Southeast Asia, standing distinct from moments of collaboration with or appropriation of colonial institutions.[66] In this vein, Islamic magic in the Indonesian Revolution was no more genuinely Indonesian than the well-drilled, Japanese-trained army regulars fighting, nor more genuinely Islamic than the high politicking at the political center. Rather, Islamic magic reflected a different side of society. Certainly not all Islamic troops used amulets, trances, or other forms of Islamic magic, and reports of these esoteric practices faded as the revolution wore on. Nevertheless, the fact that many Muslims did rely on such beliefs and practices must be considered in evaluating Islam in the revolution.

Most obviously, Islamic magic shows the gap in understanding between the Western-educated Islamic elites and the Muslim grassroots. In local communities and in Islamic militias, a wide range of nontextual Islamic practices were taken as not only aligned with Islamic beliefs but at the core of an Islamic method of fighting this war. Even ulama who had been trained in Islamic networks and institutions believed in and promoted Islamic magic, dealing in this supernatural currency to empower what they saw as the properly Islamic cause of Indonesian independence. On the other side, the national leadership, including many high-ranking figures in the Masjumi party, did not believe in the efficacy of Islamic magic, and thought that these practices fell outside acceptable Islamic tradition.[67] This divergence is acutely visible, and it was not limited to Islamic magic, but included various other points on which Islamic voices were fundamentally disunited.

Islamic prayers, incantations, and martial arts also point to the special religious and even magical meaning that could be ascribed to seemingly mundane acts, such as reciting passages from the Qur'an. When K. H. Noer Ali required his students to fast and pray and provided them with a

[66] Maitrii Aung-Thwin, *The Return of the Galon King: History, Law and Rebellion in Colonial Burma*, Ohio University Research in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series No. 124 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011), 29, 38.

[67] Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, *Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia*, 2nd ed. (Bandung: Al-Ma'arif, 1950), 47; oral history with Mohamad Roem, interviewed by A. Rahman Zainuddin, ANRI SL1 1981 #6, tape 1; Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution*, 186.

talismanic certificate for their efforts, the normal understanding of these practices was transcended by the belief that the students were receiving supernatural powers. In the same way, mundane acts of resistance and methods of fighting, when imbued with Islamic understandings, could carry heavy teleological import for Islamic fighters, facilitating their view that the revolution was a religious struggle.

Underlying this, practices of Islamic magic in the revolution demonstrate participants' beliefs that the Divine was assisting them in the fight. Far from conceiving of the war of independence as a modern political contest, or a mere military battle, these Muslims believed that supernatural powers were at work aiding them in the just cause of Indonesian independence. Despite all its syncretism, this belief system plays directly into the Muslim narrative of the struggle, which saw the Indonesian Revolution as Islamic.

5 Social Revolution

The doctor and politician Abu Hanifah, writing in Sukabumi, West Java, roughly six months after the proclamation of independence, made a very optimistic prediction: "The Indonesian nation, as a nation that believes in the justice and truth of God, will not have all the sharp and vicious ideological clashes between ourselves of a social revolution, not like France or Russia."[1] In fact, not only did belief in God not preserve Indonesia from the internal upheaval of a social revolution, but in some cases religious faith was used as an element of instigating or heightening social conflict. The understanding that the Indonesian revolution was about promoting the Islamic faith was among the many incendiary ingredients fueling horizontal conflict and social violence in the worst of Indonesia's so-called social revolution, a loose category that was applied, sometimes retroactively, to various conflicts between Indonesians. At the very least, Islam was often used as a cover for attacks by Indonesians on other Indonesians.

The social revolution was important for Indonesia because it changed the leadership of so many local communities and changed intergroup relations in many more communities. Muslims not only drove forward some of these changes through their participation but local Muslim elites were also major beneficiaries, often becoming officials in the new local governments. In some areas, especially in Aceh, the moniker "social revolution" was used for the process by which Muslim elites assumed local political leadership in a movement that also violently reorganized society to fit their vision. Thus, the social revolution – the hallmark of which was conflict between Indonesians, rather than conflicts with outside forces – was an aspect of the broader Islamic revolution for Indonesia's Muslim community. Though successful during the revolution, most pious Muslims were not able to hold on to government leadership in the

[1] Abu Hanifah, *Kita Berdjoang: Goebahan Kultur Politis* (Jakarta: Merdeka, 1946), 165.

long run, and they were not able to implement religious ideals for their communities.

"Social revolution" emerged as a term in the revolution to cover two phenomena: violence between Indonesians and the replacement of local leaders with figures of a different ideological stripe. The latter is more important to consider when probing the nature of Islamic revolutionary ideology. This ideology led local Muslims to throw out the leaders they did not like, and then to replace them with Islamic leaders. In Aceh, removing and replacing non-Islamic leaders became a violent and thorough process – the most extreme case of Islamic social revolution in the war of independence. In Madiun, East Java, another case emerged of a Communist revolt; this is not usually considered as part of the social revolution, but the competing ideological visions of the two sides fits the pattern of social revolution elsewhere. In the long run, though, Islamic advances in the social revolution did not have staying power in Indonesian politics.

Meaning of Social Revolution

The famous Muslim polemicist in Bandung, Isa Anshary, believed that any political revolution without a concomitant social revolution would be futile,[2] but what exactly would constitute a social revolution in the Indonesian context, or in an Indonesian Islamic context? The Indonesian case generally did not conform to those ideas in common circulation at the time, of a movement "eradicating social inequalities exacerbated by the intersection of colonialism and capitalism."[3] Instead, most of the actions that have been ex post facto grouped into the social revolution stemmed from a movement for some ideal that a slice of the Indonesian population thought would come with independence. This book has focused on Muslim ideas, and these drove forward a number of social actions, violent and peaceful, to achieve what they believed were the explicit goals of the revolution. There were also other visions, though, including Communist, nativist, and antifeudal.[4]

[2] Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, 30–31, citing Isa Anshary, "Katja suram dari Revolusi Perantjis," *Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam*, 137ff.

[3] Omnia El Shakry, "'History without Documents': The Vexed Archives of Decolonization in the Middle East," *American Historical Review* 120, no. 3 (June 2015): 933. El Shakry is referring to Gamal Abdul Nasser's conception of a social revolution, or *thawra al-ijtimaʿiyya*.

[4] Particularly noteworthy are the attacks perpetrated against ethnically Eurasian and Chinese communities. See William H. Frederick, "The Killings of Dutch and Eurasians in Indonesia's National Revolution (1945–49): A 'Brief Genocide' Reconsidered," 133–154 and Mary Somers Heidhues, "Anti-Chinese Violence in Java

Economic redistribution often underlay intra-Indonesian attacks, even when other ideals were invoked publicly. This was especially true for horizontal violence, an aspect of social revolution that has been indelibly burned into the consciousness of so many victims and witnesses. Mary Margaret Steedly's informants in the Christian areas of North Sumatra described "a condition of intermittent but pervasive fear and indiscriminate brutality, a 'war of us against us,' … in which anyone could become a victim."[5] Anyone could be charged with being a Dutch collaborator or sympathizer, with dire consequences to be imposed by local militias.[6] Robert Cribb, writing about West Java, describes a period of lawlessness, revenge killings, and plunder that disproportionately attacked outsiders but also wreaked havoc on anyone who was not young, male, tough, and perhaps a bit lucky.[7] The violence even continued after the formal end of the revolution in 1949, with a 1950 government memorandum from Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, reporting "revolutionaries" burning houses, killing whole families, and otherwise torturing those seen as connected with the Dutch.[8] The fact that much of this horizontal violence was about economic redistribution comes through clearly in Indonesian reports of the time. For example, the puppet state of Pasundan in West Java in 1949 explained rampant social banditry in a report saying "Political independence has been achieved, but economic independence not yet."[9] Some of this horizontal violence also involved Islamic groups in prominent roles, including East Jakarta, where a certain Haji Darip moved from his long-standing role as a religious authority and railroad union organizer to overseeing the thugs who controlled and plundered traffic in and out of the city.[10] Horizontal violence, while one of the most traumatic aspects of these years for many witnesses, seems to have been driven more by economic desires and old grudges, and does not provide many insights into the broader mentality of Islamic groups fighting across the archipelago.

The other aspect of social revolution – focused on overthrowing and replacing local Indonesian leadership – was more consistently driven by Islamic groups and forms a nexus of Muslim activity. This sort of vertical

during the Indonesian Revolution, 1945–49," 155–175 in Bart Luttikhuis and A. Dirk Moses, eds., *Colonial Counterinsurgency and Mass Violence: The Dutch Empire in Indonesia* (London: Routledge, 2014).

[5] Steedly, *Rifle Reports*, 144. [6] Siegal *Fetish, Recognition, Revolution*, 183–207.

[7] Cribb, *Gangsters and Revolutionaries*, 51.

[8] ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta, 1949–1950, #157.

[9] ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta, 1949–1950, #67 "Ichtisar dari Rapat J.M. Menteri Pertahanan RIS dengan para Residen Seluruh Djawa Barat di Ke-Gubernuran pada tanggal 26 Djuni 1950."

[10] Cribb, *Gangsters and Revolutionaries*, 52.

violence was more focused on redistributing power than redistributing economic resources per se. Muslims led these actions in two ways. First, Muslim groups led in removing the old leaders who were seen as out of keeping with certain new ideals (be they Islamic ideals or others) of the new revolutionary era. Second, Muslim candidates very often become local leaders when former leaders were overthrown. Efforts and statements as pious Muslims assumed local leadership give an idea of how low-level local elites understood the Islamic revolution in both action and discourse.

Sometimes these movements to change local Indonesian leadership could escalate into major episodes, and two such incidents examined in the following text highlight particular ideas of social revolution for Muslims during the Indonesian revolution. The first was the so-called Cumbok War in Aceh, where traditional elites were removed by Muslim groups in the most thorough-going social reorganization in the country at the time. The second was the Madiun Revolt, an attempt by Communist groups in East Java to redirect the whole revolution toward a Marxist struggle, which invoked a major response from Muslim groups. Both of these incidents involved Muslims fighting over the local leadership and direction of the revolution, and in both cases the Muslims believed that social revolution was pushing forward an Islamic struggle, with the goal of establishing an Islamic state.

Out with the Old

The first process of vertical social revolution, removing old leaders, was seen as an important part of sweeping away the vestiges of Dutch, Japanese, and generally unjust rule. Muslims were at the forefront of this process, often providing the muscle behind forceful removals.

Moves to replace old bureaucrats and local leaders were widespread across Indonesia within a year of the revolution's start. Writing on West Java, Smail has noted that the first half of 1946 "brought about a rapid and large-scale turnover in the ranks of the *pamong pradja* [traditional bureaucrats] and the village headmen," usually men who had lost their honorable reputation by working as repressive agents for the Dutch and especially the Japanese.[11] This phenomenon was both widespread and fairly thorough; one Indonesian scholar has demonstrated that in one

[11] Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution*, 121.

district of Surakarta, Central Java, 80 of the 180 sub-district heads were replaced in just the first year of the revolution.[12]

In the ousting of old civil servants and village headmen, pious Muslims usually took the lead.[13] Most often this was accomplished through *Hizbullah* or other broadly Islamic militias, such as in south Banten where in October 1945 Islamic troops drove out, killed, or otherwise replaced the district heads and most other civil servants across three districts with Islamic leaders.[14] A similar case was reported even on the outskirts of Jakarta: followers of Haji Akhmad Khaerun in Tangerang, using both their numbers and their mystical and magical powers, replaced the whole local government, and the Haji became the effective leader of government from October 18, 1945.[15] The event of the removal sometimes involved not just Muslim groups, but also activities explicitly invoking Islam, such as when a local group of radicals in Central Java cheered "*la ilaha illa llah*" ("There is no god but God," the first half of the Islamic profession of faith) as they threatened and removed elements of the old social order.[16]

Muslim militias were not the only groups engaged in pulling down those leaders who had collaborated with the Japanese or Dutch overlords, though. In Pekalongan, Central Java, mixed Muslim and non-Muslim militias joined together to throw out the old district head.[17] In an inverse case, a village head in Cisarua subdistrict, West Java, was only able to maintain his position (and his personal safety) because of his close ties to *Hizbullah*.[18]

In many or most cases, the effort to overthrow a local official was not over ideology writ large, but rather local issues, such as the reserved lands of the sub-district head or the oppression experienced during the previous colonial eras.[19] In East Java, precisely the place of the most intense division between pious Muslims and others, there were cases in which a

[12] Soejatno, "Revolusi dan Ketegangan2 sosial di Surakarta, 1945–1950," paper presented to the A. N. U. colloquium on the Indonesian revolution, Canberra, August 1973, 19, cited in Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 76 n. 7.
[13] Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution*, 123.
[14] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 337.
[15] Cribb, *Gangsters and Revolutionaries*, 53.
[16] Anton Lucas, "The Tiga Daerah Affair: Social Revolution or Rebellion?," in Audrey R. Kahin, ed., *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution: Unity from Diversity* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1985), 29.
[17] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 339.
[18] Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution*, 124.
[19] Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 62.

Socialist or Communist militia could throw out an Islamically aligned incumbent.[20] A common reason was because the pious Muslim elites had been associated with the Japanese occupation era and thereby fell out of local favor.[21] Still, in most parts of the country Muslims were coming into power, rather than exiting it.

In with the New (and Islamic)

Mohamad Jasin of the East Java police force sent a very alarmist telegram to the Prime Minister's Cabinet in May 1950. He claimed that all of the officials in Besuki district, East Java, came from the Islamic party Masjumi and, with sympathetic politicians in higher-up positions in the province, Besuki was about to undergo a "coup if the military government were abolished," with local Muslims calling for an Islamic government.[22] Jasin was correct that more and more Islamic leaders had taken roles in local government during the revolution and that this could impact local governance, even if he was overstating the threat they posed to his police force. To understand the impact of this revolution in local governance, though, one must look at both the process and the implications.

As shown in the preceding text, the removal and replacement process started quickly after the beginning of the revolution. It was also thoroughly local, focused at the district (*kabupaten*) level and lower, meaning that the new Islamic leadership would have been more visible and accessible than national leaders. This also suggests that the change in leadership at this level reflected popular desires more than unelected national government figures of the time would have. In many cases, new Islamic leaders installed as replacements for old bureaucrats were individuals chosen by the militias or activists who drove the change. This was true for district heads in Pekalongan,[23] Tegal, and Brebes,[24] Central Java, for example, and in many cases throughout West Java where a Muslim leader became the local head of government by threat of force.[25]

After the first year of the revolution, though, more and more Islamic leaders were coming to positions of power through less violent pathways. These elevations could be through appointment by the provincial

[20] Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents*, 79.
[21] Jay, *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java*, 68.
[22] ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta, 1949–1950, #33, Inter-police Radiogram, from Kep Pen Kepol Djatim.
[23] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 339. [24] Lucas, "Tiga Daerah Affair," 31.
[25] Cribb, *Gangsters and Revolutionaries*, 53; Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution* 337; Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution*, 124.

Republican government (often in response to local facts on the ground or responding to intense local pressure) or made collectively by the local power players. In Tegal, Central Java, where Dutch rule had previously excluded them from the bureaucracy, orthodox Islamic leaders won 22 percent of the government officer seats selected in 1947.[26] In West Sumatra, local, universal-suffrage elections for the lowest level of the bureaucracy (the village head) brought a new class of leaders to power in 1946, 90 percent of whom were Muslim leaders affiliated with the Islamic party Masjumi.[27] Furthermore, this rise of Islamic leaders at the lowest levels began to impact appointments further up; for example, the central government had to send Wali Al Fattah, a leading Muhammadiyah man, as the new Republican resident to Pekalongan after several secular residents had failed to keep control of Islamic leaders serving under them.[28]

Muslims could enter government more easily in this period not only because of support for their ideology but also because Muslims were better organized to put forward candidates for leadership. The Islamic organizations that facilitated the creation of militias and public kitchens also facilitated elevating a candidate into local government. "Each group, from parties, from organizations, would send a person, so that he would become a member of the representative body," explained K. H. Zen Syukri, who sat on the first city council of independent Palembang, South Sumatra, nominated by the local Nahdlatul Ulama branch. This also allowed Muslims to both receive respect in the community at large (not just among their religious followers) and participate in important decisions. According to K. H. Zen Syukri, "At that time, the representative body had a high standing, really.... Truly, its pronouncements were important, its decisions were very important."[29] As party affiliations became stronger over the first decade of Indonesia's independence and these Islamic organizational activists became party figures, this organizational backing was crucial for those who remained in their positions.[30]

Just as the process of elevating Muslim leaders in the vertical aspect of the social revolution could be violent or nonviolent, the meaning could also vary. For example, the village government of Curug, Banten, despite being led by a haji and also drawing in local Arabs, had "no overt Islamic orientation," but did reflect the people by directly electing the lowest

[26] Lucas, "Tiga Daerah Affair," 35. [27] Kahin, *Rebellion to Integration*, 123.
[28] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 342.
[29] Interview with K. H. Zen Syukri, Palembang, June 6, 2010. Cf. Feith, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, 138.
[30] Feith, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, 183.

rungs of government bureaucracy.[31] By contrast, in other communities, as in Aceh (see following section), the local leadership of Islamic elites led to increased focus on Islamic practice and Islamic law. "The regulations around here became all shari'a," according to Lela Rosma, who lived and fought in West Sumatra. "The leadership all followed shari'a, from the village head to the hamlet head, they all followed shari'a." In her village outside of Payakumbuh, this declined after the revolution, as the leaders with religious education were replaced by those with secular university qualifications.[32] A similar rise in Islamic regulations from local Islamic leaders who assumed power during the revolution has also been reported in South Sulawesi.[33]

The ability of Islamic leaders to become government executives, even on the lowest level, marked a breach with the Dutch colonial era. The moment was also distinct from later periods when it became difficult again for ulama to serve in government roles at any level outside of the Ministry of Religion, largely because of a lack of Western education.[34]

Social Revolution in Aceh: The Cumbok War

On the northern tip of Sumatra, the area of Aceh experienced particularly violent, targeted upheavals involving the removal of old leaders and the installation of new, Muslim leaders. Antony Reid has called this the "most complete" social revolution in Indonesia, and it was additionally fairly early and swift, taking place almost entirely within the months of December 1945 and January 1946.[35] Unlike the social revolution of nearby East Sumatra, where a small class of royal rulers was replaced,[36] or the broad horizontal violence of the neighboring Batak highlands,[37] this movement in Aceh targeted an entire class of traditional leaders and replaced them with Islamic figures.

[31] Cribb, *Gangsters and Revolutionaries*, 53.
[32] Interview with Lela Rosma, March 21, 2008, in Tujuh Koto Talago, West Sumatra.
[33] Bosra, *Laskar Lipan Bajeng*, 88–89.
[34] As one example, Lucas, "Tiga Daerah Affair," 45, notes that most of the Islamic leaders in government administration moved to the local offices of the Ministry of Religion after the revolution and ceased serving as local executives. See also Kevin W. Fogg, "The Standardisation of the Indonesian Language and Its Consequences for Islamic Communities," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 46, 1 (2015): 95–97.
[35] Abdullah Arif, "The Affair of the Tjumbok Traitors," trans. and introduced by Antony Reid, *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* 4–5 (1971): 29.
[36] Antony Reid discusses these alongside Aceh in his *Blood of the People*. The account of Aceh here largely follows Reid.
[37] Steedly, *Rifle Reports*, 60–61.

Local notables called *ulèëbalang* formed the backbone of the colonial administration in the territory from the time of Aceh's integration into the Dutch empire. By the 1930s, however, these *ulèëbalang* had become more dependent on the Dutch than the colonial state was dependent on them.[38] This meant both that this group had the taint of being collaborators and lacked the social power or physical dominance to guard their own security. While the *ulèëbalang* were declining in social power, Islamic organizations led by ulama were regrouping and growing in strength. Islamic leaders, militias, and ideology had been crucial when resisting the imposition of Dutch imperialism a half-century earlier,[39] but had struggled to find unity and direction for a few decades, before coming back strongly in the 1930s. With the creation of the Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh (PUSA, All-Aceh Ulama Association) in 1939, Muslim groups were organized to assume a position as the driving force of Acehnese society.[40] As the Japanese took over Aceh in 1942, antagonism between the pious Muslim community – as led by ulama – and the traditional *ulèëbalang* leaders became entrenched in many parts of the province.[41] The popular sentiment against the *ulèëbalang* held that the traditional leaders violated religion by embezzling reserved funds from Islamic endowments and taking inappropriate liberties with other men's wives, in addition to the general allegations of *ulèëbalang* treachery for having worked with the Dutch.[42]

When news of Indonesian independence reached Aceh in 1945, the ulama were particularly active and particularly enthusiastic to promote a new order. They issued fatwas in support of the Indonesian cause, and made it clear that they believed this was an Islamic struggle.[43] Ulama mobilized fighters not just to resist the reinvasion of the Dutch, but also to oppose the *ulèëbalang*, particularly a recalcitrant traditional leader called Daud Cumbok in the Pidië regency, who had been doing his best to scandalize all the local Muslims with his behavior and sponsorship of vice.[44] PUSA leaders accused Daud Cumbok and his followers not only of immoral actions, but of outright and explicit opposition to Islam, including insulting the Qur'an[45] and burning down religious schools.[46] In January 1946, the low-level conflicts against this *ulèëbalang* leader and

[38] Reid, *Blood of the People*, 17. [39] Siegel, *Rope of God*, chapter 4.
[40] Reid, *Blood of the People*, 30–31. [41] Reid, *Blood of the People*, 98, 103.
[42] Mutyara, *Peristiwa Atjeh* (Bireuen: Pendekar Rakjat, 1946), 18–19.
[43] See Chapter 2; see also Reid, *Blood of the People*, 210.
[44] Reid, *Blood of the People*, 207. [45] Mutyara, *Peristiwa Atjeh*, 28.
[46] Fachry Ali, "The Revolts of the Nation-State Builders: A Comparative Study of the Acehnese Darul Islam and the West Sumatran PRRI Rebellions (1953–1962)," MA thesis, Monash University, 1994, 37.

his associates were elevated by an official note of sanction against him by the Republican provincial government, and this opened the floodgates for serious violence. In the two weeks from January 12, Islamic forces massacred hundreds of *ulèëbalang* and those loyal to them around the village of Cumbok, giving this episode of social revolution its local name, the "Cumbok War." Pious Muslim leaders – mostly ulama – launched the "war" and overnight became the military leaders of the anti-*ulèëbalang* forces.[47] When the dust settled in late January they had also secured appointment as the new government officials at the town and regency level.[48] The force of Islamic leaders taking the full reins of government was so strong that the central government on Java felt compelled to retroactively recognize several of its leaders as Republican leaders, most notably the military commander Husein Al-Mujahid (this adopted surname meaning one engaged in *jihad*, or holy struggle) who became a Major General in the Indonesian Army[49] and the ulama leader behind the movement, Daud Beureueh, who became the Republican Military Governor.[50] For the remainder of the revolution, religious leaders connected with PUSA held all prominent government positions in every locality in Aceh,[51] and when the regional legislature in Aceh was elected in January 1950, immediately after the revolution's end, all its twenty-four members were ulama except the one representative of the Chinese community.[52] This meant that religious leaders were unparalleled as the guardians of independence in Aceh, and were able to interpret and direct the revolution for the province as a whole.

Abdurrahman Teuku Cek, an Acehnese man born in 1922, gave his impression that with the attack on the *ulèëbalang*, "they were wiped out. … Only a few were left."[53] From then on, the whole administration of the province became Islamic. "Some people said [Indonesia] should be a confederation, some said [it should] really be unitary, but all of this was in conflict with religion." Daud Beureueh and his followers saw themselves as "Islamic fighters," and they were determined to make Islam the defining feature of their independence.[54] Another Acehnese

[47] Arif, "The Affair of the Tjumbok Traitors," 53.
[48] Reid, *Blood of the People*, 221–222.
[49] ANRI RA6, Sekretariat Negara RI, 1945–1949, #544 "Pemerintahan RI Jogjakarta: Penetapan no. 20/SD tgl. 28 September 1946 tentang pengangkatan Amir Hoesin Almoedjahid menjadi Jenderal-Mayor Kehormatan pada Tentara Republik Indonesia."
[50] S. M. Amin, *Kenang-Kenangan dari Masa Lampau* (Jakarta: Pradnya Paramita, 1977), 40.
[51] Reid, *Blood of the People*, 227.
[52] Ali, "The Revolts of the Nation-State Builders," 41 n. 71.
[53] Interview with Abdurrahman Teuku Cek, Banda Aceh, March 17, 2010.
[54] Interview with Abdurrahman Teuku Cek.

man who witnessed the violence and later fought under Daud Beureueh said that religion remained "like a *kiblah*" (the direction of prayer for Muslims), constantly directing the actions undertaken by Daud Beureueh, PUSA, and the Muslims of the province – including in the 1946 violence.[55]

How did the ulama interpret revolution, and why did Muslims in Aceh engage in such thoroughgoing social revolution as a part of the overall struggle? One can find some insight from the conclusion of a booklet written in May 1946, just months after the so-called Cumbok War:

> Receive this blessing of God with full awareness that victory is only given by God to pious people. We are pious before God by following all of his commands, avoiding all immorality, because of that God gives victory. But, O my people! If we forget our oaths that we have undertaken before the religious community certainly God will send down a terrible calamity upon us.[56]

Not only did the fighters believe that it was their religious obligation to attack such enemies and immoral individuals as the *ulèëbalang*, but the preceding passage shows how they also believed that their victory in this social revolution was divinely orchestrated. The passage suggests goals of following God's commands and avoiding all immorality – in other words, implementing Islamic regulations in Acehnese governance. This animated the movement for the implementation of Islamic law in Aceh over the decades that followed.[57] In the words of Arskal Salim, eliminating the *ulèëbalang* and taking over the government of Aceh was "only a technique by which *shari'a* could be implemented and its fundamental objectives realized."[58]

Putting ulama at the head of the new government in Aceh was only one step toward the greater goal of the religious leaders in Aceh; the true aim was to achieve a fully Islamic state. The immediate goal was to implement Islamic law as fully as possible.[59] An American researcher who spoke to Daud Beureueh in 1953 came away with the understanding that he sought "an Islamic State for all of Indonesia and not just for an independent Aceh."[60] Daud Beureueh later launched

[55] Interview with Zainal Abidin, Sigli, March 15, 2010.
[56] Mutyara, *Peristiwa Atjeh*, 32.
[57] Feener, *Shari'a and Social Engineering*, 34–35.
[58] Arskal Salim, "'Sharia from Below' in Aceh (1930s–1960s): Islamic Identity and the Right to Self-Determination with Comparative Reference to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 32, 92 (2004): 86.
[59] Arskal Salim, *Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), 143.
[60] Boyd R. Compton, "Daud Beureueh – Lion of Atjeh," *Newsletter of the Institute for Current World Affairs*, September 17, 1953, www.icwa.org/articles/BRC-19.pdf, 3.

a rebellion in Aceh tied to the Darul Islam movement in West Java to achieve precisely that aim.[61]

Thus, in the case of Aceh, the most complete social revolution in the archipelago, Islamic groups were involved at all levels. Muslim militias removed the old leaders, ulama assumed the reins of local government, and Islamic ideology inspired both to push toward an Islamic form for the independent state of Indonesia.

Madiun Affair as Competing Social Revolutions

One event that is not usually associated with the social revolution, but that falls along the same lines, is the Madiun Affair of 1948. In mid-1948, the left wing of Indonesia's political spectrum was becoming ever more alienated from the presidential cabinet. At this moment, a famous Indonesian Communist leader returned from Moscow after decades of international activity, prompting the Indonesian Communist Party and sympathizers from labor unions and other leftist parties to revolt around the East Javanese city of Madiun. A Communist-led alternative government was proclaimed on September 18, 1948, drawing an immediate and fierce response from secular nationalists and Muslims alike. The revolt involved clashes with the Indonesian armed forces (first at Solo, in Central Java, before retreating to Madiun) and the strong condemnation of Indonesia's national leaders – leading to a stronger Western embrace of the Indonesian Republic – but it also had major episodes of violence between Communist-affiliated groups and Muslim social groups that should be seen as part of the social revolution.[62] In addition to national politics and conflict between loyal and disaffected military units, reports agree that local leftist brigades attacked Muslim leaders and Islamic schools, and that Muslim groups also mobilized against the declared Communist revolt.

On the Communist side, local peasants were attracted by promises of land redistribution and more effective resistance against the Dutch.[63] Local workers could also be drawn into the Communist cause by their participation in labor unions (e.g., Madiun was a hub for the railroads in

[61] Aspinall, *Islam and Nation*, 30–38. See also Chapter 6.

[62] The classic analysis of this historical incident, which emphasizes the national politics and international influences at play, is Ann Swift, *The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948* (Singapore: Equinox, 2010 [1989]). This account underplays the grassroots-level conflicts and the widespread animosity between leftists and pious Muslims that was already thick in the air by 1948.

[63] Swift, *The Road to Madiun*, 132.

East Java, and railroad unions were already well organized).[64] Communist leaders also made bold claims that only they were truly resisting Dutch imperialism, unlike the Islamic party-backed presidential cabinet.[65] These theoretical and communal disagreements easily burst into military and physical conflicts, as when the Communists attacked Islamic boarding schools around the city on September 17, 1948, the day before formally announcing their rebellion.[66] The Communist move to replace local office holders and institute their own government was a pointed attempt at social revolution, here with the leadership of national (even international) politicians rather than just locals. According to Muslim accounts, the primary victims of this effort to change the direction of the revolution were Islamic leaders and pious Muslims, who were just as often killed as driven out of town.[67] In fact, a Surabaya newspaper reported on instructions after the movement had failed for the leftist groups to kill any prisoners, including many religious figures.[68] The effects were significant enough that in 1950, the head of the local Religious Affairs Office in Madiun still reported a dearth of Islamic teachers – or Islamic leaders of any kind – in his region.[69]

On the Muslim side in 1948, the same instincts toward animosity and communal attacks were immediately in evidence once the revolt broke out. The *Hizbullah* militias and the Islamic schools that sponsored them sprang into action, proclaiming afresh the idea of a holy war. Their accusations were not only reactive, that the Communists had attacked first, or had injured the Republican cause, but also showed blanket anti-Communism: Communism was atheist, thus anti-Islamic, and must be destroyed. The Communist revolt was denounced as an attack on religion.[70] This argument on the level of principle was soon pushed into action through efforts at social revolution.

In a very evocative document, the Masjumi party defense headquarters in Yogyakarta issued instructions for all Masjumi members and

[64] Suryomenggolo, *Organising under the Revolution*, 100.
[65] Swift, *The Road to Madiun*, 106.
[66] Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents* 74.
[67] Saifuddin Zuhri, *Berangkat dari Pesantren* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1987), 360.
[68] Katharine McGregor, "A Reassessment of the Significance of the 1948 Madiun Uprising to the Cold War in Indonesia," *Kajian Malaysia* 27 (2009): 102, detailing coverage in *Trompet Masjarakat*.
[69] ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta, 1949–1950, #218. His complaints about the degree of lost or absent Islamic teachers may have been overplayed in hopes of increased funding, but the argument that the Madiun revolt hit the Muslim population hard must have had some basis if it was used in this appeal.
[70] Swift, *The Road to Madiun*, 127 n. 130.

sympathizers across Java, Madura, and Sumatra in the wake of the Madiun revolt. This document, issued on October 7, 1948, invoked the speeches and actions of the secularist President Sukarno against the Communist forces, but went significantly further to urge pious Muslims toward Islamic social revolution.[71] The Masjumi author urged followers to "take up *jihad fi sabilillah*" in "exterminating all the germs of Amir, Musso, et al., the Indonesian Communist Party, and the People's Democratic Front."[72] Furthermore, "If the institutions of state in any given place are weak, unsure, or non-existent, Masjumi members collectively have to act as the institutions of state." This involved removing any local officials, bureaucrats, or even telephone network operatives who were partial to the Indonesian Communist Party and replacing them with loyal Masjumi members – "without regard to their level of education." Any wealth the Communists had should be turned over to the police "or used in the Holy Struggle," and any weapons won from the Communists should be "quickly confiscated" for Masjumi. It seems that even the author of these instructions knew how inflammatory a Muslim takeover of all local government and resources would be, as the instruction concludes with "If this [directive] has been fully understood (take notes as needed), tear up or burn."[73] The image clearly conveyed is one of social revolution, in which pious Muslim leaders come to replace others and Islamic institutions like Masjumi are empowered locally.

This spirit emanating from leaders was reflected in the actions of pious Muslims on the ground. An American researcher working nearby in the 1950s found that Muslim forces had seized the moment in 1948 to demand all leftist youth be handed over, and to obligate the village headman to attend public worship at the local mosque. "The *santri* leaders who were present argued … that Indonesia was an Islamic country and that it was the duty of every public official to set a good example for the people by being a good Moslem."[74] Another, left-leaning

[71] This document has been preserved in ANRI RA10, Djodja Documenten, #91, in the context of its strong repudiation by General Gatot Subroto, the military governor of the area. The documents (both the instructions and the letter of condemnation) were captured by the Dutch in December 1948. Both the credence that Gatot Subroto gives to the letter and its provenance in the archives make it appear genuine. It is also in line with the hot-headed reputation of its author, Kasman Singodimedjo, then head of the Masjumi Defense Board.

[72] Amir Sjarifuddin and Musso were the Communist Party leaders who declared the rival government in Madiun. The People's Democratic Front was an organization of the Communists' left-wing political allies.

[73] ANRI RA10, Djodja Documenten, #91.

[74] Jay, *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java*, 74.

observer of the Madiun struggle explained to the same researcher that the situation was Masjumi attempting to win "control of Indonesia. The Masjumi wanted to rule."[75]

Although there was certainly an important conflict at the level of national politics, Madiun in 1948 also functioned locally as a moment of social revolution: Indonesians fighting Indonesians to institute in their communities a vision of how an independent Indonesia should look. For pious Muslims, this vision was of Islamic leadership and devout adherence to religion.

Staying Power of Social Revolution

Although the social revolution allowed pious Muslims to replace others in positions of low-level leadership in many corners of the archipelago, these changes did not last for very long. By the end of the revolution, and certainly into the 1950s, Muslim revolutionary leaders on the local level were replaced either with the old bureaucrats they had driven out or by new figures promoted by political interests of the new central government.

The replacement of Islamic officials by their colonial-collaborating predecessors was widespread across Indonesia. Even as early as 1950, for example, a police report in South Sulawesi revealed that all the old Dutch lackeys had reassumed their positions in the bureaucracy, and some Republican and revolutionary figures had even been put under arrest.[76]

In other places, the old local elites did not return, but the pious Muslim functionaries did not survive in their positions, either. Sometimes they moved sideways or one step down, e.g., demoted to become head of a local religious affairs office. Other times Muslim officials were killed as heroes in the revolution, and so others had to be appointed in their places, as happened in the Tiga Daerah Affair on Java. Muslims seem to have been more likely to leave their leadership positions after the revolution than their nonpious nationalist counterparts because they did not hold the qualifications expected of traditional bureaucrats.[77] In a village in West Sumatra, H. Asbir Dt. Rajo Mangkuto reported becoming his village head in the 1950s at the age of twenty-one "because I was

[75] Jay, *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java*, 96–97.
[76] ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta, 1949–1950, #89.
[77] Lucas, "Tiga Daerah Affair," 44–45.

the only one in the village who had a degree," discounting the qualifications of those who had been trained in Islamic education.[78]

In many areas, local leaders who came to power in a moment of social revolution were soon replaced by outsiders sent to the region. There seems to have been a particular problem of sending out individuals from Central Java, where the revolutionary national government had been centered at Yogyakarta, for positions in other provinces. The West Java branch of Masjumi complained loudly about this phenomenon. This was not just for the highest positions, but also for relatively measly roles, like head of finance, head of personnel, or archivist of the religious affairs office.[79] In West Sumatra, too, the governor expressed concerns in 1950 about individuals being sent from Central Java. He wrote to the government saying they already had so many civil servants from the revolutionary period and the Dutch period and imploring the central government to stop sending individuals out to be invested as officials.[80]

Outside appointments, especially, seemed to provoke resentment, especially when the new appointee was replacing a Muslim leader. On Madura, the local Masjumi branch wrote to the governor of East Java, appealing to him that the revolutionary regent, an Islamic leader called Bung Hasan, be reinstated; they did not want someone who did not know the local situation trying to run the government, but rather an individual who was committed to the revolutionary cause.[81] Similar resistance took place in Tegal and Brebes, Central Java, where locals protested proposals to replace the popular, revolutionary Muslim regents. The only acceptable candidates for them would be sufficiently Islamic ones.[82]

Although Islamic leaders had staying power in a few places – most notably Aceh – the general trend for revolutionary Islamic leadership to lose their positions must have been a great disappointment for Muslims supporting the revolution for religious reasons. It also speaks to the exceptional nature of the revolution as a time of Muslim activity, and sets up the rhetorical battles over the legacy of the revolution that would continue throughout the following decades.

[78] Interview with H. Asbir Dt. Rajo Mangkuto, Simarasok, Kel. Tanjuang Guguak, Kec. Baso, Kab. Agam, West Sumatra, July 10, 2007.
[79] ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta, 1949–1950, #67, "Kepolisian Karesidenan Bogor, Bagian P.A.M., Bogor, 22 Juni 1950 (Rahasia)."
[80] ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta, 1949–1950, #198.
[81] ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta, 1949–1950, #65.
[82] Lucas, "Tiga Daerah Affair," 44.

Conclusion

Muslim-led violence in the social revolution has had long-lasting consequences. As M. C. Ricklefs has argued, this violence created or deepened a breach in Indonesian society such that pious Muslims congealed as a bloc, and especially as an anti-Communist bloc.[83] Although there were a few cases where Islam and Communism could still intertwine as ideologies,[84] the social lines that would cleave Indonesian communities – especially those on Java – for the next fifteen years were drawn through this violence. By consolidating the Muslim community as a bloc, the social revolution strengthened the constituency that would later support Islamic parties throughout the country, but it also may have alienated some who might have otherwise been open to the idea of Islamic politics.[85]

Indeed, the social revolution demonstrates again how the Islamic experience of, and vision for, the revolution was only one subset of the Indonesian population, set against leftists, secular nationalists, and a range of other groups. Many of those other groups were also consolidated, and even confirmed in their antagonism against Muslims, through the social revolution. The experience of Indonesian-on-Indonesian violence and competition for local governmental leadership coincided with the community stratifying in its ideological beliefs.

This separation along ideological lines made it all the more important that Islamic leaders took positions of governmental leadership during the revolution. Local Muslim elites may have just been vying for power, but the calls to battle that they issued and the emphasis on Islamic governance after coming to power suggest that they also had a vision of Indonesia to implement with that power. This political program involved organizing the state along Islamic lines, and basing the state on Islam. The fact that so many Islamic leaders came to power during the revolution suggests that many Indonesian Muslims during the revolution were open to or downright supportive of Islamic principles underlying the state.

[83] Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents*, 71–79; see also Greg Fealy and Katherine McGregor, "Nahdlatul Ulama and the Killings of 1965–66: Religion, Politics, and Remembrance," *Indonesia* 89 (April 2010): 39.

[84] E.g., see Gusti Asnan, *Memikir Ulang Regionalisme: Sumatera Barat Tahun 1950-an* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2007) on PKI-Lokal Islamy in West Sumatra.

[85] The Islamic party Masjumi, seemingly aware of the possible alienation, tried to temper this effect with their very unreligious campaign for the 1955 elections, but without success; Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, 300–302.

The moment of Islamic governmental leadership during the revolution was short-lived, though. It was a departure from the Dutch era, and it did not generally last into the 1950s; thus, many ulama who assumed governmental positions served for only a few years. This undermined the ability of Islamic leaders to put Islamic programs into practice, meaning that the ideas of an Islamic state failed to launch. And yet, during the revolution, as ulama became political leaders on the local level, Islam thoroughly merged with politics. The ulama would not disassociate themselves from formal politics for another two decades, and even then only half-heartedly.[86]

Indonesia's social revolution wrought havoc but generally did not succeed in accomplishing the goals that pious Muslims at the grassroots level had for transformation of state and society. It came closest to achieving these goals in Aceh, where the Muslim-led social revolution was most thorough, but even in that case the ability of ulama to dominate the region and implement their vision fully was restricted by the central government in the 1950s.[87]

Indonesia's social revolution, and especially Muslim violence in the social revolution, did set a precedent for future popular acts of violence: first in 1953 when Aceh broke into rebellion, and again in 1965–1966 across Indonesia, when Muslim groups attacked supposed Communists as part of a nationwide purge in retribution for a supposed attempted Communist coup.[88] The social revolution was also part of a full spectrum of Indonesian Muslim violence against other Indonesians during the revolution, including the most famous case, the Darul Islam rebellion.

[86] The process of withdrawing from politics back into social issues from the late 1960s through the mid-1980s is chronicled well in Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003). Although many individual ulama remained involved in politics, the broad trend – from Nucholish Madjid's famous speech "Islam yes; Islamic Party no" to NU's withdrawal from politics – was for disengagement. In some ways this reflects the broad ebb and flow of religion in Indonesian political life, which has again blossomed after 1998.

[87] This contributed directly to Acehnese separatism led by Daud Beureueh; Aspinall, *Islam and Nation*, 31.

[88] Fealy and McGregor, "Nahdlatul Ulama and the Killings of 1965–66," 46–47; McGregor, "A Reassessment of the Significance of the 1948 Madiun Uprising to the Cold War in Indonesia," 113.

6 Darul Islam

When thinking about a fight in the name of Islam to establish an Islamic polity in Indonesia during the revolution (and afterward), many Indonesians would automatically think of the so-called Darul Islam rebellion in West Java, led by a man called S. M. Kartosuwirjo. This case is well known, both because it grew as a rebellion throughout the 1950s and spread to other areas of Indonesia,[1] and because it birthed or inspired the radical Islamists engaged in violent actions against the Indonesian state and non-Muslim groups since the 1990s.[2] The ongoing impact of this movement after the revolution has brought it attention of all kinds – military, political, academic, social – so that it has been conceived of as an exceptional case and a cautionary tale about the dangers of Islamic struggle. The idea that this negative example was the epitome of Islamic struggle in the Indonesian Revolution has framed national discourse to suggest that all Islamic struggle was bad and opposed to the Indonesian state.[3]

In fact, the Darul Islam movement was exceptional, but not in all the ways that popular understandings today would have us believe. Its goals, participants, and methods were well within the normal spectrum of Islamic participation in the revolution from 1945 to 1949. Instead, Darul Islam broke from the others fighting for Indonesian independence because of its exceptional leader.

The name by which this movement is now commonly known, "Darul Islam," is both accurate and misleading. In Islamic theology,

[1] The comprehensive account of the multiple branches of Darul Islam is Cornelius van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).

[2] Quinton Temby, "Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah," *Indonesia* 89 (April 2010): 1–36.

[3] E.g., Ahmad Yani Anshor, *Untuk Negara Islam Indonesia: Perjuangan Darul Islam dan al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah* (Yogyakarta: Siyasat Press, 2008). Even those who take a more neutral or nuanced view of Islamic struggle generally often have a negative approach to Darul Islam, such as Feillard and Madinier.

Dār al- Islām ("Land" or "Home of Islam") means all those territories controlled by Muslims and/or with a majority Muslim population, standing in opposition to the *Dār al-Ḥarb* ("Land" or "Home of War") from which Muslims are obliged to emigrate.[4] Because this term exists in classical theology, its invocation by Indonesian Muslims did not necessarily imply a connection to the movement in West Java; speakers at the 1948 Masjumi party congress, for example, often spoke of "Darul Islam" in its more general meaning.[5] At the same time, although Kartosuwirjo – especially in his writings at the start of the revolution – invoked "Darul Islam" as the end goal,[6] he more commonly called his movement the *Negara Islam Indonesia* (the Islamic State of Indonesia), such as in his formal proclamation and in later communiques.[7] There is some evidence that fighters at the grassroots levels may have called the movement "Darul Islam," though,[8] and that is the name that has stuck in popular discourse, along with the name of Kartosuwirjo's armed forces, the *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (Islamic Army of Indonesia).[9]

Although early studies of Kartosuwirjo and his movement dismissed any real consideration of religion as a key motivation, the evidence suggests that Islam did serve as the "ideological foundation" (to use Chiara Formichi's term) that underlay this armed movement.[10] Religious belief led Muslims in West Java to rise up and fight off the Dutch reinvasion, to organize themselves in Islamic ways, and to reject actions from the nonsectarian national government that sidelined their community and its understanding of the revolution. With a particularly prominent leader and a series of circumstances that put him in opposition to government policy, the movement slowly broke with the Indonesian

[4] A. Abel, "Dār al-Islām," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W. P. Heinrichs (Leiden: Brill Online, 2012), http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/dar-al-islam-SIM_1703 (accessed October 27, 2015).

[5] ANRI RA10, Djogja Documenten, #203, "Kutipan Pidato2 pada tg. 28/3-'48 (Kongres Masjumi di Madiun)." These speech excerpts were placed into a file about the rebellion seemingly because the police mistook them for speaking about Kartosuwirjo's movement.

[6] S. M. Kartosoewirjo, *Haluan Politik Islam* (Garut: Dewan Perdjuangan Masjumi, 1946); ANRI RA10, Djogja Documenten, #243, "Keterangan Ringkas tentang 'Perang Sabil.'"

[7] ANRI RA11, Kabinet Presiden RI, 1950–1959, #2617, "Majelis Penerangan Negara Islam Indonesia: Naskah Manifest politik Negara Islam Indonesia, karangan I, Huda mengenai Indonesia Kini dan Kelak."

[8] ANRI RA7, Sekretariat Negara RI Yogyakarta (Des '49–Sep '50), #230, "Pers Kedaulatan Rakyat kepada SetNeg: Telegram tanggal 15 Februari 1950 tentang pengacau Darul Islam."

[9] In Indonesia today, the most common ways to refer to this movement are as "Darul Islam" or "DI/TII," an abbreviation of "Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia."

[10] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 184, 6. Contrast van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam*; Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion*.

government between 1947 and 1949. It was the person and decisions of this man – not struggle in the name of Islam generally – that made the Darul Islam exceptional.

Sequence of Events Leading Kartosuwirjo into Rebellion

The man who eventually led Muslims in West Java into rebellion had been involved in mainstream Islamic politics for decades. S. M. Kartosuwirjo was educated to the highest level for Indonesians in the Dutch colonial system, and then became a disciple of two leaders of the Sarekat Islam organization: its founder, H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, and his lieutenant, H. Agus Salim.[11] Through the 1930s, Kartosuwirjo was active in mobilizing Indonesian Muslims, both through his publishing activities (he helped to edit an Islamic newspaper) and through his leadership in Sarekat Islam's successor political party: Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia. This political party saw several schisms in the late 1930s, with Kartosuwirjo consistently in the most radical faction and unwilling to collaborate in any way with the colonial regime.[12] During World War II, Kartosuwirjo held some political roles in West Java and supported the Japanese as Asians and liberators of the Indonesian Muslim people.[13] In 1945, the sources disagree as to whether Kartosuwirjo was appointed in the inaugural leadership committee of the new Islamic political party Masjumi,[14] but it is clear that his primary activity was in leading an Islamic militia in West Java.

As with many areas in Indonesia, there were frequent clashes in West Java between government-sponsored official army troops and popular militias, in this case especially those Islamic militias aligned with Masjumi.[15] In this particular province many Islamic militias were loosely aligned with Masjumi and led by S. M. Kartosuwirjo. The Islamic militias refused to be dissolved into the army and refused to surrender their weapons; they were even found by Gen. Nasution, the commander

[11] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 15, 22; oral history with Harsono Tjokroaminoto, interviewed by Wardiningsih Surjohardjo, ANRI SL1 1982 #60, tape 12.
[12] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, chapter 2.
[13] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 74–76.
[14] Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 100–101 suggests Kartosuwirjo was on the Masjumi executive committee. Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, 162 n. 117, asserts that the first Masjumi party congress did not give Kartosuwirjo any role in party leadership.
[15] Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam*, 77–81.

of the government's army in West Java, to be more skillful than his own troops.[16] These clashes were not merely trying to out tough each other, either; there were key policy disagreements, as when the government troops retreated from West Java in recognition of a temporary armistice line agreed between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic in March 1947. Kartosuwirjo fiercely opposed the armistice, even to the point of bringing his militia to the parliamentary plenary session to agitate against the agreement.[17] The conflict between Kartosuwirjo's Islamic militias and Indonesian government forces came to a head when the Dutch subsequently launched their first so-called Police Action (more accurately described in Indonesian as an "Aggression") in July 1947.

It so happened that July 1947 coincided with the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan that year, so in keeping with the spirit of the times Kartosuwirjo responded to the Dutch reinvasion of West Java with an instruction to all his followers about "Holy War" (Perang Sabil).[18] Believing that it was un-Islamic to retreat or surrender,[19] the Islamic militias continued their guerrilla attacks against the colonial forces in West Java, while the government troops retreated into Central Java, behind an armistice line.[20] Kartosuwirjo later considered this the beginning of his guerrilla operation, in part because the invading Dutch burned his Islamic training institute in his wife's home village, forcing him into more guerrilla methods and an itinerant existence.[21]

For the next year and more, Kartosuwirjo's Islamic troops continued to fight in West Java using their Islamic methods, while the Indonesian government did not exercise any authority in the region of West Java. Over the course of 1948, Kartosuwirjo reorganized Islamic groups in his sphere of operations to assert a movement that was separate from, and not subsidiary to, the Indonesian Republican government in Yogyakarta, which he accused of abandoning the righteous struggle.[22] In December 1948, Kartosuwirjo sent a "Consul" to Yogyakarta and wrote that "responsibility for the 'movement' in the regions occupied by the Dutch – specifically in the Western part of Java – is held by the Government of the Islamic State of Indonesia, and is free from the responsibility of the

[16] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 94.
[17] Holk H. Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo: Langkah Perwujudan Angan-Angan yang Gagal* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2011 [1995]), 58–59.
[18] ANRI RA10, Djogja Documenten, #243, "Keterangan Ringkas tentang 'Perang Sabil'."
[19] This theological position is emphasized in many Muslim guides for fighting, e.g., Loebis, *Toentoenan Perang Sabil*, 28–29.
[20] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 234.
[21] Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo*, 61.
[22] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 115–118, 120–122.

Republican Government."[23] Still, he had not yet given up all hope on the idea of Indonesia. Even as late as December 21, 1948, Kartosuwirjo issued a proclamation emphasizing his continuity and connection with the general Indonesian struggle for independence, and positioning his movement as one aspect of that core fight. He wrote, "Know this: That the struggle that we are pushing forward leading to the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia is a continuation of the struggle for independence, according to and in keeping with the Proclamation of 17 August 1945!"[24]

This uneasy standoff of conflicting sovereignty became outright enmity shortly thereafter. When government troops came back into West Java in 1949, they clashed repeatedly with Islamic State of Indonesia troops, whom the central government saw as lawless, unregulated militias.[25] The culmination on August 7, 1949 came just days after Eid al-Fitr (the celebration to end the fasting month), when Kartosuwirjo officially proclaimed his Indonesian Islamic State and issued a religious edict that all able-bodied Muslim men must join his cause.[26]

Thus, between 1947 and 1949, Kartosuwirjo's movement transitioned from a particularly religious local manifestation of the independence struggle to a rebellion against the Indonesian state (as well as against Dutch colonialism). Kartosuwirjo refused repeated overtures from the Republic for a peaceful settlement. Already by June 1950, the police and military had detained 4,800 individuals in the Priangan region of West Java (the hub of Kartosuwirjo's movement),[27] and the conflict continued to grow through the following decade.

The Darul Islam Movement within the Islamic Spectrum

The elements seen in Kartosuwirjo's movement were not different in kind from the elements of Islamic struggle found elsewhere. Islamic State of Indonesia used Islamic calls to fight, leadership of religious figures, Islamic militias, and even some magical practices connected to Islam.

[23] ANRI RA10, Djogja Documenten, #218, "Surat-suat bulan Desember 1948 tentang rencana ketentaraan umat Islam (Negara Islam Indonesia)." Oddly, this talk of an "Islamic State of Indonesia" appeared several months before Kartosuwirjo's formal proclamation of such a state in August 1949.

[24] Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo*, 83, quoting Kartosuwirjo's Maklumat no. 6, December 21, 1948.

[25] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 129–130.

[26] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 135–137.

[27] ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta 1949–1950, #67 "Ichtisar dari Rapat J.M. Menteri Pertahanan RIS dengan para Residen Seluruh Djawa Barat di Ke-Gubernuran."

Importantly, the national leaders of Islamic politics and the leader of this movement knew and respected each other, and they initially believed that they were engaged in the same struggle. This, then, extends Chiara Formichi's argument that "Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam were neither arch-enemies of the Pancasila Republic, as conveniently argued by the state between the late 1950s and the 1980s, nor were they the ultimate synthesis of Islamic religious piety and political accomplishment, as claimed by Indonesian Islamists today."[28] The Darul Islam movement was instead just one end of a spectrum of Islamic fighting in the Indonesian revolution. Using all the same elements as other Islamic fighters within the revolution, it merely relied more heavily on these Islamic elements and had fewer positive engagements with non-Islamic elements on the Indonesian side. Until 1948, it was not beyond the pale of Indonesian revolutionary activity and should be seen as part of the Islamic end of the struggle.

The proclamations made by Kartosuwirjo and his colleagues in West Java calling Muslims to fight for an Islamic state were not unusual in their timing, form, or content. The Dutch colonial official, C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, who was on the ground to observe developments during the revolution, wrote that "the aims of the Dar ul-Islam movement are widely shared beyond its formal limits, among the Indonesian Muslim community."[29] In 1947, Kartosuwirjo issued a call for "*Perang Sabil*" or holy war, incumbent on every Muslim individually. He said it was mandatory to "establish a 'Dar-oel-Islam' and to promulgate Islamic Law in its broadest sense," a call that Kartosuwirjo later explained was for Muslims to enact their ideology to its fullest, even while allowing for other citizens to enact other ideologies.[30] The following year, the very first "Pronouncement" made by Kartosuwirjo as Imam of the Islamic State of Indonesia government declared that "every member of the Islamic Community is obliged to engage in *Jihad Fi Sabilillah* [War in the Way of God], to reject every form of evil and despotism, and to uphold truth and justice."[31] This sounds very much like other fatwas that had been issued by Islamic scholars or groups around the archipelago.[32]

[28] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 9.
[29] C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Dar ul-Islam Movement in Western Java till 1949," in *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 161–162.
[30] ANRI RA10, Djogja Documenten, #243, "Keterangan Ringkas Tentang 'Perang Sabil,' 28 Augustus 1947." The original call was made on Friday, August 15, 1947, coinciding with 27 Ramadan (the pinnacle of the fasting month, the likeliest night for the revelation of the Qur'an to the Prophet Muhammad).
[31] ANRI RA10, Djogja Documenten, #218, "Ma'loemat Nomor 1." [32] See Chapter 2.

In fact, Kartosuwirjo's pronouncements of an Islamic Holy War to fight off the Dutch sound so very much like other pronouncements of holy war from the same period that a major Islamic politician came to his defense on this point in 1947. Kasman Singodimedjo, a politician for the national Islamic party Masjumi and serving at the time as the head of Indonesia's Courts Martial, wrote to the minister of defense in response to an inquiry about Kartosuwirjo's pronouncement, saying,

> The announcement of a Holy War by S.M. Kartosuwirjo is, if we look at it through a religious lens, based primarily on an emergency situation, and permissible! Not wrong. Based on the politics of the country which is facing a national revolution right now, leaning also on the encouragement from the Government to have a total defense struggle (*volksdefensie*) and guerrillas of the people, then this action of S.M. Kartosuwirjo is appropriate.… The Government can do naught else but be thankful to Allah, the One Almighty God of the Republic of Indonesia, because among the nation's sons there are brave and martial men like S.M. Kartosuwirjo.[33]

To drive home how Kartosuwirjo's actions were similar to the actions of other Muslims in the revolution, Kasman also sent the minister a copy of the Masjumi pronouncement of holy war made in 1947, although if he had known how many myriad declarations had been issued across the archipelago the file could have been overwhelming.[34]

Kartosuwirjo's move to form an Islamic militia was also perfectly in line with the practice of other Muslims in various regions of Indonesia. The core of his Islamic Army of Indonesia forces came from the school that Kartosuwirjo had set up in 1940 in his wife's hometown of Malongbong, a school called the Suffah Institute.[35] In 1945 he transformed it from a religious boarding school into a military training institute, in much the same way that other ulama organized their students into fighting forces.[36] These devout Muslim troops were dedicated both to religion and to the fight for independence, such that even the famous Republican General Nasution recognized them as more driven than the

[33] ANRI RA10, Djogja Documenten, #218, "Surat dari Kasman Singodimedjo kepada Menteri Muda Pertahanan, 22 Oktober 1947." Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo*, 85, reports that Kasman, along with another Islamic politician, Burhanuddin Harahap, again argued in defense of Darul Islam before the army command in December 1948.

[34] Cf. Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 87–88, who also sees the impetus to declare an Islamic State (not just a holy war) well within normative practice within Masjumi, as judged by party publications.

[35] Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo*, 25, 43.

[36] Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo*, 43. On other ulama organizing their students into militias, see Chapter 3.

official government's army units.[37] These same governmental army units begrudged Islamic militias for the level of support they received from civilians.[38] In both the devotion of the Islamic militias and in the envy of governmental troops, the Darul Islam was not unique – similar situations arose in West Sumatra or South Sulawesi, for example.[39] As the revolution went on, Kartosuwirjo merged the various Islamic militias at work in West Java into his Islamic Army of Indonesia,[40] but this did not revolutionize Islamic armed struggle so much as standardize it for the province.

In addition to integrating Islamic militias into his efforts as the revolution wore on, Kartosuwirjo also found a way to explicitly integrate ulama. He formed a section of his administration for religious matters, and put a traditional scholar in charge of it. He also created a special community of devotion for ulama.

> In the prayer headquarters, day and night there were at least 41 people praying, and among them there had to be a leader. The things that the prayer headquarters were obliged to do included prayer for specific purposes [*hajat*], thanksgiving, reading Qur'anic verses as prayer, especially those verses that are connected to warfare, remembrance [*dzikir*], and nocturnal prayers [*tahajud*]. Besides this, they were taught in matters of ideology and politics.[41]

These same concerns were shared by Islamic leaders elsewhere, like Arsjad Lubis, who also gave thorough guidelines on what special prayers to incorporate at a time of armed struggle.[42] The idea of ulama providing ideology and political instruction to those gathered in prayer or to fighters rotating off the front also sounds similar to conditions in South Sulawesi and Lombok.[43]

Another feature common to the Indonesian Islamic struggle of the 1940s was also ascribed to Kartosuwirjo: supernatural abilities or blessing provided by God. This kind of personal, possessed magic (called *sakti* in Indonesian or *barakah* following the Arabic) was consonant with other

[37] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 94.
[38] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 92, 102, 120; Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo*, 62.
[39] Kahin, *Rebellion to Integration*, 110; Bosra, *Laskar Lipan Bajeng*, 84–85.
[40] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 112.
[41] Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo*, 75.
[42] Loebis, *Toentoenan Perang Sabil*, 39–56; 72–75.
[43] Bosra, *Laskar Lipan Bajeng*, 89–90; interview with Abdul Hayyi Nu'man, Mataram, July 23, 2010; Masnun, *Tuan Guru KH Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid: Gagasan dan Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam di Nusa Tenggara Barat* (Jakarta: Pustaka al-Miqdad, 2007), 27.

Islamic magical forms.[44] Kartosuwirjo's followers believed that he had received a special consecration from God, manifested in the sign of the Muslim profession of faith spelled out on him in light in front of close associates in the forest.[45] The revelation, although usually interpreted in Islamic ways, was also connected by some followers with the idea that he was anointed with the *Cakraningrat Sadar*, a Javanese conception of a special blessing understood to be only for kings.[46] In the years following the announcement of his Islamic State, Kartosuwirjo was also rumored to collect mystical items of power in the local Sundanese tradition, such as *kris* (daggers) that would imbue their owner with great power.[47] Even as early as 1939, one of the reasons that Kartosuwirjo was at odds with other Islamic politicians was his "idiosyncratic mystical leanings."[48] The emergence of this direction in Kartosuwirjo's Islamic State was in line with other Islamic movements in Indonesia during the revolution, but some aspects may have been embellished; elements like the vision could easily have been a later reconstruction once it was clear that the Islamic State of Indonesia was going a different way from the mainstream Indonesian state.[49]

The Darul Islam movement additionally included aspects similar to social revolution in other parts of the country. For example, on March 17, 1948, one of Kartosuwirjo's top commanders told his troops to begin "a cleansing action in Priangan [region of West Java] and to conduct killings of any persons who were traitors of religion, country or nation."[50] Around this time, reports started coming into the government about Kartosuwirjo's troops acting like a "Gestapo."[51] The violence of Darul Islam could be excessive and grotesque,[52] but that was also true for social revolutions in other parts of the archipelago. In Central Java, one of the

[44] Yahya, 25; Kevin W. Fogg, "Reinforcing Charisma in the Bureaucratization of Indonesian Islamic Organizations," *Journal of Contemporary Southeast Asian Affairs* 37, 1 (2018): 117–140.
[45] Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo*, 144.
[46] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 36.
[47] Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo*, 144–145.
[48] Elson, "Disunity, Distance, Disregard," 30.
[49] Other branches of the Darul Islam movement that arose in Central Java during the revolution were also steeped in Islamic magical practices. Kyai Haji Machfudz of the Angkatan Umat Islam (which later became Darul Islam for Central Java) was well known for selling amulets to protect wearers in battle. See van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam*, 145.
[50] Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo*, 73.
[51] ANRI RA10, Djogja Documenten, #40, "Surat-surat tanggal 1 Maret–21 September 1948 tentang rencana ketentaraan umat Islam dari beberapa daerah."
[52] Van Nieuwenhuijze, "Islam in a Period of Transition in Indonesia: An Essay on Tendencies and Possibilities," in *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 62–63.

major offshoots of Kartosuwirjo's movement, led by his close confidante Amir Fatah, grew out of the social revolution along the north coast.[53] All in all, the violence of the Islamic State of Indonesia can be compared to social revolution violence happening in other places.

Finally, even Kartosuwirjo and his followers believed they were within the mainstream of Islamic struggle in Indonesia until late in the revolution, and they remained connected to other Islamic groups and leaders. This was especially true in connection with Masjumi, the Islamic political party; the Darul Islam movement believed itself to be not only allied to Masjumi but also in lockstep with it. The Darul Islam movement still sent a representative to the Masjumi party conference in Madiun in March 1948.[54] In October 1948, representatives of Kartosuwirjo's movement sent multiple messages and memoranda to Masjumi leaders including Mohammad Natsir and Mohamad Roem seeking their help, asking for weapons, and expressing support for public statements that highlighted the importance of Islam.[55] In a communique to the vice-president of the Republic of Indonesia in late 1948, Kartosuwirjo's messengers even instructed him that weapons could be sent "through the good offices of Masjumi," assuming both that the vice-president would be amenable to their plea and that the party would still support and send on materiel for Kartosuwirjo's actions.[56] There did also seem to be many Masjumi members who were sympathetic to the Darul Islam movement and saw it as acceptable; police reports from East Java in 1950 express alarm about just how many local Muslims felt that way.[57]

Kartosuwirjo's movement was, on the whole, not exceptional for its first several years. Even outside the range of Islamic movements during the revolution, there were plenty of other armed groups that caused similar, continual concern to the Republican authorities, such as one in West Java that called itself "Sharpened Bamboo" and preyed on other communities.[58] Hallmarks of the wider Islamic movement, including

[53] Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam*, 130–132.

[54] ANRI RA10, Djogja Documenten, #203, "Surat dari Moch. Oemargatab kepala Bagian PAM atas nama Kepala Kepolisian Negara tanggal 23 Juli 1948 tentang Darul Islam di Jawa Barat, disertai lampiran."

[55] ANRI RA10, Djogja Documenten, #150, "Surat dari K.H. Zainal Hasan Thoha dan Muhammad Nurlubis kepada Muhammad Natsir, Menteri Penerangan tanggal 3 Oktober 1948 tentang permohonan pengiriman senjata untuk melawan Belanda."

[56] ANRI RA10, Djogja Documenten, #150, "Surat kepada P.J.M Wakil Presiden R.I. Drs. Mohamad Hatta tentang permohonan pengiriman senjata untuk melawan Belanda."

[57] ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta, 1949–1950, #80, "Seri laporan mengenai situasi dan perkembangan politik di Surabaya; Maret, April, Mei 1950."

[58] ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta, 1949–1950, #67 "Berkas mengenai keadaan politik di daerah Jawa Barat."

calls to action based on religion, militias, ulama leadership, Islamic practices of magic or mysticism, and attacks on fellow Indonesians do not distinguish Darul Islam or West Java from other areas. The distinguishing factor was the person of Kartosuwirjo, who caused a formal break with the Republic.

Exceptional Factor: Kartosuwirjo

The most important element that set apart the Darul Islam movement, both in the later years of the Indonesian Revolution and in the subsequent years of rebellion into the 1950s, was the person of its leader: S. M. Kartosuwirjo. His decision to declare open conflict with the Republic of Indonesia was influenced by three characteristics not found in the leaders of other, similar movements. First, Kartosuwirjo was already a high-profile national leader, which made him believe he could be a head of state and made him unlikely to be overawed by appeals from the government to give up his struggle. Second, Kartosuwirjo had more interactions with leaders in the Republican capital and more news about their policies; some of these policies hardened his position against the Republic. Third, Kartosuwirjo was famously obstinate, meaning he would not change course after declaring an Islamic state.

Kartosuwirjo had been a part of the Islamic and even nationalist elite since the 1910s. He was one of many protégés of the great Islamic nationalist leader H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, and co-edited a journal with him in Jakarta for many years. As a student at Tjokroaminoto's home, he came into contact with many other future leaders of the Indonesian state, including future President Sukarno.[59] He almost married the daughter of one of Indonesia's most prominent Islamic nationalists, H. Agus Salim.[60] After the death of Tjokroaminoto, Kartosuwirjo remained a major player in Islamic politics through the 1930s.[61] In the 1940s, he remained in contact with leaders at the highest ranks of the Islamic party Masjumi. He was even offered a cabinet position (vice-minister of defense) in 1947, although he refused to take up the post.[62]

Because of his nationalist pedigree and his strong following in West Java, it is no surprise that Kartosuwirjo believed himself to be on par with

[59] Oral history with Harsono Tjokroaminoto, interviewed by Wardiningsih Surjohardjo, ANRI SL1 1982 #60, tape 8.
[60] Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo*, 29.
[61] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 56–59.
[62] The offer was to represent PSII in the cabinet when it split from Masjumi in 1947 (see Chapter 12), but Kartosuwirjo refused it out of stubborn loyalty to his new party. Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo*, 60; Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 97.

any other leader in the Republic. This confidence must have facilitated his decision to proclaim himself the leader of a new Islamic State of Indonesia. It is notable that Kartosuwirjo did not proclaim a local state, something in West Java that would be separate from the other regions of the archipelago. Instead, he envisioned a state with the borders of Indonesia (the former borders of the Dutch colony) but with an explicitly Islamic character.

Kartosuwirjo's prominence as a national leader (whether real or his self-perception) was also one of the factors that led him to pridefully reject advances from the Republican government to bring him back into the fold. When Natsir sent the leading Islamic scholar Ahmad Hassan as an emissary to the Darul Islam leadership in August 1949, Kartosuwirjo reportedly complained that his letter (in some versions written on hotel stationary instead of an official government letterhead) did not sufficiently respect his position.[63] After the revolution had ended with the Dutch transferring sovereignty in 1950, Kartosuwirjo still refused to negotiate unless Sukarno (the now internationally recognized president, but also his old mate from their younger days) first recognized him and his state.[64]

In part because of his background in Islamic and national politics, and because he was so well-connected with many nationalist leaders, Kartosuwirjo seems to have known and understood what was happening politically in the Republic better than other Islamic militia leaders. Geographic proximity, continued communication, and clear understanding of the government worked to alienate him from the Indonesian state.

Knowing what was going on in the Republic, Kartosuwirjo proclaimed his Islamic State of Indonesia in explicit opposition to what the Indonesian national leadership was doing. His most obvious objection was to the order in 1947 to retreat behind an armistice line; retreat was un-Islamic and unacceptable for this firebrand, and that moment set him on the path toward conflict. His antagonism toward Indonesian government policies deepened after the ordered retreat, though. He remained angry, for example, that the supposedly "temporary" constitution promulgated in 1945 still remained in effect four years later.[65] The proclamation of the Islamic state in 1949 came in the wake of Indonesian-Dutch negotiations

[63] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 139; Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo*, 93.
[64] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 152–153.
[65] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 82.

on independence that also offended Kartosuwirjo, well known for his fierce noncooperation policy.[66]

In this close affiliation with the Republic, one can contrast Kartosuwirjo with Islamic leaders fighting for Indonesian independence in Aceh. They were also unyielding in their dedication to Islam, but men like Hoesain Al-Mujahid and Daud Beureueh were hailed as good and patriotic Indonesians during the revolution,[67] even as they understood Islam as a crucial aspect of being Indonesian and expected to implement Islamic law for the Acehnese.[68] Hoesain was even made a major-general in the Indonesian army (while he was still in the field in September 1946) by the Republican government in Yogyakarta.[69] Daud Beureueh, similarly, was honored as the military governor of Aceh.[70] These men would also likely have disagreed with much of the policy happening in the national capital during the revolution years, and indeed went into rebellion against the Indonesian government in 1953 when they allied with Kartosuwirjo's Darul Islam.[71] Still, they were different from Kartosuwirjo during the revolution, not only because of regional dynamics through the Japanese era and the revolution but also, crucially, because their distance from other leaders and poor communications with politicians at the center may have averted more visible disagreements before the end of the revolution.

In all this, though, one of Kartosuwirjo's personal traits also set him apart as a leader and contributed to his irreconcilable position against the government: Kartosuwirjo was famously obstinate. Harsono Tjokroaminoto, the son of his old teacher who described himself as a student of Kartosuwirjo and who grew up with Kartosuwirjo around the house, talked about him this way:

> Really, the very first thing that struck me was his hard [*keras*] character, hard in the sense that if he already had a position – not just when he was still young but

[66] Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo*, 91.

[67] See, e.g., Ali, "The Revolts of the Nation-State Builders." This thesis is in line with most of the literature in recognizing the key role that the Acehnese Islamic nationalists played in establishing Indonesian independence there.

[68] Aspinall, *Islam and Nation*, 30–31.

[69] ANRI RA6, Sekretariat Negara RI, 1945–1949, #544, Pemerintahan RI Jogjakarta: Penetapan no. 20/SD tgl. 28 September 1946 tentang pengangkatan Amir Hoesin Almoedjahid menjadi Jenderal-Mayor Kehormatan pada Tentara Republik Indonesia.

[70] Ali, "The Revolts of the Nation-State Builders," 40.

[71] Having been self-governing during the revolution, Aceh went into rebellion after it had experienced several years of frustration under the new Indonesian Republic in the 1950s. One can argue that Kartosuwirjo, having experienced the meddling of the Indonesian state sooner, simply took this step sooner – during the revolution. He experienced and understood the Indonesian state's interference because of his closer geographic and personal proximity to its leadership.

also especially when we were leading the party [PSII] together – that would be his clear position that he would defend until his whole motivation and argumentation were exhausted.… The character or personality of Mas Karto [suwirjo] is not a character of following the group; on the contrary, he always wanted to be prominent and out front in promoting his ideas.[72]

Harsono also saw a direct continuation from Kartosuwirjo's activities in PSII to the declaration of the Islamic State of Indonesia: "The idea that he wanted to establish, that he wanted to spread among society, was not only in the period when he was active with me in the PSII, but as it turns out even in the independence era he wanted that vision to be put into practice, and all the way to his death he wanted this."[73]

Harsono was not the only one to note Kartosuwirjo's inflexible style. In 1939, he was expelled from the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia largely because he refused to compromise in any way about noncooperation with the colonial regime.[74] As the leader of Darul Islam he was also famously uncompromising.[75] Being hardheaded made Kartosuwirjo loath to roll back his proclamation of an Islamic state after it was made, and unwilling to compromise with the Indonesian government. When Ahmad Hassan was sent to negotiate with Kartosuwirjo shortly after the proclamation of the Negara Islam Indonesia, he was not merely rejected for his inappropriate letter but also told that what had been decreed could not be undone.[76] A few months later, when Prime Minister Natsir offered general amnesty to all armed fighters who had not yet rejoined the Republic, Kartosuwirjo and his followers remained obstinate in rejecting any truce that would diminish their religious commitment.[77] The fact that Kartosuwirjo was not willing to even negotiate with the well-meaning leaders of government from the Islamic party Masjumi, many of them his longtime associates, showed his stubborn character.

When in August 1949 Kartosuwirjo formally declared the Islamic State of Indonesia and issued a constitution for this new state, he was breaking with precedents from other parts of the archipelago.[78] He came to this position (and continued to hold it despite the pleas of his old colleagues in the Republic) because of a variety of personal and

[72] Oral history with Harsono Tjokroaminoto, interviewed by Wardiningsih Surjohardjo, ANRI SL1 1982 #60, tape 13.
[73] Oral history with Harsono Tjokroaminoto, interviewed by Wardiningsih Surjohardjo, ANRI SL1 1982 #60, tape 12.
[74] Elson, "Disunity, Distance, Disregard," 30.
[75] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 38, 201.
[76] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 139.
[77] Dengel, *Darul Islam – NII dan Kartosuwirjo*, 157.
[78] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 121.

contextual factors that pushed him and his movement into uncharted territory. The unique ending, though, should not belie the fact that Darul Islam was, for most of the revolution, more similar than different from other Islamic groups fighting across the archipelago.

Conclusion

Seeing the Darul Islam movement in the spectrum of Islamic fighting for Indonesia's independence, most of its activities through 1949 appear unexceptional. This neither excuses nor condones the extremism reported in connection with the Islamic State of Indonesia, but it does help to explain how such a movement could evolve and then draw sympathy from several other regions, such that leaders on Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi had thrown in their lot with Kartosuwirjo within five years of his proclamation. Whereas Formichi has argued that those regional rebellions merely joined the Darul Islam and then reframed their struggles in Islamic terms because this provided an easy ideological pillar, it must be considered that there was genuine affinity among some outer island Muslims for the experience of struggling for the Indonesian state in an Islamic way.[79]

Recognizing Kartosuwirjo's Darul Islam as the extreme end of a spectrum also helps to explain the reluctance of Islamic politicians to condemn this movement in strong terms. After a conference of the Islamic party Masjumi in Jember, East Java, on January 14–15, 1950, security forces reporting on proceedings said that the party was only able to take an ambivalent position on the group: "Masjumi does not want to get involved in the struggle of Darul Islam."[80] Throughout the 1950s, Masjumi and other Islamic parties attempted repeatedly to reach peaceful resolutions with Kartosuwirjo, were rebuffed, and paid a heavy political price for it.[81]

[79] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 167. Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam*, is even more dismissive of possible Islamic motivations, although Aspinall and Anhar Gonggong, *Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, dari Patriot hingga Pemberontak* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1992) seem to take them seriously.

[80] ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta, 1949–1950, #80, "Seri laporan mengenai situasi dan perkembangan politik di Surabaya; Maret, April, Mei 1950."

[81] Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, 155–179. Masjumi was accused by its detractors of being complicit with Darul Islam and its violent excesses, which hurt the party's public reputation and may have cost them in the election. Additionally, several individual party functionaries were jailed for treason over attempts to negotiate peace with Darul Islam.

And yet, although Islamic politicians on the national stage still felt some sympathy with this Islamic struggle at the grassroots level, the Muslim fighters in West Java by all signs rejected the machinations of national politicians. Given the antagonism between Darul Islam and high-profile Islamic national politicians, we must also understand the nature of the Islamic struggle in the political realm, the subject of Part II.

Part II

Islam in Indonesia's Political Revolution

7 The Jakarta Charter Controversy

Just three days after the Japanese surrender in World War II, the future president and vice-president of Indonesia proclaimed their country's independence on August 17, 1945. Although the proclamation has functioned as a bright, clear line marking the start of the national revolution in the modern Indonesian narrative, some of the most "revolutionary" moments of Indonesia's transition to independence occurred before that date.[1]

The preparations leading up to the proclamation of independence set the direction of the future Indonesian state, determining the basic form of government and, more crucially, the ideological foundation of the future state. The most salient issue, cropping up over and over again in Indonesian politics still today, was the Jakarta Charter, a compromise proposal to recognize Islamic law explicitly in the constitution.

The story of the Jakarta Charter started from Japanese-created committees set up in March 1945 and reached a peak in mid-June when secular and Islamist representatives found a solution to the impasse of how the country should relate to Islam. In the chaos of August, though, national leaders abandoned the compromise very suddenly on the morning after the proclamation. The Jakarta Charter's rise and fall demonstrated the newfound power of Islamic interests in Indonesian politics, the limits of that power, the contingency and chaotic context of the early revolution, and the isolation of early national politics from Indonesia's grassroots.

Creation of the Investigatory Board

The key element in the Japanese-coordinated efforts to guide Indonesia toward independence, and the first major step down that road, was the

[1] Among others, the classic consideration of the revolution written by George McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 120–133, recognizes the crucial nature of May through August 1945.

creation of an institutional body laboriously named the "Investigatory Board on Efforts for the Preparation of Independence" (*Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan*).[2] This Investigatory Board was made up of public figures handpicked by the Japanese from among those who happened to be on Java, but it was granted broad authority to discuss and then to establish the framework of government for the whole Indonesian people. In some ways this echoed the *Volksraad*, a puppet parliament sponsored by the Dutch for the last twenty-five years of the colonial period: both had memberships selected by an outside force and were subject to influence and veto power by a foreign executive.[3] In other ways, though, the Investigatory Board became much more than the *Volksraad* ever could. The key was the board's success at hammering out and agreeing on a draft constitution for the coming Republic of Indonesia, something that it worked on in earnest from late May through mid-July 1945.

The Investigatory Board, despite its task of hashing out issues of critical importance for the whole nation, was not representative of the future Indonesian state. Its underrepresentation of women, youth, and the poor was unsurprising, given the nature of this Japanese-appointed body and the time in which it worked.[4] More surprising, though, especially in light of the distinctly increased profile and status of Indonesian Islamic leaders under the Japanese, was the underrepresentation of these religious leaders on the board. The members with an Islamic orientation (more than just nominal Muslim faith) numbered only fifteen, or one-fourth of the total membership.[5] This was a lower percentage than the later parliaments of Indonesia, and certainly a much lower percentage than the Islamic parties won in the 1955 elections, which was closer to 45 percent.[6]

The reason that the Japanese limited the Islamic members of the Investigatory Board was not entirely clear, but it did fit a pattern of decreasing patronage of Islamic interests at the very tail end of the Japanese era.[7] The limited Islamic membership might also have been connected to the specific legal tasks of the Investigatory Board, tasks for

[2] On the evolution of the stenographic record of this body, see R. E. Elson, "Another Look at the Jakarta Charter Controversy of 1945," *Indonesia* 88 (October 2009): 110 n. 33.
[3] Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 230–232.
[4] C.f. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 64–65.
[5] Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 31; "Pidato Prof. H. Abdul Kahar Muzzakir," in *Debat Dasar Negara: Islam dan Pancasila, Konstituante 1957* (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 2001), 91.
[6] See Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957).
[7] Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 183ff.

which many potential Islamic participants were ill-equipped due to their lack of Western education and inexperience in government administration.

Insofar as the task of the Investigatory Board was to draft a constitution for the Republic, even those Islamic members who were appointed to the board were limited in how they could contribute to the work. None of the Islamic members were trained in Western law or jurisprudence, so they were unable to participate directly in the drafting process; this process was dominated by the Dutch-trained jurist Dr. Supomo.[8] Of the fifteen Islamic members, most of them were classically trained in Islamic schools, and even those who had gone abroad, like Sukiman who studied medicine in Holland and Abdul Kahar Muzakkir who studied in Cairo, were limited in their roles.

What the Islamic members lacked in Western-style legal expertise they made up for in focus and determination. It was clear that the goal for many, though not all, of the Islamic members was an explicitly Islamic state, one that recognized Islam and Islamic law in the constitution.[9] Their struggle to push the Republic of Indonesia in that direction, while not successful, did shape the debate about the Indonesian state in critical ways.

The Creation of Pancasila and the Jakarta Charter

While many aspects of the future state were agreed upon very quickly, a major sticking point was the ideological foundation of the state as expressed in the constitution. Sukarno proposed his now famous ideology "Pancasila" (the Five Principles) as a prospective state ideology on June 1, 1945; the Investigatory Board reacted with praise but not full acceptance.[10] The five principles of the ideology were a just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by the wisdom of consensus/representation; social justice for all the people of Indonesia; and belief in God (*ke-Tuhanan*). Even this formulation's inclusion of a specific reference to divinity was not enough for many Muslim members of the Investigatory Board; they wanted an explicit reference to Islam. To search for a consensus on this issue, the greater body appointed a special

[8] Elson, "Another Look," 114.

[9] Elson, "Another Look," 126. At least one member of the bloc, Haji Agus Salim, was not in favor of an Islamic state; see Noer, "Masjumi," 31 n. 21.

[10] The speech in which Sukarno first outlined this ideology has been translated and published as Sukarno, *The Birth of Pantjasila: An Outline of the Five Principles of the Indonesian State* (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1955).

"Committee of Nine" to discuss the concerns of the Muslim community, specifically that Islam should have a larger place in the state.[11]

The Committee of Nine was made up of four secular/secularist Muslims (the soon-to-be president Sukarno, soon-to-be vice-president Mohammad Hatta, Achmad Soebardjo, and Muhammad Yamin), four Islamic nationalists (Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Agus Salim, and Abdul Wahid Hasjim), and one Christian (A. A. Maramis). The four Islamic nationalists represented both political and sociocultural groups; Abikusno and Agus Salim gained prominence from their work with Sarekat Islam and its successor political parties, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir was a leading teacher in Muhammadiyah, and Wahid Hasjim served as the day-to-day leader of Nahdlatul Ulama.[12] After several weeks of debate, this committee reached a compromise by expanding Sukarno's original formulation on faith by seven words; the principle on "belief in God" would now read "belief in God with an obligation to follow Islamic sharia for its adherents."[13] The committee wrote this compromise into a draft for the proclamation of the independent state of Indonesia, and this draft proclamation, named the "Jakarta Charter" (*Piagam Jakarta*), was signed by all nine members (including the Christian representative of the eastern parts of the country) on June 22, 1945.[14] The committee reported back to the larger Investigatory Board when the latter reconvened in mid-July.

Within the broader Investigatory Board there was considerable concern about the Jakarta Charter. Christian representatives from East Indonesia complained about the implications for other religions and for those following customary (rather than Islamic) law. On the other side,

[11] Elson, "Another Look," 112.

[12] Self-completed curriculum vitae providing the background of several of these members can be found on Syahrul Hidayat and Kevin W. Fogg, "Member Profiles," *Konstituante.Net* (January 1, 2018), www.konstituante.net/en/members/5–member_profiles.html (accessed June 12, 2018).

[13] The principle in Indonesian now read "*Ke-Tuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya*." There remains some ambiguity in this as to the antecedent of "its" (*-nya*), thus whether the obligation was on all Muslims or those who embrace Islamic law, specifically. Donald K. Emmerson, "One Nation under God? History, Faith and Identity in Indonesia," in Theodore Friend, ed., *Religion and Religiosity in the Philippines and Indonesia* (Washington, DC: Southeast Asia Studies Program, John Hopkins University, 2006), 83 n. 7.

[14] Deliar Noer, citing an interview with Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, says that the idea came from an informal conversation between Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, and A. A. Maramis, and that Maramis supported this idea "200 per cent." Noer, "Masjumi," 33. This matches Abdul Kahar Muzakkir's testimony twelve years later in the Konstituante. See Wilopo, ed., *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante*, volume 3 (Bandung: n.p., 1958), 34–39. In any case, no account indicates outright Christian rejection of the Jakarta Charter before August 1945.

the hardline Muhammadiyah leader Ki Bagus Hadikusumo sought to strike the phrase "for its adherents," from the Jakarta Charter, rendering the obligation of Islamic law incumbent on all.[15] Both critiques were rejected by Sukarno, who fiercely protected the Charter as a critical compromise between the Islamic and nationalist factions. The value of this compromise became clear when the Investigatory Board incorporated the Jakarta Charter into the preamble of the draft constitution (rather than as a proclamation of independence), elevating its importance even further.[16]

Islamic members put forward various proposals for other ways to integrate Islam into the constitution, but one stood above the others in its resonance. Throughout the sessions of the Investigatory Board, Islamic representatives became increasingly vocal and recalcitrant in their demands that the constitution should require that the president be Muslim. Despite the pleas of the chairman, Sukarno, and the head of the drafting committee, Supomo, that this would upset the previously established compromise, and gripes from the non-Muslim representatives about the creation of second-class citizens (those who then could not hold highest office), Muslims held their ground as this issue came to a head on July 15. Facing a united front of fourteen Islamic votes (the more accommodating Haji Agus Salim defected to support the nationalists on this issue), the Investigatory Board gave in and voted this clause into the constitution so as to avoid alienating Islamic interests in the coming state.[17]

At the end of July 1945, with the end of the war imminent and the Indonesian state an ever-closer possibility, Islam looked to have a clear and strong place in the future republic. The constitution included clauses both to require Muslims to follow Islamic law (although no provisions to enforce such a requirement) and for the president to be a Muslim. According to Anthony Reid, "Although well short of Muslim hopes, this was to prove the highest point in their pursuit of an Islamic State."[18]

Was this really the apex of the Islamic state in Indonesia? The discussion in Part I about Islamic experiences throughout the archipelago during the revolution demonstrates that, in the lives of Indonesians, the revolutionary period in many areas followed Islamic patterns and worked through Islamic structures, meaning that the years following 1945 had

[15] Elson, "Another Look," 115–116.
[16] S. Silalahi, *Dasar-dasar Indonesia Merdeka: Vesi Para Pendiri Negara* (Jakarta: Grammedia Pustaka Utama, 2001), 167.
[17] Elson, "Another Look," 116–117; Noer, "Masjumi," 31 n. 21.
[18] Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 20.

more experiences that were understood in Islamic terms at the grassroots level. From a theoretical perspective, too, Indonesian concepts of an Islamic state, what that would mean, and how to implement it, blossomed more in the 1950s, with dozens of books and tracts on the subject and several draft constitutions for an Islamic state of Indonesia.[19] From a legal perspective, however, July 1945 may very well have been the peak of structural Islamic influence in the (yet unborn) Indonesian state. The gains that the Islamic faction had won up to this point were soon to be erased.

Removal of the Jakarta Charter from the Constitution

As the Japanese hurtled toward final defeat in early August 1945, Indonesians became increasingly restless about what to do with the plans for their country's independence. Finally, impatient youth activists forced the leadership's hand, kidnapping Sukarno and Hatta and thus pushing them to proclaim Indonesian independence on August 17.[20] These two leaders then planned to meet with a parliamentary body, mostly former members of the Investigatory Board but with additional representatives from Sumatra and Eastern Indonesia, on the following day to promulgate the already-drafted constitution.

On the night of August 17, however, the validity of the constitution for the entirety of Indonesia was thrown into question. A Japanese navy admiral (the navy being the service that oversaw Eastern Indonesia, where more Christians lived) came to visit Sukarno and Hatta in the dead of night. The admiral and his entourage warned the two leaders that if the Jakarta Charter remained in the constitution, East Indonesian Christians would see it as discriminatory (even while recognizing that it did not apply to them) and would choose not to join their regions with

[19] Among the many works on an Islamic state in Indonesia published in the 1950s, see especially the comprehensive tome of Zainal Abidin Ahmad, *Membentuk Negara Islam* (Djakarta: Penerbit Widjaya, 1956). Others included Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, *Ummat Islam Indonesia menghadapi Pemilihan Umum* (Jakarta: Endang, 1953); Abu Hanifah, *Soal Agama dalam Negara Modern*, 2nd ed. (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1950); M. Isa Anshary, *Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam* (Medan: Saiful, 1951); M. Isa Anshary, *Ummat Islam menghadapi Pemilihan Umum* (Medan: Islamyah, 1954); Djadil, *Risalah Penuntun: Idiologi Islam* (Palembang: Jajasan Tera, [1954]); Oemar Amin Hoesin, *Menudju Republik Islam* (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1953); Moechtar Jahja, *Islam dan Negara* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1951); Siradjuddin 'Abbas (Datuk Bandaharo), *Menudju Konstitusi Islam* (Bukittinggi: Pustaka Pergerakan, 1955). For draft constitutions for an Islamic state of Indonesia, see Yusril Ihza Mahendra, *Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam: Perbandingan Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai Jama'at-i-Islami (Pakistan)* (Jakarta: Penerbitan Paramadina, 1999), 206ff and Koto, 196–201.

[20] For a fuller version of this story, see Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, chapter 4.

the Republic.[21] In response to this news, Sukarno and Hatta scrambled to set up several meetings the next morning with Muslim leaders, alerting them of this new challenge, seeking changes to the constitution, and attempting to preserve the fragile national union.

The two Islamic representatives who met with Hatta on the morning of August 18 were Ki Bagus Hadikusumo and Kasman Singodimedjo. The former had participated in discussions since May as a member of the Investigatory Board and was particularly obstinate in his desire for an Islamic state. The latter, however, had not participated in the Investigatory Board, and his primary qualification was service in the Japanese-sponsored militia PETA, although he had a background in Muhammadiyah and would go on to a leadership role in Islamic politics.[22] Notably, neither of these men had served on the Committee of Nine that crafted the Jakarta Charter, and neither had been strong defenders of the Charter as a compromise – in this way they could be seen as either well qualified or unqualified to weigh in on the fate of the special Muslim provisions in the constitution.

In their meeting with Hatta, these two men agreed to a fundamental change in the religious principle of Pancasila, effectively walking back the work of the Committee of Nine. Whereas in the Jakarta Charter this principle read "belief in God with an obligation to follow Islamic sharia for its adherents," this was now changed to "belief in the One and Only God."[23] Ki Bagus Hadikusumo later took credit for this formulation, claiming that it was identical to the Islamic principle of *tauhid*, or the oneness of God, and effectively (albeit not explicitly) wrote the central

[21] Gerry van Klinken, *Minorities, Modernity, and the Emerging Nation: Christians in Indonesia, a Biographical Approach* (Leiden: KTTLV Press, 2003), 230–231, puts forward the novel idea that the man who convinced Hatta of the necessity of the change was not Japanese, but rather the Menadonese Sam Ratulangi. Although that would have added gravity to the specter of East Indonesian separatism for the two leaders, it is at odds with the broad consensus of many accounts by individuals in Jakarta at the time.

[22] Prawoto Mangkusasmito, *Pertumbuhan Historis Rumus Dasar Negara* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1970), 39. Hatta listed meeting with two other Islamic leaders, but the first, Wahid Hasjim, was not present in Jakarta and therefore could not have attended the meeting, and the second, Teuku Muhammad Hasan of Aceh, did not represent the Islamic position. Saifuddin Anshari, *The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: The Struggle for an Islamic Constitution in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, 1979), 33.

[23] In Indonesian, "*Ke-Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa*." See Sita Hidayah, "Translating 'Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa': An Amenable Religious Ideology," in Frank Dhont, Mason Hoadley, and Thomas Conners, eds., *Pancasila's Contemporary Appeal: Re-legitimizing Indonesia's Founding Ethos* (Yogyakarta: Sanata Dharma University Press, 2010), 239–254.

tenet of Islam into the constitution.[24] The morning meetings also agreed to remove the constitutional requirement that the president be a Muslim. This scrubbed the Indonesian constitution of any and all references to Islam or Muslimness, making it one of very few Muslim majority nations with no Islamic reference in their constitution.[25]

At the first session of the new parliament, on the afternoon of August 18, 1945, Sukarno and Hatta presented the newly tweaked constitution with the Islamic elements removed to the assembly. Some Islamic members of the body reported being caught off guard by these changes, or even feeling betrayed, but they did not show this at the time.[26] Instead, due to the great desire to demonstrate unity on their first day as a government, the parliament accepted the document unanimously. From that point on, Indonesia has had a nonsectarian constitution.

Implications of the Elimination of the Jakarta Charter

The Jakarta Charter specifically and the effort to make Indonesia an Islamic state more generally have continued to haunt the Indonesian body politic until today. Islamic politicians invoked this broken "Gentleman's Agreement" at constitutional debates in 1958,[27] and a new generation tried to implement it again in constitutional revisions between 1999 and 2002.[28] As a historical event, though, rather than a continuing debate, the Jakarta Charter was important in three key ways.

First, the Jakarta Charter was important to demonstrate the increased power of the Islamic bloc in politics. Contemporary accounts do not support Benedict Anderson's view that the elimination of the Jakarta Charter was writing on the wall from its very drafting and that Sukarno and Hatta intended to nix this clause all along.[29] On the contrary, Sukarno went to great lengths to defend the Jakarta Charter as a compromise in July, when he could have abandoned it just as easily. Defending the Jakarta Charter demonstrated the importance that Sukarno placed on incorporating, or in some ways placating, the Islamic

[24] Mangkusasmito, *Pertumbuhan Historis Rumus Dasar Negara*, 39.
[25] Masykuri Abdillah has identified it as one of two, alongside Turkey. See his "Ways of Constitution Building in Muslim Countries: The Case of Indonesia," in Birgit Krawietz and Helmut Reifeld, eds. *Islam and the Rule of Law: Between Sharia and Secularization* (Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2008), 56.
[26] See especially Abdul Kahar Muzakkir's speech in Wilopo, *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante*, vol. 3, 34–39.
[27] See this book's conclusion.
[28] On 1999–2002, see Ahmad Syafii Maarif et al., *Syariat Islam Yes, Syariat Islam No: Dilema Piagam Jakarta dalam Amandemen UUD 1945* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2001).
[29] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 87.

politicians, who had emerged as a crucial bloc in Indonesian politics. Similarly, the concession that Sukarno and the Investigatory Board made to insert a constitutional requirement that the president be a Muslim showed the strength of Islamic politicians to force an issue when they stood firm.

Whereas other historians have seen the Jakarta Charter incident to demonstrate "the rapid erosion of Masjumi [i.e., Islamic] power at the national level,"[30] this forgets how impressive it was that the Islamic bloc was able to create such a clause. As compared to the Dutch period, when formal Islamic politics were in many ways an afterthought in national political discourse, the Islamic bloc had grown significantly stronger under the Japanese, and other Indonesian politicians apparently recognized this group as a real force in society. The Jakarta Charter demonstrated some of the newfound strength of Islamic politicians but also their determination. It is also worth noting that the failure of the Jakarta Charter in August 1945 did not preclude the idea of an Indonesian Islamic state. As Rémy Madinier has astutely noted, the state was not Islamic, but it was "an Islamisable state."[31] Many Muslims, and even some of the non-Islamist politicians, believed it not only possible but likely that Indonesia would still transform into an Islamic state by legal means at a later date.

Second, the Jakarta Charter showed how events surrounding the creation of Indonesian state structures were contingent on very volatile factors. The elimination of the charter seems to have been a very narrow and last-minute miss for the incorporation of Islam into the constitution, due to a change of heart by a few key leaders in the twenty-four hours between the proclamation of independence and the promulgation of the constitution. The press statement on Indonesia's independence reflects just how narrow. Although the word "Allah" had been replaced with the more neutral "Tuhan" for "God" in the constitution, no one fixed the press statement before issuing it, and so the statement kept the word "Allah."[32]

These changes, caused largely by happenstance, did have a serious impact on the character of the future state, particularly the role of Islam in the state. Whereas R. E. Elson has argued that the elimination of the Jakarta Charter did not matter either way, the continuing debate about the charter suggests otherwise. In Elson's view, including or eliminating

[30] Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution*, 17.
[31] Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, 66.
[32] Boland, 37 n. 70. The word appears in the document's preface, saying what follows is "by the Grace of God."

the Jakarta Charter would have made no impact on the state because a consensus about the position of Islam in the new Indonesian state (that it would be a private matter only supported by the government in the most general way) had already arisen. "Had the seven words remained in the preamble and the body of the constitution, there was no prospect under any of the early governments of the Republic … and much less under the mature Republic presided over by Sukarno or Suharto, of the introduction of an Islamist interpretation of the Jakarta Charter," he has written.[33] On the contrary, in the 1940s and 1950s there were many strong advocates for Indonesia to become an Islamic state in strict terms, with Islamic law incumbent not just on Muslims but on all citizens in some form.[34] Because the documents of state had been explicitly nonsectarian from the beginning, it was difficult for such polemicists to get a foothold, but had the Jakarta Charter (and the constitutional mandate for the president to be a Muslim) been in effect, Islamic law could have been enforced locally in ways that would have tied the hands of higher rungs of government.

Finally, the debate over the Jakarta Charter, its creation, inclusion, and elimination, demonstrates how politics at the center were isolated from broader forces in society.[35] The group debating the draft constitution was Japanese appointed, and it did not have to answer to any electorate. There is no real evidence that wider society had any input or influence in the process.

The limited participation, compounded by the already nonrepresentative nature of the Investigatory Board and its successor organizations, was just one of many things that facilitated the divergence of central government politics and grassroots experiences during the revolution. This disconnect led to a philosophical gap that continued to grow, until the understandings of Islam and Islamic state at the end of the revolution differed greatly between the top politicians and local Muslim communities.

[33] Elson, "Another Look," 130.

[34] This was broadly circulating in Islamic periodicals from the revolutionary period. See, e.g., R. H. Bunjamin, "Islam dan Hidoep Ber-Negara," *Djiwa Islam* 1, 2 (May 1946): 2–6; Soedjono, "Menudju Masjarakat Islam Mulia dan Bahagia," *Hikmah* 15 (August 1949): 24–28. See also note 19 for the production of works in this vein in the 1950s.

[35] The possible exception to this is Eastern Indonesia, whose majority-Christian population objected to the Islamic elements in the draft constitution – but even this group was represented by a Japanese military officer, not by Indonesian actors, much less social movements with a broad base.

8 The Creation of Masjumi

As of August 18, 1945, the Jakarta Charter was for the moment a dead letter. The crucial task facing Islamic politicians – like the rest of the country – was the creation of a viable state in the face of the impending Dutch invasion, rather than pursuing their own ideological agenda.

After roughly two months, the state institutions created in Indonesia were in crisis, leading to a major revision of government structure and the opportunity to create political parties. That environment gave rise to the single most important institution of Islamic politics the Indonesian revolution: the Islamic political party Masjumi. Examining the context of the party's creation, its structure, and its leadership provides some insight into the workings of Islamic politics as Indonesia grew into national independence.

The Evolving State in 1945

As the Indonesian state came into existence, it experienced sharp growing pains. This was in part personal, between different politicians and factions of leaders, but mostly structural, involving a search for an institutional format that would best serve leaders' interests and best accommodate their needs.

The first institutions created, established by acclamation on August 18, 1945, were the presidency and vice-presidency, held by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, respectively. These two men had been the face of the Indonesian movement certainly since the advent of the Japanese, and their role as coproclamators of Indonesian independence had solidified their legendary roles in the independence struggle. Their personal differences were in many ways key to the success of their appeal as a duo. In religious terms, although both were Muslims, they differed mightily in their practice of the religion. Sukarno, in Michael Laffan's phrase, "wore

his Islam like his black felt hat."[1] With a Hindu Balinese mother and a syncretist Javanese Muslim father, Sukarno was steeped in pre-Islamic beliefs and mythology, but he was a Muslim from birth. He had spent many of his formative years living with the famed Islamic activist and founder of Sarekat Islam, H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, but in this man's house he spent his time reading Washington, Rousseau, and Marx instead of the Qur'an.[2] While in exile in Bengkulu, Sukarno joined the Islamic organization Muhammadiyah, although it is not entirely clear whether this membership stemmed more from his personal religious convictions or from his desire to marry a female Muhammadiyah activist, his second wife, Fatmawati.[3] While in exile in Ende, East Nusa Tenggara, in 1934, Sukarno engaged in a series of letters with the prominent theologian Ahmad Hassan, helping to convince the pious Muslim public (and its leaders) of his Islamic engagement.[4] However, Sukarno did not abstain from alcohol or relations with women who were not his wife. The gamut of religious faces he put forth made him rather like a human Rorschach test – everyone saw what they wanted to see as regards Sukarno's religious affiliation.

Mohammad Hatta, by contrast, left very little in doubt. He was a devout Muslim from the pious Minangkabau region of Sumatra, but one who still believed in the separation of mosque and state. His readiness for personal sacrifice served to emphasize his piety (e.g., he pledged celibacy until Indonesia achieved independence).[5] The notable Islamic politician and diplomat Mr. Mohamad Roem said that in terms of personal devotions, it was very hard to find someone more diligent than Hatta. And yet, Hatta was clearly a nationalist politician and not an Islamic politician. He even kept personal distance between himself and the Islamic faction.[6] A story emerged in later years that K. H. Wahid Hasjim of Nahdlatul Ulama had at one point approached Hatta and offered him the leadership of that traditionalist Islamic organization and later political party; Hatta turned the offer down, believing that a leader should be raised up from within an organization.[7]

[1] Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia*, 238.
[2] Theodore Friend, *Indonesian Destinies* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2003), 25.
[3] See Syamsu Hadi, *Fatmawati Soekarno Ibu Negara* (Jakarta: Yayasan Bung Karno, 2008), especially chapter 2.
[4] Sukarno's letters are reprinted in Sukarno, *Dibawah Bandera Revolusi*, vol. I (Yogyakarta: Media Pressindo dan Yayasan Bung Karno, 2015), 365–385.
[5] Friend, *Indonesian Destinies*, 28.
[6] Oral history of Mohamad Roem, interviewed by A. Rahman Zainuddin, ANRI SL1 1981 #6, tape 8.
[7] Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 24. Noer cites a personal interview with Hatta.

As a pair, the real moral authority of the Sukarno-Hatta duumvirate was not religious but revolutionary. Although after 1945 they did not exercise their moral power over the government very heavily again until 1949, they were able to wield resignation as a significant threat throughout the revolutionary period.

Under the duumvirate of Sukarno-Hatta stood the cabinet, initially responsible to the president. President Sukarno announced the first cabinet on August 31, and it lasted almost exactly two-and-a-half months. This group, made up of sixteen ministers including six without portfolio, included only two men associated with Islamic groups. These were Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, an old PSII hand, as minister of information, and K. H. Wahid Hasjim, the promising young leader of the Nahdlatul Ulama, as a minister of state without portfolio.[8] The inclusion of Wahid Hasjim was almost certainly a concession to the Islamic groups for the fact that the parliament had rejected the creation of a Ministry of Religion.

In the legislative branch the role of Islam was also limited. This branch enjoyed basic institutional continuity from the Japanese period; the old Investigatory Board continued on under a new name – the Central Indonesian National Committee (*Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*, hereafter KNIP) – and with increased membership. New additions included Kasman Singodimedjo, so crucial in last-minute negotiations over the Jakarta Charter; Mohamad Roem, a Dutch-trained lawyer and pious Muslim who moved up into the KNIP from being head of the local National Committee in Jakarta; Amir Sjarifuddin and Sutan Sjahrir, socialists who had refused to collaborate with the Japanese; and several youth leaders.[9] These additions did little to improve the position of Islam in the KNIP. Of the 137 official members as of the beginning of September 1945, no more than one in eight had affiliated themselves with Islamic interests, and several were appointed to represent other groups (such as A. R. Baswedan, who was officially a representative of the Arab community).[10] By contrast, more than eighty-five members (more than 62 percent) were Javanese *abangan* (Muslims by birth, but rather noncommittal when it came to piety), to which should be added the similarly devotionally ambivalent Muslims of the outer islands like Mr. Teuku Mohammad Hassan.[11] All in all, the KNIP continued a trend from the

[8] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 139 lists the full cabinet.
[9] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 138; Oral history of Mohamad Roem, interviewed by A. Rahman Zainuddin, ANRI SL1 1981 #6, tape 9.
[10] Noer and Akbarsyah, *KNIP: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*, 365–367 (Appendix 3) gives a full list of the members.
[11] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 91.

Japanese and Dutch periods that significantly underrepresented the influence of the Islamic movement over the Indonesian people.[12]

Perhaps to compensate for this low numerical representation, Islamic politicians took on leadership roles in the KNIP from early in its existence. The first head of the Executive Committee, later to evolve into the Working Committee that conducted the KNIP's business between plenary sessions, was Kasman Singodimedjo.[13] Kasman was a Javanese graduate of the Law Faculty in Jakarta, a man closely associated with the Muhammadiyah organization, but also a commander of the Japanese-commissioned PETA defense forces in the Jakarta region toward the end of the occupation.[14] This gave him the right balance of well-educated nationalist credentials, Islamic bona fides, and militant anticolonial struggle to become a strong compromise candidate and helped him appeal to the broader social movements underpinning the revolution. Although Kasman's political stance became uncompromisingly Islamic in later years, his leadership of the KNIP did not have a particularly Islamic flavor. Of his three deputies, one was Christian (Johannes Latuharhary) and one was irreligious (Adam Malik). More importantly, the program of the KNIP under Kasman's leadership did not include any religiously driven action points. The Ministry of Religion was created only later, and no initiative toward Islamic law was taken. Instead, the program of the government focused almost exclusively on issues of governance and government organization.[15]

In some ways, the direction of the KNIP was limited by the existence of a unitary national party, the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI). Established on August 22, 1945, as the sole political party of independent Indonesia, the party (like the KNIP) failed to include many Islamic leaders or address Islamic issues. Sukarno and Hatta led the PNI themselves, carrying the titles "Great Leader" and "Vice Great Leader"; for daily administration, Sukarno handpicked Sartono, an old friend and activist in Sukarno's prewar nationalist party from 1930.[16] The Muslim leaders involved in the leadership were only those "few members of the prewar Islamic political parties personally congenial to Sukarno."[17]

[12] Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 92, 187.
[13] Noer and Akbarsyah, *KNIP: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*, 23.
[14] See his self-reported CV from 1956 at Syahrul Hidayat and Kevin W. Fogg, "Member Profiles: Mr. R. H. Kasman Singodimedjo," *Konstituante.Net* (January 1, 2018), www.konstituante.net/en/profile/MASJUMI_kasman_singodimedjo (accessed June 14, 2018).
[15] Noer and Akbarsyah, *KNIP: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*, 26–28.
[16] Noer and Akbarsyah, *KNIP: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*, 20–21.
[17] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 93.

These men, Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, and Wondoamiseno, remained prominent in Islamic politics in the revolutionary period and afterward, but none were particularly well connected in Islamic mass organizations.

The PNI as the sole national party did not last long. Accusations that it was unrepresentative of Muslims and of figures from the anti-Japanese underground, and that a unitary party tended toward fascism (an ideology at a particularly low ebb in domestic and diplomatic popularity), may have contributed to the swift end of its monopoly of national party status.[18]

The end of PNI as the sole national party came as part of a sweeping change in government. By mid-October, the government recognized that it faced stagnation. Sutan Sjahrir convinced the country's existing leadership that correcting this required radical change. Such change came in the form of Proclamation X, signed by Vice-President Hatta on October 16, 1945.[19] Proclamation X changed the function of the KNIP by allowing it to fill the role prescribed to the Parliament as laid out in the constitution. Although the KNIP was already theoretically a legislative body, the revision gave it more powers in terms of exclusive rights to produce laws and oversee government function. Importantly, Proclamation X also created the Working Committee (an evolution of the Executive Committee) and gave it explicit authority to act on behalf of the whole KNIP in day-to-day legislative matters. Two other actions immediately followed with the proclamation: Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin became formateurs of a new cabinet, to be answerable to the KNIP instead of the president, and Sjahrir took over the leadership of the KNIP. In the meeting where this was announced, the incumbent leader of the KNIP, the Muhammadiyah-aligned Kasman, never known for his levelheadedness, became so heated that the KNIP had to relieve him from his position in favor of a deputy before formally transferring power to the socialist duo, Sjahrir and Amir, who took over the leadership of the new Working Committee.[20]

There are several reasons that Proclamation X took the form that it did. The clear stagnation of the government stood above all reasons and is agreed upon by all sources. Sukarno did not appear to have a plan for the new revolutionary government, and certainly the members chosen for

[18] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 95; Noer and Akbarsyah, *KNIP: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*, 21; oral history with Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1979 #6, tape 3.

[19] Koesnodiprodjo, ed., *Himpunan Undang[2], Peraturan[2], Penetapan[2] Pemerintah Republic Indonesia 1945* (Jakarta: S. K. Seno, 1951), 58–59.

[20] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 174.

his cabinet were now considered too close to the defeated Japanese (as was Kasman, incidentally). More importantly for the mood of the times, the old cabinet did not appear sufficiently revolutionary for the youth and also was not taking any significant revolutionary action.[21] To counterbalance this, the Proclamation in effect moved power into the hands of Sjahrir, closely aligned with the youth and free from any taint of collaboration with the Japanese, which appeased a number of domestic voices in politics. For an international audience, the Proclamation also moved power to the KNIP as a legislative institution, making Indonesia into more of a parliamentary system.[22] This certainly helped Indonesia to look more democratic and added prominent noncollaborators to the Indonesian government, thus helping to avoid accusations of being a Japanese creation. In the words of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, a member of the KNIP Working Committee at the time, they wanted to "create a form of government that could be seen as democratic government by the outside world.... We feared that international public opinion would not be favorable" if they did not break from their founding as a "plaything of Japan, a Republic of Indonesia that was 'Made in Japan.'"[23] The parliamentary system was also more familiar to the Indonesians, as this was the type of system run in the Netherlands.[24]

In the newly empowered Working Committee of the KNIP (hand selected by Sjahrir and Amir), only two of the fifteen members were Islamic politicians (Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and K. H. Wahid Hasjim).[25] Of these two, Sjafruddin was not yet solidly in the Islamic bloc. Thus, one might say that initially only Wahid Hasjim, who was also sitting in the incumbent cabinet, represented the Islamic bloc on this first Working Committee.

The trend toward a parliamentary system also opened the door for the creation of more political parties. This issue was among the first discussed by the new Working Committee, and all the members agreed that

[21] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 170.
[22] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution* 152.
[23] Oral history of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1979 #6, tape 3; cf. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 184; Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 152.
[24] Oral history of Mohamad Roem, interviewed by A. Rahman Zainuddin, ANRI SL1 1981 #6, tapes 6 and 9; oral history of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1979 #6, tape 3. The parliamentary system was later enshrined officially in the 1949 RIS constitution and the 1950 provisional NKRI constitution, but overturned permanently in the return to the 1945 constitution (as written) in 1959.
[25] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 153.

contending political parties were a necessary condition of democracy.[26] In some ways, though, the initiative for this move came from the people and not from the political center. Groups in the capital and the regions had already expressed their clear desire to form new parties, and they appeared likely to do so even if the government had not invited such a move. Within the Islamic community, rumors about an Islamic political party, and even activity toward creating one, preceded Proclamation X. Thus, Indonesian government action should properly be seen as a reaction to the mood in favor of political parties. The formal government invitation to form political parties, a decree by Vice-President Hatta on November 5, 1945, had barely gone out before the parties formed themselves.[27]

Founding an Islamic Political Party: Masjumi

Muslims had been agitating for an institutional vehicle for the Islamic movement from August 1945. Just days after the proclamation of independence, a meeting of Islamic leaders in the Balai Muslimin building in Kramat, Jakarta, discussed the state of their country's newfound independence and found it wanting. Some of those present decried the elimination of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter from the constitution; others asked more boldly "Why is this not an Islamic state?" Although the attendees came to accept the loss of the Jakarta Charter as a *fait accompli* for the time being, they also reached consensus that they should continue the Islamic movement with a follow-up meeting in Yogyakarta.[28] Other meetings, such as the formation of the Movement of Indonesian Islamic Youth (*Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia*) and a meeting in Yogyakarta on October 11 between senior Islamic leaders, were also steps toward the general Islamic congress soon to be called.[29]

The creation of this party was shaped, though, by an institutional legacy from the Japanese occupation. This legacy, the Japanese-initiated sociocultural organization Masjoemi, had brought together Islamic leaders from across Java.[30] This organization was limited in several ways,

[26] Oral history of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1979 #6, tape 3.
[27] Sastroamijoyo, *Milestones on My Journey*, 109–111.
[28] Noer, "Masjumi," 39; oral history of Mohamad Roem, interviewed by A. Rahman Zainuddin, ANRI SL1 1981 #6, tape 9.
[29] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 177; Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, 71.
[30] Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 151. Masjoemi had also incorporated the smaller groups Perikatan Ummat Islam (based in Sukabumi under Kyai Ahmad Sanusi) and Persatuan Ummat Islam Indonesia (based in Majalengka under Kyai Abdulhalim); van

though. First, it was geographically limited to Java because of the way the archipelago had been divided under the Japanese occupation. Second, it had limited popular potential precisely because it was a Japanese legacy. Finally, because its leadership was drawn exclusively from the leadership of constituent mass organizations (Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah), it was limited as not only a nonpolitical organization but also an organization without particular political skill.

Thus, the old organization needed to transform to fit the new times. The new political party, to become not only political but successful in politics, had to move beyond just two organizations and also beyond Java. While the leadership of Masjoemi had been handpicked by the occupying forces, the new initiative invited both those who had been involved in the old Masjoemi and leaders who were active before the war. Word also went out to some outer island leaders, although not many were able to attend.

On November 7, 1945, hundreds of attendees flocked to Yogyakarta to attend a congress designed to launch a new Islamic party. These attendees spanned the full gamut of Indonesian Muslim society; some came directly from the *pesantren* where they lived their full lives, and others had been educated entirely in the Dutch system.[31] They also ranged in age from youth to elderly scholars. According to one attendee, Harsono Tjokroaminoto, the goal was to "look at the possibility or rather the principles that would be carried through in this period of independence. The consultation lasted several days between many different Islamic leaders, until it ended with … a consensus, which was that at that time the Islamic community needed to be brought together in one vehicle."[32] That vehicle was a new political party: the Islamic party Masjumi.

A proposal to name the new political party *Partai Rakyat Islam* (Islamic Masses Party or Islamic People's Party) lost to *Masjumi* (the old organizational name) by a vote of 50–52.[33] The unsuccessful proposal was more along the lines of other parties being founded at the time and would have emphasized the importance of the Islamic grassroots. It failed, however, because several leaders who had been active in the Japanese-sponsored Masjoemi, including the prominent Wahid Hasjim, thought it important to maintain continuity with the old organization's name. By

Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 154 and Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 23.

[31] Oral history of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI, SL1 1979 #6, tape 3.

[32] Oral history of Harsono Tjokroaminoto, interviewed by Wardiningsih Surjohardjo, ANRI, SL1 1982 #60, tape 28.

[33] Noer, "Masjumi," 43 n. 14.

continuing to act under the same moniker, it was thought, they could prove that Masjoemi (and, presumably, its leadership) was more than just a Japanese puppet during the occupation; in other words, keeping the old name would allow them to redeem it. Those who had not been affiliated with the Japanese-sponsored Masjoemi, like H. Agus Salim and Mohamad Roem, tended to vote in favor of the proposed new name, while those most active with the Japanese-sponsored Masjoemi pushed to keep the old name.[34]

Extraordinary Members

In addition to respecting an old name, the new party worked hard to respect existing organizations. Where individual Muslims could become members of the party, sociocultural Islamic organizations could become "extraordinary members" (*anggota istimewa*).[35] This facilitated the immediate incorporation of all Muslims who were active with religious organizations in their villages, greatly increasing the new party's reach into the lower echelons of society. The idea behind this category was "to create a strong unity among the members of the Muslim community. It was expected that the system would facilitate coordination and cooperation between the numerous organizations without neglecting the relationship of their particular spheres of activity with political questions, thereby rallying all their following behind the Masjumi."[36] The first organizations to join were those that had been constituent organizations of the Japanese-sponsored Masjoemi: Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Perikatan Ummat Islam, and the Persatuan Ummat Islam Indonesia. Soon afterward, when they were re-established, Persatuan Islam and al-Irsjad, both based on Java, joined as well, followed by two Medan-based organizations: Jamiyatul Washliyah and al-Ittihadiyah.[37]

What was the impact of "extraordinary membership"? This mechanism allowed Masjumi to incorporate hundreds of thousands of Muslims through their existing participation in mass organizations. Although numerous secondary accounts criticize Masjumi and other parties for

[34] Oral history of Mohamad Roem, interviewed by A. Rahman Zainuddin, ANRI SL1 1981 #6, tape 9.

[35] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 221 n. 37.

[36] Noer, "Masjumi," 58.

[37] Noer, "Masjumi," 47. Contrast with oral history of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1979 #6, tape 3, which also lists the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII). Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, 351, adds two more extraordinary members (date of joining unclear): Mathla'ul Anwar (based in West Java) and Nahdlatul Wathan (based on Lombok, but founded only in the 1950s).

being unconnected with the masses,[38] Masjumi did, in fact, attempt to connect with everyday Muslims largely through preexisting Islamic organizations in which people were already involved. These mass organizations gave the party a path of communication to share information with villages across Indonesia, and to collect information from villages. This could have caused some complacency, however, among Masjumi leadership regarding membership drives and party propaganda. Expecting that such support-building activities would be undertaken by the mass organizations, which in fact had their own agendas and were not always concerned with Masjumi's political aims, probably limited the growth of Masjumi activism among the lowest level of Islamic society.

Connected with this latter point, the move to include extraordinary members could have been a great weakness, rather than a strength, of Masjumi. Party leader Sjafruddin Prawiranegara suggested as much in later years; once there were cabinet seats and other spoils to divide, each organization began to compete with the others within Masjumi to win the most for their own group.[39]

Masjumi Leadership in 1945

Although factionalism along the lines of mass organizations would come back to haunt Masjumi in later years, the initial composition of its leadership was a model in superseding such affiliations. The inaugural board reflected "the prevailing idea" at the congress of November 1945 "that the Masjumi should be *the* Muslim party to unite all the religious currents and prewar political affiliationship; that pre-war differences should be eliminated and forgotten."[40] The Congress elected a leadership board as follows:

[38] See a discussion of this trend in the literature in Effendy, 89. The common narrative is that only the Indonesian Communist Party connected with the people, particularly explicit in Daniel S. Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957–1959* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2009), 107 and passim; and Feith, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, 354, 548 and passim. Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, 348 and passim, argues in the opposite direction, that Masjumi was well grounded in grassroots activism. Masjumi's grassroots support was also made clear in interviews with H. Abdul Rais Saleh, June 4, 2010; Pagar Alam, South Sumatra; Sarjan K, June 17, 2010, Padang, West Sumatra; Muhammad Suriansyah Ideham, September 20, 2010, Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan; and H. Muhammad Abduh H. Laraga, November 26, 2016, Marantale, Kab. Parigi Moutong, Central Sulawesi, among others.

[39] Oral history of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1979 #6, tape 3. Contrast Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, who depicts the greatest competition between the Sukiman and Natsir factions, neither particularly grounded in a mass organization.

[40] Noer, "Masjumi," 60; emphasis in the original.

Chairman: Dr. H. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo
First vice-chairman: R. Abikusno Tjokrosujoso
Second vice-chairman: R. Wali al-Fatah
First secretary: Harsono Tjokroaminoto
Second secretary: M. Prawoto Mangkusasmito
Treasurer: Mr. R. A. Kasmat[41]

This leadership board looks very different from the Japanese-sponsored Masjoemi, mostly because of the integration of political figures at the very top. Dr. Sukiman had been the prewar head of the Partai Islam Indonesia (PII), and Abikusno was the former head of the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII), the two Islamic political parties in operation on the eve of the Japanese invasion.[42] Both of these groups had been closed by Japanese proclamation, and the intention to incorporate their leaders into the new Japanese organizations had not been fully realized.[43] More recently, these two leaders were also in the national leadership of the Partai Nasional Indonesia when it functioned briefly as a state party. Their selection as the top two leaders, then, must have seemed natural.

The rest of the leadership board also appeared to balance the key prewar political leaders: Wali al-Fatah was a former journalist; Prawoto was famous at the time for serving as the last chairman of the Studenten Islam Studieclub; Harsono was Abikusno's nephew and closely associated with PSII (he was the son of Sarekat Islam's founder); and Mr. Kasmat had been on the PII leadership (in addition to chairing the Studenten Islam Studieclub in the 1930s). The average age of the leadership committee in 1945 was forty, approximately six years younger than the average age of forty-seven for the wartime Masjoemi leadership in 1944.[44] Wali al-Fatah was the only one without Western schooling; all the others had attended the highest level of Dutch schools in the East Indies, and both Sukiman and Abikusno held advanced degrees from the Netherlands (in medicine and architecture, respectively).

Aside from its age, this leadership also stands out for its direction toward concerted political action, rather than spiritual or theological

[41] As listed in Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 100.
[42] Sukiman had also previously been in the PSII before his expulsion in 1933. He stayed out of party politics for several years before founding the PII in 1938. Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 17.
[43] Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 134.
[44] The full list of the leaders of the Masjoemi executive under the Japanese can be found in Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 262–263 n. 6. For full details on the age calculations, see Kevin W. Fogg, "The Fate of Muslim Nationalism in Independent Indonesia," PhD diss., Yale University, 2012, 91 n. 80.

leadership. No leading theologian sat on the new central leadership; they sat instead on the Madjelis Sjuro (see following text). Rather, all these leaders had political experience. This contrasts markedly with the executive of the Japanese-sponsored Masjoemi executive, made up entirely of NU and Muhammadiyah leaders with no concern for political savvy. One reason for this political turn among the new Masjumi leadership might have been to try to erase the blemish of Japanese collaboration, which was becoming a political liability once the cabinet was led by Socialists who had opposed Japanese collaboration.

In addition to the previously named positions, eleven members of the leadership did not have a specific title: Dr. Abu Hanifah, Anwar Tjokroaminoto, K. H. M. Dachlan, K. H. Fakih Usman, H. M. Faried Ma'roef, K. H. Fathurrahman, Junus Anies, S. M. Kartosuwirjo, Mohamad Roem, and Samsudin. Some of these individuals were undoubtedly close to the interests of the constituent organizations within Masjumi, particularly K. H. M. Dachlan (a former head of NU), Junus Anies (a future head of Muhammadiyah), and K. H. Fakih Usman (a future minister of religion and head of Muhammadiyah). Still, the majority of the names were youth leaders or veteran political figures, including former activists from the PSII and PII, rather than long-standing supporters of mass organizations. Among these eleven men, the average age was thirty-nine, and only two lacked Dutch schooling.[45]

Standing alongside the central leadership board was the Madjelis Sjuro, or Consultative Council, a separate body meant to provide theological guidance but not to participate in the raw politics. Most of the respected scholars of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama who had dominated the Japanese-sponsored Masjoemi's leadership, like K. H. Hasjim Asj'ari and K. Wahid Hasjim, were placed on this council.[46] This body appeared to carefully balance NU and Muhammadiyah interests in its leadership, and broader organizational affiliations in its membership:

Chairman: K. H. Hasjim Asj'ari
First Vice-Chairman: Ki Bagus Hadikusumo
Second Vice-Chairman: K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim
Third Vice-Chairman: Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo
Members: R. H. M. Adnan

[45] Fakih Usman and Junus Anies. Notably, though, three were also Middle East graduates: Farid Ma'ruf (after attending a HIS high school in the East Indies) and Fathurrahman from Cairo and K. H. M. Dachlan from Mecca (after attending a Dutch elementary school in the East Indies). Only one, Samsudin, had graduated from the Netherlands (having studied law at Leiden).

[46] Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 155.

H. Agus Salim
K. H. Abdul Wahab
K. H. Abdulhalim
K. H. Ahmad Sanusi
Syekh M. Djamil Djambek[47]

The chairman, second vice-chairman, and one other member (K. H. Abdul Wahab) were leaders of NU, while the first and third vice-chairmen were the most prominent nationalist leaders from Muhammadiyah. K. H. Abdulhalim was the leader of Persatuan Umat Islam Indonesia, and K. H. Ahmad Sanusi led the Perikatan Umat Islam, the two smaller constituent groups that had been incorporated in the Japanese-sponsored Masjoemi. Syekh M. Djamil Djambek is the only figure listed in any leadership position of central Masjumi in 1945 who was active outside of Java at the time; he lived and fought in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, where he led a modernist Islamic movement and was also chairman of Madjelis Islam Tinggi (MIT, High Islamic Council), a wartime all-Sumatra organization founded by the Japanese.[48] Only two out of these ten men (Agus Salim and Kasman Singodimedjo) had any Western schooling; the majority of them had been educated in – and then ran – traditional Islamic schools. The composition of the Madjelis Sjuro directly reflects the power of the extraordinary members in Masjumi at its founding, even though this board remained much less influential in Masjumi's governance.

Conclusion

Growing out of a moment of both crisis and possibility in the early Indonesian state, the Islamic political party Masjumi represented a major accomplishment for the Islamic community. Its form also had serious consequences moving forward.

Masjumi was novel in part because it was an *exclusively Islamic* political vehicle. Even the prewar Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, which had formed in the late 1920s out of the former mass organization Sarekat Islam, had never been entirely Muslim. Mohamad Roem noted late in his life that PSII had tried to establish a culture of crying out "Allahu Akbar!" at meetings to replace clapping for speeches, but that this never

[47] Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 101; see also a description of its function in Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 61. Notably missing from this body was K. H. Masjkur, who would become the minister of religion in 1947.
[48] Kahin, "Struggle for Independence," 71.

succeeded because there were always Christians in the crowd.[49] Although an exclusively Muslim party had never been achieved before in Indonesia, the experience of the Japanese occupation certainly helped to push the community in that direction. The Japanese occupation gave Islamic leaders opportunities for leadership and incorporation into government on levels never before attained, hoping to win Muslim support for the Japanese project,[50] and the nonpolitical associations sponsored by the Japanese certainly laid the foundation for the political party. Masjumi, in turn, laid the foundation for the series of exclusively Islamic political parties that have followed after since independence.[51]

Another novelty of the new Masjumi was its unification of all Muslims and Islamic organizations under one umbrella. This trend was short-lived, as Masjumi fractured just two years later, yet the desire for unity and especially the rhetoric of unity resounded through the early months of the party. This could date back to the MIAI,[52] or to the Japanese-sponsored propaganda about the importance of a united Islamic front,[53] but both of these were limited to efforts on Java. The unity under Masjumi was important for bring together traditionalist and reformist Muslims and spanning beyond Java, but especially because it united Islam with a *political* direction.

The political nature of Masjumi might be the most important aspect of the new party. The new party was well positioned to give Islamic interests their greatest voice in the governance of the archipelago since before colonialism. It also represented the culmination of decades of evolution in a political direction.[54] The political nature of the organization was emphasized in its politically minded leadership, made up of laymen rather than clerics. The individuals initially chosen for the leadership board did not remain at the helm through the revolution, but the character of the leadership (political rather than theological and lay rather than clerical) not only remained in place but also was indeed strengthened over time. The key development in that direction was the rise of the so-called Islamic Socialists, a new group of young leaders who would run

[49] Mohamad Roem, "Ikut Serta dalam Peringatan Tahun Pertama Revolusi Islam Iran yang Gemilang," in *Bunga Rampai dari Sejarah*, vol. 4 (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1988), 129.

[50] Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, passim, but especially 186–187.

[51] Greg Fealy and Bernhard Platzdasch, "The Masyumi Legacy: Between Islamist Idealism and Political Exigency," *Studia Islamika* 12, 1 (2005): 73–99.

[52] Menchik, *Islam and Democracy*, 76–77; Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 89–90.

[53] Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 135, reports that this was the only consistent theme (along with supporting the Japanese) in wartime propaganda toward Muslims.

[54] Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia*; Abdullah, *Schools and Politics*.

Masjumi through much of the revolution and until the party's disbanding in 1960.[55]

Given the political direction of Masjumi, theological leaders and clerics had to look elsewhere for their roles in the newly independent state. This pushed the development of a new bureaucracy that could accommodate ulama aspirations, provide patronage to Islamic groups, and demonstrate a commitment to Muslim ideals: a new Ministry of Religion.

[55] See Chapter 10.

9 The Ministry of Religion

If the political party Masjumi was the most important institution of politics during the revolution, then the Ministry of Religion is the most important institution that has lasted until today. It was not able to accomplish much in its first few years, but it has grown into a bulwark for Islamic interests in the Indonesian government. Today, the creation of this separate ministry might seem to have been natural or unavoidable in Indonesian politics, but in the early days of the Republic the establishment of this ministry was a very contentious issue.

The creation of the Ministry of Religion spoke to two trends in the early independent government. First, there was a need to accommodate Islamic interests, particularly in the wake of the Jakarta Charter's failure. Second, and in some ways a subset of the first, there was a need to integrate specifically the clerical, theological leaders of the Islamic community – the ulama and those close to them – in the new government. This second purpose became more obvious over time, as the divide between the theological leaders and political leaders also became more apparent.

From its establishment, the Ministry of Religion was a break from both the secular vision of the Indonesian nation-state and the colonial precedents that administered Islam merely to control it (rather than promote it). Because it stood at odds with both history and some leaders' vision of the future, the road to establishing the new bureaucracy was not straightforward.

Colonial Precedents

Both the Dutch and the Japanese made efforts to regulate religious life in Indonesia, though neither created an administrative scheme as all-encompassing or as supportive of Islam as the Ministry of Religion. During the Dutch colonial period, most Islamic religious issues

were administered by specific divisions within the Office for Native Affairs.[1] These divisions included administration of the hajj, marriage, and religious education, although certain aspects of Islamic administration were farmed out to other appropriate departments; for example, Islamic courts were under the Department of Justice. Additionally, the office dealt with some matters that were not connected to religion. For example, it engaged in the "surveillance of radical political organizations," Islamic or otherwise.[2]

The Office for Native Affairs, like any colonial bureaucracy, focused on buttressing the colonial state. In this case, the specific mentality of how this bureaucracy supported the Dutch colonial project was framed by a long-time head of the office, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, also the most famous Dutch orientalist. The Dutch tasked him to "assess the ways in which Islam was organized so that the state could formalize a 'Mohammedan' church and coordinate the collection and allocation of its funds."[3] This assignment was obviously Christian in normativity and not well-suited to the Indonesian context, but Snouck Hurgronje took a broader view, seeking ways to preserve Dutch superiority even while allowing Muslims broad leeway to practice their religion. His basic principle was to allow for any Muslim religious practices, but prevent any political manifestations of Islam.[4] For this work, he recruited native informants to work alongside him in the office, but the initial cadres were from the native aristocracy classes, rather than from the ulama or theological leaders of the Muslim community.[5] The notable exception was Sayyid 'Uthman, who was a scholar but of Hadrami Arab, rather than indigenous Indonesian, extraction.[6] Even after Snouck Hurgronje left for the Netherlands in 1906, he ensured that in the future the Office of Native Affairs would pass only to students expressly chosen by him for the task.[7]

Perhaps because it was staffed by people from outside the pious Muslim community, or perhaps because of the limitations that it placed on certain kinds of activity, there was a persistent tension between

[1] *Peranan Departemen Agama dalam Revolusi dan Pembangunan Bansa* (Jakarta: Departemen Agama R.I., 1965), 103.
[2] Harry A. Poeze, "Political Intelligence in the Netherlands Indies," in Robert Cribb, ed., *The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations of the Netherlands Indies, 1880–1942* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994), 231.
[3] Laffan, *Makings of Indonesian Islam*, 148.
[4] Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia*, 90.
[5] Jajat Burhanudin, "Islamic Knowledge, Authority, and Political Power: The 'Ulama in Colonial Indonesia," PhD diss., Universiteit Leiden, 2007, 104–105.
[6] Kaptein, *Colonialism and the Modern Age in the Netherlands East Indies*.
[7] Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia*, 95.

Islamic leaders and the Dutch colonial bureaucracy related to Islam. Muslims felt that the Office of Native Affairs, and the colonial government that it informed, did not understand them.[8] Worse yet, Muslims frequently accused the Dutch bureaucracy of supporting Christianity and discouraging Islam, despite the pleas of some Dutch Advisors that they were shielding the Muslim population from even more Christian proselytization.[9] Islamic leaders could point to the subsidies provided by the colonial government to Christian schools. Not only did Christian schools start to receive such subsidies decades before any Islamic institutions (these Islamic schools had to conform to Dutch standards first to be eligible), they also received several times the amount that went to Muslims, the colony's statistical majority.[10]

Seeing this religious bureaucracy that did not cater to their needs, did not employ them, and may have discriminated against them, Islamic leaders aspired to improve their standing in the government by establishing a new department to deal with Islamic issues. Leading Islamic politicians proposed to the colonial government in 1941 the creation of a Special Ministry for Islamic Affairs.[11] Although the Japanese invasion shortly afterward prevented any follow-up by the government, it is doubtful that the Dutch would have taken this idea further regardless.

When the Japanese came, they divided the Dutch East Indies into three administrative zones, but on both Java and Sumatra their occupation included the centralized administration of Islam. On Java, the Japanese established a Religious Affairs Bureau (*Shumubu*), from which they organized religious life and religious organizations.[12] On Sumatra, the Japanese organized huge rallies of Muslims early in the occupation, but only set up a Religious Office (*Shumuhan*) toward the end of their time, in 1944.[13] Both of these were focused on supporting the Japanese occupation, though, rather than developing local religious life. Additionally, they were directed at the top by Japanese officials (including some

[8] Laffan, *Makings of Indonesian Islam*, 205. [9] Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution*, 70.

[10] Moch. Nur Ichwan, "Official Reform of Islam: State Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia, 1966–2004," PhD diss., Universiteit van Tilburg, 2006, 24. The more general idea that the Dutch colonial government supported Christianity and oppressed Islam is pervasive in post-colonial Indonesian discourse; see, e.g., *Peranan Departemen Agama*, 63; Sismono, *Sejarah dan Amal Bakti Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia* (Bandung: Bina Siswa, 1991), 18.

[11] Ichwan, "Official Reform of Islam," 54–55. The proposal was made to the Visman Commission, a body set up to explore the idea of limited self-government in some areas for the Indies.

[12] Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 111; van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 117.

[13] Reid, *Blood of the People*, 122, 142.

Japanese Muslims) and were not a particular path of advancement for traditional Islamic leaders.[14]

Establishing a Ministry

Once independence was achieved, Islamic groups intended not to be ignored or treated unfairly by the newly independent Indonesian government. From the third day of independence, Muslim representatives revived their calls for a special ministry to centralize the administration of religious affairs. On August 19, 1945, the acting parliament considered the creation of a Ministry of Religion as one of thirteen cabinet-level departments in the new government. While this was supported by the subcommittee that had drafted the organization of the government,[15] the idea of a Ministry of Religion was opposed by an influential delegate from Maluku who thought such a ministry would give rise to conflict between Muslim and Christian communities.[16] Perhaps because the acting parliament notoriously underrepresented Islamic interests in its membership, this proposal failed on a vote of twenty-one against six.[17] Only twelve ministries were created, and religion was excluded. The government did, however, explicitly include religion in a ministerial portfolio, writing in the official announcement that "The Department of Instruction, Education, and Culture will look after matters of instruction, education, culture, religion, etc."[18] As in the Dutch era, though, other aspects of religious administration remained under other offices, such as Islamic courts under the Ministry of Justice and alms-giving under the Ministry of Prosperity.[19]

All the same, from the first cabinets of the Republic of Indonesia, the head of state felt that religion deserved special attention. Leaders in the Islamic community, K. H. Wahid Hasjim and H. Rasjidi, sat as "Minister of State" in the first and second cabinets, respectively, ostensibly as representatives of Islamic interests although without an official portfolio.

[14] There may have been some advantage to participation in the ulama training courses run by the Japanese on Java (van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 128–133), but it was not primarily for the advantage of the Muslim leaders or the Islamic community more generally.

[15] Ichwan, "Official Reform of Islam," 55.

[16] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 90. This delegate was Latuharhary, who also sat on KNIP leadership in the earliest days; Noer and Akbarsyah, *KNIP: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*, 25.

[17] Ichwan, "Official Reform of Islam," 56.

[18] Penetapan Panitya Persiapan Kemerdekaan, 19 Agustus 1945, found in Koesnodiprodjo, ed., *Himpunan 1945*, quote from lampiran, p. 63.

[19] Ichwan, "Official Reform of Islam," 55.

(Both of them would go on to become ministers of religion in later cabinets.) The government also moved around religious affairs as a part of the government bureaucracy to better handle the importance of that class of tasks. On November 15, 1945, religious affairs, which had up until that point been under the Ministry of Education and Culture, were moved into the Ministry of Home Affairs.[20] It should also be noted that religion was not the only proposal for a ministry that failed in the first few months. There was a proposal for a Minister of Sailing (*Menteri Pelayaran*, presumably to handle maritime matters) that was discussed by the Working Committee of the KNIP but never reached fruition.[21]

The desire of the Muslim community was still not satisfied, and according to one Dutch contemporary observer, "everywhere the leading Muslims wanted a Ministry of Religion as part of the cabinet of an otherwise 'modern' national government."[22] Thus, in a plenary meeting of the KNIP in late November 1945, the delegation from Banjumas, Central Java, led by K. H. Saleh Su'aidy, put forward a proposal strongly supported by the Islamic representatives. He argued that rather than split religious interests between several ministries (education, justice, etc.), they should be centralized and dealt with by a single Ministry of Religion.[23] The government received this notion well, but Sukarno did not want to put it to a vote for fear it could lose again. Instead, Sukarno and Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir noted the proposal as formal advice, and on January 3, 1946, Sukarno acted on that advice to decree the creation of a

[20] Penetapan Pemerintah 1945 No. 3/S.D., signed by Sekretaris Negara A. G. Pringgodigdo, reproduced in Koesnodiprodjo, ed., *Himpunan 1945*, 42. It is worth noting that the Ministry of Education and Culture had up to that time not included religion in any of its instructions or regulations about education. See *Himpunan 1945*, 203–208.

[21] "Pertelaan Pekerdjaan Badan Pekerdja," in Koesnodiprodjo, ed., *Himpunan 1945*, 143.

[22] Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 237.

[23] *Peranan Departemen Agama*, 104; Sismono, *Sejarah dan Amal Bakti Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia*, 15–16. Of the three delegates from Banjumas, K. H. Saleh Su'aidy led this initiative, even though K. H. Abu Dardiri was the official head of the delegation. Sismono, *Sejarah dan Amal Bakti Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia*, 30. Azra has suggested that the delegation may have put their proposal forward to a meeting of the Working Committee on November 11, rather than a plenary meeting of the acting parliament on November 25–28, but this seems less likely. Azyumardi Azra, "H.M. Rasjidi, BA: Pembentukan Kementerian Agama dalam Revolusi," in Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, eds., *Menteri-Menteri Agama RI: Biografi Sosial-Politik* (Jakarta: Badan Litbang Agama Departemen Agama RI bekerjasama dengan PPIM-IAIN Jakarta, 1998), 5.

new Ministry of Religion, with H. Rasjidi, formerly a cabinet minister without portfolio, as the first Minister of Religion (ad interim).[24]

For the secular press, the creation of the Ministry of Religion was a nonissue. The day after Sukarno's decree, the left-leaning daily *Merdeka* in Jakarta ran a headline about Amir Sjarifuddin leaving his post as Minister of Information to focus on his other post as Minister of Defense; the creation of a whole new Ministry of Religion and H. Rasjidi's appointment as minister appeared as only a minor item underneath Amir's move, toward the end of a fifteen-line article.[25]

The Ministry of Religion in Action

Although H. Rasjidi became the first Minister of Religion in January 1946, it seems that the Ministry did not properly become active until March, with the formation of Sutan Sjahrir's second cabinet (in which Rasjidi was still listed as Minister of Religion "ad interim").[26] Within weeks of reappointment, Rasjidi laid out his vision for the ministry and began aggregating new tasks to it in late March and early April.

On March 17–18, 1946, the ministry gathered together in a conference all the functionaries in its offices across Java and Madura.[27] This occasion was important both for the inauguration of real work in the ministry and for the vision that Rasjidi laid out for the ministry's future. The minister's keynote speech emphasized the idea of cooperation between Christians and Muslims and the support of all the country's religions in this new independence era.[28] The unspoken undertone of how the ministry would be especially supportive of Muslims, who felt they had been unsupported by the Dutch, was underlined when the ministry

[24] The creation of the ministry was in Penetapan Pemerintah no. 1/ S.D., 1946, reproduced in Koesnodiprodjo, ed., *Himpunan Undang[2], Peraturan[2], Penetapan[2] Pemerintah Republic Indonesia 1946* (Jakarta: S.K. Seno, 1951), 286. The Penetapan Pemerintah is very minimal, stating simply "Based on the proposal of the Prime Minister and Working Committee of the Central National Committee, it is decided to create (1) The Department of Religion, (2) The Youth Office, which will become a section of the Social Department." The whole document is a mere twenty-five words in Indonesian. The appointment of Rasjidi appears in *Peranan Departemen Agama*, 62.

[25] *Merdeka*, January 4, 1946.

[26] "Kabinet Baroe Repoeblik," *Merdeka*, March 12, 1946. Moch. Nur Ichwan, "Official Reform of Islam," 62, sees the transition from a "department" (departemen) to a "ministry" (kementerian) at this time as a major development, but this is doubtful. Although cabinet members were consistently called "ministers," the divisions they headed were called "ministry" and "department" interchangeably in government documents until a consolidation around the term "ministry" in early 1946.

[27] Azra, "H.M. Rasjidi," 9.

[28] *Lasjkar*, March 20, 1946; cf. Ichwan, "Official Reform of Islam," 67.

welcomed input from ulama from across Java at the conference, believing they could help to set the ministry's program of action.[29] No mention was made of leaders from other religions.

In the wake of this conference, Rasjidi's first task was to consolidate the ministry's control over various aspects of Islamic life that had been under other government divisions. The largest move was the High Islamic Court, which had already been in existence from the colonial era and stood under the Ministry of Justice. It moved to the Ministry of Religion effective March 25, 1946.[30] Rasjidi also absorbed into the ministry the right to appoint religious judges, mosque caretakers, and district-level religious officials, some of which power had previously been under local administrations.[31] During his tenure, most of the work was still setting up things. For example, the ministry organized the country's religious holidays for the first time, but had to engage in some corrections even in deciding Islamic holidays (the *hijrah* of Muhammad, a state holiday in the first regulation issued, was soon removed in favor of the revelation of the Qur'an on 17 Ramadan). In this task, though, Christians were represented, too, with four Christian holidays per year, and even Confucians received a concession with four "Chinese" holidays (including Confucius's birthday and death day, on which government offices would work half days).[32]

When Sutan Sjahrir reshuffled his cabinet in November 1946, H. Rasjidi was replaced by K. H. Fathurrahman Kafrawi. Whereas Rasjidi had a strongly reformist background with a non-Islamic education at the University of Cairo, Fathurrahman was a traditionalist product of Java's *pesantren* and al-Azhar University.[33] It is notable, though, that even with this traditionalist background, Fathurrahman was still in keeping with the arch-Western outlook of the cabinet: he had also spent some time studying in the Netherlands and touring in England and France.[34] Fathurrahman's tenure, from November 1946 to June 1947, was arguably the most productive in the ministry during the revolution, including passage of a major law and promulgation of some important regulations.

Shortly after assuming office, Fathurrahman, gave his vision for the ministry's direction in a ministerial announcement:

[29] "Konperensi Jawatan Agama," *Merdeka*, March 22, 1946.
[30] "Penetapan Pemerintah 1946 no. 5/S.D.," in Koesnodiprodjo, ed., *Himpunan 1946*, 290.
[31] Azra, "H.M. Rasjidi," 10. [32] Koesnodiprodjo, ed., *Himpunan 1946*, 277–284.
[33] Azra, "H.M. Rasjidi," 13; Minhaji and Mudzhar, "Prof. K.H. Fathurrahman Kafrawi," 38–39.
[34] Minhaji and Mudzhar, "Prof. K.H. Fathurrahman Kafrawi," 39–40.

The present field of activities of the Ministry is as follows:

(1) Realizing the principles of faith in the best manner possible.
(2) Watching over individual freedom of religion.
(3) Guiding, supporting, protecting and promoting healthy religious movements.
(4) Maintaining relations with religious movements and currents not belonging to the Islamic and Christian (Protestant and Roman Catholic) religions.
(5) Advancing the general development in social and religious life.
(6) Administering, guiding and supervising religious education in state schools.
(7) Implementing, guiding and supporting, as well as promoting education and teaching in religious schools, and private teaching of religion.
(8) Training personnel necessary for religious education in government schools, for government offices and for jurisdiction, in the capacities of teachers and of religious judges.
(9) Administering and supporting everything pertaining to spiritual education in boarding-establishments, prisons and other places where this may be deemed necessary.
(10) Regulating, administering and supervising everything pertaining to registration of marriages, divorces, and reconciliations by Muslims.
(11) Providing material support for the improvement and maintenance of places of worship (mosques, churches, etc.).
(12) Administering, regulating, and supervising all matters pertaining to religious jurisdiction and the Islamic High Court.
(13) Investigating, recognizing, registering and supervising the administration of religious endowments (*waqf*).
(14) Administering and supervising matters pertaining to pilgrimages.
(15) Appointing and announcing holidays.
(16) Regulating official events relating to religion, with the provision that freedom of religion is to be maintained.[35]

These tasks spoke to the areas of immediate regulatory action and also the long-term direction of the Indonesian Ministry of Religion.

Four of the sixteen points made by Fathurrahman pertained to education, and progress on this issue was a triumph for the Islamic community. Whereas in the colonial period the division between Islamic education and state-sponsored education had been clear and Islamic education had been at a disadvantage, in the independence era these two systems began a slow path of convergence.[36] As early as December 1945 the acting

[35] Maklumat No. 1185/K.7, dated November 20, 1946, issued by Minister K. H. Fathurrahman, quoted in van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 226–227. This quotation has been slightly modified in light of the original Indonesian version of Peraturan Pemerintah no. 33/1949, which seems to have several of the same quotes rendered slightly incorrectly by van Nieuwenhuijze.

[36] Kevin W. Fogg, "State and Islamic Education Growing into Each Other in Indonesia," in Pia Maria Jolliffe and Thomas Richard Bruce, eds., *Southeast Asian Education in Modern History: Schools, Manipulation, and Contest* (London: Routledge, 2019).

parliament discussed religious education in state schools.[37] This debate continued over the next two years, with the secular PNI opposing mandatory religious classes and Masjumi strongly supporting the idea, with both sides appealing to the state philosophy of Pancasila as their justification.[38] In the end, Masjumi won a victory for pious Islamic communities and the Ministry of Religion; regulations for religious education in state schools came out in late 1946, and the Ministry of Religion had the power to appoint the religious teachers – giving this ministry many more positions that it could fill through officials' patronage networks.[39]

Another lasting development was the issuance of a "Law on the Registration of Marriage, Divorce, and Reconciliation," Law no. 22 of 1946.[40] This legislation was the only major victory for the implementation of Islamic law during the revolution, as it required Muslim marriages not only to be registered with the government (with a fee collected by the Ministry-employed officiant) but also conducted "properly" according to Islam. Indeed, the legislative history makes it clear that one of the major goals of the law was to correct widespread misapplication of Islamic marriage law by putting marriage under the control of local officials appointed by the Ministry of Religion who would have the knowledge and authority to apply Islamic law correctly.[41] The new law inserted the government into the issue of marriage by requiring registration, standardized religious practices (imposing an idea of orthodoxy), and provided an official income for the religious scholar class by setting standard payment for this now-mandatory service.

The contribution of the Ministry of Religion to provide a place for Islamic leaders who had received a traditional theological education was confirmed in the third and fourth ministers appointed to the position. The third appointee, K. H. Ahmad Azhary, had received some international education at al-Azhar in Cairo, but had not been educated in the Western system and was a more traditional religious scholar than his two predecessors.[42] The fourth appointee, K. H. Masjkur, was educated entirely at Javanese *pesantren* and would not have even learned to write Indonesian in the Roman alphabet if he had not taken the initiative to

[37] Karel A. Steenbrink, *Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah: Pendidikan Islam dalam Kurun Moderen* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986), 91.
[38] Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 193–194 n. 1.
[39] Minhaji and Mudzhar, "Prof. K.H. Fathurrahman Kafrawi," 46.
[40] Koesnodiprodjo, ed., *Himpunan 1946*, 73–78.
[41] Koesnodiprodjo, ed., *Himpunan 1946*, 77.
[42] Kevin W. Fogg, "The Missing Minister of Religion and the PSII: A Contextual Biography of K.H. Ahmad Azhary," *Studia Islamika* 20, 1 (2013): 35–57.

study this writing system with a local widow alongside his religious studies.[43] No major developments came under these two men because of increased disruptions of the physical revolution. Azhary was unable to take up his post because the Dutch prevented him;[44] Masjkur fancied himself a "guerrilla minister" because so much of his tenure was spent in the jungle after the second Dutch military aggression in 1948. Still, their appointments confirmed the trend that the Ministry of Religion would be, for the next two decades, the province of scholars who would be seen as unqualified for other government departments because of their exclusively religious preparation.

As the revolution was winding down in 1949, the Indonesian government passed a series of government regulations, laying out the duties and structure of various government ministries.[45] The last of these, issued in December 1949, was Government Regulation no. 33 of 1949 on the Ministry of Religion.[46] In this regulation, the primary tasks of the ministry were listed as follows:

(1) Realizing the principle of Belief in the One Supreme God (*Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa*) in the best manner possible.
(2) Watching over so that every inhabitant is free to adhere to his/her own religion and to worship according to his/her own religion.
(3) Guiding, supporting, protecting and promoting healthy religious movements.
(4) Administering, guiding and supervising religious instruction in state schools.

[43] Ahmad Syafi'i, "K.H. Masjkur: Kementerian Gerilya dan Waliyul Amri," in Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, eds., *Menteri-Menteri Agama RI: Biografi Sosial-Politik* (Jakarta: Badan Litbang Agama Departemen Agama RI bekerjasama dengan PPIM-IAIN Jakarta, 1998), 57.

[44] See Chapter 12.

[45] These regulations were passed for the Ministry of Finance (no. 51/1948), Ministry of Health (no. 71/1948), Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (no. 14/1949, amended by no. 28/1949), Ministry of Transportation and Communications (no. 15/1949), Ministry of Information (no. 27/1949), and the Ministry of Religion (no. 33/1949), so this should not be seen as special attention just to religious affairs. It is notable that the Ministry of Religion was the last ministry to get a special regulation in this way. See Koesnodiprodjo, ed., *Himpunan Undang[2], Peraturan[2], Penetapan[2] Pemerintah Republic Indonesia 1948* (Jakarta: S.K. Seno, 1951) and Koesnodiprodjo, ed., *Himpunan Undang[2], Peraturan[2], Penetapan[2] Pemerintah Republic Indonesia 1949* (Jakarta: S.K. Seno, 1951).

[46] Koesnodiprodjo, ed., *Himpunan 1949*, 134–138. Although the document has the month printed, the exact date has not been given. The tasks (but not the organizational structures) in this regulation were confirmed verbatim the following year in Peraturan Pemerintah no. 8/1950, promulgated on March 3, 1950, Koesnodiprodjo, ed., *Himpunan Undang[2], Peraturan[2], Penetapan[2] Pemerintah Republic Indonesia 1950* (Jakarta: S.K. Seno, 1951), 223–224.

(5) Implementing, guiding, supporting and inspecting the education and teaching given in religious schools and the private teaching of religion.
(6) Administering everything connected with religious instruction in the army, in boarding-establishments, prisons and other places where this may be deemed necessary.
(7) Regulating, administering, and supervising everything pertaining to registration of marriages, divorces, and reconciliations by Muslims.
(8) Providing material support for the improvement and maintenance of places of worships (mosques, churches, etc.).
(9) Administering, regulating and supervising all matters pertaining to regional Religious Courts and the Islamic High Court of Justice.
(10) Investigating, recognizing, registering and supervising the administration of religious endowments (*waqf*).
(11) Advancing the general development in social and religious life.[47]

These tasks very clearly echo Fathurrahman's announcement of 1946. The first point is updated, placing the first principle of *Pancasila* as the newly explicit mainstay of ministry activities. Points 2 and 6 are minor evolutions from the previous version (numbers 2 and 9, respectively). Points number 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 appear to be verbatim repetitions of the earlier document (numbers 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 5, respectively). Other tasks from Fathurrahman's list have been curiously removed, including the administration of pilgrimage (which had been suspended during the revolution, but was starting again), holidays, and training for religious education personnel. Notably, the new document says nothing about religions outside of Islam and Christianity, which had received special attention in 1946.

The 1949 regulation also gives the most detailed picture of the structure of the ministry during the revolution era. At the central headquarters, there are eight sections (Secretariat; Religious Officials, Mosques, Endowments, and Religious Courts; Religious Education; Information and Communication; Protestant Affairs; Roman Catholic Affairs; Personnel; and Finance). The ministry then extended to the provincial, district, and even subdistrict level to oversee and administer things like religious endowments, marriages, and religious education. The only two non-Islamic sections are both Christian, and these are seen as separate from fields such as religious education, information, and religious officials – clearly general thinking about the ministry was very normatively

[47] Koesnodiprodjo, ed., *Himpunan 1949*, 134. This translation has been informed by Ichwan, "Official Reform of Islam," 71, and van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 226–227.

Islamic. Given the description of tasks at the lower levels that required particular religious knowledge to conduct oversight, the bureaucracy was also well-suited to be filled with religious functionaries, rather than the Dutch-educated clerks common in other government departments.

Conclusion: Importance of the Ministry

For the Islamic community, the creation of the Ministry of Religion was an important victory for two reasons. First, on a theoretical level, it confirmed the principle that religious affairs should not be entirely separated from governance in Indonesia. This ministry was a major step in the new independent government inserting itself into religious affairs. The registration and standardization of Islamic marriages is the prime example of legislation in this era, but the government was now able to look at alms and tithing, religious endowments, and standardizing other aspects of Islamic law and practice across the archipelago.[48] Moch. Nur Ichwan has identified the Ministry of Religion's ability to influence Muslim communities through the regulation of religious life as the "Official Reform of Islam"[49] and argued that the Indonesian Ministry of Religion, like its colonial predecessors, was "in the service of the state, rather than in the service of religion."[50] Although this became true after the end of the Sukarno era, it was not true during the revolution. To the contrary, the ministry did serve religion, in particular orthodox Muslim ulama. No one social organization had consolidated control over the ministry in this period, but the patronage available here would later be a point of serious contestation between the mass organizations Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.[51]

This was a change from previous eras. For the first time in centuries, ulama had access to government power to implement their understanding of Islam, imposing their own version of orthodoxy and sidelining what they saw as syncretism but not necessarily buttressing state power.[52] While the Dutch Office of Native Affairs had taken it upon itself to evaluate and define what should be seen as "true" or "correct" Islam for the peoples of the Indies, its leadership was Dutch and Christian

[48] For more detail on these points, see Fogg, "The Fate of Muslim Nationalism," 144–153.
[49] Ichwan, "Official Reform of Islam," 7ff.
[50] Ichwan, "Official Reform of Islam," 66. Cf., van Nieuwenhuijze's idea about the ministry as a propaganda tool to control the minds of citizens, in van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 242.
[51] Fealy, "Ulama and Politics in Indonesia," 104–105.
[52] Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 220.

rather than Southeast Asian and Muslim.[53] Placing Muslim leaders back in charge of defining what was "true" or "correct" for the practice of religion was a clear victory for Islamic interests.[54] Indeed, the complaints of Christians in the 1950s about the ministry's lack of support for their religious activities was an exact inverse from the situation twenty years earlier.[55]

Just as much as the government (in its new ulama functionaries) inserted itself into religious affairs, religious functionaries also used the Ministry of Religion to insert themselves into various government affairs. The new requirement for religious education in all state schools demonstrates how the Islamic bloc successfully pushed more religious content onto the independent state. The boundary line between religious matters and state matters was thoroughly blurred.

The second major victory for Islamic leaders in the creation of a Ministry of Religion was the newfound ability to provide government patronage to Islamic leaders. Islamic organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah could provide guaranteed salaries for their members by getting them appointed as local religious officials or religious teachers in state schools or by subsidizing their Islamic schools through the ministry. The importance of this opportunity is suggested by the raw size of the Ministry of Religion in future years. By 1971, the Ministry of Religion was the second-largest ministry in Indonesia, with 159,646 employees. This put it only 3,000 employees behind the Ministry of Education, which included all public school teachers,[56] and four times larger than the next largest ministry (the Ministry of Health, which had only 40,000 employees in 1971).[57] From the beginning, the Ministry of Religion took charge of registering all marriages and began appointing general-service religious officials for every district, generating plenty of patronage posts.

The Ministry of Religion and its local offices were an important opportunity for Islamic leaders who had been educated in *pesantren* and

[53] Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia*, 235.
[54] Menchik, *Islam and Democracy*, 81.
[55] Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 232 n. 1.
[56] Partai Nasional Indonesia, which held a lock on the Ministry of Education and Culture except for the federal cabinet of 1950, reportedly used educational positions for patronage in the same way that Islamic groups used religious positions. Oral History with Burhanuddin Harahap, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1980 #1, tape 3. Although PNI's patronage politics in the Ministry of Education were contentious, there was little or no reported dissent over Islamic parties' patronage politics in the Ministry of Religion. Oral History with Burhanuddin Harahap, tape 6; Asbiran Aswad, "Tindjauan Dalam Negeri," *Suara Masjumi* tahun XI, 2 (January 10, 1956): 2–3.
[57] H. Bachtiar, "Bureaucracy and Nation Formation in Indonesia," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde* 128, 4 (1972), 444–445.

in Islamic sciences but who were not adept at modern, Western-style bureaucracy. However, Western-educated Islamic leaders were rising elsewhere, specifically within the ranks of the Masjumi party. The new faces there, known as the Islamic socialists, were exactly the opposite of the type of men receiving patronage posts in this new ministry.

10 Rise of Islamic Socialists

The most prominent leader of Islamic politics after the war was Mohammad Natsir, who became the first prime minister of united, postrevolutionary Indonesia in August 1950. And yet, as the 1951 book *Who's Who* stated in his profile, "Before the war not many people knew who he was. … Moh. Natsir was not someone who stood out at the forefront of things; not someone who drew one's attention."[1] Although he was the head of a party by 1949 and head of government in 1950, he had neither been in organizational leadership nor even in the parliament at the moment of proclamation in 1945. How was it, then, that Natsir and several other young leaders like him – Western educated, and with a particular ideology of governance – rose so quickly to the top of Islamic politics and government in the short span of the revolution?

Over the course of the Indonesian revolution from 1945 to 1949, a major shift occurred in the Masjumi leadership. Whereas at the beginning, the top leadership comprised men who had been politically active before and during the Japanese occupation, the most visible leaders at the end of the revolution were younger faces who had become politically prominent only after independence. Their names were inscribed in history as prime ministers, cabinet members, party leaders, diplomats, and public figures: Mohammad Natsir, Mohamad Roem, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Abu Hanifah, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, and Burhanuddin Harahap.[2]

For many of them of them, including future prime ministers Natsir and Burhanuddin, they had risen to prominence in government before being added to the Masjumi leadership. This pattern of ascent in the party is counterintuitive – one would expect the leading representatives

[1] Tjiptoning, *Apa dan Siapa* (Jogjakarta: Kedaulatan Rakjat, 1951), 33.

[2] Others sometimes associated with the Islamic Socialists are Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, Mohammad Sardjan, Jusuf Wibisono, and Kasman Singodimedjo. It is important to note, though, that Islamic Socialists remained only a subset – albeit a very powerful and prominent subset – of Masjumi's Western-educated leaders and activists.

of the party in the government to be leaders within the party first – but this counterintuitive pattern was fairly consistent for this new group of leaders. They also subscribed to a political ideology combining the social concerns of the political left with the religious concerns of the political right. These men were labeled "religious socialists" by George Kahin, and the term stuck.[3] Because they included only Muslims, however, and not Christians, Hindus, or Buddhists with similar views on politics and economics, the term "Islamic Socialists" seems more appropriate. This also connects more cleanly with a common point of discussion in the writings of these men; invariably their books from the 1940s and 1950s had a section titled "*Islam dan sosialisme*."

In some ways, the emergence of a form of Islamic socialism as a prominent ideology in Indonesia at this time proves no surprise. As a rule, all parties in Indonesian politics were leaning left during the revolution.[4] Furthermore, the early Islamic political organizations in Indonesia – most notably Sarekat Islam – had also looked at socialist ideals when drawing up their platforms.[5] However, the heir to Sarekat Islam, PSII, had shifted away from Islamic socialism to being a pan-Islamic party in the 1930s, in the context of distancing itself from secular nationalists like Sukarno.[6] Furthermore, the conditions in the Islamic community at the start of the revolution gave no hint that this might come about. Masjumi's first board was led by older, more conservative hands, with many *pesantren*-educated members to balance out the Western-educated elite. The Islamic Socialists, then, were a new trajectory for the Islamic movement when they rose, even if they fit within the broader trends of Indonesian society and the longer arc of Islamic politics in Indonesia.

With their meteoric rise, the Islamic Socialists had a huge impact on the later developments of Islamic politics in Indonesia, but their rise has gone largely unquestioned by scholars. Previous works have not noticed the peculiar path to power of this group within Masjumi and the government, instead taking it for granted that the party's leadership and program would trend in this direction.[7] Chronicling the Islamic Socialists'

[3] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 156. The term continued to be used, including by members of the group; see Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution*, 161–162.

[4] George McT. Kahin, "The Impact of American Foreign Policy," in David Bourchier and John Legge, eds., *Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s* (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), 64.

[5] Kevin W. Fogg, "Indonesian Islamic Socialism and Its South Asian Roots," *Modern Asian Studies*, forthcoming.

[6] Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 50–51.

[7] E.g., Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*; Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents*, 69–70; and even Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*.

rise and questioning their ideology reveal how new the group was and how it impacted the Islamic movement more broadly.

Background of the Islamic Socialists

Prior to the Islamic Socialists who came to power during the revolution, several Muslim leaders in Indonesia had seriously probed the compatibility of socialism with Islam, paving the way for and influencing the next generation. H. Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, the father of Islamic politics in Indonesia and the founder of Sarekat Islam, wrote a volume on Islam and socialism in the 1920s, heavily plagiarized from South Asian thinkers.[8] Tjokroaminoto's protégé, H. Agus Salim, carried on the social legacy in Sarekat Islam even while turning the organization – and its successor, the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia – firmly against Marxist Communism.[9] In the 1940s, he acted as the "Grand Old Man" of Islamic politics and a mentor to the young Islamic Socialists by the time of the revolution.[10] Even closer in age and profile to the new generation of Islamic Socialists, and sometimes grouped with them, was Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, a specialist on lung disease trained in the Netherlands.[11] Sukiman stood out from the young guns not only because he was born about a decade earlier, but also because he had already been a leading activist in Islamic politics in the 1930s, founding the Partai Islam Indonesia as a splinter from Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia.[12] He was chosen as the first chairman of Masjumi in 1945, stayed in the leadership of the party through the 1950s, and also served as a prime minister from 1951 to 1952. Although he had some ideological congruence with the Islamic Socialists, he had several political differences with them, and he led a rival faction within the party against Natsir after the revolution.[13]

Although these older Islamic leaders were the clear predecessors, and sometimes partners, to the Islamic Socialists who rose during the revolution, they were also different in some important ways. Being already established within the body politic, their prominence during the revolution – both within Islamic politics and within government – came as no

[8] H. O. S. Cokroaminoto, *Islam dan Sosialisme* (Jakarta: Penerbit Tride, 2003); Fogg, "Indonesian Islamic Socialism."
[9] Erni Haryanti Kahfi, "Haji Agus Salim: His Role in Nationalist Movements in Indonesia during the Early Twentieth Century," Master's thesis, McGill University, 1996.
[10] Oral History with Harsono Tjokroaminoto, interviewed by Wardiningsih Surjohardjo, ANRI SL1 1982 #60, tape 11.
[11] Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution*, 189.
[12] Elson, "Disunity, Distance, Disregard," 22–24.
[13] Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, 122, 187.

surprise. Furthermore, both Agus Salim and Sukiman had traveled abroad with the Dutch empire (in colonial service or for schooling), making them more intimately familiar with and even tied to the Dutch than the later Islamic Socialists were. Finally, unlike the younger leaders, they had both come of age before Islamic politics got off the ground.

The next generation was born between 1906 and 1917, across Java and Sumatra. Many of them hailed from families already engaged at the lowest level of the colonial bureaucracy; for example, Natsir's father was a clerk in a Dutch government office,[14] Roem's father was a *lurah* (a local headman in an urban setting),[15] and Burhanuddin Harahap's father held a low position in the public prosecutor's office.[16] Connections with the Dutch colonial apparatus helped them gain access to higher education – a very rare and difficult thing for Indonesian families. The higher technical, law, and economic faculties were only established by the Dutch in the 1920s, and by 1940, only 637 indigenous Indonesians were studying in the highest level of Western education available in the Indies, out of a population of more than 60 million.[17] All the Islamic Socialists had finished at least high school (*Algemeene Middlebare School*) in the Dutch system; Roem, Sjafruddin, Prawoto, and Burhanuddin additionally studied law in Batavia (although not all were able to finish before the Japanese invasion), and Abu Hanifah was a Dutch-trained medical doctor. Many of them had also been schoolmates or been in organizations together during their studies.[18]

Schooling and close proximity to the Dutch administration made these men Western in style.[19] A 1951 profile described Natsir saying, "Truly Natsir is a pious Muslim. But he's a pious Muslim in modern form."[20] It pointed to his training in the Greek and Roman classics at Dutch-run schools and his unassuming Western-style slacks and ties – things that were unthinkable for an earlier generation of Muslim leaders. Much of Natsir's knowledge of Islamic subjects came through Orientalist writings in European languages.[21] Perhaps the most Western-oriented among this cohort was Sjafruddin Prawiranegara; while studying law in Batavia he

[14] Kahin, *Islam, Nationalism and Democracy*, 2.
[15] Oral history with Mohamad Roem, interviewed by A. Rahman Zainuddin, ANRI SL1 1981 #6, tape 1.
[16] Oral history with Burhanuddin Harahap, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1980 #1, tape 1.
[17] Justus M. van der Kroef, "Higher Education in Indonesia," *Journal of Higher Education* 26, 7 (1955): 367. The combined number of Europeans and Chinese in the system at the same time was almost equivalent.
[18] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 432.
[19] For a good discussion of this point, see Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, 25ff.
[20] Tjiptoning, *Apa dan Siapa*, 34. [21] Feener, *Muslim Legal Thought*, 85–86.

helped to found the *Unitas Studiosorum Indonesiensis*, a pro-Dutch clubhouse where they had a bar and billiards and speaking Indonesian was *verboden*.[22]

In the context of their Western educations, many of them also engaged with Islam through Western-style organizations. The key organization that drew most of these young men together, the *Jong Islamieten Bond* (Young Muslims' Union), was designed with the mission of increasing the Islamic devotion of "educated people," i.e., those who had studied in the Dutch system. Natsir, Roem, and Prawoto were all active members.[23] In 1934, Roem and another future leader of Masjumi, Jusuf Wibisono, founded a corollary organization targeting specifically university students, the *Studenten Islam Studieclub*, in which Prawoto and Burhanuddin also took part.[24] These groups promoted Islam using reasoning, modern publications, and discussion groups, but they were never very large; the *Studenten Islam Studieclub* never grew to more than 100 people.[25]

Although they were involved in elite Islamic organizations, none of these men had strong connections with Islamic mass organizations. None of them held leadership positions in NU or Muhammadiyah. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara had no Islamic organizational background whatsoever before joining Masjumi.[26] Natsir came from a background in Persatuan Islam, a small, puritanical organization in Bandung without mass backing.[27] The widest network available to these Islamic Socialists was political, in the old PSII and its offshoots where Roem and Wibisono had been active under H. Agus Salim and Sukiman; however, they did not have mass backing from their old political organization after it fractured in the 1930s.[28]

[22] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 439; oral history with Burhanuddin Harahap, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1980 #1, tape 1.
[23] Latif, *Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power*, 204–206.
[24] Oral history of Burhanuddin Harahap, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1980 #1, tape 1; Latif, *Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power*, 207–208.
[25] Latif, *Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power*, 208.
[26] He also chose never to join Muhammadiyah or Nahdlatul Ulama so as to stay out of their theological disputes; oral history of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1979 #6, tape 4.
[27] George McT. Kahin, "In Memoriam: Mohammad Natsir (1907–1993)," *Indonesia* 56 (October 1993): 160; Kahin, *Islam, Nationalism and Democracy*, chapter 2. Cf. Howard Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam* (Ithaca, NY: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1970), which called Persatuan Islam "small and loosely-knit" (8).
[28] Benda, *Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 90–91.

Rise in Government and the Party

Against this background, the rise of the Islamic Socialists in the revolution must be seen as surprising. More surprising still is that the explanation comes not from within Masjumi. The rise of key Islamic Socialists within Masjumi was caused *not* by the Islamic Socialists' original strength as a faction within the party, but rather by their selection by Socialist Party–led governments for cabinet positions. Once these men first became prominent in the Republican government, only subsequently did they become party leaders. This means that the leadership of Islamic politics in Indonesia was determined largely by an outside force: the Socialist Party of Sutan Sjahrir.

Sjahrir became prime minister when Indonesia switched to the prime ministerial system in November 1945. He went on to lead three different cabinets before he lost his mandate in July 1947 and handed the reins to his Socialist colleague Amir Sjarifuddin. In this 20-month window, Sjahrir had broad power to elevate individuals in the government. The first step into political prominence was to become a member of the national parliament (KNIP, or Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat), but the highest echelons of government at this time were the Working Committee of the parliament, a 15-member unit that met more regularly and made all decisions between rare plenary sessions, and the Cabinet – and Sjahrir had the power of appointment to all these bodies.[29]

Although the early Indonesian governments worked to represent all major factions and build unity across the spectrum of politics, the members chosen for the Working Body and the Cabinet were not necessarily the ones that the factions would have chosen as their representatives. Sjahrir's administration did not feel obliged to choose leading Masjumi candidates to be cabinet ministers, or to solicit nominations from Masjumi. Instead, Sjahrir chose Muslims and Masjumi members whom he believed would support his socialist goals and men who were not associated with Japan. As Abu Hanifah wrote, "Sjahrir was criticised for having only his nearest friends in the Cabinet; in fact the cabinet looked like a Sjahrir Club."[30] Some of the young Islamic Socialists in Masjumi attained seats in the cabinet exactly because they were "linked politically more to Sjahrir" than to any Islamic faction.[31] Three examples stand out especially: Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Mohammad Natsir, and Burhanuddin Harahap.

[29] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 152. [30] Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution*, 165.
[31] Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution*, 162. See also Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 230.

Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was appointed to the Working Committee of the KNIP in October 1945, a month before Masjumi was formed.[32] At that time, he had no affiliation with the Muslim bloc. When parties were formed in November, Sjarifuddin reported that he

> found it really difficult to decide whether to join the PSI [Indonesian Socialist Party] or Masyumi. This was because it was Syahrir and Amir Syarifuddin [two Socialist leaders] who had brought me into the executive board of the KNI [wartime parliament], so I owed them a personal debt and really should have joined the PSI. But at the same time, as a Muslim I felt this wasn't right, when I had the choice of Masyumi, an Islamic party. So in the end I chose to join Masyumi, but I retained a sympathy for the struggle and ideals of the socialists.[33]

He later told an interviewer, "Not long after I became a member of Masjumi, maybe because of my position as a Minister, I was already selected as a member of the Leadership Board" of the party.[34]

Natsir was not even a member of parliament in August 1945. He was a teacher living in Bandung, but he came down for a visit to Jakarta and stayed with a member of the KNIP who took him along for a meeting in September 1945. When the guard at the door wrote down Natsir's name for entrance, he officially became a member of the body.[35] When Masjumi was founded, he started as an untitled board member, but after the Socialists promoted him to the Working Committee in December 1945 and handpicked him for the cabinet in January 1946 (he served twice as minister of information), he moved up in the party.[36] It also helped that another outside force – Indonesian President Sukarno – was fond of Natsir and worked with him very closely throughout the revolution, especially on public pronouncements.[37] Before the end of the revolution in 1949, Natsir, a man who had not been in parliament in 1945, became head of the party.[38]

[32] Oral history of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1979 #6, tape 3.

[33] "Emergency Government: An Interview with Syafruddin Prawiranegara," in Colin Wild and Peter Carey, eds., *Born in Fire: The Indonesian Struggle for Independence* (Athens: Ohio University Press and BBC Publications, 1988), 195.

[34] Oral history of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL11979 #6, tape 3, 29:20–29:34. His qualifier "maybe" here should be taken as a form of Indonesian modesty through avoiding definitive statements, not an expression of uncertainty.

[35] Kahin, *Islam, Nationalism and Democracy*, 45–46.

[36] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 170 n. 34; Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 101.

[37] Kahin, *Islam, Nationalism and Democracy*, 53.

[38] His position as "Ketua Partai" (party head) was alongside Sukiman, who was "Presiden Partai" (party president). The division of authority between these two positions is unclear. The post of president was eliminated in 1952, when Sukiman became vice-head I. Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 102–103.

Burhanuddin Harahap did not have any leadership position in Masjumi when it was founded in November 1945, although he did have a position in a youth organization that supported Masjumi.[39] In early 1946, though, he was appointed to the Working Committee by Sjahrir. After internal Masjumi conflict over policy in 1947, he became more involved in party matters, and was elected to a leadership position in 1949.[40] By 1950, he was the party's floor leader in parliament, and he went on to become prime minister in 1955–1956.[41]

These three individuals, Sjafruddin, Natsir, and Burhanuddin, were the most prominent examples of Islamic Socialists being raised up by leaders from the Socialist Party, but Mohamad Roem's story bears similarities. Although he had been a supporting player in Islamic politics in the 1930s, Roem was not initially selected for a titled position in Masjumi because he was of the younger generation, while the first party congress had been dominated by older leaders.[42] He was pulled into major diplomatic efforts of the Socialist Party–led government starting with the Linggajati Agreement in November 1946,[43] entered the government in Sjahrir's third cabinet (1947), quickly rose to the fore of Indonesia's international negotiations, and then became second vice-head of Masjumi in 1951.[44]

Sjahrir's choices to place younger, left-leaning Islamic politicians in his cabinet did not reflect the balance of power within Masjumi, nor was Sjahrir choosing the only Masjumi candidates qualified for office. In fact, he had many other options for Islamic leaders to nominate to his cabinet who were equally qualified and who better represented powerful factions. Sukiman, the head of Masjumi, or Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, his deputy, would have been natural choices for ministerial positions; both were well educated and experienced in colonial-era politics. The selection of young, socialist-leaning Muslims reflected the cliquish nature of Sjahrir's politics,[45] the currency of youthfulness in the revolution,[46] and the

[39] Oral history with Burhanuddin Harahap, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1980 #1, tape 2.
[40] Oral history with Burhanuddin Harahap, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1980 #1, tape 1.
[41] Badruzzaman Busyairi, *Boehanoeddin Harahap: Pilar Demokrasi* (Jakarta: Panitia Buku Boerhanoeddin Harahap/Bulan Bintang, 1989), 121.
[42] Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 45 n. 4.
[43] Oral history with Mohamad Roem, interviewed by A. Rahman Zainuddin, ANRI SL1 1981 #6, tape 9.
[44] Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 102.
[45] Rudolf Mrazek, *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1994), 375.
[46] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, chapter 1.

compatibility of these Islamic Socialists' policies with those that Sjahrir wanted to pursue.[47] All these factors were external to the politics within Islamic groups and within the Masjumi at the time, and so the elevation of Natsir, Sjafruddin, Burhanuddin, and so forth in Masjumi was a reaction to developments *outside* the party in revolutionary politics.

Of course, Masjumi did not have to respond in this way to Sjahrir's selection of certain candidates from the party, either. Masjumi could have chosen to leave these individuals out of party leadership still, or even to exclude these individuals from party leadership, as the rival Partai Nasional Indonesia did with several members of the Working Committee in 1947.[48] This reaction by the party to so thoroughly embrace individuals elevated in the government also reflected the currency of Western education in politics of the time and low levels of internal conflict within the body of Masjumi in its first two years.

Islamic Socialists and the Masjumi Platform

The rise of the Islamic Socialists was important not only because of their staying power in Masjumi and national leadership well after the revolution had ended but also because it brought about a new emphasis in the party's platform. While accepting several core principles that held Masjumi together as an Islamic party, the Islamic Socialists turned policy attention toward socio-economic concerns and international affairs, making them very different from the party's rank and file.

The central tenet of Masjumi – both before and after the Islamic Socialists came to the fore – was always to uphold Islam as the ideal foundation of the state. According to Mohamad Roem's account, this concern led prominent Muslims to form Masjumi in the first place so that the idea of an Islam-based state could have a political vehicle.[49] Despite this absolute consensus, there remained a spectrum of beliefs within the party about exactly what an Islamic state should mean. The older, more conservative ulama generally pushed for the full implementation of Islamic law by the new state.[50] However, several of the Islamic

[47] This is particularly true on the subject of diplomatic negotiations with the Dutch, one of the leading issues at the time. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 166.

[48] J. Eliseo Rocamora, *Nationalism in Search of Ideology: The Indonesian Nationalist Party, 1946–1965* (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Advanced Studies, 1975), 25–27.

[49] Oral history with Mohamad Roem, interviewed by A. Rahman Zainuddin, ANRI SL1 1981 #6, tape 6. Cf. Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, ch. 5.

[50] This became especially clear after the war; Boyd R. Compton, "The Medan Ulama Conference," *Newsletter of the Institute for Current World Affairs*, August 20, 1953, www.icwa.org/articles/BRC-18.pdf (accessed November 30, 2009).

Socialists thought that it was enough for the state to profess the name of Allah and to be based on Islam; for them, going all the way to full implementation of Islamic law was desirable but not mandatory.[51] Both sides found their theoretical foundation in the Qur'an, the recorded actions of the Prophet, and examples from Islamic history.[52] Despite these differences in interpretation of the nature of an Islamic state, the whole party agreed that the government of Indonesia should be made more religious, as a way to guide the general populace to become more pious.

There were a number of other points of the general Masjumi platform that the Islamic Socialists supported wholeheartedly. A point of consensus across the political spectrum, but of particular importance to the Islamic party, was the full unity of Java and the outer islands. This reflected both an ideological position about the unity of Indonesia as a nation and a political reality that Masjumi's greatest strengths lay beyond Java and Bali. It also reflected a belief that a strong national system (rather than a federal system) would protect Islamic prerogatives even in non-Muslim-majority regions.[53] The Islamic Socialists also toed the party line on women's issues, clearly supporting women's rights while still holding to ideas of complementarianism between the sexes.[54] The Islamic Socialists joined the party generally in supporting private property rights, including those of foreign owners, more staunchly than any other party in Indonesia, reflecting the interests of both the traders and the rural ulama (often listed as large landholders) in Masjumi.[55]

Beyond these points of agreement with Masjumi's mainstream, the Islamic Socialists had several points of sharp divergence. Unlike the party leaders educated in traditional Islamic institutions, the Islamic Socialists had an international orientation both in policy and in style. In policy, they emphasized engagement with the wider world in diplomacy and education,[56] and they took seriously the developments of the United

[51] Harun Nasution, "The Islamic State in Indonesia: The Rise of the Ideology, the Movement for Its Creation and the Theory of Masjumi," MA thesis, McGill University, 1965, 141ff; Abu Hanifah, *Kita Berdjoang*, 157; Prawiranegara, *Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia*, 52.

[52] Noer, "Masjumi," 67.

[53] Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution*, 330; "Masjoemi Soelawesi Membongkar Idee Perpetjahan," *Lasjkar*, December 16, 1946.

[54] Abu Hanifah, *Kita Berdjoang*, 124–45; Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, 352–53; Susan Blackburn, "Indonesian Women and Political Islam," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 39, 1 (2008): 93–94.

[55] Prawiranegara, *Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia*, 33; Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 84; Hans Schmitt, "Post-Colonial Politics: A Suggested Interpretation of the Indonesian Experience," *The Australian Journal of Politics and History* 2, 9 (1963): 179.

[56] Prawiranegara, *Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia*, 54.

Nations and other international bodies.[57] Even during the chaos of the revolution, their writings showed attention to such topics as the treatment of minority races in the United States, Australia, and South Africa;[58] the victories of the Chinese Communist Party;[59] Turkish governmental reforms;[60] and the established church in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden (as models of religion-state synthesis).[61]

These men were also internationally oriented in their style. Their writing relied heavily on Dutch cognates, or even neologisms drawn from the Western canon, such as *donquichotterie*.[62] Both Abu Hanifah and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara quoted Shakespeare in their works, with the latter enjoining his readers to "Remember Shylock!" when considering European capitalist systems – a task that must have been quite hard for most of them, as Sjafruddin was probably one of very few Indonesians who knew about this fictional moneylender.[63] Among the Islamic Socialists, Mohammad Natsir engaged most deeply with the classical Islamic heritage, citing Ibn Sina, Ibn Tufail, and Ibn Rushd, and incorporating plentiful quotes from the Qur'an and Prophetic traditions in Arabic. Even he, however, also considered the works of Leibnitz and Kant for comparison.[64] None of this was standard fare in the sort of theological or motivational tracts other Islamic leaders were producing in this period.

This international orientation may have caused one of the prominent policy divergences for the Islamic Socialists from both the rural base and the clerical wing of the party: the question of negotiations with the Dutch to end the conflict. Older politicians and rural ulama leaned more heavily toward armed struggle and victory on the battlefield as the proper way to solve the dispute and show God's power at work.[65] The Islamic Socialists preferred to engage in negotiations, hoping to find a quicker solution that would be still beneficial to the Indonesians.[66] Connected to their belief in negotiations to seek an end to the conflict, Islamic Socialists took key

[57] Zainal Abidin Ahmad, *Kemerdekaan Indonesia dan Islam* (Bukittinggi: Poestaka Negara, 1946), 21–23; St. Rais Alamsjah, *Sepuluh Orang Indonesia Terbesar Sekarang* (Bukittinggi: Mutiara, 1952), 63; Abu Hanifah, *Kita Berdjoang*, 187.

[58] Prawiranegara, *Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia*, 23.

[59] Jusuf Wibisono, *Islam dan Sosialisme*, 2nd ed. (Jakarta: Pustaka Islam, 1950), vol. I, 4.

[60] Mohd. Natsir, *Islam dan Akal Merdeka* (Tasikmalaja: Persatuan Islam, bagian Penerangan, 1947), 15.

[61] Abu Hanifah, *Soal Agama*, 23–25.

[62] Prawiranegara, *Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia*, 17. The most appropriation of Dutch terms can be found in Jusuf Wibisono, *Islam dan Sosialisme*.

[63] Prawiranegara, *Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia*, 24. Abu Hanifah, *Soal Agama*, 3, takes its epigraph from *Hamlet*: "There are more things on heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

[64] Natsir, *Islam dan Akal Merdeka*, 12, 19.

[65] Noer, "Masjumi," 65.

[66] Abu Hanifah, *Kita Berdjoang*, 171; Prawiranegara, *Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia*, 57.

roles in cabinets that engaged in negotiations, and Mohamad Roem, especially, was at the forefront of diplomatic efforts with the Dutch.[67]

Islamic Socialists' willingness to negotiate with the Dutch seemed to be rooted mostly in their close political alliance with the Indonesian Socialist Party. Of course, the Islamic Socialists were also close to other political blocs, such as non-Socialist Christian leaders including Dr. Leimena and Tambunan.[68] More important, though, was that several of the Islamic Socialist leaders felt personally obliged to Sutan Sjahrir for promoting them within government, and several also had long-standing ties to his more radical colleague Amir Sjarifuddin, who got on less well with Muslims generally.[69] The strongest connection was between Mohammad Natsir and Sutan Sjahrir. The two may have had some family connection; both Natsir's wife and Sjahrir were from the Natal region of West Sumatra, and Natsir's children always called Sjahrir "uncle."[70] They also shared similar demeanors, social and economic outlooks, and personal circles.[71] This connection between the Islamic Socialists in Masjumi and Sjahrir's Indonesian Socialist Party would last until both parties were disbanded in 1960.

One reason for aligning with the Socialist Party was the major distinction of the Islamic Socialists within Masjumi. They believed in a socio-economic program that combined religious beliefs and social justice priorities. The Islamic Socialists wrote that Islam had both the strong moral principles to organize society and the deep compassion for the disadvantaged that were necessary for a downtrodden society as found in Indonesia.[72] This new generation wanted to meet people's material needs, but also go beyond this, as Sjafruddin Prawiranegara explained: "While admitting the fact that human beings need to eat, drink, marry, and have a home in order to live, that does not necessarily mean that human beings live *only* to eat, drink, marry, and have homes."[73] Practicing Islam was certainly the ends but also the means to achieve their political vision for Indonesian society; if the working class lived and struggled in accordance with the teachings of the Qur'an, it would improve their fate.[74]

[67] Alamsjah, *Sepuluh Orang Indonesia Terbesar Sekarang*, 56–63.
[68] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 157.
[69] Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution*, 44, 213.
[70] Interview with Ir. Achmad Fauzie Natsir, August 1, 2009, Cinere, Depok.
[71] Kahin, *Islam, Nationalism and Democracy*, 53.
[72] Oral history with Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, tape 3; Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution*, 64, 69, 161–162, 188, 213.
[73] Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, *Politik dan Revolusi Kita*, 2nd ed. (Medan: Andalas, [1948?]), 19–20.
[74] Wibisono, *Islam dan Sosialisme*, vol. II, 29.

The Islamic Socialists' platform mirrored standard socialist programs but with some distinct and Islamically guided limitations. Their program for Masjumi included guaranteeing the life and livelihood of the Indonesian masses. They promoted the obligation for employers to provide sick leave, pensions, and "social payments" to employees to support the economic and social welfare of workers, although unlike most socialists they limited the right to strike.[75] While upholding the sanctity of private property in Islam, Sjafruddin made it clear that Islamic Socialists were open to nationalization of industries, but only certain ones that were truly necessary for the good of the people and only after appropriate consultations.[76] They also wanted to limit the excesses of capitalism and to "fight for the right to live fully for our common people, called the laborers or farmers," aiming for a time when each individual in society would have "Economic Freedom" and not just national or religious freedom.[77]

In this platform, the Islamic Socialists had certain commonalities with the leftist movement more broadly. In the words of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara,

> Social justice, which is one of the goals and aspirations of the ideology of Marxism, is also a guideline for Islam. Progress and high standards of living for the poor community, the oppressed community and those oppressed by all the harshness of the capitalists, these are also aspirations of Islam. It is an obligation for all Muslims to help and aid the weak, poor, and oppressed. Islam also, like Marxism, recognizes the presence of groups or classes within society.[78]

At the same time, the Islamic Socialists were uncompromising in their utter rejection of any overall compatibility between Marxism and Islam. No topic gets so much attention in the writings of Islamic Socialists as the rejection of Marxist Communism.[79] The Masjumi authors rooted a small part of their rejection in "conflicting understandings on methods and guidelines."[80] The greater issue, and the one that took most of the attention, was the atheism of Marx and Marxist socialism or communism; this was something that the Islamic politicians could not brook. Railing against atheism and the false ideology of religion as "opiate of the masses," Abu Hanifah, Jusuf Wibisono, and Sjafruddin

[75] *Pedoman Perjuangan Masjumi*, 2nd ed. (Jakarta: Pimpinan Partai Masjumi Bagian Keuangan, 1955), 68–69, 55; Abu Hanifah, *Kita Berdjoang*, 60.
[76] Prawiranegara, *Politik dan Revolusi Kita*, 42.
[77] Abu Hanifah, *Kita Berdjoang*, 46.
[78] Prawiranegara, *Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia*, 13; Jusuf Wibisono wrote almost exactly the same points in *Islam and Sosialisme*, II, 23–24.
[79] Prawiranegara, *Politik dan Revolusi Kita*, 10–15, 39–48; Wibisono, *Islam dan Sosialisme*, II, 22–47; Abu Hanifah, *Soal Agama*, 28–45.
[80] Wibisono, *Islam dan Sosialisme*, II, 30.

Prawiranegara all insisted in their revolutionary writings that no Muslim or Christian could truly be a Communist.[81]

By the end of the revolution, when national conditions were stable enough for Masjumi to adopt a full policy platform, the document was authored by an Islamic Socialist and largely reflected this group's thinking.[82] Thus, the ascent of the Islamic Socialists was evident not only in personnel but also in ideology.

Conclusion

By 1951, the year of the first Masjumi congress after the dust of the revolution had settled, Islamic Socialists and their allies held all six of the titled leadership positions of Masjumi, and two more Islamic Socialists sat among the nine party board members.[83] The group had come to dominate the party, and set the tone for Islamic politics more broadly, by the period of political Islam's greatest strength in government, the early 1950s.

The swift rise of Islamic Socialists had several consequences during the revolution, in the immediate aftermath, and in the long term. During the revolution, they changed the policy direction of the party and its political allies. Although this was less notable for social programs (which could not be carried out under emergency conditions), the support of Islamic Socialists for negotiations was critical for Indonesian governments choosing this route, which eventually led to the settlement with the Dutch. The fact that the Socialists had lifted up the Masjumi leaders who eventually lent them political cover on diplomatic negotiations should not be forgotten.

Other consequences during the revolution and the immediate aftermath are less apparent but still significant. How might the rise of the Islamic Socialists' have impacted other, more seasoned leaders in Islamic politics, often with larger mass followings? Unlike the carefully balanced leadership boards appointed in 1945, the Islamic Socialists were less representative of the Muslim public. Especially because they were young, Western educated, and supported by outsiders, it would have been easy for PSII and NU leaders (consciously or unconsciously) to resent them

[81] Wibisono, *Islam dan Sosialisme*, II, 11; Abu Hanifah, *Kita Berdjoang*, 154–155; Prawiranegara, *Politik dan Revolusi Kita*, 10.

[82] *Pedoman Perjuangan Masjumi*. This document seems to have been authored by Jusuf Wibisono.

[83] Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 102. The titled leaders were Sukiman, Kasman Singodimedjo, Jusuf Wibisono, Mohammad Natsir, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, and Mohamad Roem. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Abu Hanifah sat on the board.

for their meteoric rise. Both of these groups left Masjumi, breaking the unity of Islamic politics and causing further alienation between the new, Islamic Socialist leadership of the party and the Muslim grassroots.

In the long run, the greatest impact of the Islamic Socialist group was in their ideology. The new policy direction they introduced during the revolution – pointing toward social justice and an international, later pro-Western orientation for Islamic politics – would remain in force through the 1980s and arguably beyond. Thus, this group of young, Western-educated Muslim leaders made prominent through the help of an outside party, was critical to the evolution of Islam and state in Indonesia.

11 Regional Islamic Parties

While divisions grew at the center of politics between old and new guard, traditionalist and reformist, or political versus theological, a different split emerged regionally. Although Masjumi intended to be the sole representative of Islamic interests in the political sphere, its growth across the archipelago was not entirely smooth. Where it was unable to spread because of wartime conditions, or where Masjumi leaders engendered hostility from other Islamic leaders, other groups soon emerged. These groups reflect not only the regional diversity of Indonesia but also the inability of certain regions to communicate with one another and coordinate their programs throughout the revolution.

Regional divisions in Indonesian politics were also connected to the difference between the national political leadership and the Muslims fighting for independence on the ground. Regional political leaders were, of course, the middlemen who (in Masjumi's ideal vision) could have connected the two very disparate ends of the Islamic movement during the revolution, but the gaping divide between national politics and local fighting prevented them from effectively bridging the two. Looking at how Islamic parties grew across Indonesia during the revolution, one sees the importance of local conditions in the revolutionary experience: individual actions, provincial concerns, and limited geographic connectivity directed these developments. Although some of the concerns reflected those at the political center – issues like Islamic law and the place of religion in the state – the methods and answers varied because of regional differences.

Masjumi's Geographic Expansion

After Muslim leaders came together in Yogyakarta to found Masjumi as a political party in November 1945, they then had to spread the news of this party throughout the archipelago for it to form local branches and become the force that they had envisioned. Because of the chaos of the revolution, this process was slow and sporadic. The initial concern was

establishing a Masjumi outpost in all regions of the archipelago; after entering a region, Masjumi did not have an active program from its national headquarters to facilitate the spread of the party into all levels of Islamic society within that area.

On Java, the transition from the Japanese-sponsored social organization Masjoemi into the political party Masjumi on the local level was fairly straightforward. Because most of the delegates at the party's founding conference came from Java, news of the party spread quickly. The old social organization quickly morphed into a political party; the only changes involved personnel on a local level to accommodate for the new political mission.[1]

On Sumatra, Masjumi spread haphazardly at first, but by the end of the revolution it was widely known and followed. Of course, the Japanese-sponsored social organization Masjoemi did not exist outside Java, so it could not function as a platform for the new party, but there was another organization that served a similar purpose. In West Sumatra, the Japanese had established the Majelis Islam Tinggi (MIT, or High Islamic Council) during their occupation, and before the Japanese surrender this organization had begun to expand into other regions. A December 1945 meeting in Bukittinggi (the organization's headquarters) recommissioned the MIT as a political party, but in February and March of the following year the branches of this new party slowly declared themselves for Masjumi, and soon the separate MIT-based party was dissolved.[2] In South Sumatra, people had heard of and begun to follow Masjumi by mid-1946.[3]

In the parts of Indonesia most distant from Java, Masjumi as a political party was even slower to spread. This seems to have been especially true in East Indonesia, which the Dutch had separated militarily from the rest of the territory early in the revolution.[4] As of 1948, only two branches were set up in this region: at Makassar and Gorontalo.[5] The southeastern archipelago of Nusa Tenggara did not see Masjumi form during the revolution; instead an entirely social Islamic organization called Persit emerged on Timor.[6] The Muslims of the Moluccas were equally

[1] See, e.g., Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution*, 169ff and 188.
[2] Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 85.
[3] Maksum et al., *Musyawaratuththalibin*, 62; interview with M. Thahir Azhari, Ciputat, January 17, 2010; interview with K. H. M. Zen Syukri, Palembang, June 7, 2010.
[4] East Indonesia had also been under the separate administration of the Japanese Navy during the Japanese occupation period.
[5] ANRI RA6, Sekretariat Negara RI, 1945–1949, #476.
[6] I Ketut Ardhana, *Penataan Nusa Tenggara pada Masa Kolonial, 1915–1950* (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 2005), 377.

ignorant of the Islamic politics in the center. One of them, a certain Husain bin Alie in Tidore, North Maluku, wrote to K. Taufiqurachman (a Masjumi leader and high-ranking bureaucrat in the Ministry of Religion) in October 1948 asking about Islam in the Republic's government. K. Taufiqurachman wrote back, explaining from scratch the nature of the party and the position of the party's leaders in government. Taufiqurachman then invited Husain bin Alie to join and thus finally expand the party to the Moluccas.[7]

Wherever local Muslims established new Masjumi branches outside of Java, the local groups had a theological, rather than political, nature. Put another way, the theological leaders of Indonesia's Islamic mass organizations saw more of their brothers become members and leaders of Masjumi's provincial branches; there were few or no Western-trained Islamic politicians in the regions who would have been inclined to imitate the Islamic socialism emanating from the party's headquarters. Because theological leaders carried the torch of the party on the provincial level, old theological divisions could create dissension and threaten the unity of Masjumi as an umbrella party. This was precisely the case in West Sumatra, where the party had been spread by reformist, Muhammadiyah-aligned leaders like Syekh M. Djamil Djambek – the only leader based outside of Java among Masjumi's announced leaders in 1945. The Muhammadiyah's old rivals, local theological traditionalists, organized themselves into a new political party, rivaling Masjumi.

Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti)

That party was called Perti, the first Islamic party to emerge outside Masjumi. This group declared itself a political party in December 1945, just weeks after Masjumi, but its roots go back much further.

In 1928, facing an increasingly strong network of Islamic reformist schools, the Islamic traditionalists of West Sumatra felt they needed to band together to stand up for the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence.[8] A group of traditionalist Islamic scholars created a network for their own schools, called *Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah* (the Islamic Educational Union), commonly abbreviated "Perti," and in 1930 they made a modern-style organization out of this network. The organization was,

[7] ANRI RA6, Sekretariat Negara RI, 1945–1949, #476.

[8] The conflict between reformist (sometimes called "modernist") and traditionalist groups in West Sumatra is explained well in Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement*; Rais, *Against Islamic Modernism*; and Hamka, *Ajahku: Riwajat Hidup Dr. H. Abd. Karim Amrullah* (Jakarta: Djajamurni, 1967).

according to its own reckoning, "a social movement, working to advance education and teaching in religion and generally, to help the poor, to encourage mutual aid, etc."[9] Besides being a major social force in West Sumatra, it was also a nascent political force at the end of Dutch colonialism. It was, in fact, important enough that the Dutch included a Perti representatives in the Visman Commission of 1941 that weighed self-governance for the Dutch East Indies; on the commission, Perti strongly supported not only self-government for the Indies but furthermore Islamic government, with the head of the government required to be Muslim and Islam enshrined in the constitution.[10] As of 1945, the organization had, by its own tally, more than 350 affiliated schools, and 400,000 members, almost exclusively on Sumatra and mostly in the Minangkabau ethnic homeland.[11]

Upon hearing about Mohammad Hatta's call on November 5, 1945, to create political parties, the organization's leadership called a plenary meeting of the leadership on November 22, which was followed by the organization's fourth congress on December 24–26, 1945, in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. At these meetings, members and leaders officially endorsed the move to become a political party: *Partai Politik Islam Perti* (the Perti Islamic Political Party). They also changed the meaning of Perti: whereas before it had stood for the Islamic Education Union, the abbreviation henceforth was to stand for the Islamic Education Movement, emphasizing practical activity.[12] The party's ideological foundation was "the Islamic religion in its law and rituals according to Imam Shafi'i's school of jurisprudence and following the determinations of the Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah school."[13] Although they did not put forward a full political program until 1950, Perti did include five broad goals in their founding document – but most of them were social rather than political goals:

1. Deepen the feeling of love toward religion, nation, and homeland.
2. Intensify the spread and defense of the Islamic religion.
3. Defend the independence of the nation and State of Indonesia.

[9] Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, *Kepartaian di Indonesia* ([Jakarta]: Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1951), 72.
[10] Koto, *Pemikiran Politik PERTI*, 106.
[11] Koto, *Pemikiran Politik PERTI*, 45. Perti's organization also extended up into Aceh and down into South Sumatra, but without nearly as large a following as it held in West Sumatra at this time.
[12] *Kepartaian di Indonesia*, 72. From meaning "Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah," the name became "Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah."
[13] *Kepartaian di Indonesia*, 73; Koto, *Pemikiran Politik PERTI*, 175.

4. Advance the teaching, studying, and intelligence of the people.
5. Advance the economy and work toward the prosperity of the people.[14]

At the birth of Perti as a political party, then, it basically looked like a social organization, precisely as it was before independence. It had not added a political aspect to its program, and it did not enter national politics (or even provincial politics) in a meaningful way until after the revolution was over. It seems that Perti's switch to become a political party followed what its leaders understood to be the direction of the day, toward politicization, without a strong understanding of what that direction meant.

Given that the leaders wanted to become political, the greatest question coming out of the founding of Perti is why the group did not join the Masjumi party. The answer to this question is never entirely clear in party documents or memoirs because the issue of Masjumi is often avoided or omitted. One can only point to a few speculative causes based on the background of Perti and the party's actions in the following decade.

First, the traditionalist ulama who founded Perti as an organization and converted it into a political party did not trust the leaders of Masjumi. Those national Masjumi leaders originating from Sumatra were generally aligned with the reformist theological camp (such as Mohammad Natsir and Burhanuddin Harahap), thus meriting theological distrust. Worse yet, the leading Masjumi representative on Sumatra was Syekh M. Djamil Djambek, the reformist scholar and leader in Bukittinggi and the archenemy of Perti's traditionalists.[15] The foremost traditionalists in the organization were Javanese, from Nahdlatul Ulama. It is likely that Perti's leadership did not trust that their political positions would be represented well by these groups.

Second, and probably just as important, it seems that the leaders of Perti sought higher political office by founding their own party. Even if they had lined up on policy with the leadership of Masjumi, which did happen, for example, on the point of desiring Islamic law to come into force as Indonesian law,[16] Perti's leaders hoped to gain national prominence and powerful positions by driving their own, separate political vehicle.[17]

The third answer to the question, and perhaps the most important on the ground in 1945, was structural. During World War II, Sumatra was

[14] *Kepartaian di Indonesia*, 73; Koto, *Pemikiran Politik PERTI*, 176.
[15] On his enmity with the traditionalists, see Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement*, 36ff.
[16] Koto, *Pemikiran Politik PERTI*, 186.
[17] This seems to follow the pattern of political party splits in Indonesia today, where conflict arises more often over personnel and positions than substantive policy issues. It also foreshadows the reasons for the exit of PSII from Masjumi; see Chapter 12.

administered by the Japanese 25th Army out of Singapore, totally separate in its administration from Java, which was under the 16th Army.[18] Islamic groups on Sumatra were not folded into the Japanese-sponsored Masjoemi religious organization created on Java; Perti never became involved in the cooperative programs between Java's traditionalist and reformist Islamic groups that occurred under Masjoemi auspices. Having never been a subsidiary of Masjoemi, Perti was reluctant to become one when the social-religious group transformed into the political party Masjumi in November 1945. It seemed more natural to the Minangkabau leaders to form their own political party than to join one that had already been formed in their absence.

Seen in this light, why did other Islamic social-cultural-religious organizations outside of Java, such as Jamiyatul Washliyah in North Sumatra, Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh (PUSA) in Aceh, and Musjawarattuthalibin in Banjarmasin, choose not to form their own political parties during the revolution? In fact, to the contrary, these organizations chose between 1945 and 1949 to become subsidiaries of Masjumi. Some of these groups had not weathered the Japanese era very well, such as Musjawaratutthalibin, and so were in no position to reconstitute themselves as religious organizations, much less as political parties.[19] For groups like PUSA and Jamiyatul Washliyah, the perceived ideological difference must have been much less of a challenge because neither came out of a traditionalist environment that sharply conflicted with reformists. Thus it was that Masjumi was able to carry the banner of the vast majority of Indonesia's Muslims for its first several years of existence, with only Perti emerging as a rival Islamic party.

There were two key consequences to the establishment of Perti as a separate party in 1945. First, of course, was the politicization of Perti, which remained a political party until 1970 and a faction within the official Muslim party of the 1970s–1990s, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, through the end of the New Order.[20] The second consequence was setting a precedent, however small at the time, for having more than one Islamic party in the field in Indonesia. This created an opening that

[18] Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 13.

[19] Musjawaratutthalibin was a group very similar to Perti, founded in 1931 by traditionalist students in South Kalimantan. See Maksum et al., *Musyawaratuththalibin*, 17. The organization was banned and persecuted under the Japanese (Maksum et al., *Musyawaratuththalibin*, 48), and after the proclamation of independence, rather than reconstitute Musjawaratutthalibin, the former leaders and members declared their support for Masjumi in 1946 (Maksum et al., *Musyawaratuththalibin*, 62) and many then affiliated themselves to other mass organizations that were "extraordinary members" of Masjumi.

[20] Interview with Jamaluddin Batubara, Medan, October 26, 2009.

would later be used to split Masjumi with the departure of PSII.[21] It should be emphasized, though, that Perti was not a prominent force in politics, certainly not in national politics, and perhaps Masjumi saw it as a regional party likely to integrate itself into Masjumi after the chaos of the revolution had ended, like other regional parties. Mohammad Natsir, the leader of Masjumi after the revolution, certainly did not feel threatened by the existence of Perti; he presided over the commissioning of their *Laskar Muslim Indonesia* and *Laskar Muslimaat* (Indonesian Muslim Troops and Female Muslim Troops) militias in Bukittinggi during his visit with a cabinet delegation in March 1946.[22] In any case, Perti started as a small, rather unimportant exception to Masjumi's unitarianism, as evidenced by the fact that leading observers were sometimes unaware of its existence.[23]

Regional Political Islam Facing Federalism

Not all regional Islamic interests wanted to found rivals to Masjumi, and yet they sometimes did not or could not join Masjumi. In Dutch-occupied areas, especially in regions that had been quickly reconquered after 1945, affiliating with national organizations was often prohibited, leading to other solutions. The Dutch were attempting to set up puppet states in several regions of Indonesia to become constituent members of a federal version of Indonesia, which they believed would be easier for the Netherlands to control.[24] Islamic efforts through local politics were part of the resistance to that idea.[25]

In Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan, in 1946 locals created an Islamic party, the *Serikat Muslimin Indonesia* (Sermi, Union of Indonesian Muslims), to oppose the creation of a federal state on Borneo as separate from and counterweight to the Republic of Indonesia.[26] Although founded by Islamic leaders, the idea seems to have come from secular counterparts in the *Serikat Kerakjatan Indonesia* (SKI, or Indonesian

[21] See Chapter 12.
[22] Syamsul Madi, "Partai Politik Islam di Sumatera Barat, 1945–1949," Skripsi S1, Fakultas Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial, Universitas Negeri Padang, 2000, 28.
[23] See, e.g., van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 164, where he lists only Masjumi and PSII as functioning Islamic parties. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, also makes no mention of Perti.
[24] Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 110.
[25] Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 108.
[26] Artum Artha, *Sejarah Kota Bandjarmasin* (Bandjarmasin: Museum Bandjar Lambung Mangkurat, 1970), 19; Maksum et al., *Musyawaratuththalibin*, 4; *Kepartaian di Indonesia*, 231; ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta, 1949–1950, #176; Ideham et al., *Sejarah Banjar*, 416.

Popular Union); the two parties also worked closely together through the end of the revolution in opposition to Dutch federalist politics.[27] Sermi's goal was "the foundation of a Unitary State of Indonesia (based on politics and religion)." Among Sermi's members was the very popular Col. Hassan Basri, a devout Muslim who served as the regional leader of the Indonesian national military (TNI) and the broader anti-Dutch fight in South Kalimantan.[28] Although Sermi was aware of developments of the nationalist Muslim party Masjumi on Java, the Dutch prohibited it from using national names for its local organization. Still, Sermi was unambiguously intended as a local version of Masjumi, "until, in the end, Sermi here became Masjumi" after the revolution, according to one former student at a Sermi school.[29]

The Dutch, alarmed by Islamic and Republican politics in South Kalimantan, attempted to entice several religious leaders to create a break-off group from Sermi. They even sent the well-known Orientalist Dr. van der Plaas, a man fluent in Arabic and competent at Qur'anic exegesis, to try to convince or win over local Islamic scholars. After several unsuccessful attempts with other ulama, the Dutch managed to gain the support of K. H. Abdurrachman Siddiq, one of the founders of Sermi. In July 1947, he established a break-off group in Banjarmasin, the *Serikat Rakyat Islam* (SRI, or Union of Islamic People). This new organization was willing to allow the creation of a federal system for Indonesia, with some conditions.[30]

In 1950, when the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs issued a report on regional parties, both the unitarian Sermi and the federalist SRI were still in existence. They reported their own membership numbers: Sermi said it had 10,000 members while SRI listed "roughly 60,000."[31] Both figures were probably more wild guesses than mere inflations of membership rolls, and SRI's large membership is particularly suspect.

These parties were founded as a response to local circumstances (impending federalism), but like Masjumi they brought together traditionalists and reformists. The members of these organizations dissolved the groups upon the integration of the Unitary State of Indonesia in August 1950; Sermi officially dissolved itself into Masjumi in late

[27] *Kepartaian di Indonesia*, 231; Ideham et al., *Sejarah Banjar*, 413–419.
[28] ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta, 1949–1950, #176.
[29] Interview with H. Ali Assegaf, Banjarmasin, September 19, 2010. H. Ali was a student at the Sekolah Menengah Tinggi founded jointly by SKI and Sermi in 1947 through its shuttering by the Dutch in 1948.
[30] ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta, 1949–1950, #176.
[31] ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta, 1949–1950, #176.

1950, and many of its chapter leaders became the local leaders of Masjumi.[32] Similar movements emerged in other federal states as placeholder parties, such as the *Gerakan Muslim Indonesia* (Indonesian Muslim Movement) that formed itself as a "political movement" in Bandung, West Java, in September 1949. In this case, the connection with Masjumi was even clearer: when West Java was reclaimed by the Dutch, several founding members of Masjumi, such as Isa Anshary and K. H. Abdulhalim, wanted a vehicle to criticize the puppet state that the Dutch were creating. *Gerakan Muslim Indonesia* provided that opportunity.[33] The disappearance of these regional Islamic parties in 1950 suggests that there was very little enthusiasm in Indonesia for new, local political vehicles. Instead, the regional leaders, and even the local leaders, were generally supportive of the idea of Masjumi as a unitary political vehicle for Islamic interests.

Conclusion

The Indonesian revolution varied widely from region to region, but regional developments in politics could still carry serious consequences on politics in the center. The development of Islamic parties across the whole archipelago had two important implications for the longer term: one defined by success and the other defined by failure.

First, the success of establishing Islamic parties throughout Indonesia showed the strong appeal of Islamic politics to Muslims across the country. Indeed, Islamic parties – and especially Masjumi – captured a significantly larger proportion of the vote on Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi than they did on Java in the national elections of 1955.[34] The regional branches of Islamic parties did not look like the Islamic socialists in the leadership of Masjumi, but nor did they perfectly mirror the popular Islamic militia movements of the regions; they sat somewhere in between. Leadership usually rested with Islamic theological leaders. The theological leaders were also intimately tied to the second consequence of regional parties.

The second consequence was from the failure of Masjumi to maintain regional parties within its umbrella structure. While the establishment of Islamic parties in federal states of Dutch creation, like Sermi, did not

[32] *Kepartaian di Indonesia*, 231; ANRI RA32, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, #55 "Daftar riwayat hidup calon Majelis Perwakilan Muhammadiyah Daerah, tahun 1951–1953," curriculum vitae of Basthami bin H. Djantera.
[33] ANRI RA6, Sekretariat Negara RI, 1945–49, #1030.
[34] See Feith, *Indonesian Elections*.

threaten the position of Masjumi as the unitary representative of Islamic political interests, the rise of Perti as a political party in West Sumatra set a precedent for multiple – possibly rival – Islamic parties within Indonesia. This became important even during the revolution, when Masjumi experienced its first fissure, but the full consequences were not seen until the 1950s when liberal democracy was in full swing.

12 The Exit of PSII and the First Fracture of Masjumi

While regional parties were alternatives to Masjumi, they were not directly competing with Masjumi for support in the regions or for positions at the national level. They also had formed independently, not out of former Masjumi members. For this reason, the first two years of Masjumi's existence as a political party were a time of relative unity.

This came to an end in the middle of 1947 with the first real fracture in Masjumi, connected to the creation of a new cabinet. The new party that resulted from Masjumi's fracture was, in fact, an old party: the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII). Although the strongest Islamic political party before the Dutch fell, in 1942 the Japanese forced the PSII to suspend all activities and issue a proclamation putting the organization on ice.[1] It did not re-emerge as a party in 1945; instead, most of its key national leaders became a part of Masjumi. However, in 1947, several second-tier activists long associated with the PSII left their affiliations with Masjumi, led the declaration of PSII's reactivation, and became cabinet members representing the newly reborn party. The standard narrative of this movement focused on politics in the halls of power and the positions won by a few specific individuals. The narrative put forward by the PSII fought against the idea that it was reborn through "political opportunism" (in the words of George Kahin);[2] instead the party pointed to initiative from its regional chapters to bring the party back. The actual motivations probably pulled on both the personal interests of leaders and the collective desire of regional branches.

Standard Narrative of PSII's Exit: Central Power Play

The start of the standard narrative of PSII's fracture begins with the cabinet crisis in June 1947. After leading three different coalition cabinets, Sutan Sjahrir's string of luck appeared to run out when his latest

[1] *PSII dari Tahun ke Tahun*, 14. [2] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 210.

cabinet fell, and he was not reappointed as a formateur for the new cabinet.[3] Instead, Sukarno appointed a team of four leaders from different parties: Sukiman from the Masjumi, A. K. Gani from the Indonesian Nationalist Party, Amir Sjarifuddin from the Socialists (Sjahrir's party), and Setiadjit from the Labor Party. These four were unable to reach a compromise on the composition of the cabinet because Sukiman made high demands that the others were unwilling to meet; Masjumi demanded at least four portfolios, including the prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, minister of home affairs, and minister of defense.[4] Considering he was only one of four formateurs, Sukiman's demands sounded unreasonable, but Masjumi felt that it was not only the largest faction in parliament but also the strongest party by popular following. In this case, foreshadowing similar political blunders in the early 1950s, the Masjumi representative in cabinet negotiations overplayed the party's hand.

This intransigence might have had more personal reasons behind it, too, not merely hubris by the Islamic faction. Put rather bluntly, Masjumi did not want to work with Amir Sjarifuddin of the Socialist Party. Several Masjumi leaders (although not all) distrusted Amir because of his conversion to Christianity at age 24 and his antifascist collaboration work with the Dutch in the late colonial era (after previous political activity advocating noncollaboration).[5] The issue of wartime collaboration, whether with the Dutch or Japanese, continued to have resonance in Masjumi and in Indonesian politics generally.

When the original team of four formateurs found itself unable to create a cabinet because of Sukiman's overly high demands, Sukarno dismissed the formateurs and reappointed a new team of three, made up of the original four minus Sukiman. Amir Sjarifuddin and his colleagues now had an opportunity to craft a cabinet more to their liking, but they thought it would be politically dangerous to create one without Islamic leaders in it. Amir contacted several Masjumi leaders who had previously served in cabinets without a mandate from their party. Mohamad Roem, for example, reported being contacted by Amir, requesting that he join in

[3] Sjahrir's third cabinet fell on June 27, 1947, but Sukarno did not appoint formateurs until June 30, with the new cabinet formed on July 3. See Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 209.

[4] Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 169–170. Of course, it was a given that the minister of religion would also be a Masjumi representative, but this demand was not made explicit.

[5] Noer, "Masjumi," 107. Not all Masjumi leaders disliked Amir. Dr. Abu Hanifah, a schoolmate of Amir's in Bandung and his close friend in Jakarta, still regards Amir very fondly in his 1972 memoir. Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution*, 44ff and passim.

the new cabinet. Roem felt he had to reject the offer for two reasons. First, his party had strongly proclaimed that they would not join the cabinet if they could not lead it; in previous cabinets Masjumi had not drawn such a clear line in the sand. Second, Roem felt that as a member of the outgoing cabinet his policies had been rejected with the cabinet's fall, and so he had best not govern for a while.[6] In the end, Amir did succeed drawing in one Masjumi affiliate into his new cabinet: H. Agus Salim, who served as minister of foreign affairs.[7] Given the Masjumi rejection of Amir as the new cabinet's leader, though, Salim served as an individual and not on behalf of the party, just as he had in previous cabinets.

Unsuccessful at getting first tier Masjumi leaders to join the cabinet, Amir then turned to second-tier leaders with plenty of experience in colonial politics. Specifically, he looked to W. Wondoamiseno and Arudji Kartawinata, two activists from the prewar PSII who were now low-level leaders of the Masjumi's Hizbullah militia office. The most common narrative surrounding the rebirth of the PSII is that these two leaders made a deal with Amir Sjarifuddin that recreated the PSII on paper and secured seats in the new cabinet for themselves and a few colleagues but drew no strength or support from the grassroots (or from other key PSII leaders). George McT. Kahin reflected this narrative in his account of the PSII's split, based on his own personal observations and accounts while in the revolutionary capital. Kahin reported a conversation with Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, brother of the party's founder and its chairman before the Japanese occupation, who claimed the PSII "was re-established in July 1947, against his [Abikusno's] express wishes, by Wondoamiseno and Arudji Kartawinata as a result of a deal between them and [Amir] Sjarifuddin, who needed Islamic political backing for the cabinet he was attempting to form, the Masjumi having refused to support him."[8] This narrative does not examine the possibility of grassroots support for the old party.

PSII's Own Narrative: Regional Initiative

Especially outside of Java, it was natural that PSII would have remained an important and popular vehicle for Muslim activists. Because former PSII activists in the outer islands were not folded into the social organization Masjoemi under the Japanese, they would have felt little connection

[6] Oral history with Mohamad Roem, interviewed by A. Rahman Zainuddin, ANRI SL1 1981 #6, tape 9.
[7] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 210.
[8] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 210.

to the new party of the same name. Conditions under the Japanese, especially the division of Indonesia under three Japanese military commands, would have prevented communication between PSII's top brass in Jakarta, who went along in supporting the creation of Masjumi as a unitary Islamic party, and the rank and file in the outer islands.

Not surprisingly, then, several regions still had active PSII branches in the early revolution. In West Sumatra, the popular mayor of Padang, Bagindo Aziz Chan, strongly supported the re-establishment of the PSII there.[9] The local PSII held a meeting in Bukittinggi as early as November 18, 1945,[10] although it was not active full-time until the party revived on a national level. The strong activity in the West Sumatra region was doubtlessly encouraged by the fact that PSII activists already saw room for the birth of multiple Islamic parties, due to the presence of Perti.

South Sulawesi was another area of serious PSII activity during the Dutch period, especially in the Luwu region at the top of the Gulf of Bone. The most prominent PSII activist in this region is also arguably the most recognizable revolutionary figure from Luwu: Opu Daeng Risaju (1880–1964). She had founded the local PSII branch in 1930 and resisted attempts by both the Dutch and local royals to shut down the organization. During the Indonesian revolution, she was tortured so severely for her resistance to Dutch reoccupation that she became deaf for the rest of her life. Her leadership helped PSII to gain prominence in this staunchly Islamic region just as it was being revived at the national level.[11] Furthermore, Sarekat Islam schools continued to function in South Sulawesi during the revolution, meaning that not all vestiges of the party had shut down.[12]

In some areas, like Indonesia's southeast corner, PSII remnants constituted the whole of the nationalist movement during the early revolution. On the island of Alor, just north of Timor, PSII had had a branch whose nationalist credentials were unimpeachable; for this reason, Republican groups from Java consistently tried to contact old PSII leaders as local nationalist leaders. In December 1946, the Republic even sent a motor boat to contact the old Alor PSII branch; this boat was captured, and as a consequence the Dutch imprisoned several Islamic leaders.[13]

[9] Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 76.
[10] Madi, "Partai Politik Islam di Sumatera Barat, 1945–1949," 30.
[11] See Daud; Muhammad Arfah and Muhammad Amir, *Biografi Pahlawan Opu Daeng Risaju: Perintis Pergerakan Kebangsaan/Kemerdekaan Republik Indonesia* (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1991).
[12] Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 77.
[13] Ardhana, *Penataan Nusa Tenggara pada Masa Kolonial, 1915–1950*, 353.

In light of these strong regional bases, the PSII's own narrative of its revival, claiming the initiative came from the regions instead of from political opportunism, is worth examining. In this version, the call to determine the party's status was initiated in West Sumatra by several PSII leaders there. They sent a resolution dated August 23, 1946, to the central leadership on Java, pointing out that the PSII's constitution did not permit the organization to disband, so it had to either reactivate or formally become a part of Masjumi.[14] As the couriers carried this resolution to Java, they picked up two more signatures of key party leaders in Palembang, thus strengthening their mandate. Although Wondoamiseno, the recipient of this resolution, systematically left out the resolution's stated option of joining Masjumi, he often invoked the Sumatran resolution. Although this resolution was frequently mentioned and even published, the timing of its publication and some of its contents were suspicious.

According to Wondoamiseno, the resolution from the Sumatran leaders reached him on April 21, 1947. After wrestling with the decision for one day and one night, Wondoamiseno signed the order on April 22 to "re-activate PSII on all the islands of Indonesia," an order that already had the signatures of his colleagues Sjahbuddin Latif and Harsono Tjokroaminoto.[15] Thus, this account placed the PSII's rebirth a full two months before the cabinet crisis in which Amir Sjarifuddin had to look for new Islamic partners, a crisis that emerged on June 26, 1947.

Wondoamiseno described the decision to join Amir's cabinet as unexpected and incidental. He claimed that on July 2, three colleagues in the party leadership (Arudji Kartawinata, Anwar Tjokroaminoto, and Harsono Tjokroaminoto, the latter two carrying extra heft as the sons of the Sarekat Islam's founder) came to his home and called on him as a party leader to join in cabinet discussions. At their urging, Wondoamiseno went down to Yogyakarta and met with the three cabinet formateurs (after Sukiman's exclusion), eventually accepting their offer of several positions for PSII in the cabinet. His decision to lead the party into the

[14] Putjuk Pimpinan Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia, Bagian Penjiaran, *Barisan Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia bersiap!: Sedjarah pembangunan P.S.I.I. kembali* ([Jogjakarta?]: Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia, [1948?]), 3.

[15] Putjuk Pimpinan PSII, *Barisan Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia bersiap!*, 2. Harsono, by contrast, makes no mention of PSII's rebirth in 1947 in his oral history, and instead he speaks of the reactivation happening in 1948 at a party congress in Yogyakarta. Oral History with Harsono Tjokroaminoto, interviewed by Wardiningsih Surjohardjo, ANRI SL1 1982 #60, tape 28.

cabinet was then affirmed by a congress of PSII held on July 13, 1947, back in Wondoamiseno's hometown of Banjarnegara, Central Java.[16]

This narrative from the PSII remained roughly the same over the following decade, the only variation being the addition of Sulawesi branches to those who called for the re-establishment.[17] The greater surprise, though, is that this narrative, and the event of the rebirth in general, were rarely brought up. In fact, PSII documents often conspicuously skipped over that moment. For example, none of the recorded messages of the 1953 party congress in Jakarta, not even the historical article titled "40 Years of the PSII's Struggle," mention the rebirth, which had happened just five years earlier.[18] To outside critics, this clearly suggested that the PSII split from Masjumi was something that PSII leaders were ashamed about, perhaps for personal reasons. The archives cannot resolve this historical question, but the truth seems to sit between the two versions: some regional initiative, which Wondoamiseno and Arudji took advantage of to their own benefit.

Weighing Personal versus Regional Interests in PSII's Rebirth

Wondoamiseno was especially vulnerable to accusations of promoting personal interests. He had previously held such high positions as the first director of the M. I. A. I. umbrella organization under the Japanese,[19] a leader in the PNI when it was the sole state party,[20] and one of the inspirations for the founding of the *Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia* (GPII, or Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement, i.e., Masjumi's youth auxiliary).[21] In Masjumi, however, his position in 1947 was merely on the board of the Hizbullah – an especially insignificant position considering how decentralized Hizbullah was.[22] When the cabinet was being formed in July 1947, Wondoamiseno was also just leaving incarceration, having been captured in June 1946 and accused of complicity in a plot to overthrow the government.[23] Reid has reported that his release was part of the deal Amir offered to draw former PSII leaders into his cabinet,

[16] Putjuk Pimpinan PSII, *Barisan Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia bersiap!*, 2.
[17] *PSII dari Tahun ke Tahun*, 14 and 34.
[18] *Kongres P.S.I.I. ke-29: 20–27 Maret 1953 di Jakarta* (Jakarta: Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia, 1953).
[19] Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 142.
[20] Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 93.
[21] Latif, *Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power*, 322 n. 105.
[22] Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 76.
[23] Many accounts, such as Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, imply that Abikusno and Wondoamiseno were complicit in the preparations for a Tan Malaka-led government

although this cannot be confirmed from other sources.[24] In contrast to his downfall from high positions and the indignity of incarceration, Wondoamiseno jumped to the strongest position among the PSII in the new Amir cabinet. He received the powerful minister of home affairs position, holding it from July 1947 until Amir reshuffled his cabinet in November 1947, at which point Wondoamiseno became second vice prime minister.[25]

The other key figure in PSII's rebirth, Arudji Kartawinata, had not been so influential during the late Dutch and Japanese periods. Still, he had also served in the national leadership of PSII before the war and felt disappointed with how little political power he now had in the Hizbullah office.[26] Resurrecting the PSII alongside Wondoamiseno, Arudji was rewarded with the vice-minister of defense post, which he held until Amir's cabinet fell in January 1948.

One can also point to personality issues on the Masjumi side that may have contributed to the break. The identities of the main leadership of Masjumi were bound to have some conflicts with PSII personalities because of their divisions in Islamic politics during the colonial era. Sukiman, Masjumi's head throughout the revolution, had left PSII on unpleasant terms in 1938, and his leadership of Masjumi must have felt like a blow to PSII activists. Furthermore, the PSII party line was not as close to economic socialism as the Natsir-led faction of the party.[27] PSII's stated objection to the positions of the younger Masjumi leaders centered on those leaders' willingness to negotiate with the Dutch, although this objection sounded very hollow when Abikusno, once again leading the PSII after his initial reticence, accepted a position in the delegation to the Round Table Conference negotiations with the Dutch in 1949.[28]

Besides Wondoamiseno and Arudji, who may have had personal aspirations due to their change in fortunes, the other PSII leaders placed in the cabinet were more minor leaders. In fact, two of the others turned

turn over, but Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution*, 167, suggests that these two men were merely the designated Masjumi observers at the conference Tan Malaka and his colleagues held in Madiun. Either way, Wondoamiseno had been detained for a year, and no other accounts have him free in April 1947 when he was supposedly receiving letters from Sumatra.

[24] Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, 99.

[25] ANRI RA6, Sekretariat Negara RI 1945–1949, #615.

[26] Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 76.

[27] This is rather paradoxical because the origins of the PSII as the social safety network Sarekat Islam were very close to the religious socialist vision of Natsir and Sjafruddin.

[28] *PSII dari Tahun ke Tahun*, 15.

down their offers explicitly, seemingly in a rejection of this splinter party.[29] Three other names, though, were announced with Amir's cabinet: Sukoso Wirjosaputro became vice-minister of social affairs, Sjahbudin Latif assumed the post of minister of information, and K. H. Ahmad Azhary was appointed minister of religion – although his story is more complex.[30]

The story of K. H. Ahmad Azhary sheds some light on the feasibility of each narrative of the rebirth of PSII, something otherwise very difficult to tease out. Azhary was a religious scholar from South Sumatra trained in Cairo at Al-Azhar University, whence he took his surname. He had joined PSII in the late 1930s, becoming the head of the party's branch in Palembang by the time of the Japanese invasion. In the resolution Wondoamiseno published from the Sumatran branches, urging the re-establishment of the party, Azhary was listed as cosigning on behalf of South Sumatran leaders, but in the standard narrative of PSII's re-emergence, the "political opportunism" story, the authenticity of these documents from the regions comes into doubt. Azhary's later actions could also cast a shadow on these documents. After his appointment in July 1947, Azhary never came to Java to take up the post; he was captured by the Dutch shortly after his name was announced and his intentions toward the cabinet were never known. After the revolution his later political activity was entirely with Masjumi, where he rose to become the head of the Consultative Council in 1954.[31]

Although Azhary's nonparticipation in the cabinet (or in PSII generally afterward) might on the surface undermine the narrative of Sumatran leaders as initiators of the reactivation, careful analysis suggests that his story in fact vouches for the authenticity of the regional resolution.[32] Minister of religion was a crucial position of power and patronage for an Islamic party, so it was highly unlikely that the PSII would give this seat to someone whose loyalty and commitment to the reborn party it did not trust. This implies that Azhary must have been in communication with Wondoamiseno leading up to his appointment – most likely in the form

[29] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 210 n. 206; Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation*, 97. These two were S. M. Kartosuwirjo (later founder of Darul Islam), who was appointed second vice-minister of defense portfolio, and Surowijono, who was offered vice-minister of education.

[30] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 211; ANRI RA6, Sekretariat Negara RI 1945–49, #615; Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 171.

[31] Syahrul Hidayat and Kevin W. Fogg, "Member Profiles: K.H. Achmad Azhary," *Konstituante.Net* (January 1, 2018), www.konstituante.net/en/profile/MASJUMI_achmad_azhary (accessed June 19, 2018).

[32] For a fuller biography of K. H. Ahmad Azhary and a complete analysis of what his case says for the birth of PSII, see Fogg, "The Missing Minister of Religion and the PSII."

that Wondoamiseno later documented: the resolution from the Sumatran branches. This resolution allowed for the possibility that PSII would formally and permanently come under the umbrella of Masjumi, so it was not necessarily inconsistent with Azhary's future devotion to Masjumi; still it provided a good reason for Wondoamiseno to believe Azhary would come along with the PSII. That belief, combined with Azhary's exceptional educational credentials, probably led to his appointment. Because of his capture by the Dutch shortly after his appointment was announced, history will never know whether he intended to join the splinter party or wanted to stay loyal to the umbrella Islamic party. Whatever the reason for Ahmad Azhary's absence from Java during his official tenure as minister of religion, in his absence another PSII activist took up the post: H. Anwaroedin served as acting minister of religion.[33]

One final personal narrative worth examining in connection with PSII's exit from Masjumi is the story of Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, the brother of Sarekat Islam's founder. He was in jail (like Wondoamiseno) from mid-1946 and remained in jail in July 1947, leaving him outside the commotion refounding the party. Furthermore, Abikusno expressed strong disapproval of PSII splintering Masjumi – in some ways crafting the standard narrative of "political opportunism" – and he continued to show his own loyalty to Masjumi by running for a leadership position in, and winning another term in, Masjumi at the March 1948 party congress.[34] Only in 1949 did Abikusno switch allegiances and reassume the leadership of PSII. At this point, the party was sufficiently well established that there was little chance it would fold itself back into Masjumi,[35] and Abikusno saw this as a vehicle to bring himself (and his nephews, Anwar and Harsono Tjokroaminoto) greater power. His personal interests, following almost an inverse arc with Wondoamiseno's, provide some explanation for how the standard narrative emerged.

There were plenty of regional PSII leaders who were enthusiastic about the party's reactivation, though, such that PSII branches quickly reassembled themselves when they received word from Yogyakarta. The chapter furthest east provides a clear example. The PSII activists on Alor, mentioned previously, formally re-established their branch of the party in May 1948, after the re-emergence of the national party and the stabilization of the political environment locally. Membership must have been

[33] ANRI RA6, Sekretariat Negara RI 1945–1949, #615; *Peranan Departemen Agama*, 29.
[34] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 210; Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 100.
[35] See the interview with Abikusno in George McTurnan Kahin Papers, #14-27-3146, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library, Box 54, Folder "PSII, 1948–49." My thanks to Audrey Kahin for making this collection available for research.

extensive; the Dutch reports at the time say members worked in thirty-one different trades.[36] Branches in Sumatra, Sulawesi, and parts of Java also grew to support the new PSII.[37] Besides supporting the possibility of a regional initiative for the party's rebirth, these branches were a sort of guarantee that the PSII would not collapse after the cabinet did in January 1948.

Conclusion: The Implications of PSII's Exit for Islamic Politics

Masjumi apologists have tried to downplay the importance of PSII's exit from the unitary Masjumi party. M. Dzulfikriddin provides a representative example, saying, "The impact of SI's [i.e., PSII's] exit was not felt too much by Masjumi, because SI only represented a small party of the Islamic community and their political influence was also limited."[38] The small size of the party at the time misses the most important aspect of PSII's exit from Masjumi. PSII was the first fracture of Masjumi (or, for that matter, of any major party). Elected leadership from one party split to found a rival group. For the Islamic community, in particular, this fissure was felt very keenly at the time because it violated the principle of religious unity.[39]

The short-term influence of Masjumi's exclusion from the cabinet in preference to PSII was minimal. The left-leaning government was not very friendly toward Masjumi; Sukiman said that "Masjumi was having a very difficult time and was not being offered any chance for activity and development."[40] However, that government did not last long. In November, after a major Dutch military drive, popular displeasure with the results of the young ministers forced Amir to reshuffle his cabinet. Several Masjumi figures entered the cabinet at that time: Mr. Samsoedin, Mr. Mohamad Roem, Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo, and K. H. Masjkur.[41] It seems to have been apparent that Masjumi could not be ignored or left

[36] Ardhana, *Penataan Nusa Tenggara pada Masa Kolonial, 1915–1950*, 385.
[37] Bosra, *Tuang Guru, Anrong Guru dan Daeng Guru*, 107 and 268; Salmah Gosse, "Opu Daeng Risaju: Dari Bangsawan sampai Tokoh Pergerakan (1930–1950)," Skripsi S2, Universitas Indonesia, 2000, 124.
[38] M. Dzulfikriddin, *Mohammad Natsir dalam Sejarah Politik Indonesia: Peran dan Jasa Mohammad Natsir dalam Dua Orde Indonesia* (Bandung: Mizan, 2010), 98.
[39] Oral history of Burhanuddin Harahap, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1980 #1, tape 2; oral history with Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1979 #6, tape 4.
[40] Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 55 n. 1.
[41] ANRI RA6, Sekretariat Negara RI 1945–1949, #615.

out of government. Amir fell as prime minister just two months later, on January 16, 1948.[42]

In the long term, PSII's exit seems to have set up another, more crippling fissure of Masjumi: the exit of NU from Masjumi to establish its own party in 1953. By setting a precedent whereby an Islamic organization could reactivate itself and begin to function politically independent of Masjumi, PSII must have been the unspoken model for NU's action, and would have created the space where NU could not be accused of being the great violator of Islamic unity. The departure of PSII also shifted the religious or theological orientation of Masjumi, from a "big tent" that incorporated both traditionalist and reformist voices to a body that leaned more toward reformist leaders – another spur that drove NU toward leaving the party several years later.[43]

Seeing the question of Islamic political unity as the crux of the issue in PSII's exit from Masjumi, the regional initiative for this exit also becomes more important. Whereas the standard narrative facilitated Muslim nationalists decrying the break in unity as the actions of a few misguided leaders at the center, the regional narrative demonstrates the existence of fissures within the Islamic community on the ground. The myth of Indonesian Islamic solidarity during the revolution rings false not just at the center, but also in the regions.

[42] Noer and Akbarsyah, *KNIP: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*, 180.
[43] Fealy, "Ulama and Politics in Indonesia," 104–105.

13 Islamic Diplomacy

There was one area in which the uncoordinated scramble of elite politicking and the religious fervor of pious Muslims to support the revolution in Islamic ways intersected with major consequences for Indonesia's revolutionary success: diplomacy. Because the new state had no infrastructure abroad to promote its case to other countries, this gap was filled initially by Indonesians who happened to find themselves overseas when the revolution broke out. In the Middle East, where thousands of Indonesians were living in the 1940s, this led to the emergence of a kind of Islamic diplomacy by students and Muslim scholars. This Islamic diplomacy was so successful that it led to Indonesia's first de jure recognition by a foreign state and helped to elevate the country's dispute with the Netherlands to the United Nations. Thus, although diplomacy was a crucial part of the political revolution to achieve Indonesia's sovereignty, it took on the characteristics of the grassroots Islamic struggle in the war of independence.

This narrative upsets the established view of Indonesian foreign policy, which has not recognized any influence of Islam from the very beginning, or at most has seen Islam as a minor constraining factor rather than a building block of Indonesian diplomacy.[1] This was more than just societal pressures from Muslims and Muslim groups in Indonesia shaping

[1] Michael Leifer, "The Islamic Factor in Indonesia's Foreign Policy: A Case of Functional Ambiguity" in Adeed Dawisha, ed., *Islam in Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 144–159; Kirdi Dipoyudo, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy towards the Middle East and Africa," *The Indonesian Quarterly* 13, 4 (October 1985): 474–485; Azyumardi Azra, "Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy," in *Indonesia, Islam and Democracy: Dynamics in a Global Context* (Jakarta: Solstice, 2006), 89–111; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia," *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities* 3 (2010): 37–54. The exception that makes the rule is Rizal Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), and his argument is quite modest.

the government's approach to certain issues.[2] Here Muslim activists carried out diplomacy in the Arab world, and they used Islamic brotherhood as a key pillar of their outreach. During the revolution, Islam was an important rallying cry and point of solidarity building Indonesia's first diplomatic contacts.

Groups of Indonesians organized in Cairo, Mecca, and elsewhere to push foreign governments toward supporting the Indonesian cause. The efforts in Cairo were both particularly Islamic in content and particularly successful, leading to recognition by the Arab League and subsequently by Egypt and other Arab states. Recognition by these Arab states was important for Indonesia because this allowed its leaders to internationalize the conflict, denying the Netherlands the ability to call the war in Indonesia an "internal" problem immune from international meddling.

The Islamic diplomacy that helped Indonesia's foreign relations during the revolution reflected a religious understanding of the state, held by student activists abroad. The fact that this became a building block of the greatest diplomatic successes the country saw in its first few years shows that the mentality of the grassroots Islamic Revolution seen in the war of independence was not entirely isolated from the political revolution among the elite.

Grassroots Islamic Diplomacy

By the 1940s, small numbers of Indonesians had spread to many countries around the world as students, traders, activists, or laborers. This meant that when the Indonesian Revolution broke out, there were individuals abroad who quickly appointed themselves as representatives for the Indonesian cause. This was the case in Australia, where Indonesians who had been interned in the country won over the support of the labor movement as a whole.[3] Indonesians also took up the new country's cause in the United States, the Czech Republic, and in the Middle East.[4]

[2] Anak Agung Banyu Perwita has laid out such an argument for the Suharto era; see his *Indonesia and the Muslim World: Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond* (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007).

[3] Mohamad Bondan, *Genderang Proklamasi di Luar Negeri* (Jakarta: KAWAL, 1971).

[4] Samuel E. Crowl, "Indonesia's Diplomatic Revolution: Lining Up for Non-Alignment, 1945–1955" in Christopher E. Goscha and Christian F. Ostermann, eds., *Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945–1962* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press and the Woodrow Wilson Center, 2009), 240; Mien Soedarpo, *Reminiscences of the Past*, vol. II, Siti Nuraini Barnett, ed. (Jakarta: Sejati Foundation with PT Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 1997); ANRI RA10, Djogdja Documenten, #306: "Surat-surat dari Perwakilan Republik Indonesia di beberapa negara."

The numbers of Indonesians in the Middle East were greater than those in other regions. The increasing connectedness of the Islamic world in this period facilitated ever-rising numbers of Indonesians going for the pilgrimage to Mecca or for study in the Hijaz, Cairo, or other seats of learning.[5] Being absent from the homeland, though, did not mean they were disconnected from it. In the 1920s and 1930s, Indonesian students in Cairo especially were active in nationalist organizations and publishing Malay-language journals about religious and political issues.[6]

With this foundation, it is no surprise that Indonesians in the Arab world were especially active in promoting Indonesia during the revolution. The key theme they deployed for Indonesia's diplomatic outreach was Islamic Brotherhood (Ar., *ukhuwah Islamiyah*).[7] Islamic Brotherhood as a doctrine emphasizes the fellowship of all Muslims, joined through their shared religious beliefs, and the obligation for mutual help among them. Although this was certainly not the only common thread between Indonesia and the Arab world (anticolonialism was also raging in both places), Indonesian accounts emphasize the Islamic aspects, and the leaders with whom they had the most success were Islamically inclined. Indonesian societal groups were able to mobilize this ideology to gain the support of key Muslims in the Arab world. These Muslim leaders were then able to drive states and international organizations to action.

The societal groups that pioneered the Indonesian cause in the Middle East were student groups. Although many of these groups had been active as welfare or scholarly organizations in key centers of learning before World War II, their role transformed into lobbying organizations quickly in 1945. Islam was important within the groups, building solidarity among members and providing a theological basis for the desire to liberate Indonesia from colonial rule by non-Muslims. Islam was also important as these groups appealed beyond their own membership, to the Muslims of the Middle East.

In 1945 when Indonesian independence was proclaimed, organizations of Southeast Asian Muslims were active across the Middle East. In Egypt, the leading group was the Persatuan Pemuda Indonesia-Malaya (Perpindom, Union of Indonesian-Malayan Youth), formed around a core of students but also with some graduates who were still

[5] Feener, "New Networks and New Knowledge"; Tagliacozzo, *The Longest Journey*.

[6] William R. Roff, "Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 1920s," *Indonesia* 9 (April 1970): 73–87; Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia*.

[7] Not to be confused with the religious-cum-political group in Egypt, the Muslim Brethren or Muslim Brotherhood (Ar. *Ikhwan al-Muslimin*), nor with pan-Islamism that sought to combine all Muslims under one polity.

resident in the city.[8] According to a newspaper account in July 1946, there were about 70 Indonesian students in Egypt who had stayed through World War II, struggling against food shortages and a lack of communication with their homeland.[9] Saudi Arabia had by far the largest population of Indonesians in the Middle East – between 3,500 and 4,000 individuals at the start of the revolution[10] – and the analogous collective there was called Persatuan Talabah Indonesia-Malaya (Pertindom, Union of Indonesian-Malayan Students). Iraq was a much smaller outpost, but still had its own group, the Majlis Kebangsaan Indonesia-Malaya (Makindom, National Council of Indonesia-Malaya), centered in Baghdad.[11] One of the activists in Cairo compared these rag-tag student groups to the militias that were springing up to defend Indonesia's independence back in the home country.[12]

The public relations campaign in Cairo began soon after news of the proclamation of independence reached them in September 1945 (almost a full month after the proclamation because of Allied censorship on the issue).[13] The Indonesians there scrambled to put out information about their country's independence struggle, even though they did not have full or accurate information. This led to the publication of a book in Arabic, *Indonesia ath-Thawrah* (*Indonesia in Revolution*), with certain episodes completely fabricated, such as Sukarno's proclamation of independence in front of a massive crowd in Jakarta's central square (in fact, it happened before a small group at a house on a major thoroughfare).[14]

The first coordination between the various Indonesian organizations across the Middle East came in November 1945. Taking advantage of *hajj* season, leaders of Perpindom, Pertindom, and Makindom met in Mecca on November 13 to coordinate their efforts. They all agreed to follow the political program set in Cairo because they saw Cairo as the diplomatic seat of the Arab world.[15] After this face-to-face contact, the organizations were able to keep in touch with the help of the Iraqi ambassador in Cairo, who allowed the Indonesians to use the security

[8] Perpindom was the heir and fusion of two earlier student organizations in Egypt: Nadi Pemoeda Indonesia dan Malaja and Djamijatoel Chairijah. See Tengkoe Jafizham, *Studenten Indonesia di Mesir* (Medan: Sinar Deli, 1939), 75–76.

[9] "Nasib Poetera2 Indonesia di Mesir dan Arab," *Lasjkar*, July 25, 1946.

[10] See the various estimates in Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, 35, and "Nasib Poetera2 Indonesia di Mesir dan Arab," *Lasjkar*, July 25, 1946.

[11] On the organizations, see Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, 23.

[12] Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, 20.

[13] Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, 49.

[14] Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, 50–52. Hassan transliterates the book title as *Indonesia as-Sairah*.

[15] Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, 57.

of his diplomatic pouch for transferring messages safe from the prying eyes of the Dutch.[16]

As they began efforts aimed at increasing the profile of their national struggle, Indonesian groups frequently made use of Islamic symbols. For example, in the closing months of 1945, the Indonesian committees across the region convinced mosques around the Arab countries to hold special prayers for the "souls of the Indonesian martyrs of Surabaya," a major battle early in the war.[17] A similar tactic was taken later, upon the death of a leading Islamic cleric in Surabaya, the Muhammadiyah leader K. H. Mas Mansur. The Cairo committee turned it into a propaganda point, "degrading the humanity of the Dutch and their English allies" that such a casualty could happen under their watch.[18] Students in the organization reportedly "wrote in the local Egyptian newspapers, attended political meetings in Cairo and met important political figures to ask for their support for Indonesian independence."[19] Throughout, they used Islam as a mobilizing factor. Presenting a message to Arab foreign ministers as the revolution began, Indonesian students had intentionally mentioned Islam when describing their country: the student leader M. Zein Hassan spoke of Indonesia as a country of "70 million, among whom 90% consist of Muslims," or even as an "Eastern Islamic country."[20]

To help their own public relations efforts, the Indonesians in Cairo created an organization to mobilize Arab voices in favor of Indonesian independence. This group, formed in October 1945, was called the Committee to Defend Indonesia (*Lajnatud Difa'i 'an Indonesia*).[21] Its members included luminaries from Arab society, like 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Azzām (often called Azzam Pasha in the Indonesian accounts), secretary-general of the nascent Arab League, and Habib Bourguiba, future president of Tunisia.[22] In circulating the committee's goals to governments, the honorary head, Gen. Saleh Harb Pasha, repeatedly

[16] Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, 33.
[17] Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, 89.
[18] Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, 275. For more information on the passing of Mas Mansur in the context of Indonesia, see oral history with Harsono Tjokroaminoto, interviewed by Wardiningsih Surjohardjo, ANRI SL1 1982 #60, tape 28.
[19] Mona Abaza, *Islamic Education: Perceptions and Exchanges: Indonesian Students in Cairo*, Cahier d'Archipel no. 23 (Paris: Association Archipel, 1994), 82.
[20] Quoted in Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, 42.
[21] Abaza, *Islamic Education*, 81.
[22] Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, 62. It is worth noting that many of the prominent individuals here were secular, and the initial efforts seemed to have less Islamic flavor. This is in line with the secular nature of Arab world politics in the 1940s, but it does not limit the Islamic emphasis that evolved moving forward.

pointed to "Islamic brotherhood" as his motivating goal, showing the importance of this idea for diplomatic relations.[23] Similarly, a former Egyptian ambassador to London, Dr. Hafiz Afifi Pasha, agreed to help lobby on behalf of the Indonesians to the UN meeting in Great Britain in 1946, reportedly inspired by the fact that Egyptians and Indonesians "had the same religion, traditions, and goals."[24]

The talking point of Islamic brotherhood was impressed on the Arab public by careful messaging on the part of the Indonesian students of Perpindom. When the first official Indonesian delegation was passing through the Middle East in April 1946 (on its way to and from negotiations in the Netherlands), the local committee encouraged them to use Islamic rhetoric and to push especially hard on the theme of Islamic Brotherhood, as the Indonesians in Cairo believed that this was the most effective strategy for drawing in the Arab world.[25] This was not the only option available to them; to internationalize the war in Indonesia the delegation could have played on anticolonialism, nationalism, or anti-European sentiments, as *New York Times* articles of the era did, for example, to connect Egypt and Indonesia.[26] Islamic brotherhood must have been a conscious and strategic emphasis, and it turned out to be effective. In the context of highly secular Arab politics at the time, this choice of emphasis likely reflected the Indonesians who were doing the lobbying.

This outreach proved effective in Egypt. Egyptians participated in a boycott of Dutch ships, and even harassed and encircled Dutch ships passing through the Suez Canal to prevent them from boarding new supplies.[27] By late September 1946, the Egyptian newspaper *Al Ichwanoel Moeslimin* (Muslim Brethren) editorialized in favor of recognizing the Indonesian Republic.[28] Indonesian students reported that Egyptian political parties from across the political spectrum, from the nationalist Wafd through the socialist Misr al-Fatāh and even the Communists were working with them to promote Indonesian independence. Despite working with a broad cross-section of society, the sympathies among

[23] Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, 66.
[24] Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, 112.
[25] Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, 137.
[26] "Britain and Egypt," *The New York Times*, April 6, 1946.
[27] "Nasib Poetera2 Indonesia di Mesir dan Arab," *Lasjkar*, July 25, 1946; Crowl, 242.
[28] "Akoeilah Repoeblik Indonesia: Desakan sk di Mesir," *Lasjkar*, November 11, 1946. It is possible that the report was mistaken, and this urging came from the mass organization known as the Muslim Brotherhood, but the Brotherhood did have a newspaper subsidiary in this period.

the Indonesian students most commonly lay with the Muslim Brothers organization,[29] helping to explain in part why they would focus on Islamic brotherhood in their public diplomacy.

Success with the Arab League

After the seeds had been sown by the Indonesian students in Cairo, the initiative to support Indonesia's independence was taken up by the diplomats and political leaders. However, it was not primarily Indonesian diplomats (Indonesia was still unable to send ambassadors abroad at this stage), but rather Arab diplomats, who moved forward on the issue – particularly diplomats from the Arab League, a new regional organization.[30]

Arab League attention to the Indonesian issue began quite early. In a speech in the American University of Cairo on January 4, 1946, the secretary-general assured his audience that the new organization was "defending justice and liberty everywhere, be it in Indonesia or in a defeated Germany."[31] On April 8, 1946, less than nine months after Indonesia proclaimed independence, the Arab League issued its first resolution on the Indonesian national struggle. The text ran thus: "The Council seized an opportunity during the passage through Cairo of the Indonesian delegation going to Holland to declare its sympathy for Indonesia and its wish that it would secure full independence."[32] This was just two days after it formally resolved to support Libyan independence, and still several months before the Arab League formally declared in favor of Tunisia or Morocco becoming independent from the French. Clearly, the Indonesian issue was at the forefront of its diplomatic thinking.[33]

Further action came in November 1946, when the Arab League agreed in a unanimous vote of all seven states to a resolution: "The Council recommends to the members of the Arab League that they recognize

[29] Abaza, *Islamic Education*, 86, citing an interview with Yussuf Saad in Cairo, October 4, 1987. Yussuf Saad was an Indonesian student in Cairo in the 1940s, and he returned to work in the Indonesian embassy there much later.

[30] Majid Khadduri, "The Arab League as a Regional Arrangement," *The American Journal of International Law* 40, 4 (October 1946): 765.

[31] Abd al-Rahman Azzam, "The Arab League and World Unity," reprinted in Anouar Abdel Malek, ed., *Contemporary Arab Political Thought*, Michael Pallis, trans. (London: Zed Press, 1983), 144.

[32] Resolution 45, Session 3, Schedule 9, April 8, 1946, as translated in Egyptian Society of International Law, *Egypt and the United Nations* (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1957), 138.

[33] Egyptian Society of International Law, *Egypt and the United Nations*, 148.

Indonesia as an independent sovereign state."[34] This made the Arab League the first international body to recognize Indonesia's independence.

The story of the Arab League's proactive stance supporting Indonesia centers on the Islamic ideals of the league's first secretary-general: 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Azzām, commonly called Azzam Pasha.[35] He was very receptive to the message of Indonesian students in Cairo, and was heralded in the Indonesian press.[36] Crucially, his own vision for the Arab League and diplomacy more broadly was built on the idea of pan-Islamism (thus pushing even beyond the Islamic brotherhood message of the Indonesian student groups), as laid out in his major work, *The Eternal Message of Muhammad*.[37]

In this and other writings, Azzam Pasha explained how Islam obliged its believers to reject all colonialism.[38] In fact, Azzam even put out a pamphlet in the name of the Arab League using Islamic principles to condemn imperialism. In the conclusion, he wrote, "It is a religious duty of all Moslems to condemn Imperialism. It is a great and honorable task for every Arab, true to faith and manly tradition to oppose it."[39] Azzam Pasha also pushed the idea of Islamic brotherhood in his own writings, such as when he described his vision for Islamic international relations: "We pray that people will awaken to guidance, that they will discover in Islamic principles the means for establishing international relations on a basis other than that of colonialism, and that this new attitude will rest on the Islamic spirit of brotherhood."[40]

These intertwined ideas of pan-Islamism, anticolonialism, and Islamic brotherhood were motivating factors for Azzam Pasha's actions to support Indonesian independence. When the Arab League voted to

[34] Egyptian Society of International Law, *Egypt and the United Nations*, 138. Cf. 5.37, "International Relations: Recognition of Indonesia Proposed, 1947: Abdul Rahman Azzam to Sir W. Smart, 27 February 1947 (FO 371/61518)" in Anita L. P. Burdett, ed., *The Arab League: British Documentary Sources, 1943–1963*, vol. 5 (London: Archive Editions and the Foreign Office of Great Britain, 1995), 744.

[35] Ralph M. Coury, *The Making of an Egyptian Arab Nationalist: The Early Years of Azzam Pasha, 1893–1936* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998).

[36] Sastroamidjojo, *Milestones on My Journey*, 152; N. Mans, "Abdur Rachman Azzam Pasha," *Hikmah*, June 1949, 23–25.

[37] 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Azzam, *The Eternal Message of Muhammad*, trans. Caesar E. Farah (London: Quartet Books, 1979). This book was first published in Arabic in 1946, then with an expanded edition in 1954 that included a chapter on the state in the Islamic world.

[38] 'Azzam, *The Eternal Message*, 217.

[39] Abdul Rahman Azzam, *Imperialism: The Barrier to World Peace*, Arab League Pamphlets on International Relations, no. 1 (Cairo: Government Press, 1947), 12.

[40] 'Azzam, *The Eternal Message*, 220.

recognize Indonesian sovereignty, Azzam Pasha was quoted in the *New York Times* pointing to shared histories of suffering under colonialism but also "strong religious and cultural ties with the Indonesian people."[41]

Thus, from the Islamic diplomacy of Indonesians on the ground in the Middle East, the Arab League recognized Indonesian independence and emphasized Islamic brotherhood in supporting the new country. This laid the foundation for Indonesia's integration into wider diplomatic networks and for recognition by individual sovereign states – although these were not always based on Islam.

Diplomatic Milestones

The year 1947 was a crucial turning point in Indonesian diplomacy, seen in three major milestones: the first foreign diplomatic delegation to visit the Indonesian revolutionary capital; the participation of an Indonesian delegation at a major international diplomatic conference; and the first foreign treaties recognizing Indonesian independence. All these were outcomes of the Arab League's support for Indonesian independence.

The first foreign diplomatic visit to the Republic of Indonesia was initiated by Azzam Pasha in Cairo. In January 1947, he informed the British government that he would be sending a representative of the Arab League to Indonesia and asked for British facilities to ease the mission.[42] The British were alarmed and dismayed at this prospect, but they were not in a position to stop it.[43] This was particularly so because the initiative to send a delegate was also strongly supported by Saudi Arabia, which was interested primarily because of the large number of Indonesian pilgrims who undertook the *hajj* every year – another Islamic connection for Indonesia's foreign relations.[44] By March 1947, he had arranged for the Egyptian Consul General in Bombay, Muhammad Abdul Munim, to travel to the revolutionary capital in Yogyakarta, Central Java.[45]

[41] "Arabs Hail Indonesians: League of Seven States Votes to Recognize New Republic," *New York Times*, November 10, 1946.

[42] 5.37, "International relations: recognition of Indonesia proposed, 1947: Sir R. Campbell, Cairo to Foreign Office, 8 January 1947, and response, 13 January 1947," in Burdett, ed., *The Arab League*, vol. 5, 739, 743.

[43] 5.37, in Anita L. P. Burdett, ed., *The Arab League*, vol. 5, 740.

[44] 5.37, in Anita L. P. Burdett, ed., *The Arab League*, vol. 5, 739.

[45] Egyptian Society of International Law, *Egypt and the United Nations*, 74 n. 6. Alternative spellings of his name include Abdel Mounem, Abdul Mun'im, and various other combinations. The record, including primary sources from various sides, is mixed as to whether he was representing Egypt, the Arab League, or both, but his travels were clearly prompted by Azzam Pasha.

Abdul Munim made it clear while in Indonesia that Islamic motivations were central to the Arab support for Indonesian independence. While in Yogyakarta, the diplomat echoed the position of Azzam Pasha, saying, "It is the Islamic brotherhood that gave rise to the support for the struggle of the Indonesian people. The spirit of Islam tells us to oppose all forms of colonialism which in essence is a practice of slavery."[46] President Sukarno's speech to honor this diplomatic guest expressed a similar sentiment, although perhaps not quite as strongly: "It is only natural that relations with Arab countries are easily made strong, because of the religious connection that already binds us together."[47] The visit must have been important and moving for the Indonesian leadership, because Vice-President Mohammad Hatta went so far as to use the name of Egypt's queen when naming his first child, born that month.[48]

The visit of Abdul Munim was also crucial because it allowed an Indonesian diplomatic delegation to get past a Dutch blockade and exit Indonesia in March 1947, en route to their first major international summit. Apparently the Egyptian diplomat had agreed to allow members of the Indonesian delegation to join him on the flight to Singapore, but he was surprised when 24 individuals (still not the whole delegation) were on board – well above the plane's listed capacity. Abdel Munim justified this by saying that the Indonesian delegation "consisted of very thin and light men"; the plane made it off the runway with some difficulty, but the delegation was able to start their journey to India to attend the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi.[49]

Although participation in the Asian Relations Conference was a significant moment for Indonesia, the conference did not focus on Indonesia's independence; the tenor of the meeting was general anticolonialism and promotion of pan-Asian solidarity. Indonesia's participation increased its diplomatic profile abroad, including solidifying relations with India, a state that proved a major supporter in the United Nations. Importantly, though, Indonesia was only able to send a delegation because of the support provided by the Arab League envoy to get the

[46] Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, 27–28.

[47] Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, 194. The full speeches of both Abdul Munim and Sukarno were reprinted in the official English-language propaganda of the Republic of Indonesia: *Voice of Free Indonesia*, #62 (April 12, 1947). See also Zuhri, *Guruku Orang-Orang dari Pesantren*, 357.

[48] The full name was Meutia Farida Hatta, after Queen Farida of Egypt. Personal communication with Halida Hatta, June 17, 2013.

[49] Sastroamidjojo, *Milestones on My Journey*, 134–135. A full account of the Asian Relations Conference can be found in *Asian Relations, Being Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March–April, 1947* (New Delhi: Asian Relations Organization, 1948).

diplomats past the Dutch blockade – thus again making Islamic connections critical in the development of Indonesian diplomacy. In the wake of the conference, relations with Arab states again took center stage, as Junior Foreign Minister H. Agus Salim traveled onward from Delhi to the Middle East to engage in state-to-state diplomacy.

In the Middle East, Salim secured the de jure recognition of the Republic of Indonesia by several Arab governments, starting with Egypt. The treaty signed on June 10, 1947, included articles to protect the friendship between the two countries, to protect mutual peace, to establish diplomatic relations, and to make a temporary trade treaty, to be followed by a permanent commerce treaty soon afterward.[50] Although the treaty makes no explicit mention of Islam or shared cultural values, the Indonesian delegate was one of the country's diplomats who was known for supporting Islamic solidarity. Salim was closely aligned with the Islamic party in Indonesia, Masjumi; had led the Sarekat Islam at various phases as both a social movement and political party; and had strong Islamic beliefs and experience in the Middle East dating back to his own time working in the Dutch consulate in Jeddah 30 years earlier.[51] More explicit was the response by the Egyptian prime minister at the time, who said when receiving Salim and his delegation, "as a state based in Islam, there is no other choice [for Egypt] but to support the struggle of the Indonesian people who are also Muslim."[52] This bond was forged not only in mutual anticolonial interests, but specifically in a context of Islamic brotherhood.

After the treaty with Egypt, H. Agus Salim continued his travels around the Arab world, securing recognition in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq in the months of June and July 1947.[53] Working with other diplomats, Saudi Arabia and Yemen followed with recognition within the next year.[54] All these formal recognitions were crucial for Indonesia to prevent the Dutch from denying international status to the Indonesian conflict (especially before the United Nations). Indonesia did not expect military support from its new allies, but diplomatic support in seeking an

[50] Official copies of this treaty in Indonesian, Arabic, and French can be found in ANRI RA10, Djodja Documenten, #15 "Surat perjanjian persahabatan antara Republik Indonesia dengan negara kerajaan Mesir tanggal 10 Juni 1947."

[51] On Salim's previous time in the Middle East and his Islamic nationalism, see Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia*, 181–189.

[52] Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, 27–28, quoting from A. R. Baswedan, "Catatan dan Kenangan," in *Sekitar Perjanjian Persahabatan Indonesia-Mesir Tahun 1947* (Jakarta: Panitia Peringatan HUT ke-32 Perjanjian Persahabatan Indonesia-Mesir, 1978), 59.

[53] "Indonesians Form a 'Peace' Cabinet," *New York Times*, July 4, 1947; Leifer, 150–151.

[54] Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, 27. Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution*, 263.

internationally mediated solution was at the forefront of the young state's thinking.

It is also important to note that the move toward formal relations did not mean that the tradition of activism from the Indonesian student community in Cairo was lost. The first Indonesian Ambassador to Egypt, H. M. Rasjidi, had been a student in Cairo in the 1930s, and had even served as a commissioner of Perpindom when the organization was created (at the merger of two earlier Indonesian organizations) in 1937.[55] In January 1946, Rasjidi had been appointed Indonesia's first minister of religion, but he moved out of this role fairly soon and started working for the foreign ministry.[56] When H. Agus Salim came to Cairo in 1947, Rasjidi was appointed as the official representative of the Republic of Indonesia for Egypt and Saudi Arabia.[57] Nor was Rasjidi the only former student in Indonesia's new, official diplomatic office in Cairo; Fu'ad Fakhreddin, who had come from West Sumatra to Cairo to study in 1928 and had married an Egyptian woman, was absorbed into Indonesia's local diplomatic office upon its establishment.[58]

From 1945 and 1946, when the cause of Indonesian diplomacy in the Arab world had been led by societal initiatives by Muslim student activists, Indonesia's support among Arab Muslim countries grew to concrete and formal relations in 1947. Thus, the de jure recognition that did not couch itself in Islamic terms was still built on the foundation of "Islamic brotherhood" propaganda and support from Islamically-minded politicians, and the Islamic influence in diplomacy often spilled over into the speeches or writings of these leaders.

Conclusion

Most studies of Indonesia's early foreign policy highlight the role of the United Nations,[59] or solidarity from India and Australia who put the Indonesian question to the Security Council and thus forced the

[55] Jafizham, *Studenten Indonesia di Mesir*, 88. For a fuller biography of Rasjidi, see Azra, "H.M. Rasjidi, BA."

[56] Rasjidi's official transfer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was only executed in January 1948, after he had already been working with Foreign Affairs for some time; ANRI RA6, Sekretariat Negara RI 1945–1949, #574 "Presiden RI: Surat Keputusan No. 1/P.CIV/48 tgl. 12 Januari 1948 tentang pemberhentian dengan hormat H. Rasjidi dari jabatannya sebagai Sekretaris Jenderal Kementerian Agama."

[57] H. M. Tahir Azhary, "In Memoriam: Almarhum Prof. Dr. H.M. Rasjidi (1915–2001): Birokrat Muslim, Diplomat dan Pemikir Islam," in *Bunga Rampai Hukum Islam* (Jakarta: Ind-Hill-Co, 2003), ix.

[58] Abaza, *Islamic Education*, 83.

[59] Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations*.

Netherlands into formal negotiations.[60] Of course, it is important to recognize Indonesia's recourse to international mediation because of the precedent it set. As Samuel Crowl has noted, "Indonesians were the first colonial subjects to successfully use diplomacy as a weapon against a colonial power in an independence struggle."[61] The new United Nations Organization took up Indonesia's case in plenary debates in 1947, and the UN-created "Committee of Good Offices" facilitated negotiations between Dutch and Indonesian representatives leading to the final settlement in 1949. However, Western powers did not recognize the Indonesian Republic, and even India and Australia only recognized the Republic's de facto control of certain territories.[62] Their moves to internationalize the conflict would not have been possible without the de jure recognition of Arab countries in 1947. It was the connection with the Arab League, Egypt, and other countries in the region that laid the foundation for Indonesia's success at the United Nations. Arab recognition of Indonesian independence denied the Netherlands the ability to claim that the revolution was merely an "internal" affair in which other countries could not intervene. Indonesia's relations with these Arab states, in turn, were built on the foundation of Islamic brotherhood, first put forward by Indonesian Muslim student activists in the region and strengthened by Arab statesmen like Azzam Pasha.

As the case was carried to the United Nations by other countries, Arab and Muslim actors remained supportive, but less actively involved. In December 1948, after a second Dutch military aggression (called by the Dutch side a "Police Action"), the Arab League called on the Security Council to step in and stop the violence.[63] In March 1949, the Arab League resolved to congratulate Nehru for his work on Indonesian advocacy.[64] At this stage though, Arab countries did not take the lead after 1948 because of the diplomatic crisis in their own neighborhood: the creation of the state of Israel.[65]

From 1945 to 1947, when Islam was frequently invoked as the basis for Arab support of Indonesia, this policy did not come from the newly

[60] Crowl, "Indonesian's Diplomatic Revolution"; Simon Boeke, "'Australia's Near North': The Dutch-Australian Political Clash over Indonesia, 1945–1948," Master's thesis, Leiden University, 2017.
[61] Crowl, "Indonesian's Diplomatic Revolution," 238.
[62] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 196–197; Crowl, "Indonesian's Diplomatic Revolution," 244–245.
[63] "Arabs Back Indonesia," *New York Times*, December 22, 1948.
[64] Egyptian Society of International Law, *Egypt and the United Nations*, 75.
[65] For more on the changing position of the Arab countries after 1947, see Kevin W. Fogg, "Islam in Indonesia's Foreign Policy, 1945–1949," *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 53, 2 (2015): 324–329.

independent government or its formal representatives. Instead, Islam was deployed by societal groups at some distance from the state (both ideologically and geographically). The ability of Indonesian student and scholars in the Middle East to act independently was partially born of their isolation from the Indonesian state, but the interpretation of the revolutionary struggle that they put forward sounded much like an interpretation that circulated within Indonesian society: a Muslim people struggling against colonialism to respond to the imperatives of Islam. Although this vision was not embraced by secular nationalist leaders like Sukarno, Hatta, and Sutan Sjahrir, it was accommodated in the context of Islamic diplomacy because it was effective at achieving Indonesia's foreign policy goals. This demonstrates how the grassroots vision of Islam was not entirely locked out of Indonesian state policy.

The balance between society and the state during the revolution was unusual; very rarely can grassroots activists execute diplomacy as the Indonesian students did in the 1940s. While the Indonesian state largely kept Islamic nationalism at bay, and the major developments among Islamic politicians were among Islamic institutions, rather than the core of the new government, diplomacy is a unique realm where Islam played a significant – although rarely recognized – role in the establishment of independent Indonesia.

Conclusion

Harsono Tjokroaminoto, heir to the leading family in Islamic politics and a major national player himself, reflected in an interview 35 years after the revolution about what independence meant for Indonesia. He warned young Indonesians, who had not lived through the revolution, "not to ascribe any meaning to our independence other than the original hope, from the time when the nation … fought for our independence." He feared that a new generation could come along and turn the country in a direction "that was different from or even opposed to the nation and country as imagined by our Founding Fathers in the past."[1]

Harsono overlooks in this quote the fact that many different ideas and meanings about Indonesia's freedom were held by those men and women who fought for the country's independence. Even among pious Muslims, there were different Islamic ideas that fueled the fight for a free Indonesia, between the grassroots level in the war of independence and national elites in the political revolution. Across the decades of independence, these Islamic visions and the struggle by Muslims to implement them during the revolution have been invoked in continuing attempts to promote Islam in Indonesia's national life. The assertions of a religious ideology (grassroots or elite) of the revolution have been sidelined or erased by a secular nationalist narrative, what Anthony Reid called "the cocoon of bland national myth,"[2] but the Islamic ideology continues to spring up from the pious Muslim community, still promoting an Islamic future for their country. Even though Muslims who fought for Islam in the revolution did not accomplish everything they wanted with the independent Indonesian state, their struggle during the revolution has left indelible prints on Indonesia ever since. Both in politics and in social life, the place of Islam in Indonesia today shows precedents set down in the 1940s.

[1] Oral history of Harsono Tjokroaminoto, interviewed by Wardiningsih, ANRI SL1 1982 #60, tape 10 (dated May 15, 1982).
[2] Reid, *Blood of the People*, xvii.

Invoking the Revolution

In the years after the Dutch transferred sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949, many different people tried to "give a meaning to independence" – often sharply different meanings based on their own understandings and experiences of the fight. Many of these have now been forgotten, with the Indonesian government's official history of the revolution "overlaying … and increasingly replacing" private, partisan, or family memories of it.[3] The decade following the revolution, though, was a time when the revolution was ever present in political speeches and important for justifying a party's or individual's position. Thus, the Muslim community – in particular, Islamic political elites – tried in various ways to invoke its revolutionary pedigree and bend the state toward their Islamic vision, without too much success. The ideology that was reflected in later commentaries was almost always the revolutionary Islamic ideology of the national elites, and no mention was made of the contrary positions held by Muslim fighters at the grassroots; this is keeping with the general law that the "little tradition" is more easily erased from recorded history.[4] Still, these invocations shine a light on one side of Muslim interpretations of the revolution and its importance, and they were certainly heard (and probably in broad strokes supported) by Muslims at the grassroots.

In the period of parliamentary democracy just following the revolution, Islamic leaders often framed arguments in terms of what Muslims had earned by fighting. Ulama, after drawing so many Muslim fighters to defend the cause, had reasonable expectations that they would be rewarded with appreciation and status once Indonesia's independence was achieved. In the 1950s, this expectation arose in different ways in different places, but leadership and recruitment during the revolution were common refrains to justify them.[5] These expectations were unmet, though. As early as 1950, Islamic politicians were bemoaning the lack of attention from the government to their community. Isa Anshary, a firebrand Masjumi politician and scholar based in West Java, epitomized this trend when he whipped up party members with speeches saying that "the

[3] Anthony Reid, "Remembering and Forgetting War and Revolution" in Mary S. Zurbuchen, ed., *Beginning to Remember: The Past in the Indonesian Present* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 173.

[4] Scott, "Protest and Profanation," 219.

[5] See the letter of Col. M. Dahlan Djambek to Bung Tomo, ANRI RA14, Konstituante 1956–59 #315, for a representative example; Dahlan Djambek was the son of a leading Muslim cleric in West Sumatra, Syekh Djamil Djambek.

Government does not value the service of the Muslim community" in the revolution.[6] Islamic veterans' associations also formed to apply pressure on certain issues of collective interest, but they did not achieve any concessions for pious Muslim veterans or a greater place for Islam in the state.[7]

The one part of the new government that did respond very well to these pleas was the Ministry of Religion. The ministry not only endorsed calls to treat Muslim veterans better and to support Islam, but also doubled-down on the narrative that Islam played a role in achieving independence. Instead of limiting the narrative to just the revolution of 1945–1949, the ministry claimed an even lengthier pedigree: "this struggle for independence already started in preceding centuries and has originated from the desire and the expectation that in a free and independent state religious matters can be better taken care of."[8] The bulk of the government, though, did not embrace the idea that the revolution – or any previous periods of anticolonial struggle – were driven by religious concerns.

Leading up to the national elections of 1955, the invocations of the revolution took a particularly partisan turn. Election pamphlets like *This Is My Platform* and *Masjumi, Supporter of the Republic of Indonesia* sought to convince readers that an Islamic party should have their vote because "The Islamic community formed the greatest contribution to the struggle for Indonesia's independence"[9] and the Muslims "accepted the call of the Divine word, the call of *jihad* in His way and they enthusiastically and happily sacrificed their belongings and risked their lives" to achieve freedom.[10] Masjumi, PSII, and NU all campaigned on the platform that Muslim contributions leading the fight for independence in Islamic

[6] ANRI RA9, Kabinet Perdana Menteri RI Yogyakarta 1949–1950, #67, "Ichtisar Rapat para Kepala P.A.M. Djawa Barat bersama J.M. Menteri Pertahanan di Gubernuran pada tanggal 26 Djuni 1950."

[7] These groups included the Persatuan Pedjuang Islam Bekas Bersendjata Seluruh Indonesia and the Ikatan Bekas Pejuang Islam (IKABEPI). See ANRI RA11, Kabinet Presiden RI 1950–1959, #980, "Ikatan Bekas Pejuang Islam (IKABEPI): Surat pernyataan tanggal 30 Juli 1954, 2 Maret 1957 tentang penolakan pembentukan pengawal pemilu," and #991, "Persatuan Pejuang Islam Bekas Bersenjata Seluruh Indoensia Darah Jabar: Surat pernyataan tanggal 25 September 1955 tentang pelanggaran larangan untuk mengadakan rapat raksasa dalam menghadapi pemilu." See also George McTurnan Kahin Papers, #14-27-3146, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library, Box 56, Folder "Islam, 1953–54."

[8] Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, 231, quoting a Ministry of Religion report.

[9] Pusat Komite Aksi Pemilihan Umum Masjumi, *Masjumi Pendukung Republik Indonesia* (Jakarta: Partai Politik Masjumi, [1954?]), 12.

[10] K. H. Taufiqurrahman and Moh. Natsir, *Inilah Chittahku* (Jakarta: Penerangan Pimpinan Partai Masjumi, 1953), 3.

terms should be rewarded with the leadership of the country's government.

Although Islamic parties did not succeed in winning a majority in the 1955 elections, they continued to put forward the revolution as their justification for Islamic proposals in the Constitutional Assembly of 1956–1959, where delegates debated again the possibility of Islam as the foundation of the state. The politicians who represented Islamic interests in this body put forward many arguments for why Islam should be made the foundation of the state; in addition to the sweeping claims that Islam would be best for Indonesia and bring the country prosperity, two arguments were based on revolutionary justification.

First, members of the Constitutional Assembly argued that pious Muslims had sacrificed the most in the revolution and that Islam had been the key motivator for those participating in the revolution. Natsir argued that during the revolution, leaders

> used the rallying words of the holy war to move the hearts and emotions of the people to fight to expel the oppressor during our revolution for independence. We all know the result. This call to war would not have had so great an affect [*sic*] had not the fiery spirit of the holy warriors been burning still in the hearts of the people. That is the people who under the leadership of the ulama were taught by their religion to wage holy war.[11]

The Islamic activist Hamka, like the earlier Ministry of Religion narrative, saw all the Muslim rebels against the Dutch colonial regime in previous centuries as fighting for an Islamic state (in exactly the form he was propounding in the Constitutional Assembly, by happy coincidence), and the Muslims fighting in the revolution as direct heirs to that tradition.[12] Isa Anshary joined in this line of argumentation, saying that because Muslims fought in the revolution to get an Islamic state, that is the type of constitution that should be crafted.[13] Wahab Chasbullah from NU also pointed to the struggle for religion as a key part of Indonesia's war of independence; he reckoned that "surely the Islamic people who were victims [of the revolutionary war] were no less than 80%."[14] Even Anwar Sutan Amiruddin, from the minor Islamic party PPTI (Partai

[11] Natsir's speech, translated by Kath Williams, in Margaret Bocquet-Siek and Robert Cribb, eds., *Islam and the Panca Sila* (North Queensland: James Cook University, 1991), 23.

[12] Hamka in Wilopo, ed., *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante*, vol. 3, 56–60.

[13] Isa Anshary in Wilopo, ed., *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante*, vol. 2, 200–201.

[14] Wahab Chasbullah in Wilopo, ed., *Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante*, vol. 3, 344.

Politik Tharikat Islam), at one of the final meetings of the Constitutional Assembly, took pains to recount one by one the names of the Islamic militias that had fought for Indonesia's independence during the revolution.[15] These arguments about the great Islamic contributions to the revolution and independence were not successful in swaying minds, though; many members from non-Islamic parties must have felt that their revolutionary pedigrees (with very different ideologies) were equally strong.

Second, those members who had also been active in politics at the start of the revolution said that Islam should have been the country's foundation all along – they felt tricked or cheated by the political outcome of August 1945. Zainal Arifin of NU, for example, identified Islam as the foundation of Sukarno's ideology of Pancasila as unveiled in 1945, and so "acceptance of Islam means we have returned to our original Foundation, which is in accord with the Indonesian character and identity."[16] The argument decrying the historical erasure of Islam during the revolution was taken furthest by Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, one of the members of the Committee of Nine that agreed on the Jakarta Charter before it got removed from the Constitution at the last minute. He called the resultant Pancasila a "neutered" version, saying "what had been an agreement was intentionally betrayed."[17] Against the nationalists who decried the Islamic parties for breaking the "Gentleman's Agreement" of 1945 by demanding an Islamic state, Muzakkir insisted "firmly I say to you that if someone talks about betrayal of a pact called a 'Gentleman's Agreement,' then the side that betrayed it was not our side, the Islamic side, but rather the side that changed it, i.e., the ones that erased the essential formulation regarding Islam," meaning the Jakarta Charter.[18] For this reason, he called for a reinstitution of the Jakarta Charter or, better yet, acceptance of Islam as the foundation of the state. In the end, no amount of invoking the revolution was effective at swaying the other side in the Constitutional Assembly debate; with the body still in disagreement over the foundation of the state in July 1959, President Sukarno unilaterally disbanded the duly elected assembly and made the 1945 Constitution

[15] This speech was made not during the main debate on the foundation of the state, but rather in the closing debates of the assembly in May 1959. ANRI RA11, Kabinet Presiden RI 1950–1959, #1467, "Pemandangan Umum Babak ke-II SDR ANWAR SUTAN AMIRUDDIN."

[16] Zainal Arifin's speech, translated by Kath Williams, in Bocquet-Siek and Cribb, eds., 34.

[17] Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, "Pidato Prof. H. Abdul Kahar Muzakkir," in Yusran R., ed., *Debat Dasar Negara: Islam dan Pancasila, Konstituante 1957* (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 2001), 95.

[18] Muzakkir, "Pidato Prof. H. Abdul Kahar Muzakkir," 96.

(without the Jakarta Charter) the permanent legal foundation of Indonesia.

After 1960, the use of the revolution as a justification for a more Islamic Indonesia was decidedly less common. Masjumi as a party was disbanded by the government for its supposed sympathy with a regional rebellion,[19] and President Sukarno increasingly aggregated all Revolutionary bona fides to himself with his title "Great Leader of the Revolution."[20] After 1965, the participation of Muslim groups in the elimination of the supposed Communist threat became a more current justification for political patronage,[21] and the new regime of General-cum-President Suharto constructed a narrative of the revolution that revolved exclusively around the army.[22]

This did not mean that Muslim contributions to the revolution were entirely erased, however – some had even been written into Indonesia's human geography. Mosques in several regions have been named "Masjid Shuhada" (Martyrs' Mosque) in reference to the revolution, and there is even a village in Luwu, South Sulawesi, that has taken the name Syuhada '45 (the Martyrs of 1945), in honor of the Muslims who lost their lives fighting in an Islamic way.[23]

The real re-emergence of invocations of the Islamic side of the revolution came after the fall of Suharto in 1998. Islamic parties revived the Jakarta Charter debate, but their efforts to amend the constitution were unsuccessful.[24] In conservative publications from the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia and others, Muslim authors argued for Indonesia to become an Islamic state, and revolutionary heritage was part of their thinking.[25] Even in recent years, Islamic groups have pointed to their major contributions during the revolution. In 2017, the head of NU

[19] Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, 274–284.

[20] Sukarno did this much to the annoyance of Islamic leaders who had spent time in the jungle as revolutionaries; oral history with Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, interviewed by J. R. Caniago, ANRI SL1 1979 #6, tape 6.

[21] Fealy and McGregor, "Nahdlatul Ulama and the Kinngs of 1965–66," 50.

[22] Katherine E. McGregor, *History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007).

[23] The village is in Luwu Regency, a few kilometers south of Padangsappa along the Jalan Poros Palopo-Belopa. Interview with Umar Masri, Syuhada '45, Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 3, 2010. Many of the mosques named after the so-called Martyrs of '45 were located at places where guerilla fighters had died fighting the Dutch. See, e.g., Iqbal, "Menyulut Api di Padang Ilalang: Pidato Politik Soekarno di Amuntai 27 January 1953," 53, about such a mosque in Sungai Durian, South Kalimantan.

[24] R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, "Indonesian Democracy: From Transition to Consolidation" in Mirjam Künkler and Alfred Stepan, eds., *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 30.

[25] Feener, *Muslim Legal Thought*, chapter 5.

decried the creep of radical groups in Indonesia, groups who "had never participated in struggling to free Indonesia from colonialism, like the kyais of NU and the leaders of Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam, who participated in bringing the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia into existence."[26] On the other side of the spectrum, the arch-conservative online news outlet *EraMuslim* in 2015 bemoaned the Indonesian government's supposed anti-Muslim slant, writing "This country's government is truly discriminatory against the Islamic community, for a long time now. This despite the fact that the country was liberated, made independent, with cries of faith, Allahu Akbar, and the spirit of fighting in the way of God (*jihad fi sabilillah*). The government has forgotten history."[27]

Considering how many voices have argued in the eight decades since the revolution for an Islamic interpretation of the conflict, it is striking that this has not been studied academically before.

Impact of the Revolution

Of course, the revolution led to an independent Indonesia, but it also indelibly shaped the nature of the country it birthed. For religion in Indonesia, there were both social and political consequences of the revolution, many of which have ongoing impacts to this day.

Social Impact

In society, the revolution bred greater division between pious Muslims and others, but within the pious Muslim community it contributed to a new wave of piety. M. C. Ricklefs has argued that the revolution was a time when the lines between pious Muslims and others on Java were calcified, formally politicized, and enforced through violence (most notably in acts of social revolution, like the Madiun Revolt in 1948).[28] He is right that identity was formed by way of negative contrast, when pious Muslims defined their identity as against the Dutch or against other Indonesians, but that was not the only way. A pious, Muslim,

[26] "Kiai NU Diminta Lebih Aktif," *Kompas*, January 12, 2017, 5.

[27] "Andai Gereja Papua yang Dibakar, Tentu Densus-88, Jokowi, JK, dan Lainnya Akan Turun Langsung ke Papua," *EraMuslim: Media Islam Rujukan*, 4 Syawwal 1436/July 20, 2015, www.eramuslim.com/berita/nasional/andai-gereja-papua-yang-dibakar-tentu-densus-88-jokowi-jk-dan-lainnya-akan-turun-langsung-ke-papua.htm (accessed July 21, 2015).

[28] Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents*, 69. Menchik has argued that the trend began earlier, in the 1930s; Menchik, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia*, chapter 3.

Indonesian identity was also forged by Muslims positively working toward common goals in the revolution. The experiences of the mass organization-aligned collective kitchen, or Islamic militia training, or collective prayer for the specific goal of independence were more common during this period than attacks on non-Muslim groups in acts of social revolution. Both conflict (with non-Muslims or nonpious Muslims) and cooperation (with other pious Muslims) contributed to the formation of a sharper sense of identity as pious Muslims, as *santri*, with a clearer set of common experiences and articulated Islamic goals for the nation. This period of clear-cut boundary lines between pious Muslims and others set up the starkly divided society that Geertz observed in the 1950s and also facilitated further communal tension in the late 1950s and 1960s.[29]

As the pious Muslim community became more insular in the wake of the revolution, it also emphasized different practices and understandings that were more in line with ideas found in the Middle East. This was a trend already noted in the first half of the twentieth century, but the revolution and its aftermath were a catalyst for further convergence on textual, nonsyncretic forms of Islam. The coordinating role that mass organizations had in overseeing Muslim efforts in the revolution laid the groundwork for their continuing importance into the 1950s; these organizations also promoted specific practices and beliefs that they asserted as orthoprax and orthodox.

The drive toward new visions of orthodoxy was also spurred by the new Ministry of Religion. This happened first through the ministry's prerogative to install Muslim officials in each region overseeing the practice and teaching of Islam. Those ministry officials had the authority and the power to influence how Muslims understood and practiced their religion, and they were not only chosen for their beliefs but also had an employment incentive to toe a ministry line on the faith, thus spreading "official" ideas of Islam more widely.[30] The ministry officials could also use the power of the purse to pull Islamic schools toward more desired positions. In the wake of the revolution, when so many Islamic

[29] Fealy and McGregor, "Nahdlatul Ulama and the Kinngs of 1965–66"; H. Abdul Mun'im DZ, *Benturan NU-PKI, 1948–1965* (Depok: PBNU bekerja sama dengan Langgar Swadaya Nusantara, 2013).

[30] Ichwan, 7. For more on the early regulation of religion by the Indonesian Ministry of Religion, see Kevin W. Fogg, "Defining and Regulating Religion in Early Independent Indonesia," in J. L. Neo, A. A. Jamal and D. P. S. Goh, eds., *Regulating Religion in Asia: Norms, Modes and Challenges* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Jeremy Menchik, "The Co-Evolution of Sacred and Secular: Islamic Law and Family Planning in Indonesia," *South East Asia Research* 22, 3 (2014): 359–378.

institutions saw their physical infrastructure destroyed, the ministry held the prerogative to disburse grants for rebuilding Islamic schools or funding their students, and it was not shy in laying out preconditions for that kind of support.[31]

Political Impact

The Ministry of Religion's impact was not only social, though; it also became a major political player. The ministry provided reliable, well-paid employment for a large segment of the clerical class, individuals who otherwise did not have a place in the government of the independent country. With so many positions to fill, the ministry also formed an important location for patronage by Islamic parties in the 1950s and beyond – so much so that ministers even became embarrassed by this phenomenon (although no one was successful in stemming its tide).[32] NU and Muhammadiyah, especially, engaged in a drawn-out conflict over the control of the ministry.

As the ulama were solidifying their positions in the new Ministry of Religion, laypeople were consolidating their hold over Islamic politics. This was a new turn during the revolution – very different from the leaders raised up by the Japanese. Still, the precedent held, especially in Masjumi and in successor organizations that have claimed its mantel. Even in Indonesia's new democratic era after the fall of Suharto, the majority of leaders in Islamic political parties are laypeople without serious theological training.

Another political consequence of the revolution was the importance of mass Islamic organizations, and the confluence of these organizations with specific political parties. They mobilized fighters on the ground, but also formed the touchstone for identities up to the highest levels of politics. Prior to the revolution, Islamic mass organizations and Islamic political parties had functioned separately, but the creation of "extraordinary member" status in Masjumi brought them firmly into the constellation of politics. In the 1950s, this would become even more

[31] Arsip Aceh, Koleksi Lhok'nga, 1934–1952, #56 "Berkas sehubungan dengan permintaan jatah Sekolah dan Murid Sekolah rendah Islam yang terdapat dalam Kenegerian Lho'nga Leupung (tahun 1948)"; Arsip Sulawesi Selatan, Koleksi 11, Kantor Wilayah Departemen Agama Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan, Periode Tahun 1947–1990, #33 Letter of Sekretaris Djenderal, Kementerian Agama RI, Djakarta, April 16, 1957.

[32] An example from 1951 can be seen in ANRI RB16, Djamal Marsudi, #22, "Surat Edaran dari Menteri Agama A. Wachid Hasyim kepada para Pengurus Besar Organisasi-organisasi Islam mengenai Semangat Konco-System dan kepartaian."

entrenched, with Muhammadiyah becoming indistinguishable from Masjumi in some regions, and other mass organizations being formed at the urging of political figures.[33]

The alignment of mass organizations with political parties, begun during the revolution, exacerbated another trend begun in those same years: party fractures within the Islamic bloc. The scramble for patronage and position between different mass organizations affiliated with a party could lead to contention, as it did increasingly between Muhammadiyah and NU within the body of Masjumi. In 1952, NU broke off from Masjumi to form its own independent party, in a political earthquake that has been the focus of much scholarship.[34] This event should not be removed from the context of the previous offshoots of Muslim parties, particularly the PSII split in 1947. Like the PSII, which split so as to take up positions in a new cabinet, NU also broke with Masjumi over cabinet positions, although the structural instability of "extraordinary member" status had been causing problems since the revolution ended and NU-aligned ulama felt sidelined from policy and personnel decisions. Furthermore, NU explicitly cited its revolutionary pedigree when agreeing on the exit, saying at the 1952 conference, that NU "had contributed to the founding of the Republic of Indonesia through its involvement in the various boards and committees which drafted the constitution and prepared for independence. Many thousands of its members later gave their lives in defending the Republic during the Revolution. To abstain from a role in the affairs of state was seen as forsaking the ideals and sacrifices of a generation of NU members."[35]

Herbert Feith noted that Indonesia's revolution "was a peculiarly central personal experience for all those who were actively involved in it."[36] The revolution was much more than this, though; it is an important case of anticolonial revolution, a precedent-setting moment of international diplomacy in the twentieth century, and – as this book has shown – religion in revolution. Islam as system of beliefs was an important motivator for Muslim participants in Indonesia's revolution, but there was not a unified Islamic revolutionary ideology for all of them. Instead, the discourse and actions of pious Muslims at the grassroots – open to radicalism, open to the supernatural, and locally framed – differed from the ideology of Islamic elites – rational, modern, textual,

[33] For more detail on this point, see Fogg, "The Fate of Muslim Nationalism in Independent Indonesia," 304–311.
[34] Fealy, "Ulama and Politics in Indonesia," chapter 3; Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, 80–97; and Madinier, 135–146 are the most important accounts.
[35] Fealy, "Ulama and Politics in Indonesia," 99.
[36] Feith, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, 18.

and internationally influenced. Even though both levels were truly and thoroughly Islamic, their vision of the revolution diverged. The very fact that two, substantially different ideologies of Islamic revolution coexisted in one struggle forces broader evaluation of the ways that religion is deployed in divergent ways as a revolutionary ideology.

For Harsono Tjokroaminoto, the PSII leader whose quote opened this conclusion, and for Muslim veterans who fought on the ground, their Islamic ideologies of the revolution remained unattained in the Indonesian state. As the PSII stated at its 1953 Congress, "[I]ndependence is not a goal. The independence of the nation and state, for us, is just a kind of absolute relationship in which we can begin to work out the true achievement of our goal. The goal is the glory and happiness of all our community, morally and physically, with the implementation of God's just laws over the country of Indonesia."[37] Even if the revolution did not achieve this, understanding the perspectives of Muslims who held this goal illuminates the independence struggle in a different light. Recognizing other Islamic visions that focused less on law and more on community, complicate the picture of Islam in Indonesia and ideology in revolution. As many Muslims in Indonesia today articulate religious aspirations for their country, initial attempts to establish the country along more Islamic lines should not be forgotten. Although religious understandings did not represent the majority of Indonesians then or now, pious Muslims at the grassroots and elite levels must be understood to see the full picture of Indonesia and the country's revolution.

[37] Message of the Madjelis Tahkim to the 1953 Congress of the PSII, in *Kongres P.S.I.I. ke-29*, 9.

Appendix: Oral History Sources

Date	Name	Gender	DOB	Interview Province	Interview Place
2006-06-01	Nazwir L. D. Simarajo	M	*1939	West Sumatra	Padang
2006-06-17	Bagindo Fahmi	M	*1936	West Sumatra	Padang
2006-06-18	Nurjani	F	*1923	West Sumatra	Lubuk Alung, Kab. Padang Pariaman
2006-06-18	Maryam Zunaria	F	*1930	West Sumatra	Sungai Abang, Kab. Padang Pariaman
2006-06-21	Rosliani binti Sabirin	F	*1935	West Sumatra	Padang Panjang
2006-06-21	Sutina binti Sabirin	F	*1945	West Sumatra	Padang Panjang
2006-06-21	Ir. Yusuf B.	M	*1934	West Sumatra	Padang Panjang
2006-06-21	Taufik Dt. Mangkuto Rajo	M	*1943	West Sumatra	Padang Panjang
2006-06-21	Zainal Abidin	M	*1925	West Sumatra	Bonjol, Kab. Pasaman
2006-06-22	Taufik	M	*1940	West Sumatra	Bonjol, Kab. Pasaman
2006-06-22	Ismael	M	*1926	West Sumatra	Bonjol, Kab. Pasaman
2007-07-10	H. Asbir Dt. Rajo Mangkuto	M	*1933	West Sumatra	Simarasok, Kab. Agam
2007-07-20	Darisun Rivai	M	1928-03-20	West Sumatra	Bukittinggi
2007-07-23	H. Zainal Kahar	M	*1934	West Sumatra	Padang
2007-07-24	Hj. Siti Zaliar	F	1938-06-08	West Sumatra	Padang
2007-07-26	Saleh Pakia Mangkuto	M	*1937	West Sumatra	Tanjung Alam, Kab. Tanah Datar
2007-07-29	Victor Siburian	M	1935-03-14	West Java	Cinere, Depok
2007-07-29	Lydia Merlingga Siburian	F	1947-03-25	West Java	Cinere, Depok
2008-03-21	Lela Rosma	F	1930-10-11	West Sumatra	Tujuh Koto Talago, Kab. 50 Koto

(*cont.*)

Date	Name	Gender	DOB	Interview Province	Interview Place
2009-06-20	Achmad Fauzie Natsir	M	*1944	West Java	Cinere, Depok
2009-06-27	Ucep Sulirrahman	M	1960-10-10	West Java	Cibadak
2009-10-24	Rumintang br. Sianturi	F	1916-3-28	North Sumatra	Medan
2009-10-26	Nur Ahmad Fadhil Lubis	M	1954-11-17	North Sumatra	Medan
2009-10-26	Jamaluddin Batubara	M	1939-05-25	North Sumatra	Medan
2010-01-13	Adnan Buyung Nasution	M	1934-07-20	DKI Jakarta	South Jakarta
2010-01-17	M. Thahir Azhari	M	1939-05-12	Banten	Ciputat
2010-01-17	M. Thahir Azhari	M		Banten	Ciputat
2010-02-03	H. Munir Zakaria, Tuanku nan Mudo	M	1923-12-19	West Sumatra	Bukittinggi
2010-02-05	Fakir Mohamad	M	1926-09-01	West Sumatra	Bukittinggi
2010-02-06	Darmis Kamaruddin	F	1938-12-03	West Sumatra	Bukittinggi
2010-02-11	Muhammad Said Dt. Tan Kebesaran	M	1925-07-01	West Sumatra	Bukittinggi
2010-02-12	Hj. Sanwar	F	1929-05-15	West Sumatra	Pandai Sikat, Kab. Tanah Datar
2010-03-15	Zainal Abidin	M	1938-03-05	Aceh	Sigli
2010-03-15	Said Abdul Gani	M	1920-04-01	Aceh	Sigli
2010-03-15	H. Teuku Nazaruddin	M	1938-07-01	Aceh	Sigli
2010-03-16	Cut Hawa	F	*1930	Aceh	Jeumpa, Kab. Pidie
2010-03-17	Abdurrahman Teuku Cek	M	*1922	Aceh	Banda Aceh
2010-04-15	Halongpon Tampubolon	M	1943-10-26	West Java	Cinere, Depok
2010-04-19	H. Anwar	M	1943-10-07	South Sulawesi	Makassar
2010-04-24	Andi Sindrang Tjago	M	1938-04-21	South Sulawesi	Makassar
2010-04-27	Andi Anton Pangeran	M	1945-08-21	South Sulawesi	Palopo

(*cont.*)

Date	Name	Gender	DOB	Interview Province	Interview Place
2010-04-27	K. H. Sjojah Opu Daeng Malongjo	M	*1908	South Sulawesi	Bua, Kab. Luwu
2010-04-30	Abdul Chalid U.A.	M	1944-07-13	South Sulawesi	Makassar
2010-06-01	Nofrizal	M	1954-11-30	South Sumatra	Palembang
2010-06-01	Abdullah Sani	M	1942-09-05	South Sumatra	Palembang
2010-06-03	K. H. M. Zen Syukri	M	1919-10-10	South Sumatra	Palembang
2010-06-04	H. Abdul Rais Saleh	M	1923-10-10	South Sumatra	Pagar Alam
2010-06-06	Binti Zaider Jasahan	F	1940-05-01	South Sumatra	Palembang
2010-06-07	Prof. H. Mochtar Effendy	M	1928-04-03	South Sumatra	Palembang
2010-06-07	T. G. K. H. Drs. M. Thoulun Abd. Rauf	M	1942-06-04	South Sumatra	Palembang
2010-06-11	H. Mas'oed Abidin	M	1935-08-11	West Sumatra	Padang
2010-06-14	Buya Mozhar	M	*1928	West Sumatra	Padang
2010-06-17	Yusral St. Bagindo	M	1942-06-30	West Sumatra	Padang
2010-06-17	Sarjan K	M	1917-03-03	West Sumatra	Padang
2010-06-17	Ajis	M	*1922	West Sumatra	Padang
2010-07-23	Abdul Hayyi Nu'man	M	1945-01-15	NTB	Mataram
2010-07-27	H. Jamiluddin Azhar	M	1930-12-19	NTB	Mataram
2010-07-27	Syafii Arifini	M	*1943	NTB	Praya, Kab. Lombok Tengah
2010-08-28	Ahmad J. D.	M	1939-08-17	NTB	Mataram
2010-08-28	Lalu Fathurrahman	M	1957-08-17	NTB	Pengujak, Kab. Lombok Tengah
2010-08-29	Hj. Raden Rorah Noeryaktien	F	1937-04-06	NTB	Mataram
2010-08-29	Abdurrahman Kuling	M	1947-02-13	NTB	Mataram
2010-08-29	Syamsuddin Anwar	M	1946-06-25	NTB	Mataram

(*cont.*)

Date	Name	Gender	DOB	Interview Province	Interview Place
2010-08-29	Drs. H. L. Mudjtahid	M	1938-09-08	NTB	Mataram
2010-09-20	Adnan Iskandar	M	*1929	South Kalimantan	Banjarmasin
2010-09-20	Muhammad Suriansyah Ideham	M	1927-06-01	South Kalimantan	Banjarmasin
2010-09-21	H. Sjarifuddin	M	1935-10-11	South Kalimantan	Banjarmasin
2010-09-21	Hj. Soerliani Djohansyah	F	1930-01-21	South Kalimantan	Banjarmasin
2010-09-23	H. M. Irsyad Zein	M	1936-05-07	South Kalimantan	Kec. Martapura Timur, Kab. Banjar
2010-09-26	H. Saifulkan Angai	M	*1930	South Kalimantan	Marabahan, Kab. Barito Kuala
2010-09-26	H. Arkani	M	*1931	South Kalimantan	Marabahan, Kab. Barito Kuala
2010-09-26	Junaidi Murid	M	1938-08-06	South Kalimantan	Marabahan, Kab. Barito Kuala
2010-09-27	K. H. Birhasani	M	1921-09-27	South Kalimantan	Banjarmasin
2010-09-28	H. Ali Assegaf	M	1929-05-12	South Kalimantan	Banjarmasin
2010-09-28	Habib Hasan bin Abdurrahman al-Habsyi	M	1942-03-04	South Kalimantan	Banjarmasin
2010-09-29	Habib Agil bin Salim Bahsin	M	1942-11-06	South Kalimantan	Banjarmasin
2010-09-29	H. Muhammad Ramli bin Abdurrahman	M	1940-05-10	South Kalimantan	Banjarmasin
2010-10-03	Umar Masri	M	1929-12-31	South Sulawesi	Ponrang, Kab. Luwu
2010-10-11	Sayyid Saggaf al-Jufri	M	1937-08-17	Central Sulawesi	Palu
2010-10-12	K. H. Abd Salam Thahir	M	1924-10-25	Central Sulawesi	Palu
2010-10-12	Sharifa Sajida binti Idrus al-Jufri	F	1937-08-15	Central Sulawesi	Palu

(*cont.*)

Date	Name	Gender	DOB	Interview Province	Interview Place
2013-07-29	H. Abdul Bashir Marjudo	M	1948-12-18	Central Sulawesi	Palu
2013-07-29	H. Mohammad Godal	M	1949-05-05	Central Sulawesi	Palu
2013-07-29	Sa'diya binti Sheikh Bahmid	F	*1946	Central Sulawesi	Palu
2016-09-22	H. Ruslan	M	*1944	NTB	Gelang, Kab. Lombok Timur
2016-09-22	Hj. Siti Hudusiyyah	F	1937-12-19	NTB	Kelayu, Kab. Lombok Timur
2016-09-23	T. G. Taisir	M	*1944	NTB	Kab. Lombok Tengah
2016-10-04	T. G. H. M. Yusuf Ma'mun	M	*1950	NTB	Pancor, Kab. Lombok Timur
2016-11-13	Dahlan Tangkadere	M	1945-03-01	Central Sulawesi	Palu
2016-11-14	Hafsah S. Pattah	F	1951-01-19	Central Sulawesi	Palu
2016-11-19	K. H. Salim Daeng Masuka	M	1955-12-09	Central Sulawesi	Palu
2016-11-19	Hafizuddin Thompo	M	1952-02-18	Central Sulawesi	Palu
2016-11-26	K. H. Daud Towandu	M	1938-08-19	Central Sulawesi	Marantale, Kab. Parigi Moutong
2016-11-26	H. Muhammad Abduh H. Laraga	M	1938-02-25	Central Sulawesi	Marantale, Kab. Parigi Moutong
2016-11-26	Hj. Nurein	F	1950-01-29	Central Sulawesi	Marantale, Kab. Parigi Moutong
2017-02-21	Edy Zuhrawardi Pane	M	*1955	North Sumatra	Medan
2017-02-23	Hj. Rolina Silitonga	F	1944-05-05	North Sumatra	Medan
2017-02-24	H. Yahya Tanjung	M	1939-01-22	North Sumatra	Medan
2017-02-27	Nizar Syarif	M	1944-11-23	North Sumatra	Medan
2017-02-27	Usman Batubara	M	1950-08-10	North Sumatra	Medan

(*cont.*)

Date	Name	Gender	DOB	Interview Province	Interview Place
2017-03-11	Alwi al-Hadar	M	1946-10-01	North Maluku	Ternate
2017-03-12	Muhammad Said bin Abdullah	M	*1941	North Maluku	Ternate
2017-03-13	Yahya Abdurrahman Misbah	M	1951-07-15	North Maluku	Ternate

Glossary

abangan	Nonpious individual
adat	Traditional culture, often as a counterbalance to Islam
fatwa	A religious decree or instruction
Golongan Islam	The "Islamic group," i.e., the faction of Islamic interests in politics
hajj	The pilgrimage to Mecca, one of the five requirements for all Muslims who are able
halal	Ritually permitted under Islamic law
Hizbullah	One of the popular Islamic militias during the revolution
jihad/jihad fi sabilillah	"Struggle" or "struggle in the way of God," a common frame in which Muslims thought about the revolution
jimat	Amulet or talisman
kafir	Infidel or nonbeliever, a common epithet for the Dutch during the revolution
kris	A traditional Javanese dagger
Kyai	Javanese title for an Islamic religious scholar
madrasah	An Islamic school
perang fi sabilillah	"War in the way of God," used similarly to *jihad fi sabilillah*
pesantren	An Islamic boarding school of the Javanese style
reformist	A Muslim who does not follow one of the four traditional schools of jurisprudence, often associated in Indonesia with the mass organization Muhammadiyah
Sabilillah	One of the popular Islamic militias during the revolution
santri	A pious Muslim
silat	Traditional Indonesian martial arts

TNI, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*	The Indonesian state's armed forces
traditionalist	A Muslim who follows one of the four traditional schools of jurisprudence, often associated in Indonesia with the mass organization Nahdlatul Ulama
ulama	Muslim clerics and scholars
ulèëbalang	Traditional feudal elites of Aceh

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